IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: J.W. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In December of 2023, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned to have J.W. (“Child”) adjudicated to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) after a staff member at her school observed bruising on her abdomen, which had been caused by her mother, D.B (“Mother”). Child was removed from Mother's care and eventually placed with her maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). After Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS, Mother was ordered to participate in various services, which she failed to consistently do. DCS eventually petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child, which, after a hearing, the juvenile court granted. Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 4, 2023, then-ten-year-old Child was removed from Mother's care after a school staff member observed a bruise on Child's abdomen. Child had told the school staff that Mother had struck her with a belt and that she was afraid of getting into more trouble and became extremely upset. When a DCS family case manager (“FCM”) tried to interview Mother about the bruise, she became verbally aggressive. As for Child's Father,¹ he was unable to care for Child because he was in jail on pending murder and armed-robbery charges.

[3] On December 5, 2023, DCS filed a CHINS petition. On December 18, 2023, Child was placed with Grandmother. On February 29, 2024, Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS, and the juvenile court ordered Mother to participate in a family-functioning assessment, home-based therapy, and family therapy and to follow the recommendations of the service providers.

[4] Meanwhile, beginning in December of 2023, Mother attended four child and family team meetings (“CFTMs”) with FCM Jonathan Tokoko, a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for Child, the service providers, and Grandmother. During the meetings, Mother seemed to have a grudge against DCS regarding previous allegations ² and was a difficult person to work with. “[Mother] would always mention that she has work, she has other things to do, she don't have time for this.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Mother also often complained about Grandmother. Mother was unruly, disrespectful towards DCS employees, and did not seem to like anything. Mother accused Child of lying about the allegations underlying the CHINS petition. Mother had nothing nice to say about Child and accused her of being manipulative and “fat and nasty[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 49. When one therapist tried to increase the amount of visitation between Mother and Child, Mother refused, saying she had to work.

[5] Beginning in June of 2024, Mother participated in a family-functioning assessment that was designed to identify her strengths and needs. Mother refused to meet with the assessor at her home, provide any employment information, or discuss her own mental health. Mother blamed DCS's involvement on Child, whom she characterized as a liar and a manipulator. As part of the assessment, the assessor observed a visitation between Mother and Child. Mother spent the first thirty minutes of the visit playing with another child instead of Child, something the assessor had never seen before.

[6] Between May of 2024 and February of 2025, therapist June French provided family-therapy services to Mother and Child for a short time and then to just Mother. In the first session, Mother stated that DCS's involvement was all Child's fault, Child had all the problems, and everything would be better if Child fixed her problems. French observed that that made Child “put her head down, she stopped talking and she just looked sad.” Tr. Vol. II p. 27. In the next session, French attempted a game that encouraged Mother and Child to say nice things about each other. Child did very well in saying positive things about Mother, but “[w]hen it was [Mother]’s turn to say something positive about [Child], she responded, I don't know.” Tr. Vol. II p. 28. When French prompted Mother to say something nice about Child, Mother said, “I like her hair because it's like my hair or I like this because it's similar [․] to me.” Tr. Vol. II p. 28. French ended the game because it became just another way for Child to be disappointed. French stopped family therapy after this second session due to concerns that it was not healthy for Child.

[7] After that, French began working with Mother individually. French tried to work with Mother on anger management, but Mother refused to and became “very mad” when such work was recommended. Tr. Vol. II p. 31. Mother also refused to identify any goals for individual therapy, would not agree to any treatment, and called French a liar when she said something that Mother did not like. French never recommended unsupervised visitation because what she had observed during family counseling had appeared to her to be “toxic” to Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 31. French unsuccessfully discharged Mother in February of 2025.

[8] Therapist Jada Tucker started working with Child and attending therapeutic visits between Mother and Child in October of 2024. During CFTMs, Mother accused Tucker of lying about various things. Tucker observed that “[i]t is always an argument” with Mother. Tr. Vol. II p. 67. Mother refused to provide Tucker with a schedule so that Tucker could coordinate therapeutic visits. Tucker observed during therapeutic visits that Mother had made it clear to Child that she was to blame for the case. During a visit on Child's birthday in October of 2025, Mother “did not want to stay very long[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 70. The visit lasted “maybe an hour, and that was too long because [Mother] kept saying, I have to go. I have things to do. I have this, I need to go.” Tr. Vol. II p. 70. Mother was very upset and not interested in talking to or visiting with Child. Tucker later testified that “there's no positive progression in this case. Visits have not been consistent[,]” and “[t]hey're just like they were when I first started[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 73.

