III v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] William Fred Grumbo III appeals his Level 1 felony child molesting conviction, alleging the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting his statements to police at trial. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2021, when Child Victim was nine years old, Grumbo began molesting her in their Evansville home.¹ Child Victim explained that the molestations happened in various rooms of the house on an almost daily basis for the next several years. Some incidents, including the first time, occurred in Grumbo's bedroom. One time, when Child Victim and Grumbo were both naked in his room, he touched her breasts, made her stroke his penis, put his penis in her mouth, and “put his fingers in her vagina[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 61. Another time, in the basement laundry room, Grumbo took off his pants and underwear, got on top of Child Victim, and began moving his fingers back and forth in her vagina. He then stood up and began moving his penis back and forth in Child Victim's mouth, then ejaculated on her body. On another occasion, in the garage, Grumbo stood behind Child Victim, “bent [her] over[,]” and inserted his penis all the way “inside [her] butt.” Id. at 65.

[3] Child Victim had been seeing a therapist since she was four or five years old. On July 22, 2025, when she was twelve, Child Victim told her therapist that Grumbo had touched her inappropriately. Evansville Police Department Detective Cameron Werne received a report about the disclosure. Detective Werne went to Grumbo's house and conducted an initial interview of Grumbo.²

[4] Grumbo initially denied touching Child Victim inappropriately but admitted that he once touched her vagina over the clothes when he was tickling her. Shortly after, Detective Werne told Grumbo he was not going to take him to jail that day. Detective Werne later explained that, at the time of the first interview, he did not plan to arrest Grumbo that day because he only had “hearsay” evidence and wanted to discuss the case with the prosecutor first.³ Tr. Vol. II p. 197. As the interview continued, Grumbo admitted that he touched Child Victim's vagina under the clothes, with his hand, at least five separate times for sexual pleasure.

[5] Detective Werne left Grumbo's house and went to “Holly's House” to observe Child Victim's forensic interview. Id. While Detective Werne was gone, another detective spoke with the local prosecutor, who decided Grumbo should be arrested at that time. Grumbo was then arrested and taken to jail. After Child Victim's interview, Detective Werne went to the jail to interview Grumbo a second time.

[6] At the beginning of the interview, Detective Werne said, “First of all, I had zero intentions of bringing you to jail today. I know you probably don't believe me, but I had zero intentions of bringing you to jail. That was a prosecutor decision, okay? I was, one-hundred percent gonna leave your house today and not arrest you.”⁴ State's Ex. 22 at 0:00-0:33. Detective Werne indicated that Child Victim disclosed more details than what Grumbo admitted to in the first interview. Grumbo then said, “Whatever she said, just, I did it” and “Anything she says, it's true.” Id. at 1:10-1:45.

[7] Grumbo continued to participate in the interview for over twenty-five minutes. He admitted that he molested Child Victim “on a daily basis,” id. at 2:05-2:20, starting “a couple years” ago, id. at 3:50-4:00. Grumbo said he had Child Victim touch his penis with her hands and put it in her mouth. He also admitted he would put his hand down her pants and “slide it in” her underwear. Id. at 11:30-11:57. He then confessed to penetrating Child Victim's vagina with his fingers “more than a hundred” times, id. at 14:30-15:30, and said that the incidents usually lasted “ten, fifteen minutes tops,” id. at 17:15-17:30. Finally, he admitted he gave Child Victim a list of pornographic websites and told her it was okay for her to watch pornography.

[8] The State charged Grumbo with Level 1 felony child molesting and Level 4 felony incest. A jury found him guilty of the charges, and the trial court entered judgments of conviction accordingly. At sentencing, the trial court vacated the incest conviction for double jeopardy concerns. On the child molesting conviction, the trial court sentenced Grumbo to forty years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Grumbo contends the court erred by admitting his second interview with police, claiming his confession therein was induced by Detective Werne's promises of leniency and was thus involuntary. “We generally review a trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Perry v. State, 267 N.E.3d 20, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “However, the failure to object when evidence is admitted results in waiver of the issue for appellate review unless fundamental error occurred.” Id. Grumbo concedes he did not contemporaneously object to the admission of his statements to police, but he asserts fundamental error. Appellant's Br. p. 14. The fundamental error exception is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (citation omitted), reh'g denied. This exception is only available in “egregious circumstances” where the error made a fair trial impossible. Id.

[10] Grumbo argues his confession was coerced in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession under the United States Constitution, “the state must prove the statement was voluntarily given by a preponderance of the evidence.”⁵ Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 114 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied. In evaluating whether a statement was voluntary, trial courts consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 115. On appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence but instead examine the record for “substantial, probative evidence of voluntariness.” Malloch v. State, 980 N.E.2d 887, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “We examine the evidence most favorable to the State, together with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.” Id. Where there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion, it will not be set aside. Id.

