Greg Schafer, Appellant-Plaintiff v. LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Greg Schafer was removed from the board of directors of Shorewood Forest Utilities, Inc. (“Utility”), a nonprofit cooperative wastewater utility. He subsequently filed claims against numerous defendants, including an attorney and two law firms (collectively, the “Attorney Defendants”), which had advised Utility. The trial court dismissed all of Schafer's claims against the Attorney Defendants. Schafer appeals, and the Attorney Defendants seek an award of attorney fees for their defense of this appeal. We affirm the dismissal of Schafer's claims, award the Attorney Defendants attorney fees based on Schafer's bad-faith conduct of this appeal, and remand to the trial court to calculate reasonable attorney fees.

Facts

[2] Schafer's amended complaint alleged the following facts. Schafer was twice elected to serve on Utility's board of directors by its members. During his tenure, he raised concerns about the safety of some of Utility's sewer facilities, its billing and collection practices, and its payment of legal fees to protect board members. In response, board members consulted attorney Scott Seville about removing Schafer. Relying on Seville's advice, a majority of the board voted to remove Schafer without providing notice to Schafer or to Utility's members. Seville and his law firm, Robbins & Seville, LLC (“Robbins & Seville”), then communicated to others that Schafer was no longer a director. They also advised Utility not to indemnify Schafer for his related legal expenses.

[3] In a subsequent board election, Schafer supported “reform candidates” who won seats and voted to reinstate Schafer. Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 66. But when Schafer again raised concerns about “leadership and governance,” the new board consulted another law firm, Sworden Law Office, P.C. (“Sworden”), which advised that Schafer had been appointed, rather than reinstated to his elected position. Id. at 67. That advice renewed “confusion about Schafer's true status as an elected director” as it suggested the board could remove him again. Id. Yet, after another change in board membership, Schafer ultimately “had his status” as a continuously serving elected director “acknowledged.” Id.

[4] Schafer's amended complaint included claims against Seville, Robbins & Seville, and Sworden—the Attorney Defendants—for legal malpractice, “conflicted representation,” and civil conspiracy. Id. at 73. The complaint also included: a derivative claim against the Attorney Defendants for “misuse and waste of [Utility's] corporate funds”; defamation claims against Seville and Robbins & Seville; and a claim that Sworden “aid[ed] and abett[ed]” the Utility board's breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 73–74. Schafer requested, among other things, compensatory damages for malpractice and defamation, punitive damages, and restitution to Utility of “funds wrongfully expended.” Id. at 79.

[5] The Attorney Defendants moved to dismiss Schafer's claims for failure to state a claim under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). The trial court dismissed with prejudice all of Schafer's claims against the Attorney Defendants, entered its order as a final judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 54(B), and denied Schafer's motion to correct error.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Schafer appeals the dismissal of his claims against the Attorney Defendants, who in turn request that we order Schafer to pay their attorney fees for defending this appeal.

I. Issues with Schafer's Briefing

[7] Schafer's briefing pervasively violates our Appellate Rules in numerous ways that hinder our review. We choose to address some of his arguments to the extent we are able, but we conclude he has waived the remainder.

A. Violations of the Appellate Rules

[8] It is well settled that pro se litigants like Schafer are held to the same standards as trained attorneys and receive no leniency simply because they represent themselves. Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025). “This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Here, Schafer's briefing violates the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure in several respects.

[9] His briefing lacks any “citations to ․ the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on.” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Thus, Schafer never cites the contents of his amended complaint to explain what makes it legally sufficient. Schafer also claims in his initial brief that the trial court imposed a $400 sanction on him, while noting: “[CITE NEEDED: sanction order not located in the provided Appendix Vols. II-IV.]” Appellant's Br., p. 25. Schafer then acknowledges in his reply brief that he was not in fact sanctioned in this proceeding.

