IN RE: J.M. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.J. (“Mother”) and M.M. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) challenge the order of the juvenile court finding that their minor child, J.M. (“Child”), is a child in need of services (“CHINS”). We affirm.

Issue

[2] Parents present two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the juvenile court clearly erred in determining that Child is a CHINS.

Facts

[3] Parents are the biological parents of Child, who was born in November 2022. In September 2025, Mother attempted to leave Father and take Child with her. In response, Father pointed a gun at Mother and told her, “if she left with [Child], he would kill [Mother].” Tr. Vol. II pp. 20-21. The police were summoned to the scene and confiscated Father's gun. As a result of this incident, the State charged Father with intimidation using a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony; domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony; domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, a Level 6 felony; strangulation, a Level 6 felony; pointing a firearm, a Level 6 felony; possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. As a result of these charges, a no-contact order was issued on September 3, 2025, but this no-contact order was later withdrawn at Mother's request, and Father moved back into the family home. Father ultimately pleaded guilty to domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury and the two possession charges.

[4] On November 11, 2025, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report of domestic violence and drug use in Parents’ home. DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Megan Johnson went to Parents’ home to investigate the report and spoke with Mother. Mother informed FCM Johnson about the incident that resulted in Father's criminal charges, but Mother tried to blame herself for the incident, saying, “it was [my] fault that it happened because [I] push[ed] [Father] to that moment.” Id. at 25. FCM Johnson also observed drug paraphernalia inside the home along with alcohol and firearm ammunition within reach of Child. There was no bed for Child. There was a large hole in the bedroom wall, and the home had little food, reeked of marijuana, and was infested with cockroaches.

[5] Based on these observations, DCS removed Child from Parents’ care on November 13, 2025, and placed him with his maternal aunt (“Aunt”). On November 17, 2025, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS. Child's hair follicles were collected for drug exposure testing on November 19, 2025, and tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, cocaine, THC, and cannabinoids. Aunt tested negative for illicit drug use, and FCM Johnson explained that the follicle test indicated that Child was exposed to the substances within the last three months.

[6] FCM Sasha Cleveland held a child and family team meeting in November 2025, at which she explained to Mother that domestic violence and the conditions of the home were the “barriers” preventing Child's return. Id. at 36. FCM Cleveland referred Mother to several services, including home-based casework, supervised visitation with Child, random drug screening, a substance abuse assessment, and therapy. Mother failed to maintain sobriety; she tested positive for THC on December 29 and 31, 2025, and January 15 and 21, 2026. Mother also missed three random drug screens.

[7] In December 2025, there was another incident of domestic violence involving Parents, which resulted in Mother being hospitalized. Mother again blamed herself for this incident, stating that she had “too much to drink and held onto the window of [Father's] vehicle trying to prevent him from leaving.” Id.

[8] FCM Cleveland set up a child and family team meeting with Father and also explained to him the drug and domestic violence issues that were preventing Child's return to Parents’ care. Father was referred to services including home-based case management, fatherhood engagement, supervised visitation, intensive outpatient treatment, and random drug screens. Father participated in anger-management classes via probation in the criminal case. Father missed two drug screens and tested positive for THC five times. He admitted at the CHINS factfinding hearing that he still uses THC to manage his stress.

[9] When FCM Cleveland visited Parents’ home on February 10, 2026, just nine days before the CHINS factfinding hearing, there was still drug paraphernalia laying around the home. The home had a strong smell of cat urine, contained little food, and had chemicals and medication within a child's reach. Parents had unsuccessfully attempted to patch the hole in the bedroom wall, and the home was still infested with cockroaches.

[10] The juvenile court held a factfinding hearing on February 19, 2026. FCM Cleveland testified that Child “seems to be thriving” in Aunt's care and that Aunt was working to get Child into the Headstart program. Id. at 56. Father disputed FCM Cleveland's account of the December 2025 domestic violence incident in which Mother was taken to the hospital, and he claimed that Mother lied to the police regarding that incident. Father also testified that he continued to use marijuana to manage stress and anger, notwithstanding his completion of anger-management classes. At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court took the matter under advisement and, on February 26, 2026, entered an order finding Child to be a CHINS. Parents now appeal.¹

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[11] The juvenile court here found Child to be a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 (the “neglect statute”). This statute provides that a child is a CHINS if, before the child turns eighteen:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

I.C. § 31-34-1-1.

