IN RE: the Adoption of A.I.B. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.B. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order granting A.C.’s petition to adopt Mother's biological child (“Child”). Mother contends the trial court erred when it concluded that she consented to the adoption. We disagree and affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on April 20, 2023, with methamphetamine in her umbilical cord. Mother gave A.C., whom she knew, permission to take Child home from the hospital and care for her. Soon thereafter, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) petition as to Child ¹ and placed Child with A.C. Following Mother's admission, the trial court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS and continued Child's placement with A.C. Child has remained in A.C.’s care for her entire life.

[3] On October 21, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate parental rights (“TPR”) to Child. On January 24, 2025, the trial court held a permanency hearing in the CHINS case “in conjunction with” a fact-finding hearing in the TPR case. App. at 15. Mother, with counsel, submitted a signed and notarized “Consent to Adoption” (“the Consent”) in which she consented to the adoption of Child “by [C.K., Child's maternal aunt] or by a person or persons whose names are not known to [Mother].” Id. at 50. Mother had signed the notarized consent form on January 24, 2025, and the Consent was “done in agreement with [DCS] in lieu of terminating Mother's parental rights involuntarily.”² Appealed Order at 4. The trial court “went over with Mother on the record ․ the implications of signing said consent[,]” id., and “[M]other testified that her consent was made freely and voluntarily[,]” February 3, 2025, Order on Publication Hearing and Consent to Adopt, Cause No. 20D06-2410-JT-34.³

[4] On August 25, under cause number 20D06-2508-AD-32 (“AD-32”), A.C. filed a petition to adopt Child.⁴ Soon thereafter, A.C. also filed a copy of the Consent signed by Mother. On September 9, Mother filed a “Notice of Objection” to the adoption of Child by A.C. and a motion to contest that adoption. App. at 51. Mother's notice stated that “the [C]onsent filed in this matter does not apply to [A.C.] and that Mother does NOT consent to the adoption by [A.C.].” Id. (emphasis in original).

[5] On October 23, C.K. and her husband D.K. filed in AD-32 a “Verified Motion to Intervene and to Stay Adoption and Notice of Intent to File Cross-Petition” in which they notified the court that C.K. is Mother's sister (i.e., C.K. is Child's biological aunt) and that she and D.K. intended to file their own petition to adopt Child. Id. at 94. On December 26, under cause number 20D06-2512-AD-60 (“AD-60”), C.K. and D.K. filed their petition to adopt Child and a motion to consolidate AD-60 with AD-32.⁵

[6] On January 30, 2026, “[f]or the sake of judicial economy,” the trial court conducted a “consolidated hearing” for causes AD-32 and AD-60 and treated C.K. and D.K. as intervenors and their petition in AD-60 “as a [c]ross-petition” in AD-32. Appealed Order at 1. At the January 30 evidentiary hearing, A.C. presented the testimony of several witnesses, including herself, Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) Emily Hershberger, and DCS Family Case Manager Elizabeth Conley. Cross-petitioners C.K. and D.K. also presented witnesses, including themselves and their expert witness, therapist Rebecca Loth, the latter of whom testified generally about trauma to children in new placements but had never seen or treated Child specifically.

[7] On March 20, the trial court issued an order granting A.C.’s petition to adopt Child. The order included findings of fact and conclusions of law, which included the above-stated facts. The order also found, in part, as follows:

13. [C.K.] does not live in the area, but rather near Omaha, Nebraska, and has not been a significant part of the child's life.

14. [C.K.] describes her relationship with [Mother] as strained and that they were not on speaking terms and that any information [C.K.] received of [Mother] was disclosed by their sister [N.]

15. [C.K.] has met the child a few times but her husband, [D.K.], has never met the child or traveled to Indiana to meet the child.

16. [A.C.] has no criminal history but has needed help financially on two separate occasions in the past.

17. [A.C.] has been at her current residence for four years.

18. [C.K.] owns her home but has stayed in different states frequently for long periods of time.

***

21. The child is very bonded with [A.C.], as that has been the child's only home her entire life.

22. [C.K.] and the child do not share a bond but have built a minimal rapport after December 25, 2025, that might strengthen with more time.