[11] “[C]oercive police activity is a necessary prerequisite to finding a confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Scalissi v. State, 759 N.E.2d 618, 621 (Ind. 2001). A confession is voluntary if “the confession is the product of a rational intellect and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant's free will.” Id. “The critical inquiry is whether the defendant's statements were induced by violence, threats, promises, or other improper influence.” Id. In general, police deception does not automatically render a confession involuntary. See Malloch, 980 N.E.2d at 903. “A confession is inadmissible if it is obtained by promises of mitigation or immunity[.]” Id. at 902. But “statements [that] are too vague and indefinite to constitute promises of leniency or mitigate[ ] punishment” do not render confessions involuntary. Id.

[12] Here, Grumbo alleges that Detective Werne deceived him “[b]y promising Grumbo that he had no intention of arresting him, ․ falsely assur[ing] Grumbo that there would not be consequences for his confession—or at the very least that he could avoid incarceration.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. His claim rests on Detective Werne's statement: “First of all, I had zero intentions of bringing you to jail today. I know you probably don't believe me, but I had zero intentions of bringing you to jail. That was a prosecutor decision, okay? I was, (inaudible) percent gonna leave your house today and not arrest you.” State's Ex. 22 at 0:00-0:33. When Detective Werne said this, Grumbo had already admitted to touching Child Victim's vagina with his hand approximately five times, and he had already been arrested and taken to jail. In addition, Detective Werne made no explicit promise of immunity, release, or any other mitigation in exchange for an additional confession. Rather, his statement merely reflected that he had not planned to bring Grumbo to jail earlier in the day. To the extent that one could be confused by Detective Werne's statement, we find it too vague and indefinite to constitute a promise of leniency.

[13] Grumbo points to no other statements throughout the interview that could be construed as a false promise by Detective Werne, and we find none. After Detective Werne made a single statement about his intent earlier in the day, Grumbo continued to participate in the interview for over twenty-five minutes. Detective Werne and Grumbo were calm throughout. Just over one minute in, Grumbo said, “Whatever she said, just, I did it.” State's Ex. 22 at 1:10-1:20. Grumbo confessed that the molestations “happened on a daily basis” starting a couple of years prior, id. at 2:05-2:20, and involved Child Victim's hands and mouth touching his penis and his hand touching Child Victim's vagina. Ultimately, Grumbo admitted his fingers penetrated Child Victim's vagina “more than a hundred” times. Id. at 14:30-15:30.

[14] Given the totality of these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Grumbo's statement was voluntary. We find no error in the admission of Grumbo's second interview, let alone fundamental error so blatant that the trial judge should have intervened sua sponte.⁶ See Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018) (fundamental error encompasses errors “so blatant that the trial judge should have acted independently to correct the situation”). We thus affirm.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code sections 35-32-4-1 to -4 (2026) require redaction of the names of child victims and witnesses, as well as those of everyone whose name could be used to identify those children, in criminal actions. Each name must be replaced by “a descriptive anonymous designator,” which cannot be the person's initials or a reference to a familial relationship. Ind. Code § 35-32-4-3 (2026). However, as we recently noted, “we read the new statutes as not requiring courts to redact defendants’ names or defendant–victim family relationships in cases where those relationships are critical to the result[.]” Sayger v. State, --N.E.3d--, 2026 WL 2881348, *1 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). Accordingly, we do not redact Grumbo's name.

2.   State's Exhibit 20, which is Detective Werne's body-worn camera footage, has a time stamp reflecting July 23, 2025. However, the probable cause affidavit and Detective Werne's testimony reflect that he received the report and conducted interviews of Grumbo on July 22, 2025.

3.   In his brief, Grumbo does not mention Detective Werne's comment from the first interview about not taking him to jail or challenge the statements he made to Detective Werne in the first interview as coerced. See Appellant's Br. p. 11 (challenging only the admission of State's Exhibits 21 and 22, both recordings of Grumbo's “second interrogation” by Detective Werne). We note that, at trial, Detective Werne stated, “At the time I had zero intention of taking him to jail that day, I guess I could see where it could be a false perception.” Tr. Vol. II p. 195. Although Grumbo mentions this testimony once in his brief, he does not use it to challenge admission of the first interview.

4.   At trial, the second interview was admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 22 and published to the jury. The trial transcript reflects, “Alright, first of all I have zero intentions of bringing you to jail, I know you probably don't believe me, but I have zero intentions of bring you to jail, those are the Prosecutor's decision okay.” Tr. Vol. II p. 174. In our review of State's Exhibit 22, Detective Werne is audibly speaking in the past tense. There are other words missing from the transcription that are audible in the Exhibit. Moreover, Grumbo was already in jail at the time. Given these discrepancies, we quote the audible words directly from the Exhibit rather than from the transcription.

5.   “[T]he Indiana Constitution requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights, and that the defendant's confession was voluntarily given.” Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90, 114 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied. Grumbo does not separately challenge the voluntariness of his confession under the Indiana Constitution. He also does not challenge whether he was advised of his rights or whether he voluntarily waived them.

6.   Because we find no error, we do not reach Grumbo's harmless error analysis.

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.