RaJuante Coleman, Appellant v. Jeffrey Elftman and Bolinger Law Firm, Appellees (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] RaJuante Coleman, pro se, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to stay and the dismissal of his complaint pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In September 2020, Coleman entered into an agreement for legal services with Jeffrey Elftman and Bolinger Law Firm (“Appellees”) for representation in criminal cause numbers 34D02-2007-F2-2029 (“Cause No. 2029”), 34D01-1607-F2-684 (“Cause No. 684”), and 34D02-2009-F6-2720 (“Cause No. 2720”). After that representation ended, in September 2022, Coleman entered into a second agreement for legal services with Appellees for representation regarding a request for sentence modification in Cause Nos. 2029 and 684.

[3] On April 22, 2025, Coleman filed a pro se Civil Complaint for Legal Malpractice against Appellees “seeking declaratory relief and damages.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 11. He alleged in relevant part that “[o]n February 1, 2023, Attorney El[f]tman filed, simultaneously, motions to modify” his sentences in Cause Nos. 2029 and 684; on February 24, 2023, “Howard County Superior 2 granted [his] petition to modify his sentence in [Cause No. 2029] and awarded him 182 days of credit time, thus making his [earliest possible release date] (under that cause) 5/2/23”; he “asked Attorney Elftman to ensure that Howard Superior 2 sent the Abstract of Judgment to the Indiana Department of Corrections (herein after IDOC) ․ due to issues that they had in the past with this same court neglecting to send abstracts to IDOC”; on March 20, 2023, “Howard County Superior 1 granted [his] petition to modify the sentence in its court in connection with [Cause No. 684] and ordered him released and placed on Community Corrections In Home Detention”; on March 23, 2023, he was released and reported to In Home Detention; on March 24, 2023, he “had a phone conference with Attorney Elftman and inquired about the status of his case in Howard Superior 2” and “Attorney Elftman falsely informed [him] that this cause had been considered satisfied by Howard Superior 2”; on March 31, 2023, Attorney Elftman called him “informing him he needed to turn himself in to the Howard County Criminal Justice Center” because “Howard Superior 2 failed to send the Abstract of Judgment showing his award of 182 days of credit time to IDOC and IDOC probably thought he owed them more time than the 30 days he actually did”; on April 27, 2023, “over 30 days after [he] was ordered released on [Cause No. 684], Howard Superior 1, sua sponte, ordered the order on [his] sentence modification ‘rescinded’ ”; he asked Attorney Elftman “to file an appeal or whatever needs to be filed to remedy this issue”; and Attorney Elftman failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Id. at 12-15. Coleman asserted that “[h]ad Attorney Elftman exercised reasonable diligence and promptness in representing [him] and ensured that Howard Superior 2 sent the Abstract [of] his award of 182 days of credit time to IDOC as requested,” a warrant would never have been issued by IDOC and he “would have never had to return to custody for any reason at all.” Id. at 22. Coleman further asserted that Attorney Elftman's failure to appeal or “initiate a process to remedy” the wrong caused by the rescission order resulted in further injury. Id. at 23.¹

[4] On July 14, 2025, Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6). They argued that Coleman “failed to plead facts demonstrating [Appellees] breached a duty of care during their representation of [him], or that a breach of that duty of care proximately damaged [him].” Id. at 42. Specifically, they argued that they “had no legal duty to forward the abstract of judgment” and that Coleman “failed to plead facts to demonstrate that an alleged failure to file a motion or an appeal from the April 27, 2023 order rescinding [his] sentence modification proximately caused [him] any harm.” Id. at 43 (emphasis and capitalization omitted). Accordingly, they moved to dismiss Coleman's complaint pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6) because it “failed to state a claim under which relief could be granted.” Id.

[5] On September 4, 2025, Coleman filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings stating that, on July 9, 2025, he had filed a copy of his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (filed on September 5, 2024, and amended on May 20, 2025) “as designated Evidence in the instant cause” and that staying the proceedings “in this cause until the outcome of the” post-conviction cause “would be in the interest of justice as the underlying facts” in the post-conviction cause “will support the malpractice claims in the instant case.” Id. at 47. On September 22, 2025, Coleman filed an extensive response to Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss arguing that his complaint was sufficient pursuant to notice pleading standards. On October 6, 2025, Appellees filed a reply.

[6] On October 31, 2025, the court held a hearing. During the Zoom video hearing, defense counsel stated that Appellees had no further argument and that they would “stand on our pleadings today.” Transcript Volume II at 11. The court then advised Coleman that it had reviewed his submissions and asked if he wished “to be heard any further.” Id. Due to technical difficulties, the court was unable to hear Coleman's response. Defense counsel stated that he believed he heard Coleman state, “I stand on my submissions[.]” Id. Coleman responded to defense counsel's statement with “the thumbs up sign” indicating that defense counsel heard him correctly. Id. On November 7, 2025, the court issued an order granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss and denying Coleman's motion to stay.

Discussion

[7] Coleman first challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to stay the legal malpractice proceedings pending the outcome of his post-conviction cause. He asserts that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion because “the facts and circumstances that brought about the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief are identical to the facts and circumstances that brought about the underlying Complaint for Legal Malpractice,” and that staying the proceedings in his legal malpractice case “until the outcome of [his] Post-Conviction cause” would have been “in the interest of justice[.]” Appellant's Brief at 11. Coleman further challenges the trial court's decision to grant Appellees’ motion to dismiss.