[10] With rare exceptions, Schafer generally fails to provide citations to pertinent “authorities” such as caselaw to support his arguments. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). And several of the authorities Schafer does cite do not stand for the propositions he asserts. For example, Schafer cites Miller v. Cent. Ind. Cmty. Found., Inc., 11 N.E.3d 944, 954–56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), for the proposition that “nonprofit governance rights may be enforced according to governing documents and Indiana nonprofit law.” Appellant's Br., p. 23. But the cited material concerns defamation. Schafer also misdescribes material in Ind. Dep't of Env't Mgmt. v. Conard, 614 N.E.2d 916, 922 (Ind. 1993), and St. John Town Bd. v. Lambert, 725 N.E.2d 507, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

[11] Schafer's briefing also contains suggestive indicators that he may have relied on artificial intelligence or other software without verifying its output. These include the “[CITE NEEDED: sanction order not located in the provided Appendix Vols. II-IV]” entry discussed above, the cases cited for inaccurate propositions, and the statement “Final word count should be confirmed in Microsoft Word before filing” appearing in the word count certificates of Schafer's initial and reply briefs. Appellant's Br., p. 27; Reply Br., p. 25. And his briefing contains other strange features such as garbled text—“Neither Appellee identifies the source of authority by which three directors could remove heclaimsxeqwredfactualdeve opmen concerning counsel's advice”— and, remarkably, an identical 6,036-word count for both his initial brief and his reply brief. Reply Br., p. 24. Panels of this Court have warned litigants about the dangers of reliance on artificial intelligence and the need to verify briefs before filing—as well as about the possibility of sanctions. See, e.g., Holstein v. Holstein, 283 N.E.3d 233, 241–42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).

[12] All in all, Schafer's contentions lack “cogent reasoning.” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). For instance, Schafer does not explain what duty the Attorney Defendants owed him, as necessary to support his tort claims, or how the law authorizes him to sue the Attorney Defendants derivatively on Utility's behalf for misuse of funds.

[13] It is not our role as adjudicator to search the record or devise legal arguments for a party that has failed to develop them adequately. Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990). Thus, we could deem all of Schafer's arguments waived. Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984. Nevertheless, we choose to briefly address the arguments we can discern and deem the remainder to be waived because their lack of cogency inhibits our review.

B. Merits of Discernible Arguments

[14] Turning to the merits of Schafer's reviewable arguments, “[w]e review a trial court's decision on a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion de novo.” Kelly v. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 260 N.E.3d 934, 937 (Ind. 2025). “Taking the facts alleged as true and viewing all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, we ask whether a legally actionable injury has occurred.” Id. at 937–38.

[15] Schafer asserts generally that the Attorney Defendants “supplied successive legal theories that enabled ․ [his] removal from the Board despite member-election rights, governing-document limits, and Indiana nonprofit law.” Appellant's Br., p. 17. And his core claims are premised on alleged legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty by attorneys.

[16] Such claims require a showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, which usually depends on the existence of an attorney–client relationship. Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1283–84 (Ind. 1996). Yet, as Schafer concedes, the “general rule” is that an entity's attorneys “represent the entity”—here, Utility, not directors like him. Appellant's Br., p. 18. Indeed, our Professional Conduct Rules provide that “[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.” Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 1.13(a).

[17] Because any attorney–client relationships in this case existed between the Attorney Defendants and Utility alone, the Attorney Defendants owed Schafer no duty. Schafer contends the Attorney Defendants “were not mere bystanders” to his removal from the board because they advised board members on the matter. Appellant's Br., p. 18. But those allegations have no bearing on whether the Attorney Defendants owed Schafer the requisite duty. Consequently, Schafer has failed to state actionable claims for legal malpractice, “conflicted representation,” or breach of fiduciary duty.

[18] Schafer also argues the Attorney Defendants engaged in a “civil conspiracy” with others to remove him improperly from his position and aided and abetted that conduct. Id. at 20–21. But his briefing fails to state a cognizable tort that the Attorney Defendants conspired in or aided. See ONB Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Est. of Megel, 107 N.E.3d 484, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (stating that conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting theories require an underlying tort). And he supplies no authority for his amended complaint's theory that the Attorney Defendants’ legal advice subjects them to liability as conspirators. See Meier v. Pearlman, 401 N.E.2d 31, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (“Absent fraud, collusion, malicious or tortious conduct on the part of an attorney, the rule is ․ well established that no liability to third parties arises from the attorney's conduct as an attorney for another.”)

