J.T., Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.T. (Father) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his minor children R.T. and H.S. (Children).¹ Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) asks us to reconsider the decision of our motions panel to allow Father's forfeited appeal and maintains that, even if we permit Father's appeal, DCS presented sufficient evidence to terminate Father's parental rights.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Father and Mother (Parents) married in March 2018 and are the biological parents of R.T., born in March 2018, and H.S, born in April 2023.² In January 2024, DCS received a report that Children were victims of abuse or neglect due to poor home conditions, including lack of utilities, and substance abuse by Mother. At that time, Father was in pre-trial jail confinement.

[4] A DCS family case manager (FCM) went to the family's home on January 18, 2024, and spoke with Mother, who advised that Children were staying with her mother (Maternal Grandmother) and Maternal Grandmother's husband (Step-Grandfather). The FCM met with Maternal Grandmother at her home, the conditions of which appeared appropriate. Maternal Grandmother informed the FCM that Mother's home did not have electricity. In the ensuing month or so, Mother failed to show up for several scheduled drug screens and thereafter admitted to using methamphetamine. Maternal Grandmother agreed to come to DCS for a drug screen on February 21, 2024, the results of which subsequently came back positive for methamphetamine.³ On February 27, 2024, Children were removed from Mother's care.

[5] On February 28, 2024, DCS filed child petitions for R.T. and H.S., alleging each was a child in need of services (CHINS). Father appeared the next day, in custody, at the initial hearing and indicated he intended to hire counsel. A CASA was appointed, and supervised visits for Mother and Father by a third-party provider were approved. Father bonded out of the Tipton County Jail in early March 2024. A week or so later, Father appeared for a status conference, at which the trial court appointed counsel to represent Father, set the matter for a hearing on March 27, and scheduled the fact-finding hearing for April 24. Father failed to appear for the March 27 and April 24 hearings except by counsel. In the meantime, on April 9, DCS made a referral for Father to complete a substance abuse assessment through 4C Health by October 8, 2024; Father never completed the assessment.

[6] Following the fact-finding hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement and then adjudicated Children as CHINS on April 28, 2024. The trial court issued findings and conclusions, including that “Father has been absent from the Children's lives for at least the last 2 1/212 years,” that Father was incarcerated at the start of the CHINS case and was released, but has pending felony theft and burglary charges, and that although he was aware of the CHINS cases and the fact-finding hearing, failed to appear. Appendix at 122. Children were placed with Step-Grandfather and a maternal aunt (Aunt), with a safety plan that Maternal Grandmother never be alone with Children.

[7] In May 2024, the CHINS court issued a dispositional order, following a hearing, directing that Children remain in their current placement and under DCS's supervision. Father was ordered to, among other things, attend all appointments with DCS and service providers, remain in contact with the FCM, provide a safe and stable home environment, actively participate in and successfully complete all recommended services within the timeframes set by the therapists, participate in supervised visits with Children as recommended and approved by DCS, and complete a parenting assessment and all recommendations from it. The order also provided:

Should [Father] become/remain incarcerated in a local jail or in prison, he should seek out services through the jail or Department of Correction facility in which he is housed and complete all services that will improve his ability to fulfill his parental obligations.

Id. at 125. In the dispositional order, the court set a review hearing for August 14, 2024.

[8] On June 11, 2024, a child and family team meeting (CFTM) was held, and Father did not attend. He also did not attend the August 14 review hearing. A status hearing was held in October 2024, and Father again failed to appear. The court found that neither parent had complied with Children's case plan or been in contact with the FCM, and that it was in the best interest of Children for removal from Parents’ care to continue, with a permanency hearing set for January 29, 2025.

[9] On December 18, 2024, Father came to DCS offices, spoke with the FCM, and took a drug test, which returned positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. On January 10, 2025, a CFTM meeting was held. Father attended and submitted to a drug screen that also was positive for methamphetamine.

[10] On January 16, the Children's placement was changed from Step-Grandfather and Aunt's care due to their allowing Maternal Grandmother, who continued to test positive for methamphetamine, unsupervised contact with Children. Children were moved to the homes of other maternal relatives.

