Jordan Talley-Smith, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Indiana Department of Workforce Development, Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jordan Talley-Smith sought a writ of mandamus in Lake Superior Court to compel the Department of Workforce Development (the “DWD”) to pay him unemployment benefits. The trial court denied the writ, and Talley-Smith appeals. The dispositive question is whether the DWD had a clear, non-discretionary legal duty to pay benefits that a trial court could compel by mandamus. Because the administrative decisions provided by Talley-Smith to support his petition resolved only specific eligibility questions and left the ultimate question of benefit eligibility to the DWD's judgment, mandate was unavailable, and we accordingly affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Talley-Smith was discharged from his employment on May 20, 2024, and he applied for unemployment benefits. In a series of administrative proceedings, the DWD resolved multiple specific questions about Talley-Smith's eligibility. One administrative law judge (“ALJ”) decided that Talley-Smith had not been discharged for just cause and that he therefore was entitled to benefits “[u]nless otherwise ineligible.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 4.) Another ALJ decided that, for four weeks in August 2024, Talley-Smith was exempt from the requirement that he make an effort to secure full-time work because he was “a member in good standing of a union with a hiring hall” and therefore he was eligible for benefits for those weeks “[u]nless otherwise disqualified.” (Id. at 6.) Talley-Smith appealed the second ALJ's determination to the Unemployment Insurance Review Board, but the Review Board dismissed his appeal because the ALJ had ruled in his favor.

[3] Talley-Smith then petitioned the Lake Superior Court for judicial review of the DWD's determinations and for a writ of mandamus ordering the DWD to pay all benefits that he claimed were owed. The trial court dismissed the judicial-review claims ¹ but allowed the mandamus request to proceed. On February 3, 2026, the trial court denied the writ after concluding the two ALJ decisions cited by Talley-Smith had each resolved only a single issue regarding his eligibility and therefore did not compel the DWD to pay benefits.

Discussion and Decision

[4] As a preliminary matter, we acknowledge that Talley-Smith proceeds in this case pro se. Pro se litigants are held to the same standard as attorneys and are required to follow procedural rules. Maw v. Pringle, 263 N.E.3d 790, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). When an appellant elects to represent himself, we will not “indulge in any benevolent presumptions on [his] behalf, or waive any rule for the orderly and proper conduct of [his] appeal.” Ankeny v. Governor of State of Ind., 916 N.E.2d 678, 679 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d 494, 496 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)), trans. denied.

[5] Talley-Smith argues the trial court erred when it denied his petition for a writ of mandamus.² Whether the law imposes a duty amenable to a writ of mandamus is a question of law that we review de novo. Price v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 80 N.E.3d 170, 173 (Ind. 2017). We also review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo. Town of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 229, 234 (Ind. 2023).

[6] An action for a writ of mandamus exists “to compel the performance of any: (1) act that the law specifically requires; or (2) duty resulting from any office, trust, or station.” Ind. Code § 34-27-3-1. A writ of mandamus is “an extraordinary remedy, viewed with extreme disfavor.” Price, 80 N.E.3d at 174 (quoting State ex rel. Civil City of South Bend v. Court of Appeals of Indiana – Third District, 406 N.E.2d 244, 245 (Ind. 1980)) (emphases added in Price). As such, “[j]udicial mandate is appropriate only when two elements are present: (1) the defendant bears an imperative legal duty to perform the ministerial act or function demanded and (2) the plaintiff ‘has a clear legal right to compel the performance of that specific duty.’ ” Id. at 175 (quoting City of Auburn v. State ex rel. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 83 N.E. 997, 1003 (Ind. 1908)). “[M]inisterial acts are those done only pursuant to law, in a fixed manner, in specific circumstances, and without discretion[.]” Id. at 176. If a defendant retains discretion, there is no clear duty to perform a specific act, and a writ of mandamus will not lie. Id. at 175. A writ of mandamus “should ‘never [be] granted in doubtful cases.’ ” Id. (quoting Burnsville Turnpike Co. v. State ex rel. McCalla, 20 N.E. 421, 422 (Ind. 1889)).