[9] On November 6, 2024, the juvenile court changed Child's permanency plan to a concurrent plan of reunification with Mother and adoption by Grandmother. Around February 25, 2025, a CFTM occurred, at which Mother “seemed very nonchalant and not present. She was on her phone during the majority of the meeting[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 92. On March 14, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father.

[10] For several months in 2025, Mother was in a relationship with a man named “Ollie,” who was staying in her home and had previously been arrested for sexually molesting his girlfriend's daughter. FCM Samantha Deweese (who had been assigned to the case in February of 2025) tried to address that issue with Mother, who responded that it was none of her business and had nothing to do with Child. Grandmother told Mother that if she wanted Child back, she would need to stop seeing Ollie. Mother responded that she was an adult, she could do what she wanted, and nobody could tell her who she could date. When Tucker tried to address concerns about Ollie, Mother told her that what she did with Ollie was none of her business, it was her personal life, and it should not have any impact on home visitation. Around October 30, 2025, Mother stopped contacting the therapist who had been assigned to work with her.

[11] Around October of 2025, Mother experienced difficulty with her housing and finances. Grandmother and a family friend paid $800.00 to restore disconnected water and electricity. (Tr. Vol. II pp. 55, 69, 94). Grandmother did not know how long Mother's water had been shut off before she had paid the bill. FCM Deweese conducted a public-records check and discovered that Mother was also facing eviction. Mother had not told FCM Deweese about those issues. In January of 2026, Mother provided information to FCM Deweese that she would not, in fact, be evicted. As a result of Mother's housing situation, her visitation was inconsistent between October of 2025 and February of 2026. Tucker tried to help Mother address the housing issue, but Mother said that it was none of her business.

[12] On February 10, 2026, the juvenile court held a factfinding hearing on the termination petition. Child was now twelve years old and had been placed with Grandmother for over two years. Grandmother testified that when Child had come to live with her in December of 2023, she had had problems with boundaries, putting her hands on other people, anger, wanting to fight adults, lying, and poor academics. Grandmother had also observed that Mother had consistently talked negatively to her about her situation, how she should handle things and told her that she should not listen to anyone besides Mother. Grandmother was very concerned because that had negatively affected Child and she did not want Child to get into trouble as a result of being misguided by Mother.

[13] Grandmother testified that, as of the fact-finding hearing, “[Child] is doing wonderful. [Child] has a lot more confidence in herself. [Child] speaks for herself. She knows she has a voice that she can speak for herself now. She looks forward to doing well[,]” and all of her grades in school had improved. Tr. Vol. II p. 60. Grandmother further stated, “[Child's] doing very well. Everybody, every one of our providers, her doctors, her therapist, everybody is very proud of [Child] because [Child] has made a very positive turnaround.” Tr. Vol. II p. 61. Grandmother also testified that she would adopt Child if Mother's parental rights were terminated.

[14] FCM Deweese testified that terminating Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. FCM Deweese indicated that there had been very minimal progress and, while there had been some periods of engagement, it had not been consistent. FCM Deweese testified that permanency was important for Child so that she would not have to experience “a guessing game of if I'm going to stay here, if I'm going to go somewhere else, if something could happen and then this person can't take care of me anymore[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 98.

[15] GAL TeQuaysha Tubbs, who had been appointed in November of 2024, also testified that terminating Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. GAL Tubbs stated that Mother still maintained an emotional distance from Child and that it had taken her far too long to separate from Ollie. GAL Tubbs also had ongoing concerns about the lack of progress in the relationship between Mother and Child. GAL Tubbs observed that while Child tried to engage in loving behavior with Mother, Mother had not reciprocated. GAL Tubbs also testified that Mother still blamed Child for the DCS case and that Mother had never taken any responsibility for DCS's involvement. GAL Tubbs indicated that Child appeared to be doing well in her placement with Grandmother.

[16] After the factfinding hearing concluded, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. The juvenile court found that Child had been continuously removed from Mother's care for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and that neither the conditions resulting in removal nor the reasons for placement outside the home had been remedied. The juvenile court also concluded that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being and that the conditions leading to continued removal of Child from Mother would not be remedied. The juvenile court concluded that terminating the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests, noting that both the FCM and the GAL had recommended terminating Mother's parental rights. Finally, the juvenile court found that adoption by Grandmother was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child.