[12] CHINS proceedings are civil actions; thus, “ ‘the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.’ ” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)); see also Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. On appeal, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. (citing In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017)). Instead, we consider only the evidence that favors the juvenile court's decision and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012).

[13] We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.; D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578. “[T]he purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not [to] punish parents.” N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106. A CHINS adjudication is not a determination of parental fault but is a determination that a child is in need of services and is unlikely to receive those services without the coercive intervention of the court. Id. at 105. “A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child ․” Id. (citations omitted). “A CHINS finding should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014).

[14] Here, the juvenile court entered findings and conclusions thereon ² sua sponte.³ As to the issues covered by such findings, we apply our familiar two-tiered standard of “whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. at 1287 (citations omitted). We review the remaining issues under the general judgment standard, under which a judgment will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id.

II. The juvenile court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.

[15] Parents first challenge several of the juvenile court's findings of fact, which we address below.

A. Findings 5–13

[16] Parents first challenge Findings 5–13 which provide:

5. Father was arrested on 8/31/2025 after a domestic violence incident occurring at the family's home and was charged with Domestic Battery, Domestic Battery with a Weapon, Strangulation, Pointing a firearm, Intimidation with Gun (loaded), Possession of marijuana, and possession of a controlled substance (enhanced, gun) ․

6. On 9/3/2025, this Court ordered Father to have no contact with Mother.

7. On 11/10/2025, per Mother's request, the No Contact Order was dropped and Father returned to the home.

8. Father plead[ed] guilty to Domestic Battery Resulting in Moderate Bodily Injury, Possession of a Controlled Substance, and Possession of Marijuana.

9. On 11/13/2025, FCM M. Johnson interviewed Mother at the family's home.

10. FCM M. Johnson observed visible damage to the home resulting from the domestic violence between the parents.

11. FCM M. Johnson observed several safety concerns in the home, including, but not limited to: open bottles of alcohol, drug paraphernalia, and ammunition all within reach of the child.

12. FCM M. Johnson observed the home to [be] below minimum standards with roaches throughout the living space and Mother reported that the child did not have his own bed.

13. FCM M. Johnson observed the smell of marijuana seemingly emanating from the family's home although both parents denied current drug use. DCS obtained the Court's authorization to submit the child to a hair follicle toxicology screen; results indicated the presence of illicit substances including, but not limited to: amphetamines, methamphetamines, cocaine, cannabinoids, and Delta-5 THC.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 93-94.

[17] Parents do not argue that these findings are unsupported by the evidence, nor could they; the juvenile court's findings are amply supported by the evidence presented at the factfinding hearing. Instead, Parents argue that these findings cover only the circumstances at the time of Child's removal and do not discuss the changed circumstances. Parents cite In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 580 (Ind. 2017), for the proposition that, “when determining CHINS status under [the neglect statute] ․, courts ‘should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.’ ” (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290). “Doing so avoids punishing parents for past mistakes when they have already corrected them.” Id. at 581 (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1289-90).

[18] Here, however, the juvenile court did not base its CHINS determination solely on the conditions when the case was filed. As discussed in more detail below, Parents have not already corrected the conditions, and the juvenile court made several factual findings regarding Parents’ progress, or lack thereof, and the conditions that existed at the time of the factfinding hearing. Parents’ challenge to Findings 5–13, therefore, fails.

B. Findings 19–26

[19] Parents also challenge several of the juvenile court's factual findings as unsupported by the evidence. First, Parents challenge Finding 19, which provides: “An additional incident of domestic violence occurred after Mother's return to the home with the child, resulting in Mother's hospitalization.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 94. Parents note that Mother stated that this incident was her fault, which is consistent with Father's version of what happened. But the juvenile court was under no obligation to credit Father's testimony, and Mother had a history of blaming herself for the domestic violence she suffered. FCM Cleveland testified that Mother reported an incident of domestic violence that occurred on December 4, 2025, which resulted in Mother's hospitalization. Finding 19 accurately reflects this evidence. The juvenile court was not required to believe Mother's self-blame for this incident.