[11] Permanency hearings were held on January 29 and March 14, 2025, and Father failed to appear. The concurrent plan of reunification and adoption was approved, and the court found, in part, that Father had not complied with the case plan, had not participated in any services, and had submitted to a drug screen in December 2024 that was positive for methamphetamine. The court denied Father's request, by counsel, that Children be moved back to Step-Grandfather's care.

[12] Meanwhile, on February 11, 2025, a CFTM was held, and Father failed to appear. He later explained that he came to the DCS office but saw law enforcement officers in the parking lot, thought they were there for him, so he left and hid in the woods. On March 18, 2025, a new referral was made to Bowen Health for Father, but he never scheduled any appointments.

[13] On March 18, 2025, DCS filed separate petitions for the termination of parental rights of Parents to each of the Children. In late March or early April 2025, Father was arrested and incarcerated in the Miami County Jail. On April 9, 2025, an initial hearing was held in the termination case, and Father appeared in custody.

[14] A termination of parental rights fact-finding hearing was held on June 16, 2025, at which Father appeared in person and by counsel. FCM April Arrowood, who supervised Children's CHINS cases, testified regarding random drug screens, which required Father to call in daily at 9:00 a.m. to learn whether he needs to screen that day; FCM Arrowood noted that the provider can meet the parent such that the parent does not always need to come to DCS. Father never called in to find out if he was required to submit to a random screen. Father submitted to two drug screens, one at a CFTM and the other when meeting with FCM Arrowood and the CASA, and both were positive for methamphetamine. FCM Arrowood testified that Father never completed any court-ordered assessments and was not currently participating in any services at the Miami County Jail.

[15] FCM Arrowood also testified that Parents were initially offered supervised visitation but because neither parent consistently participated, and pursuant to the CASA's request, that was suspended in November 2024 and never reinstated. FCM Arrowood testified that, between the date of Children's removal and when visitation was suspended in November 2024, Father did not participate in any visits with Children. FCM Arrowood testified that, in addition to being incarcerated at the beginning of the CHINS case, Father had new criminal arrests and charges during the pendency of the case and admitted to avoiding a CFTM by hiding because he saw law enforcement. She testified that Children's current relative placements were appropriate, and Children were “doing really well.” Transcript at 33.

[16] CASA Terri Boyer, who had been involved with Children since March 1, 2024, testified that she had met with Father only on limited occasions, namely a couple of times early in the case, then in December 2024 and January 2025 at DCS offices, and in May 2025 at the jail. She testified that Children's demeanors were markedly improved in their current relative placements as compared to when they were with Step-Grandfather and Aunt. In her opinion, termination of parental rights and adoption were in Children's best interests, given that Parents “haven't progressed past where we started,” “haven't put any energy into trying to accomplish any goals,” and “never followed through with anything.” Id. at 54.

[17] Miami County Sheriff's Department Sergeant Lisa Hunt, who worked at the jail, testified that in March 2025, Father “was [ ] mad,” “said he did not want to be around anyone,” and requested to be placed in restricted housing, where an inmate remains for thirty days before being assessed again. Id. at 57. He returned to the general population for a time, but then on May 17, was placed by staff back in restrictive housing due to “issues [ ] with some people.” Id. at 58-59. Sergeant Hunt testified that there are services offered at the Miami County Jail, including drug class and Moral Reconation Therapy, but that Father was not eligible to participate when in restricted housing. He was set to be moved from restricted housing on the date of the termination hearing.

[18] DCS also called Father to testify. He testified that he was “working on” dissolving his marriage to Mother and wanted to “cut ties” with her. Id. at 62. He explained that, when the CHINS case first started, he was in the Miami County Jail in general population for several months, where services could have been available if DCS had referred them.

[19] On July 25, 2025, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law terminating Father's parental rights.⁴ The court found that Children had been removed from Parents’ care since February 27, 2024, that no reasonable probability existed that Parents would remedy the conditions that resulted in Children's continued removal from their care, and that there was a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship would pose a threat to Children's wellbeing. The court found that DCS's plan of adoption was satisfactory and that termination was in the best interest of each child.