Discussion and Decision

[17] Mother contends that the juvenile court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights to Child. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Moreover, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships in our culture.” Id. (citation omitted). “Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parties are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents.” In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. “Termination of parental rights is proper where the children's emotional and physical development is threatened.” In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d at 773. The juvenile court “need not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id.

[18] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Invol. Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We recognize the juvenile court's “unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court's only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[19] In order to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child, DCS was required to prove the following:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

[․.]

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and (B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home [or]

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4. Mother challenges only the juvenile court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[20] In considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted).

[21] Here, FCM Deweese and GAL Tubbs both testified that terminating Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (noting that the testimony of DCS case workers and a court-appointed special advocate regarding the children's best interests supported the juvenile court's finding that termination was in the children's best interests). While this evidence may be sufficient to support the termination of Mother's parental rights to Child on its own, we need not address that question because there is much more.

[22] As detailed above, the record contains evidence of Child being physically abused by Mother, having shown up to school with a bruise on her abdomen, caused by Mother hitting her with a belt. There is also ample evidence of Mother's habit of blaming Child, Grandmother, and DCS employees for everything that was wrong, frequently expressing her belief that DCS's involvement in the case was all Child's fault. The record also contains copious evidence that Mother frequently refused to participate and/or fully engage in services, including family and individual therapy, visitation, CFTMs, or attempts to address her anger issues.

[23] The record also contains evidence that Mother struggled to maintain stable and appropriate housing: Mother's water and electricity were cut off for an unknown amount of time (before they were restored by others), and she faced eviction at one point. Finally, the record indicates that, despite multiple persons raising concerns, Mother was involved in an extended romantic relationship with a man who had been charged with child molesting, lived in her home, and interfered with a service provider. All of this additional evidence is directly relevant to the question of Mother's fitness as a parent, and such evidence may support a juvenile court's conclusion that termination is in a child's best interests. See In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 221 (“A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the Child's best interests.”) (citation omitted). In addition, there is evidence that Child was doing very well in her pre-adoptive placement with Grandmother, having increased confidence, knowing that she will be heard, and doing better in school. In summary, there is ample evidence to sustain the juvenile court's conclusion that termination and adoption by Grandmother is in Child's best interests.

[24] Mother argues that the testimony of FCM Deweese and GAL Tubbs was inadequate to support a termination of her parental rights because it was allegedly solely based on the desire for Child to have permanency. It is true that the Indiana Supreme Court has held that “[w]e do not find that G.Y.’s need for immediate permanency through adoption to be a sufficiently strong reason, either alone or in conjunction with the court's other reasons, to warrant a conclusion by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights is in G.Y.’s best interests.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265–66 (Ind. 2009). Even if we were to assume that G.Y. stands for the general proposition that evidence of a need for permanency, standing alone, can never be sufficient to support termination, Mother's argument ignores the copious evidence from other sources regarding Mother's abuse of Child (physical and otherwise), failure to comply with services, refusal to accept responsibility, and difficulty maintaining a safe and stable home. Mother's reliance on G.Y. is unavailing.

[25] Mother also mentions evidence that she at one point had requested a second family functional assessment, which was never completed. This evidence, however, does not support the juvenile court's judgment, and we will not consider it. See, e.g., In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879. The juvenile court was in the best position to evaluate the evidence, and we will not second-guess its determinations. Mother's argument is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Matter of Eq.W. 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2019).³

[26] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's father consented to the adoption of Child on October 8, 2025, and does not participate in this appeal. (Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 78).

2.   A petition to have Child found to be a CHINS had been filed in 2021 and resolved through an informal adjustment. (Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 86).

3.   Mother cites to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4.5(d), which provides, in part, that a possible compelling reason that the petitioner (generally, DCS) may wish to file a motion to dismiss a petition to terminate a parent's parental rights is “the fact that the child is being cared for by a custodian who is a relative[.]” To the extent that Mother may be suggesting that this statute requires DCS to dismiss a termination petition whenever a child is placed with a relative after removal from the parent's home, suffice it to say that it merely gives DCS that option, which it declined to exercise in this case.

Bradford, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.