23. [A.C.] is not in agreement with [C.K.] having more time with the child as it can cause the child to be confused. The child now calls multiple people ‘Mommy,’ which only began recently.

24. [A.C.] feels that it has been too long in the process for [C.K.] to come in. She has had the child in her care for almost 3 years and thinks that [C.K.] had plenty of time to come forward and claim the child.

25. [C.K.] believes that as the child's blood relative, her adoption petition should take precedence over [A.C.]’s.

26. [A.C.] states that [Mother] has known her child has been placed with [A.C.] since she was born and [Mother] never had an issue with it.

27. [C.K.] states that the reason it took so long to become involved was due to finding legal counsel willing to take the case.[6]

28. [C.K.] states she is willing to continue working with [A.C.] and incorporating her into their family dynamic so that the child doesn't lose that bond with [A.C.].

29. [C.K.] believes she is the best placement for the child because she is a blood relative.

30. [A.C.] believes she is the best placement for the child because the child has been in her care and custody her entire life.

Id. at 2-3.

[8] The trial court concluded that the language “or by a person or persons whose names are not known to me” in the Consent signed by Mother made it a general consent that applied to any qualified person, including A.C. App. at 50. The court further noted that DCS believed it would be in Child's best interest to be adopted by either A.C. or C.K. and D.K., but the CASA recommended that Child be adopted by A.C., as there is a “very strong bond between [A.C.] and Child” and “continuity of care is very import[ant].” Appealed Order at 5. The trial court specifically noted that the testimony of therapist Loth “was not helpful to the Court[,]” as she had never “seen or in any way observed or interacted with the Child[,]” and the court therefore accorded Loth's testimony “very little weight.” Id. The trial court noted that Child “has a strong bond” with A.C., and the “nature of this bond is that of a parent.” Id. The court found that removing Child from A.C., who provided “the only home [Child] has ever known,” would be “a certain loss and cause significant trauma” to Child. Id.

[9] The court concluded that “it is in the best interests of [Child] to continue in the care of [A.C.] and for the Court to grant [A.C.]’s Petition for Adoption.” Id. at 6. The court further concluded that “it is not in the best interests of [Child] to be adopt[ed] by [C.K. and D.K., whose] Petition for Adoption is denied.” Id. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Mother challenges the trial court's decision to grant A.C.’s adoption petition. Specifically, she contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that her signed and notarized Consent applied to A.C.’s adoption of Child. As an initial matter, we note that A.C. has not filed an Appellee's brief in this appeal. Under such circumstances, this court

need not develop an argument for the appellee[ ] but instead will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error. Prima facie error in this context means at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.

Salyer v. Wash. Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020) (quotations and citations omitted).

[11] Our standard of review in adoption cases is well-settled.

A trial court's decision in matters of family law enjoys “considerable deference” on review, given its “position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.” E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In adoption cases specifically, this Court neither reweighs evidence nor assesses witness credibility and “presume[s] that the trial court's decision is correct,” with the appellant bearing the burden of rebutting that presumption. Id. (citation omitted).

When, like here, the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law under Trial Rule 52(A), an appellate court on review “must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment.” Matter of Adoption of C.J., 71 N.E.3d 436, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citation omitted). An appellate court “will not set aside the findings or the judgment unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). A “trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to support them,” while a “judgment is clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and the conclusions relying on those findings.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). We also owe no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions. In re Adoption of A.M., 930 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

In re Adoption of P.J.W., 248 N.E.3d 574, 578-79 (Ind. 2025); see also In re Adoption of M.D., 258 N.E.3d 1087, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“We consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's judgment, and the inferences therefrom[.]”), trans. denied.

[12] Here, Mother has failed to make a prima facie showing of error. First, we note that Mother has not challenged any of the court's factual findings; therefore, those facts are deemed admitted. See, e.g., In re To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. denied.

