Matthew D. Stamper, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Matthew D. Stamper appeals the trial court's order that he serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence in the Department of Correction (“DOC”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 9, 2024, the State charged Stamper with nonsupport of a dependent child as a level 5 felony. On January 7, 2025, the parties filed a plea agreement. On February 5, 2025, the court held a change of plea hearing at which Stamper pled guilty to nonsupport of a dependent child as a level 6 felony. The court sentenced Stamper to 912 days with 613 days suspended to probation and ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to sentences under cause numbers 45D07-2112-F6-2803, 45G02-2401-F3-1 (“Cause No. 1”), and 49D34-2303-CM-8585 (“Cause No. 8585”).¹ In its sentencing order, the court ordered Stamper to pay “his weekly child support in Cause No. 37C01-1310-JP-000183 of $72.00 per week and an additional $30.00 per week on arrears. Payments shall resume within 60 days of [his] release from incarceration.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 19.

[3] A document titled “Conditions of Probation,” which was signed by Stamper and filed on June 26, 2025, indicated that one of the conditions was that he “timely pay child support in Cause No. 37C[0]1-1310-JP-000183 of $72.00 per week an [sic] additional $30.00 per week on arrears. Payments shall resume within 60 days of your release from incarceration.” Id. at 21, 23. That same day, Probation Officer Jared Courtney provided and read a copy of the rules to Stamper, and Stamper signed them.

[4] On February 26, 2025, Stamper was released from incarceration. On August 12, 2025, the State filed a Petition to Revoke Probation alleging that, as of August 12, 2025, Stamper had been released from incarceration on or about February 26, 2025, he had been ordered to make weekly child support payments of $72 plus $30 toward the arrearage, the payments were to commence within sixty days of his release, and he had made only two child support payments dated June 12, 2025, and June 18, 2025.

[5] On November 5, 2025, the court held an initial hearing and appointed counsel for Stamper. On November 17, 2025, the court began a scheduled fact-finding hearing, defense counsel asked the court to reschedule the hearing, and the court rescheduled it for January 7, 2026. On November 25, 2025, the Director of the Jasper County Community Corrections (“JCCC”) filed a JCCC Program Recommendation which stated that Stamper was “not statutorily qualified for” community corrections due to a warrant pending in another jurisdiction, noted that Stamper had active warrants in Lake and Marion Counties under Cause Nos. 1 and 8585, and stated, “[i]f warrants are resolved, JCCC recommends Work Release.” Id. at 28.

[6] On January 7, 2026, the court began a scheduled fact-finding hearing at which the prosecutor stated that “[t]here are extenuating circumstances in this one” as “[t]he agreement calls for work release, but [Stamper] has another trial – pretrial violation out of Marion County, so [defense counsel] needs time to clear that up.” Transcript Volume II at 14. The court scheduled a pretrial conference for February 4, 2026.

[7] On February 4, 2026, the court held a pretrial conference, and defense counsel stated that he had “worked out a resolution with the State of Indiana to resolve everything,” Stamper had been approved for community corrections work release pending a warrant being resolved in Marion County, and “[t]he agreement is to O.R. [Stamper] today, such that he'll be transported to Marion County to resolve that warrant, which time we'll set a fact-finding hearing in thirty days ․” Id. at 17. After some discussion, the court continued the matter at defense counsel's request.

[8] On March 11, 2026, the court held a fact-finding hearing. Defense counsel stated, “[W]e're prepared to admit to the allegations and argue the resolution.” Id. at 24. After the court informed Stamper of his rights, Stamper admitted that his conditions of probation required that he pay $72 plus $30 toward an arrearage in weekly child support payments and that he failed to make those payments. The court found a factual basis to support the admission. The prosecutor asserted that “a warrant was issued in August of 2025,” Stamper “wasn't picked up until November of 2025 and during that time frame did absolutely nothing to attempt to get back into community corrections, deal with community corrections, or anything of that nature.” Id. at 28. The prosecutor asked “for the suspended time ․ to be in the” DOC. Id.

