Damian Hatton, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Damian Hatton appeals his conviction of Level 3 felony rape.¹ He presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether his rape conviction should be reversed based on insufficient evidence because the victim's testimony was incredibly dubious. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In October 2024, Hatton and Witness One (“W-1”) were dating, and Hatton attended W-1's seventeenth birthday party at W-1's house in Lebanon, Indiana. Approximately ten others also attended the party, including Minor Victim 1 (“MV1”) and Minor Victim 2 (“MV2”), who were two of W-1's classmates. During the party, MV1 drank about eight vodka shooters. More than once during the party, Hatton suggested to W-1 that they should have a “threesome” with MV1. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 141.)

[3] MV1's parents eventually found out about the party, and MV1's mother went to W-1's house and picked MV1 up. MV1's mother drove MV1 back to their house. At their house, MV1 got into an argument with her parents and threatened suicide, so her parents took her to a hospital. After MV1 was discharged from the hospital, MV1's mother drove her back to W-1's house to spend the rest of the night.

[4] By the time MV1 returned to W-1's house, the party had broken up, and MV1 joined W-1 and Hatton in W-1's bedroom. MV1 had about five or six more vodka shooters and took “a couple hits off” a THC vape. (Id. at 193.) W-1 asked MV1 if she wanted to participate in a threesome, and MV1 declined. MV1 then fell asleep. Sometime thereafter, Hatton took off MV1's pants and inserted his penis into her vagina. W-1 used her cellphone to record video of the intercourse. MV1 woke up the next morning with a bruise on her “right shoulder that looked like a bite mark” and her buttocks hurt. (Id. at 194.) MV1 told W-1 about the bite mark, and W-1 “just said under her breath oh, yeah, biting's his thing. And proceeded to say that she never wanted [Hatton] to come around again.” (Id. at 195.)

[5] In the days following the birthday party, W-1 showed the video of MV1 and Hatton to MV2 and others in their mutual friend group. MV1 continued to spend time with W-1 and Hatton after the birthday party. She joined them and other friends when they went to downtown Indianapolis to look at Christmas lights and spend the night at a hotel.

[6] MV1 did not know about the videos W-1 had recorded of MV1 and Hatton until MV2 told her about them in late December. MV1 then contacted the police. Before the police could secure a search warrant for W-1's phone, W-1 deleted the video, and the police were unable to locate the video. On March 6, 2025, the State charged Hatton with Level 3 felony rape, and the trial court held a jury trial beginning on February 2, 2026. The jury found Hatton guilty, and the trial court subsequently sentenced Hatton to thirteen years for the Level 3 felony rape conviction.²

Discussion and Decision

[7] Hatton contends the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because MV1's testimony was incredibly dubious. When reviewing a defendant's challenge on appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, we normally apply “a deferential standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020). Instead, “we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence” and “will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 262-63.

[8] “The incredible dubiosity rule allows the court to impinge upon the jury's assessment of witness credibility when the testimony at trial is so contradictory that the verdict reached would be inherently improbable.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 751 (Ind. 2015). “The incredible dubiosity rule is only applied in limited circumstances.” Id. at 754. “[T]he appropriate scope of the incredible dubiosity rule as utilized in Indiana ․ requires that there be: 1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 756.

[9] Hatton asserts that “[b]ecause MV1's testimony was the only evidence the jury heard that established [Hatton's] guilt, he satisfies prong one of the incredible dubiosity analysis.” (Appellant's Br. at 12-13.) However, as the State notes, “more than one witness gave evidence of different elements needed to prove the rape of” MV1. (Appellee's Br. at 11.) W-1 testified that she never heard MV1 verbally consent to sex with Hatton, which is some evidence the intercourse was not consensual. MV2 testified that she viewed the video W-1 recorded and that the video depicted MV1 “passed out on the bed not moving and [Hatton] was standing over her having sex with her.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 229.) Thus, MV1 was not the sole testifying witness supporting the charge of rape. In addition, even though W-1 deleted the video of Hatton and MV1 before the police had the opportunity to find and preserve it, the existence of the video at one time is undisputed, and the video constituted circumstantial evidence of Hatton's guilt.

[10] Hatton argues MV1's testimony was “inherently improbable” and “contrary to how a reasonable person would act under those circumstances” because MV1 continued to spend time with W-1 and Hatton in the months following the birthday party. (Appellant's Br. at 13.) Nevertheless, Hatton does not argue there was anything about her testimony that was inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion. Hatton points to a discrepancy between W-1's testimony and MV1's testimony regarding whether MV1 was conscious during the intercourse, but it is the role of the fact-finder to weigh the evidence and resolve conflicting factual testimony between witnesses. See Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022) (“It is the role of the jury, as fact-finder, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. When there are conflicts in the evidence, the jury must resolve them.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, we hold Hatton has not satisfied any of the three prongs required to prove MV1's testimony was incredibly dubious, and we affirm the trial court because the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction. See, e.g., Leyva v. State, 971 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding testimony of victim was not incredibly dubious and the State presented sufficient evidence to support defendant's child molesting conviction), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[11] MV1's testimony was not incredibly dubious, and the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hatton's conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a) (2022). In the same proceeding, Hatton was also convicted of a second count of Level 3 felony rape, Class B misdemeanor battery, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c) (2024), and Class A misdemeanor contributing to the delinquency of a minor, Ind. Code § 35-46-1-8(a) (2017). However, Hatton does not challenge those convictions on appeal.

2.   The trial court also sentenced Hatton to thirteen years for his second rape conviction, 180 days for his Class A misdemeanor contributing to the delinquency of a minor conviction, and 60 days for his Class B misdemeanor battery conviction. The trial court ordered Hatton to serve his Level 3 felony rape sentences consecutively and his misdemeanor sentences concurrently with one of his rape sentences, for an aggregate term of twenty-six years.

May, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Vaidik, J., concur.