James E. Watson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] James Watson appeals his Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine conviction and sentence. Watson presents three issues for review, which we restate as follows:

I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Watson of Level 4 Felony Dealing in Methamphetamine.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not considering certain mitigating factors at Watson's sentencing hearing.

III. Whether Watson's aggregate thirty-year sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of his offense and character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2024, Brandi Cook resided in Wabash County with her boyfriend, Josh Fields. Sometime before November 26, 2024, Fields was arrested. In hopes of reducing his time in jail, Fields reached out to Cook, asking her to work as a confidential informant with the Kosciusko Police Department's Drug Task Force team. Cook agreed to do so and met with the task force, including Officer Devin Bechtold. Cook and Fields both had previously supplied drug-related information to Officer Bechtold. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 156. Officer Bechtold regarded Cook as a reliable informant. Id. at 170-71.

[4] During their conversation, James Watson's name came up as a person under investigation by the task force. Cook, through Fields, personally knew Watson and maintained regular contact with him. Id. at 127. Cook's house and Watson's camper also sat on the same street, separated by one house. The task force asked Cook if she could “get him” and if she would take part in a controlled buy. Id. at 132. Cook replied “yeah,” and ultimately agreed to work as a confidential informant on Watson's case. Id.

[5] Officers with the task force instructed Cook to perform a controlled buy from Watson's camper. On November 26, 2024, two task force officers went to Cook's house, equipping her with surveillance equipment and $120 for the controlled buy. The officers instructed Cook to buy a “ball” of methamphetamine, which amounts to three-and-a-half grams. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 134. The officers then searched Cook.

[6] Cook then immediately walked over to Watson's camper. Inside, she asked for a “B” to give to a friend.¹ State's Ex. 2 at 3:00-3:15. Watson retrieved the methamphetamine in his bedroom and eventually “threw [the drugs] on the floor.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 137. Cook picked up the drugs and returned home. The two task force officers once again searched Cook and confiscated the methamphetamine. Id. at 138. Indiana State Police forensic scientist Brittany Borzych determined that the official weight of the methamphetamine was 3.12 grams. Id. at 200.

[7] Police arrested Watson on January 8, 2025, and the State charged him with Level 4 Felony dealing in methamphetamine. During a recorded jail phone call, he referred to a “[b]itch” he sold the drugs to and commented on her appearance. Id. at 169; State's Ex. 4 at 0:38-0:40. Following his jury trial, Watson was convicted of Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine. Watson then admitted to being a habitual offender. Id. at 26.

[8] At his sentencing hearing, Watson argued the trial court should consider his age (fifty-four years old) and his extensive drug abuse issues as mitigating factors. Id. at 248. Conversely, the State argued the trial court should consider the defendant's extensive juvenile and criminal history, including nine felonies, and his multiple failures to complete probation as aggravating factors. Id. at 249. The trial court agreed with the State's proposed aggravating factors and found no mitigating factors. The court sentenced Watson to twelve years for his Level 4 felony conviction and enhanced that sentence by eighteen years for his habitual offender adjudication.

[9] This appeal ensued.

The State presented sufficient evidence to support Watson's conviction for Level 4 Dealing in Methamphetamine.

[10] On appeal, Watson first contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for Level 4 dealing in methamphetamine. For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[11] Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1.1(c)(1) provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally delivers or finances the delivery of at least one gram but less than five grams of methamphetamine, pure or adulterated, commits a Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(c)(1) (2025). Watson raises several arguments contesting the sufficiency of the evidence.

[12] First, Watson contends that Cook “entrap[ped] and ensnare[d]” him to hand deliver the drugs because she was motivated to get her boyfriend out of prison. Appellant's Br. at 14. A defendant may raise an entrapment defense if defendant's “prohibited conduct ․ was the product of a law enforcement officer, or his agent, using persuasion or other means likely to cause the person to engage in the conduct” or “the person was not predisposed to commit the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-9(a). Once the defendant has raised the entrapment defense and showed government participation, the burden shifts to the State to show the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. Scott v. State, 772 N.E.2d 473, 474-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit the offense does not constitute entrapment.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-9(b); Drollinger v. State, 274 Ind. 99, 409 N.E.2d 1084 (Ind. 1980).