[8] We review a trial court's denial of a motion to stay under an abuse of discretion standard. Fry v. Schroder, 986 N.E.2d 821, 822-823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs “when the decision misinterprets the law or clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Smith v. Franklin Twp. Comm. School Corp., 151 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2020).

[9] In Silvers v. Brodeur, 682 N.E.2d 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied, this Court addressed the relationship between post-conviction proceedings and a civil legal malpractice claim. Although we noted that “it may be advisable for a trial court, in legal malpractice proceedings, to hold the malpractice claim in abeyance until the conclusion of any criminal proceedings which bear either on the criminal defendant's conviction or the effectiveness of his attorney,” this language is explicitly advisory. Id. at 818 n.4. Indiana courts have declined to hold that a stay is strictly required and have instead held that the court's power to stay its proceedings is discretionary and it is not improper for a trial court to make a ruling in a legal malpractice action pending the outcome of post-conviction proceedings. See Hockett v. Breunig, 526 N.E.2d 995, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (criminal defendant petitioned for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and simultaneously filed a legal malpractice action against his attorneys, and this Court rejected the argument that the trial court “should not have ruled on the motion for summary judgment regarding the attorney competence issues before this [C]ourt decided his post-conviction relief appeal” and held that the claim that it was “improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment in the malpractice action prior to the disposition of the post-conviction appeal is without merit”); see also Williams v. Maschmeyer, 870 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (plaintiff argued that trial court should stay his legal malpractice action because he intended to pursue federal habeas corpus relief after losing his petition for post-conviction relief, and this Court squarely rejected the argument that the Silvers advisory language required the trial court to hold the malpractice action in abeyance and affirmed summary judgment for the defendant attorneys).² We cannot say that the court's decision denying the motion to stay clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.

[10] As for the trial court's decision to grant Appellees’ motion to dismiss, we observe that a motion to dismiss under Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Price v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 80 N.E.3d 170, 173 (Ind. 2017). On appeal from a trial court's ruling on a 12(B)(6) motion, this Court applies a de novo standard of review and examines the pleadings in a light “most favorable to the nonmoving party, with every reasonable inference construed in the nonmovant's favor.” Ind. Land Tr. #3082 v. Hammond Redevelopment Comm'n, 274 N.E.3d 437, 441 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Charter One Mortg. Corp. v. Condra, 865 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind. 2007)). “ ‘A complaint may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it is clear on the face of the complaint that the complaining party is not entitled to relief’ under any circumstances.” Id. (quoting Charter One Mortg. Corp., 865 N.E.2d at 605).

[11] Ind. Trial Rule 8(A) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ind. Trial Rule 8(E) provides that “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” Ind. Trial Rule 8(F) provides that “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice, lead to disposition on the merits, and avoid litigation of procedural points.” The Indiana Supreme Court has held that Indiana is a notice-pleading state and that, “[i]n practice, this liberal standard merely requires that a ‘complaint ․ put the defendant on notice concerning why it is potentially liable and what it stands to lose.’ ” KS&E Sports v. Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892, 901 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Noblesville Redevelopment Comm'n v. Noblesville Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 674 N.E.2d 558, 564 (Ind. 1996)).

[12] Generally, “[t]o satisfy this standard, the plaintiff need not ‘state all the elements of a cause of action.’ ” NFI Interactive Logistics LLC v. Bruski, 239 N.E.3d 63, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting State v. Rankin, 260 Ind. 228, 294 N.E.2d 604, 606 (1973)), trans. denied. Rather, the plaintiff “need only plead the operative facts involved in the litigation.” Id. (quoting Rankin, 260 Ind. 228, 294 N.E.2d at 606).

[13] In his complaint, Coleman makes multiple factual allegations against Appellees underlying his legal malpractice claim. Among them, he alleges that he employed Appellees to pursue modification of his sentences in Cause Nos. 2029 and 684, Appellees failed to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge, and that such failure was the proximate cause of damage to him. Appellees point out that they were successful in obtaining sentence modification for Coleman and that it was the trial court's obligation, not counsel's, to promptly send the abstract of judgment to the IDOC indicating that Coleman's sentence had been modified. However, Coleman alleges that he requested the law firm to file a motion with the trial court requesting the abstract of judgment be sent to the IDOC and that the law firm said it would do so. As alleged, Appellees agreed to take steps to ensure the trial court had followed through, whether through motion or inquiry, and they did not do so. Based upon our liberal notice-pleading standard and examining the complaint in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we cannot say that it is clear on the face of the complaint that Coleman is not entitled to relief under any circumstances. The trial court erred in dismissing Coleman's complaint pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim.

[14] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's denial of Coleman's motion to stay but reverse the trial court's order granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss Coleman's complaint and remand for further proceedings.

[15] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Coleman alleged that, as Attorney Elftman's employer, Bolinger Law Firm was “vicariously liable under the respondeat superior theory.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 23.

2.   The Williams Court observed that the post-conviction court's adverse ruling on the ineffective assistance claim had preclusive effect on the legal malpractice action. Williams, 870 N.E.2d at 1071 (citing Belford v. McHale, Cook & Welch, 648 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was decided unfavorably to [defendant] and affirmed․ As a matter of law, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of [the attorneys] on [defendant's] claim for malpractice relating to the investigation, guilty plea, and sentence.”), reh'g denied, trans. denied). The existence of this preclusive mechanism means that the civil malpractice court may properly proceed, in that if the post-conviction relief petition is later denied, issue preclusion resolves the malpractice claim; if post-conviction relief is granted, the plaintiff may benefit. In neither scenario does the pendency of post-conviction proceedings compel the civil malpractice court to stand idle.

Brown, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and Scheele, J., concur.