[20] Parents next challenge Finding 20, which states: “Prior to the involvement of DCS, the family was not participating in any services to address the issues of the domestic violence in the home, substance use in the home, or safety issues related to the home's conditions.” Id. Parents claim this finding is contradicted by Father's testimony that he began attending anger-management classes on his own initiative, through his probation, before DCS ever became involved with the family. Again, however, the juvenile court was not required to credit Father's testimony on this matter. Moreover, FCM Cleveland testified that, prior to DCS's involvement with this case, Parents had not sought services on their own. At best, this is a conflict in the evidence that was for the juvenile court to resolve as the trier of fact.

[21] Moreover, Parents only challenge the domestic-violence portion of Finding 20, which also addresses Parents’ non-participation in services to address the issues with substance use and home safety. Parents do not dispute that neither of them engaged in any service addressing substance use or the home's conditions before DCS's involvement. Finding 20 is supported by the evidence regardless of the precise timeline of Father's participation in anger management.

[22] Parents claim that Finding 21, which states, “Despite the parents’ participation in services as recommended by DCS, the underlying safety concerns resulting in the removal of the child from the home have not yet been remedied,” is also clearly erroneous. Id. This finding is supported by the evidence. Parents continually tested positive for marijuana use and missed drug screens; marijuana was still present in the home; medication and other chemicals were within easy reach of a child; and the home was still infested with cockroaches.⁴ Thus, Finding 21 is not clearly erroneous.⁵

[23] Parents also contend that there is insufficient evidence connecting Child's hair-follicle testing to their neglect. Parents note that FCM Cleveland testified that there was no direct proof of where Child was exposed to the substances found in his hair follicle test. But the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Child was exposed to these substances while in Parents’ care. FCM Johnson testified that a hair-follicle screen reflects exposure occurring within the preceding three months, and that, during those three months, Child was in Parents’ care and was not in the care of anyone else until his removal on November 13, 2025. At the time of that removal, Parents’ home contained drug paraphernalia, alcohol, and a strong odor of marijuana. By contrast, FCM Cleveland testified that Aunt's drug screen was negative, and FCM Johnson testified that she had no concerns that Aunt used illicit substances or kept paraphernalia in her home. Furthermore, Child was in Aunt's care for only six days before the follicle sample was collected on November 19, 2025. The juvenile court could reasonably infer from this evidence that Child's exposure occurred while in Parents’ care.⁶

[24] Parents next challenge Finding 22, which provides: “Father acknowledged benefiting from services offered by DCS but did not intend to continue those services absent a court order requiring him to do so.” Id. Parents claim that Father never expressly stated that he would not continue with services absent a court order. But Father testified that DCS's service referrals were beneficial to him because they gave him access to services he otherwise could not afford. Father also admitted that his ability to continue with therapy depended on his ability to pay. From this, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that, absent a CHINS adjudication and the services DCS could offer to Father, Father did not intend to continue with such services because he could not afford them. Finding 22 is, thus, not clearly erroneous.

[25] The next finding challenged by Parents, Finding 23, provides:

Children are particularly susceptible to the long-term trauma effects from being in a home where they can hear and/or see ongoing domestic violence. Mother and Father have shown little-to-no understanding of how the significant domestic violence between them in front of [Child] affects [Child's] mental, emotional, and physical well-being.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 94. Parents argue that Father's completion of an anger-management program and the lack of another domestic violence incident in the period between the December 2025 incident and the February 2026 factfinding hearing show that “the parents have learned to avoid domestic violence going forward and understand its negative impact[.]” Appellants’ Br. p. 16.

[26] FCM Johnson testified, however, that Parents “didn't really see the issues of this all happening in front of the child.” Tr. Vol. II p. 25. FCM Cleveland testified that she was concerned about domestic violence because both Parents “minimize” the violence and refused to admit that it was a problem. Id. at 56. She also testified that a child need not be physically harmed to suffer the trauma of witnessing domestic violence. Father's completion of an anger-management class and the absence of a further reported domestic violence incident do not compel a finding that Parents’ understanding had changed, which is the question Finding 23 addresses. The juvenile court was entitled to credit the testimony of the FCMs over Parents’ self-serving testimony. See In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (a juvenile court may discount a parent's testimony in light of an established pattern of minimizing domestic violence), trans. denied. Finding 23 is not clearly erroneous.