[13] Second, we conclude that the judgment is supported by the uncontested findings of fact and the trial court's conclusions thereon. On January 24, 2025, Mother signed her consent to the adoption of Child by C.K. “or by a person or persons whose names are not known” to her. App. at 50. On February 3, she filed the Consent in her CHINS and TPR cases. At no time thereafter did Mother withdraw that Consent.⁷ Rather, Mother seems to assert the Consent she signed is not a general or blanket consent because it includes a specifically named person, i.e., C.K. However, this argument ignores the clear language of the Consent, which states that it applies to C.K. “or” other unknown persons. App. at 50 (emphasis added). That language supports the trial court's conclusion that the Consent is “in effect” a general or blanket consent to adoption. Appealed Order at 4; see also In re Adoption of A.S., 912 N.E.2d 840, 849 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Rhodes v. Shirley, 129 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1955) and Johnson v. Cupp, 274 N.E.2d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971)) (noting Indiana's appellate courts have long concluded that “blanket consents are permissible” in adoption cases).

[14] Mother also alleges the Consent is invalid as a general or blanket consent because it does not contain a statement that she voluntarily executed it without disclosure of the name of any other petitioner for adoption. Indiana law specifies that “[a] consent to adoption that does not name or otherwise identify a petitioner for adoption is valid if the consent to adoption contains a statement, by the person consenting to adoption, that the person consenting to adoption voluntarily executed the consent to adoption without disclosure of the name or other identification of the petitioner for adoption.” Ind. Code § 31-19-9-3(a). Consent is “voluntary” if it is “an act of the parent's own volition, free from duress, fraud, or other consent-vitiating factors” and it is “made with knowledge of the essential facts.” K.F. v. B.B., 145 N.E.3d 813, 824 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. And “the validity of a consent may be satisfied by evidence that the signatures are authentic and genuine in all respects and manifest present intention to give the child up for adoption.” In re Adoption of Infant Child Baxter, 799 N.E.2d 1057, 1062 (Ind. 2003).

[15] Mother's contention is technically correct, as the consent form itself does not contain any statement about it being signed voluntarily. However, as the trial court noted, when Mother's consent was first introduced in the CHINS/TPR context, the trial court “went over” the Consent with Mother, on the record, to make sure she understood “the implications of signing said consent.” Appealed Order at 4. In the CHINS/TPR matter—which involved the same court—the judge specifically noted that:

[c]ounsel for the mother tenders to the Court a Notice of Consent to Adoption that is signed by the mother, [M.B.], and is notarized. The Court reviewed the tendered document with the mother. The mother indicated that she reviewed the document with her attorney and signed the document. The mother understands that her consent is permanent and cannot be revoked or set aside. The mother testified that no one had forced her, promised her anything in exchange for her consent, threatened her, or coerced her into consenting to the adoption of the child. The mother testified that her consent was made freely and voluntarily.

February 3, 2025, Order on Publication Hearing and Consent to Adopt, Cause No. 20D06-2410-JT-34. Thus, there was evidence that Mother's Consent was voluntary.

[16] Mother also asserts that the language “or by a person or persons whose names are not known to me” in her Consent does not apply to A.C. because A.C.’s name was known to Mother. App. at 50. However, Mother cites no law in support of that argument, and the trial court concluded otherwise. That is, the court concluded that the general language in the Consent was meant to apply to other, then-unnamed individuals and that A.C. was one such individual. We find this to be a reasonable reading of the Consent's language.

[17] Moreover, we note that Mother's proposed hyper technical reading of the Consent would subvert the purposes of the adoption statutes. Although the adoption statutes are to be strictly construed, they are “not to be so strictly construed as to defeat [their] purposes.” In re Adoption of A.M., 930 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). And we are mindful that “ ‘careful administration of the statute serves purposes beyond protecting the rights of natural parents to be with their children. It also serves to protect the children and to shield all involved parties from unnecessary instability and uncertainty.’ ” In re Adoption of A.S., 912 N.E.2d 840, 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Adoptive Parents of M.L.V. v. Wilkens, 598 N.E.2d 1054, 1056 (Ind. 1992)), trans. denied. Indeed, “the primary concern in an adoption proceeding” is the best interest of the child. Id.