[9] Defense counsel asserted that Stamper “does have employment waiting for him if provided the opportunity to go to work release,” he had been able “to get back into the” Iron Workers Union, he “was approved for work release pending resolution of warrants in Lake and Marion counties,” and the warrant in Lake County had been resolved “leaving only the misdemeanor warrant in Marion County.” Id. at 30. He asked the court to sentence Stamper to the “balance of his sentence at [JCCC] at a level to be determined by them, but give him two weeks to get hooked up there, such that he may be transported to Marion County from our jail upon release to resolve that warrant and then come back up here.” Id. at 30-31. The prosecutor indicated that community corrections was not willing to accept Stamper. Defense counsel argued, “It's only because of this warrant, which I think we are able to resolve.” Id. at 31. The court stated:

Well, yeah, but – but that's kind of a big thing that you can't go out there when you have a warrant pending. You know. And, you know – well it's a minor violation of the rule, I guess. You know. I – I don't – I'm not aware of that. You know. I mean, that's what your argument basically is, and that's – that's just crap argument, you know? Well, I'll just sentence him to the balance at [DOC] and the – I mean, it's a violation of probation and I don't understand, you know, when we have these – we have these rules that require you can't be under a warrant from another jurisdiction that – in order to go out to community corrections. I would love on a nonsupport of a dependent child to require you to go to community corrections. I would like to do that so that you can actually work and pay what you haven't been paying, you know. And – and, but the – but the problem is - is, and this isn't the first time here, you know. We've – we've delayed this, delayed this, and delayed this and nothing has gotten resolved on it. At some point we just have to – we – we need to move on, and so – as far as the sentence, I'll just impose the balance of the sentence and why this – why this has – has taken from August of last year till now to deal with is beyond me

Id. at 31-32.

[10] On March 12, 2026, the court entered an order finding that Stamper violated his probation. The court found that the matter had “been pending before the Court since August 12, 2025, and since such time [Stamper] has failed to resolve the outstanding warrant in Marion County after having ample time to do so.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 30-31. The court ordered that, “for [Stamper's] violation of probation as alleged in the Petition to Revoke Probation, and the judgment entered thereon, [Stamper] is ordered to serve the balance of the previously imposed sentence, the same being 613 days, in the” DOC. Id. at 31.

Discussion

[11] Stamper argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to serve the entirety of his suspended sentence in the DOC. He asserts that his “proposal to impose a community corrections sentence would have served the exact purpose that the trial court seemingly seeks for all nonsupport cases – that is the ability for the convicted offender to work and pay child support, while also serving an executed sentence” and, without citation to the record, that “at least by the date of the filing of this brief, the Marion County warrant is resolved, which would render him eligible for the sentence he requested.” Appellant's Brief at 8. He asks that we remand “for a new sentencing hearing.” Id. The State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Stamper to serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence and notes that, to the extent Stamper believes that circumstances have changed such that modification of his sanction would be appropriate, his remedy would be to file a motion for modification under Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17.

[12] Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) provides:

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.n

[13] Generally, we review trial court probation violation determinations and sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013) (citing Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). The Indiana Supreme Court has explained that “[o]nce a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed” and that, “[i]f this discretion were not afforded to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. When reviewing an appeal from the revocation of probation, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, and we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Vernon v. State, 903 N.E.2d 533, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. As long as the proper procedures have been followed in conducting a probation revocation hearing, the trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Goonen v. State, 705 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

[14] The record reveals that Stamper was convicted of nonsupport of a dependent child as a level 6 felony. The conditions of his probation required that he timely pay child support of $72 per week and an additional $30 per week toward an arrearage and that the payments resume within sixty days of his release from incarceration. On February 26, 2025, Stamper was released from incarceration, and, as of August 12, 2025, he had made only two child support payments on June 12, 2025, and June 18, 2025. In light of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Stamper to serve his previously suspended sentence. See Runyon v. State, 939 N.E.2d 613, 618 (Ind. 2010) (observing that the defendant argued that the trial court was unduly harsh in ordering him to serve six years of his eight-year sentence for his probation violation and that a shorter period of incarceration would have permitted him to be gainfully employed so as to reduce the support arrearage and declining “to find the trial court's decision to require the defendant to serve six years of the eight-year sentence to be an abuse of discretion”).

[15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order that he serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Sentencing Order indicates that 763 days were suspended and notes that Stamper “shall have credit for time served from September 9, 2024, to February 4, 2025, for a total of 149 actual days served prior to sentencing.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 18. On appeal, both parties agree that the suspended time was later calculated to be 613 days.

Brown, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and Scheele, J., concur