[27] Parents next challenge Finding 25, which provides: “At this time, [Parents] are unable or unwilling to protect [Child] from the trauma and risks associated with the domestic violence and substance use occurring in the home, nor are they meeting [Child]’s needs for appropriate care and supervision in an appropriate home environment.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 94. Parents claim that the December 2025 incident was not domestic violence, but this is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence. The juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Mother was minimizing the seriousness of that incident and blaming herself, as she has done in the past, to protect Father. And DCS presented evidence that neither Parent completed any domestic violence services. Both parents also continued to use illegal substances, tested positive for drug use, and missed random drug screens. Finding 25 is not clearly erroneous.

[28] Lastly, Parents claim that Finding 26 is clearly erroneous. This finding provides: “For the forgoing reasons, [Child] is a child in need of services and unlikely to receive said services without the coercive intervention of the Court.” Id. at 94-95. Parents’ argument regarding this Finding is sparse, but it is essentially that Finding 26 cannot stand because the findings upon which it was based are clearly erroneous. As discussed above, the other challenged findings are not clearly erroneous and, therefore, Parents’ attack on Finding 26 fails.

III. The juvenile court did not clearly err in concluding that Child's physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered as a result of Parents’ neglect, inability, or refusal to provide for Child.

[29] Parents argue that the juvenile court clearly erred by concluding that DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Child's “physical or mental condition [wa]s seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of” Parents’ “inability, refusal, or neglect” to supply Child “with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision,” when financially able to do so or due to Parents’ “failure, refusal, or inability ․ to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so[.]” I.C. § 31-34-1-1. Considering only the facts favorable to the juvenile court's decision, and the inferences that can reasonably be drawn from those facts, the juvenile court did not clearly err in making this determination.

[30] DCS became involved shortly after a domestic violence incident in which Father pointed a gun at Mother and threatened to kill her if she left with Child. When DCS went to Parents’ home, it was in a deplorable condition. Testing of Child's hair follicles indicated that he had been exposed to numerous illicit drugs. Even after DCS's involvement, Parents were involved in another domestic violence incident that resulted in Mother's hospitalization. See In re A.M., 277 N.E.3d 972, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (noting that a “ ‘single incident of domestic violence in a child's presence may support a CHINS finding, and it need not necessarily be repetitive.’ ”) (quoting In re D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)). Despite Parents’ effort to pin the blame on Mother for this incident, the juvenile court was not required to credit their version of events. Instead, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that this was part of Mother's pattern of minimizing the seriousness of the domestic violence and shifting blame to herself and that the underlying relationship issues between the Parents were unresolved. Both Parents demonstrated a lack of insight into how exposure to domestic violence could affect Child.

[31] Moreover, FCM Cleveland's visit to Parents’ home shortly before the factfinding hearing revealed that marijuana and drug paraphernalia were still in the home, which had a smell of cat urine, little food, and an unsuccessfully-repaired hole in the wall. There were also chemicals and medication within reach of a child, and the home was still infested with cockroaches. Both parents missed drug screens and tested positive for marijuana usage multiple times. From this evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Child's physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered as a result of Parents’ neglect, inability, or refusal to provide for Child.

IV. The juvenile court did not clearly err in determining that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary.

[32] Parents next argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that Child was unlikely to receive necessary services without the coercive intervention of the court. See I.C. § 31-34-1-1(2). In making this argument, Parents rely on D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, which we find to be distinguishable. In D.J., our Supreme Court held that the coercive intervention of the court was unnecessary because, there, the parents “eventually cooperated with [DCS]’s services and had satisfactorily completed all services (except those deferred by [DCS] or the court) by the time of the fact-finding hearing.” Id. at 581.