[13] Simply said, if the State initiates the transaction, entrapment will not exist if the police informant merely provided an opportunity for the defendant to carry out his natural propensity to commit a crime. Wallace v. State, 498 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ind. 1986) (quoting Thomas v. State, 345 N.E.2d 835, 837 (Ind. 1976)). Our courts have long recognized the circumstances surrounding predisposition. These include knowledge of the going price of the drugs on the criminal market, familiarity with drug terminology, possession of drug-related apparatus, the manner of the sale itself, and the accused's readiness to participate. McKrill v. State, 452 N.E.2d 946, 949 (Ind. 1983).

[14] Watson never formally raised the entrapment defense at trial, nor was the jury ever instructed on the entrapment defense. Yet his questions to Cook and the investigating officers on cross-examination arguably were sufficient to raise this defense. Griesemer v. State, 26 N.E.3d 606, 609 (Ind. 2015) (citing Wallace, 498 N.E.2d at 964 (holding that a defendant can raise the entrapment defense during cross-examination by affirmatively showing the police were involved in the criminal activity and expressing an intent to rely on the defense)). Nevertheless, Watson's entrapment defense fails.

[15] Watson accepted Cook's $120 offer without any hesitancy after she asked for a “B.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 137. He also prepared and “threw” the methamphetamine onto the floor for Cook to take within minutes of her request. State's Ex. 2 at 3:00-3:15, 11:55. Thus, the evidence is sufficient to show Watson's predisposition to commit dealing in methamphetamine and to rebut his entrapment defense.

[16] Watson next claims that the State presented insufficient evidence that he delivered the methamphetamine because Cook could have supplied the methamphetamine she gave to the officers. Appellant's Br. at 14. Once again, we disagree.

[17] Cook had regular contact with Watson and lived only two doors down from him. The video recording of the controlled buy first showed the task force equipping Cook with the surveillance equipment. The video then showed Cook walking directly from her house to Watson's camper in the span of about two minutes. State's Ex. 2 at 0:45-2:45. Cook testified to paying Watson $120 for a ball of methamphetamine. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 137-38, 141. The video recording showed Cook's request for a “B” in exchange for $120. State's Ex. 2 at 3:00-3:15. The video then showed Cook immediately return to her house and surrender the methamphetamine to law enforcement. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 138; State's Ex. 2 at 12:05-13:14. The officers searched Cook before and after the buy. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 138. And during a jail phone call Watson referred to the “[b]itch” he sold the drugs to. State's Ex. 4 at 0:38-0:40.

[18] Further, Watson contends that because Cook was compensated for her assistance, cooperated with the task force in hopes to benefit her boyfriend, and was not subjected to a search of her “intimate areas,” the evidence must be insufficient to support his conviction. Appellant's Br. at 14. It is routine for officers to pat down controlled buy participants, like the officers did to Cook, without subjecting the participant to a cavity search. See Hudson v. State, 462 N.E.2d 1077, 1083 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that despite not performing a strip-search nor a cavity search, pat-down searches of confidential informants are sufficiently thorough).

[19] Watson is asking us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007) (holding that it is the factfinder's role to assess witness credibility and the weight of the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction). We agree with the State that the jury ultimately decided to credit Cook's testimony, and we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal.

[20] The State thus demonstrated sufficient evidence and reasonable inferences from this evidence to support Watson's conviction.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the mitigating circumstances.

[21] Watson next argues that the trial court abused its discretion during Watson's sentencing hearing because it failed to consider any mitigating factors. Appellant's Br. at 16. “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions drawn therefrom.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). In the sentencing context, a trial court abuses its discretion when it omits from its sentencing statement a mitigating factor that is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91; Ind. Code § 35-38-1-1.3 (2014).

[22] A trial court is “not required to accept the defendant's arguments regarding what constitutes a mitigating factor or assign proposed mitigating factors the same weight as the defendant.” Mehringer v. State, 152 N.E.3d 667, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Nor is the trial court obligated to explain why it declined to find a proffered mitigator. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. Rather, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the omitted mitigators were both significant and clearly supported by the record. See Carter v. State, 711 N.E.2d 835, 838 (Ind. 1999).

[23] Watson argues that the trial court should have considered four mitigating circumstances: his age, that his criminal history involves offenses related to substance abuse issues, his substance abuse history, and the fact that he had obtained his GED. However, Watson failed to submit two proposed mitigators, his criminal history and his GED obtainment, during his sentencing hearing. Because Watson failed to argue those mitigating factors at sentencing, he is precluded from advancing these mitigating factors for the first time on appeal, and we will presume that those factors are not significant. See Hollin v. State, 877 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind. 2007).