[19] Schafer thus fails to persuade us that his claims were dismissed in error.

II. Request for Appellate Attorney Fees

[20] The Attorney Defendants request attorney fees for their defense of what they characterize as Schafer's “frivolous” and “bad faith” appeal. Appellee's Br. of Sworden, p. 44.

[21] Appellate Rule 66(E) authorizes us to “assess damages if an appeal ․ is frivolous or in bad faith,” and such damages “may include attorneys’ fees.” We award attorney fees only when “an appeal is permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay.” Staff Source, LLC v. Wallace, 143 N.E.3d 996, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

[22] Bad faith comes in two forms. Arguments that are “utterly devoid of all plausibility” constitute substantive bad faith. Id. And “[p]rocedural bad faith occurs when a party flagrantly disregards the form and content requirements of the rules of appellate procedure, omits and misstates relevant facts appearing in the record, and files briefs written in a manner calculated to require the maximum expenditure of time both by the opposing party and the reviewing court.” Id. “Just as pro se litigants are required to follow all of the rules of appellate procedure, they are liable for attorney fees when they disregard the rules in bad faith.” Boczar v. Meridian St. Found., 749 N.E.2d 87, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We agree with the Attorney Defendants that Schafer's briefing exhibits both substantive and procedural bad faith.

[23] In terms of substantive bad faith, Schafer's arguments are devoid of legal merit. On his core malpractice-related claims, he acknowledges that the Attorney Defendants represented Utility, not himself. Yet he fails to cite any authority supporting his right to bring such claims. He also offers no pertinent authorities to show he may pursue his conspiracy, aiding-and-abetting, or derivative claims. What's more, the authorities Schafer does cite in his briefing are in large part irrelevant, inaccurately described, and unsupportive of his arguments. His briefing pervasively lacks cogency.

[24] Schafer has also displayed procedural bad faith by flagrantly violating the Appellate Rules. He fails to cite his amended complaint to show in what ways it is legally sufficient. His initial brief fails to cite any sanctions order in the record to show that he was sanctioned. Swathes of his argument lack citations to authorities. And at least one of his duplicate word count certificates is inaccurate.¹ Furthermore, it is evident from the Attorney Defendants’ briefs that responding to Schafer's meritless arguments cost their attorneys considerable time and effort.

[25] To be clear, we are not sanctioning Schafer merely because his briefing lacks merit or is unpersuasive. Rather, Schafer's briefing blatantly violates the Appellate Rules. It contains omissions and errors that demonstrate a lack of concern for accuracy. And it is so pervasively frivolous that we conclude Schafer pursued this appeal without attempting in good faith to mount cogent legal arguments. “These are circumstances significantly more grave than mere lack of merit. Gross abuse of the right to appellate review ‘crowds our court to the detriment of meritorious actions, and should not go unrebuked.’ ” Posey v. Lafayette Bank & Tr. Co., 512 N.E.2d 155, 156 (Ind. 1987) (quoting Marshall v. Reeves, 316 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. 1974)).

[26] For these reasons, we conclude that the Attorney Defendants are entitled to appellate attorney fees. See Wenner v. Hensley, 224 N.E.3d 339, 342–45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (imposing attorney fees on a pro se litigant whose briefing lacked citations to the record and cogent argument).

Conclusion

[27] Schafer fails to persuade us that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims against the Attorney Defendants. And we find it appropriate to award the Attorney Defendants attorney fees for defending this bad-faith appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Schafer's claims and remand to the trial court with instructions to calculate reasonable appellate attorney fees.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Following the dictates of Appellate Rule 44(C), our count reveals that Schafer's reply brief actually contains approximately 4,900 words.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.