[33] Here, in contrast, FCM Cleveland testified that, as of the factfinding hearing, Parents continued to test positive for THC despite their participation in random drug testing. And the home visit that occurred nine days before the factfinding hearing revealed marijuana and drug paraphernalia within the home; a strong odor of cat urine; insufficient food; an unsuccessfully-repaired hole in a bedroom wall; and chemicals and medications within a child's reach. Thus, unlike the parents in D.J., who had substantially complied with all of DCS's requirements, Parents’ compliance here remained incomplete and the concerns that prompted removal were “not resolved.”⁷ Tr. Vol. II p. 62. Parents’ argument to the contrary is little more than a request to reweigh the evidence and come to a different conclusion than did the juvenile court, which we cannot do.⁸

Conclusion

[34] Parents’ attacks on the juvenile court's factual findings are little more than a request that we reweigh evidence. The juvenile court did not clearly err in determining that Child's physical or mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered as a result of Parents’ neglect, inability, or refusal to provide for Child, nor did the juvenile court clearly err in determining that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's judgment.

[35] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The juvenile court held a dispositional hearing on March 19, 2026, and issued a dispositional order on March 27, 2026. Technically, this is the final order from which Parents appeal. See In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017) (holding that a CHINS adjudication is a “preliminary step” to final disposition and that the dispositional order is the final appealable order).

2.   “Unlike CHINS dispositional decrees, ․ no statute expressly requires formal findings in a CHINS fact-finding order[.]” S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287 (citing Ind. Code § 31-34-19-10).

3.   Neither party requested that the juvenile court enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A); instead, the juvenile court indicated that the parties were welcome, but not required, to submit proposed findings and conclusions. We, therefore, treat the findings and conclusions thereon as sua sponte. See Estudillo v. Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

4.   Parents note that FCM Cleveland testified that the “roaches were addressed” because Parents had “bombed” the apartment multiple times. Tr. Vol. II p. 55. But FCM Cleveland also testified that, despite Parents’ efforts, “[e]very time they got rid of the roaches[,] they would come back.” Id. Thus, the infestation was not necessarily resolved at the time of the factfinding hearing. To be sure, FCM Cleveland viewed the alcohol and paraphernalia present in the home as more pressing concerns, but this does not alter the fact that the infestation persisted despite Parents’ efforts. Parents’ argument is little more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

5.   Parents note that FCM Cleveland did not testify that ammunition was in the home during her later visit and that the ammunition and firearm were removed in connection with Father's criminal case. But Finding 21 does not depend on the presence of ammunition.

6.   This case is unlike In re Ad.M., 103 N.E.3d 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), cited by Parents. In that case, the CHINS finding was based on a mother's marijuana use and the presence of marijuana in the family home. But DCS's own witness in that case testified that she “really can't see the way that” the mother's use “has impacted” the children. Id. at 714. We held that “evidence of one parent's use of marijuana and evidence that marijuana has been found in the family home, without more, does not demonstrate that a child has been seriously endangered.” Id. at 713. Here, however, DCS did not rely solely on Parents’ use of marijuana, or its presence in the home; Child's own hair-follicle test was positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, cocaine, THC, and cannabinoids, establishing that Child was exposed to these substances, not merely that they were present somewhere in his environment.

7.   Parents also claim that their issues are attributable to poverty rather than unwillingness on their part and claim that coercive intervention cannot be based on mere poverty. See In re E.K., 260 N.E.3d 901, 917 (Ind. 2025) (holding that a CHINS finding under the neglect statute cannot rest on a parent's financial inability alone where the parent has pursued all other reasonable means available to meet the child's needs). Here, however, Parents’ continued THC use, missed drug screens, and minimization of their domestic violence cannot be attributed to Parents’ financial hardships. The juvenile court could, instead, reasonably attribute those failures to unwillingness rather than inability.

8.   Parents further argue that DCS's own Child Welfare Policy Manual required an Informal Adjustment (“IA”) under these circumstances rather than a coercive CHINS disposition because Parents were voluntarily participating in services. FCM Cleveland, however, testified that an IA was not available to Parents because DCS does not offer an IA once a child has already been removed from the home for safety concerns; instead, an IA is reserved for cases in which the child remains in the home. FCM Cleveland also testified that the safety concerns presented here rose above the threshold at which an IA would be appropriate.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.