[7] To be eligible for unemployment benefits, a claimant “must meet the requirements set forth in Ind. Code ch. 22-4-14[ ] and must not be disqualified by any of the various exceptions provided in ch. 22-4-15[ ].” M.A. v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 157 N.E.3d 536, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Ind. State Univ. v. LaFief, 888 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind. 2008)). Those eligibility requirements include that the claimant be “unemployed, have sufficient wage credits in his base period, be able, available, and actively seeking work, and meet certain registration and reporting requirements.” LaFief, 888 N.E.2d at 186 (citing Ind. Code §§ 22-4-14-2, 22-4-14-3, 22-4-14-5). Unemployment benefits “are not an unqualified right and may be denied to claimants who are disqualified by any of the various exceptions provided in ch. 22-4-15.” Giovanoni v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 927 N.E.2d 906, 909 (Ind. 2010).

[8] The ALJ decisions on which Talley-Smith relies each resolved only a single question about his eligibility for benefits – one decided that his discharge was not for just cause, and the other decided that he “was exempt from making an effort to secure suitable full-time work because he is a member in good standing of a union with a hiring hall” during the four weeks at issue. (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 6.) However, each decision, by its explicit terms, made him entitled to benefits only “[u]nless otherwise ineligible,” (id. at 4), or “[u]nless otherwise disqualified,” (id. at 6). Neither decision determined that Talley-Smith satisfied every eligibility requirement of chapter 22-4-14 or was free of every disqualification under chapter 22-4-15.³ Because the two ALJ decisions cited by Talley-Smith resolved only specific issues and left the ultimate question of payment dependent on other eligibility and disqualification determinations to be made by the DWD, they imposed no clear, non-discretionary duty on the DWD to pay benefits. Talley-Smith therefore established neither an imperative ministerial duty nor a clear legal right to compel payment,⁴ and the trial court correctly denied the writ. See Great Lakes Transp., LLC v. Porter Cnty. Highway Dept., 952 N.E.2d 235, 245 n.7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding Great Lakes could not receive a writ of mandamus compelling Highway Department to grant a driveway permit when the county engineer had to exercise discretion to determine if the permit would comply with local regulations).

Conclusion

[9] We conclude the trial court did not err when it denied Talley-Smith's petition for a writ of mandamus. Accordingly, we affirm.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court determined that Talley-Smith had not demonstrated that he exhausted his administrative remedies by bringing his denials of benefits to the Review Board and also that any appeal therefrom would be to the appellate court rather than the trial court, pursuant to Indiana Code section 22-4-17-12. (Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 19-20.) Talley-Smith has not challenged those determinations in this appeal.

2.   Talley-Smith also argues the trial court erred by failing to provide additional findings and conclusions in accordance with his motion under Indiana “Trial Rule 52(A).” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 41.) However, Talley-Smith's motion was filed two days after the trial court entered its six-page final order, which contained thirty-five paragraphs of findings and conclusions. The trial court was not required to enter a new order based on Talley-Smith's untimely request under Rule 52(A). See T.R. 52(A) (indicating party's written request for findings should be “filed with the court prior to the admission of evidence”). Nor, to the extent he so argues on appeal, did the trial court's failure to include additional findings and conclusions impede our review, which is de novo.

3.   In fact, the record suggests the DWD suspended his benefits for other weeks based on his failure to meet reporting requirements.

4.   Talley-Smith's contrary argument – that the trial court failed to establish that the ALJ determinations favorable to him carried no legal consequence – misapprehends the burden of proof. It is the party seeking mandamus who must affirmatively demonstrate a clear duty to perform a specific, ministerial act and a clear right to compel it. Price, 80 N.E.3d at 175.

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.