[20] On August 13, 2025, Father filed a motion for appointment of appellate counsel, and the next day, the trial court granted the motion, ordering the State Public Defender (PD) to file the notice of appeal in accordance with our Appellate Rules. Following an unexplained delay, the PD accepted the appointment to represent Father on May 6, 2026, and, on May 8, Father filed a petition with this court for permission to file a belated appeal. Our motions panel granted the request and thereafter denied DCS's motion to reconsider. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion & Decision

1. Reinstatement of Father's Appeal

[21] Because DCS's challenge to this court's reinstatement of Father's forfeited appeal is potentially dispositive, we address it first. Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A) provides that a party initiates an appeal by filing a notice of appeal within thirty days of the final judgment being entered on the chronological case summary and that the right to appeal shall be forfeited if a notice of appeal is not timely filed. App. R. 9(A)(1), (5). Our Supreme Court has recognized that a forfeited right to appeal may be restored when “extraordinarily compelling reasons” are present. In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014).

[22] Father's May 8, 2026 petition to file a belated notice of appeal stated that, about two weeks after the trial court's July 25, 2025 termination order, he timely requested by motion the appointment of counsel to represent him in an appeal. He explained that the trial court sent an order on August 19, 2025, by certified mail to the PD, and that the PD signed the return receipt card two days later. For reasons not known, the PD failed to appoint outside counsel, which Father surmised may have been due to a clerical error.

[23] In late April 2026, after becoming aware that no appeal had been perfected by Father, the trial court re-sent the appointment order to the PD. This time, the PD contacted an attorney, who accepted representation of Father in this appeal and filed the petition with this court to allow a belated appeal. Father acknowledged in his petition that his right to appeal had been forfeited but argued that extraordinarily compelling reasons existed for this court to restore Father's right to appeal, pointing to the facts that he had timely requested counsel and that the trial court promptly referred the case to the PD. Father emphasized that termination of parental rights is one of the gravest dispositions a parent could face. Five days later, this court's motions panel granted Father's petition, subsequently denying DCS's motion to reconsider the decision. On appeal, DCS asserts that the motion panel's decision was in error and asks us to dismiss Father's appeal.

[24] We recognize that the writing panel has inherent authority to reconsider any decision of the motions panel while an appeal remains pending. Milbank Ins. Co. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 56 N.E.3d 1222, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); D.C. Jr. v. C.A., 5 N.E.3d 473, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). That said, “[w]e are reluctant to overrule orders issued by the motions panel unless we have determined that there is clear authority establishing that the motions panel erred.” Robertson v. Robertson, 60 N.E.3d 1085, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[25] In granting Father's petition, our motions panel relied, in part, on In re Adoption of O.R. In that case, the trial court entered an order finding that the biological father's (N.R.) consent to adoption was not required. Before a notice of appeal was due, N.R. wrote a letter to the trial court clerk requesting the appointment of appellate counsel for the purpose of appealing. After the deadline for the timely filing of N.R.’s notice of appeal, the trial court entered an order appointing appellate counsel. Thereafter, N.R.’s counsel filed a petition to accept N.R.’s appeal, which our motions panel granted. The writing panel dismissed N.R.’s appeal on the basis that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the untimely notice of appeal.

[26] The O.R. Court vacated the dismissal and clarified that failure to timely file a notice of appeal results in forfeiture but does not deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The Court then determined that “extraordinarily compelling reasons” existed to restore N.R.’s forfeited appeal, identifying three factors it considered: (1) Ind. Appellate Rule 1 provides a mechanism to resurrect an otherwise forfeited appeal;⁵ (2) before the notice of appeal was due, N.R. sought the appointment of counsel for the purpose of appealing the decision but counsel was appointed after the deadline for timely filing; and (3) considered by the Court as “perhaps the most important” factor, the Fourteenth Amendment protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children, and the parent-child relationship is one of the most valued relationships in our culture. 16 N.E.3d at 972.