[24] Watson fails to show that either of the other two mitigators must be considered significant. With regards to Watson's substance abuse history, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that his self-imposed substance abuse problem was not a mitigator. See Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that, “when a defendant is aware of a substance abuse problem but has not taken appropriate steps to treat it, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by rejecting the addiction as a mitigating circumstance”), trans. denied.

[25] At sentencing, Watson requested “some type of a treatment” from the trial court. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 248. He admitted to his drug abuse issues, noting the issues began at the “age of 12.” Id. But his presentence investigation showed that he had been offered multiple drug treatment opportunities after prior convictions and had failed to take advantage each time. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 98-103. Thus, we agree that the trial court here did not abuse its discretion when it did not consider Watson's extensive substance abuse problem as a mitigator.

[26] Watson next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider his age at his sentencing. Appellant's Br. at 16. “Age is neither a statutory nor a per se mitigating factor.” Sensback v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1160, 1163-64 (Ind. 1999). A defendant's age, in conjunction with “suffering from any significant age-related infirmities,” can be a mitigating factor. See Gutermuth v. State, 848 N.E.2d 716, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), aff'd by Gutermuth v. State, 868 N.E.2d 427 (Ind. 2007). In Gutermuth, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not considering the defendant's age of eighty-three as a mitigating factor because the defendant failed to show any evidence of significant age-related infirmities. Id. The same applies here to Watson, who has failed to show any age-related infirmities.

[27] For all of these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when failing to consider Watson's substance abuse history and his age when it imposed an aggregate term of thirty years imprisonment.

Watson's sentence is not inappropriate considering the nature of his offense and his character.

[28] Watson's final argument is that the trial court's sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of his offense and his character. Appellant's Br. at 16. We disagree.

[29] We may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[30] However, sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we will defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offenses and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[31] The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is two to twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5 (2025). The sentencing range for a habitual offender enhancement is between eight and twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1) (2025). Here, after weighing Watson's aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial court ordered Watson to serve twelve years for his Level 4 felony, along with an additional eighteen years because of his habitual-offender status.

[32] Watson first argues that the nature of his case was “not the worst of the worst” and he dealt “barely over three grams” of methamphetamine. Appellant's Br. at 18. He further argues that the nature of his offense does not support the “elevated” sentence he received. Id. Finally, Watson argues that the State “failed to demonstrate any particularized harm afflicted by Watson to the State or any other enumerated victim.” Id.

[33] We are not persuaded by Watson's arguments. While Watson's crime was a run-of-the-mill offense, his argument that his crime was not the worst of the worst fails to convince us why his sentence should be reduced. Watson may have received an “elevated” sentence, but the sentence on both counts remained within the statutory range. And even though his conduct did not harm any specific victim here, the seriousness of his offense should not be overlooked.

[34] As for his character, Watson concedes that he has a criminal history but also argues that he has strong character traits because he recently obtained his GED and he is dealing with multiple health issues. Watson's criminal history includes seven prior felony convictions, five misdemeanor convictions, and four petitions to revoke probation. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 103. He also has an active warrant in Florida for violating probation. Id. Most of Watson's misdemeanors and almost half of his felony convictions involve possession of some sort of drug, whether it be marijuana, cocaine, or methamphetamine. Id. at 98-103. Watson did not present evidence of any ongoing health issues and we note his multiple failures to take advantage of the rehabilitative programs offered to him. And while we commend Watson for obtaining his GED, he has failed to demonstrate that he is willing to be a law-abiding member of society.

[35] Watson fails to direct us to any compelling evidence that portrays the nature of his offense or his character in a positive light. We therefore affirm his sentence.²

Conclusion

[36] For all these reasons, we affirm Watson's conviction and his aggregate sentence of thirty years.

[37] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “B” is a slang term for 3.5 grams of methamphetamine. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 168.

2.   In a footnote in his Appellant's Brief, Watson asks us to review his jail time credit calculation for this case and argues that he should receive four days of jail credit for this case. Appellant's Br. at 7 n.2. But Watson had another pending case at the time of this sentencing hearing, and the trial court stated that the credit time would be applied to that separate pending case. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 251. Moreover, Watson did not object to the trial court's determination during the sentencing hearing, and therefore, he waived this argument for the purposes of this appeal. See Groves v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Because Watson failed to raise this claim in the trial court, the record does not support his claim that he failed to receive any jail time credit owed.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.