[18] Mother has not rebutted the presumption that the trial court's decision is correct.⁸ See In re Adoption of P.J.W., 248 N.E.3d at 578 (citation modified) (noting we “presume that the trial court's decision is correct, with the appellant bearing the burden of rebutting that presumption”). Not only did the trial court reasonably conclude that Mother gave consent to unnamed individuals, including A.C., to adopt Child, but it also concluded that it is in Child's best interest to be adopted by A.C. rather than C.K. and D.K.⁹ While it is true that a “blood relationship” is a material factor to consider in an adoption proceeding, it “is not controlling”; rather, “the main concern should lie with the effect of the adoption on the reality of the minor child's life.” P.J.W., 248 N.E.3d at 581. Here, the reality is that Child is bonded with A.C., who has provided Child with the “only stable home [Child] has ever known.” Appealed Order at 5. That reality led the CASA to opine that it is in Child's best interest to be adopted by A.C. And the uncontested facts are that Child “is [e]motionally stable and content” in A.C.’s care, “physically healthy and developing appropriately for her age,” and also “bonding with [the] other children in [A.C.’s] home.” Id. Further, Child does not have a similar bond with her aunt, C.K., whom Child has met only a few times, and D.K., whom Child has never met. These uncontested facts support the trial court's finding that “[i]t is certain that [Child] will suffer great harm [if she is] removed from her only home, from her only caregiver, and [ ] placed hundreds of miles away” with C.K. and D.K. Id. at 5-6.

Conclusion

[19] Mother has not established prima facie error in the trial court's ultimate finding that Mother gave a blanket consent to adoption of Child that applied to A.C. Nor has Mother argued, much less established, that A.C.’s adoption of Child was not in Child's best interests. Therefore, we affirm.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The CHINS petition named Mother and alleged or unknown fathers.

2.   Following Mother's consent to adoption, DCS dismissed her as a party to the TPR action and “proceeded with the involuntary termination of parental rights as to any alleged or unknown fathers, which was granted.” Appealed Order at 4.

3.   We accessed records from the TPR action via the Odyssey case management system, as Mother has failed to provide any of those records on appeal. Mother has also failed to provide a transcript of any hearings in the TPR case. See Ind. Appellate Rule 9(F)(5) (requiring an appellant to designate portions of transcripts “necessary to present fairly and decide the issues on appeal” to be assembled by trial court clerk).

4.   A.C.’s adoption petition was filed under the new cause number in the same court in which the CHINS and TPR actions were pending, i.e., Elkhart Superior Court 6.

5.   It appears from records contained in the Odyssey case management system that the trial court never issued an order in AD-60 on C.K. and D.K.’s motion to consolidate.

6.   The CASA, whom C.K. cites as support, did not testify that C.K. “attempted to see [Child] and build a relationship with her but was unable to do so until January 2026.” Appellant's Br. at 8.

7.   On September 9, 2025, Mother filed a “Notice of Objection” to the adoption of Child by A.C. in case AD-32, in which she stated that “the consent filed in this matter does not apply to [A.C.] and that Mother does NOT consent to the adoption by [A.C.].” App. at 51. Mother does not contend that the Notice of Objection constituted a withdrawal of her Consent. But, even if that could be considered an attempted withdrawal of the Consent, it was filed well beyond the fifteen-day deadline to withdraw consent. See Ind. Code § 31-19-10-3.

8.   Mother spends much time arguing the Consent was not a “subsequent” consent. Appellant's Br. at 14-19. However, the trial court did not find the Consent was valid as a subsequent consent; rather, the court specifically found that there is only one Consent in this case, and it applies “to a named individual or another, not named individual.” Appealed Order at 4.

9.   Although Mother does not appeal the trial court's findings regarding Child's best interests, she does incorrectly state that the “trial court did not find that [C.K.’s] adoption was not in [Child's] best interest.” Appellant's Br. at 16. That statement is obviously false, given the court's clear statement that “it is not in the best interests of [Child] to be adopt[ed] by [C.K. and D.K., whose] Petition for Adoption is denied.” Appealed Order at 6.

Bailey, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.