[27] We agree with Father that the delay in perfecting his appeal appears to be “attributable to a breakdown in the appointed-counsel system, and not to any lack of diligence on the part of Father.” Reply Brief at 5. And we find that the reasoning and result of O.R. apply here. Specifically, in light of: (1) App. R. 1; (2) Father's timely request for appointment of counsel to appeal and the trial court's first timely order to the PD; and (3) the constitutional dimensions of the parent-child relationship, we conclude that Father's appeal deserves a determination on the merits.

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[28] Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In re J.W., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[29] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, and thus we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019). In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[30] Our review for clear error is confined to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). Reviewing whether the evidence “clearly and convincingly” supports the findings, or the findings “clearly and convincingly” support the judgment, is not a license to reweigh the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (observing that weighing the evidence under the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to termination cases is the trial court's prerogative, not ours). Further, we must accept any unchallenged findings as true. See Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

[31] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS must allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the existence of one or more of the circumstances described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (Subsection (d)); (2) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and (3) termination is in the child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c); Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2. Here, Father challenges only the trial court's determinations regarding Subsection (d). That is, he does not challenge the determination that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of Children or that DCS has a satisfactory plan for Children's care and treatment. Father does not challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact as clearly erroneous.

[32] Subsection (d) contains a number of circumstances supporting termination, of which the following two were alleged by DCS:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d). The trial court found both circumstances to have been proven by clear and convincing evidence. If we affirm one of these, we need not address the other. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1047 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[33] In determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions that resulted in Children's placement outside Father's home will not be remedied, a trial court engages in a two-step analysis: (1) ascertaining what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home and (2) determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. The latter step requires the trial court to “judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1045 (quoting In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied).

In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through DCS. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.

Id. (brackets omitted). Further, it is within the trial court's discretion to disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and to weigh more heavily the parent's history of conduct prior to those efforts. P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799.

[34] Father claims that the trial court's conclusions that conditions resulting in Children's removal will not be remedied (as well as the conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationship threatened Children's wellbeing) “rested substantially on an improper assumption that Father was unwilling to complete reunification services.” Appellant's Brief at 4. Father's argument is that DCS's witnesses established that the Miami County Jail, where Father was housed at the very beginning for some months and most recently in April 2025 to the present, offered programming in support of reunification efforts and that DCS referred Mother to in-person home-based case management services at some point while she was at that facility, but “DCS never extended the same opportunity to Father.” Id. at 7. He suggests that the trial court thus relied on the erroneous premise that Father's failure to complete court-ordered services “reflected his unwillingness, rather than his inability,” to work toward reunification. Id. at 6-7.

[35] This argument is unavailing. When Father was not incarcerated for around one year, he never submitted to any random screens as required. In fact, he submitted to only two screens, both of which returned positive for illegal substances. And before the offered supervised visitations were suspended for non-completion of services and CASA's concerns about one or both Children, Father exercised no visitations with Children. Nor did he complete any assessments or programming. He attended few CFTMs and chose to leave and hide after arriving at one when he saw law enforcement parked there. After being arrested again in March or April 2025 and jailed in Miami County, he requested restrictive housing, in which he could not attend classes or receive services. Then, after about a month of being in general population, he was sent back to restrictive housing by staff for having issues with other inmates. The record indicates that Father made no progress toward reunification and exhibited little effort to do so when it was available to him.

[36] Father has failed to establish clear error regarding the trial court's conclusion that the conditions keeping Children out of Father's care were unlikely to be remedied.

[37] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   D.S.’s (Mother) parental rights were also terminated. As she does not participate in this appeal, the facts largely will be confined to those relevant to Father.

2.   Mother and Father have a third child, born between the other two. She was under a guardianship and not involved in the CHINS case.

3.   At that time, Maternal Grandmother was on probation, and the positive screen was a violation of the conditions of her probation.

4.   The termination order was entered on the chronological case summary (CCS) on July 30, 2025.

5.   App. R. 1 provides that our appellate courts may permit deviation from the appellate rules upon the motion of a party or the court's own motion.

Altice, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.