Joshua Codee Havermale, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Joshua Codee Havermale appeals the sentence for his convictions of dealing in methamphetamine, as a Level 3 felony, and providing a firearm to an ineligible person, as a Level 5 felony. The only issue he raises is whether the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was an abuse of discretion. Concluding that it was not, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 19, 2025, Havermale sold approximately 16.86 grams of methamphetamine and a handgun to a confidential informant during a controlled transaction in Kokomo. Havermale knew the confidential informant was a felon who was not permitted to possess a handgun by law. Havermale again allegedly sold approximately fifteen grams of methamphetamine to the same confidential informant on two other subsequent occasions in two other subsequent controlled transactions in Kokomo.

[3] On September 12, the State charged Havermale with Count 1, Dealing in Methamphetamine as a Level 2 felony; Count 2, Providing a Firearm to an Ineligible Person as a Level 5 felony; Count 3, Dealing in Methamphetamine as a Level 2 felony; and Count 4, Dealing in Methamphetamine as a Level 2 felony. On the same day, the State also filed its Notice of Intent to Seek Habitual Offender Status based on two prior convictions. On March 12, 2026, Havermale and the State filed a plea agreement in which Havermale pleaded guilty to the May 19, 2025, incident of dealing in methamphetamine and providing a firearm to an ineligible person. Regarding the dealing in methamphetamine charge, the parties agreed that Havermale would plead guilty to a lesser-included Level 3 felony charge. In return, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts as well as two other pending criminal cases involving Havermale. The agreement also stated, “the sentence for the Counts being plead[ed] too [sic] shall be left to the discretion of the Court.” App. at 46.

[4] On March 12, the trial court held a change of plea hearing and ordered a presentence investigation report. The report showed Havermale's criminal history, which began as a juvenile. Havermale had prior misdemeanor convictions for assault and receiving stolen property. He also had prior felony convictions for attempted arson, sexual misconduct with a minor, possession of methamphetamine, and two separate convictions for failure to register as a sex offender. Havermale had previously served prison sentences in Ohio and Indiana, had served “three sentences to Work Release [and] one to In Home Detention, and he ha[d] been on Probation five times.” Id. at 57-58. He had eight prior probation violations, and he had “been revoked back to DOC once.” Id. at 58. Havermale also committed new crimes while on probation and pretrial release.

[5] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on April 17. The court found as mitigating that Havermale had pleaded guilty but “discount[ed] that to a certain degree” because the “dealing cases ․ would not have been that difficult to prove.” Tr. at 23. The court also noted that Havermale received the bargain of dismissing other charges and two other cases, and he was not being sentenced as a habitual offender in the present case. The trial court also found it mitigating that Havermale was remorseful. As aggravating circumstances, the court found that Havermale had a “significant” criminal history, prior efforts at rehabilitation had failed, Havermale had a disdain for the law, and probation was not a viable option. Id. at 24. The trial court determined that the “aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances[,]” Appealed Order at 1, and Havermale's “sentence will [ ] reflect[ ] accordingly[,]” Tr. at 25.

[6] The trial court then imposed a ten-year prison sentence for the Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine conviction and a four-year prison sentence for the Level 5 felony providing a firearm to an ineligible person, to be served consecutively. The court also stated that Havermale can petition to modify the latter sentence after he has served the entirety of the former sentence. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Sentencing decisions, including the imposition of consecutive sentences, lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008); Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869 (citation omitted).

[8] So long as a sentence is within the statutory range, the trial court may impose it without regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). If the trial court does find the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors, it must give a statement of its reasons for selecting the sentence it imposes. Id. at 490. However, the relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869.

[9] Moreover, we note that “a trial court is required to state its reasoning for imposing consecutive sentences,” and “must find at least one aggravating circumstance” to do so. McBride v. State, 992 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “[A] trial court may rely on the same reasons to impose a maximum sentence and also [to] impose consecutive sentences.” Gilliam v. State, 901 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The existence of even one valid aggravating factor is enough to support the imposition of consecutive sentences. See, e.g., Walden v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1165, 1177-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. And “[i]t is a well-established principle that the existence of multiple crimes or victims constitutes a valid aggravating circumstance that a trial court may consider in imposing consecutive sentences.” McBride, 992 N.E.2d at 919-20. This is true even when multiple crimes arise out of a single episode of criminal conduct, although there are maximum sentences that may be imposed in such circumstances. See Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1143 (Ind. 2022) (allowing consecutive sentences for multiple crimes in a single episode of criminal conduct, so long as the aggregate sentence for crimes that are not crimes of violence is within the statutory sentencing cap); Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d)(7) (providing that, “[i]f the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a Level 3 felony, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed twenty (20) years.”).¹

[10] Here, Havermale was convicted of two felony offenses that occurred during a single episode of criminal conduct, the most serious of which was a Level 3 felony. The trial court imposed sentences for each such felony that were within the statutory ranges for Level 3 and Level 5 felonies. See I.C. § 35-50-2-5 (imposing sentencing range between three and sixteen years for a Level 3 felony); I.C. § 35-50-2-6 (imposing sentencing range between one and six years for a Level 5 felony). The trial court found the commission of multiple crimes to be an aggravating factor, along with Havermale's significant criminal history and the failure of prior efforts at rehabilitation. Those are permissible aggravating circumstances, and Havermale does not contend otherwise.

[11] The court further concluded that those aggravators outweighed the mitigating factors, thus justifying the imposition of consecutive sentences, the fourteen-year aggregate of which was not greater than the statutory cap of twenty years. See I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d)(7). The consecutive sentences were justified by the existence of the aggravating factors, and the trial court's stated reason for imposing consecutive sentences was that “[t]he aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.” Appealed Order at 1. The court acted well within its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences by finding aggravating factors and stating its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. See, e.g., McBride, 992 N.E.2d at 919.

Conclusion

[12] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences upon Havermale. Therefore, we affirm.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that Havermale's aggregate sentence of fourteen years for his Level 3 and Level 5 felony convictions is well within the statutory cap of twenty years. See id.

Bailey, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.