LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT RALIS v. NICOLOSI (2026)

[1] A client previously represented in other matters by the Law Offices of Robert J. Ralis (Ralis) lost a foreclosure action. The foreclosure judgment resulted in a sheriff's sale of the client's property, leaving a $25,373.31 surplus. After the surplus funds were transferred to the court clerk and made available to “rightful claimants,” two parties stepped forward to claim the monies. The first was Daniel Nicolosi, the mortgagee who won the foreclosure judgment and was allegedly owed certain profits from the sale under a separate agreement. The second claimant was Ralis, which had intervened in the foreclosure action to assert an attorney lien that was based on outstanding fees owed to Ralis by the former client.

[2] The trial court found no valid attorney lien existed and denied Ralis's claim, prompting this appeal. We affirm the trial court's judgment, concluding that Ralis was not entitled to a statutory attorney lien on proceeds arising from a judgment entered against, rather than in favor of, its former client.

Facts

[3] Nicolosi held a mortgage on real property in Michigan City, Indiana. On November 27, 2024, the trial court entered a foreclosure judgment on that property in favor of Nicolosi and against four parties: North Side Ventures, LLC (North Side); 100 North Washington, LLC; Todd T. Davis; and the Indiana Department of Revenue. The judgment directed that sale proceeds be applied in the following order: (1) costs of the action and the expenses of the sheriff's sale; (2) to Nicolosi in the amount of $1,029,197, with interest at 15% per annum; and (3) to the Clerk “for the use and benefit of those rightfully entitled thereto, subject to further Order of this Court.” App. Vol. II, p. 13.

[4] Prior to the foreclosure judgment, Ralis had performed legal work for North Side on matters unrelated to the foreclosure action. On January 26, 2025—after entry of the foreclosure judgment—Ralis filed an “Attorney's Intention to Hold Lien,” asserting North Side owed Ralis unpaid fees of approximately $110,000.

[5] The foreclosed property sold at sheriff's sale in August 2025 for about $1.23 million. After satisfaction of Nicolosi's mortgage, interest, and the expenses of the sale, $25,373.31 remained and was paid to the Clerk. Two parties petitioned for the surplus: Ralis, citing its purported attorney lien, and Nicolosi, as an assignee of a 2023 Joint-Venture Agreement with North Side which allegedly entitled him to certain net profits from the sale of the foreclosed property.

[6] The trial court awarded the surplus funds to Nicolosi. The court concluded that Ralis had no attorney lien on the surplus funds under these circumstances because the attorney lien statute applied only to judgments rendered in favor of Ralis’ former client, North Side, not against it. And the surplus funds from the sheriff's sale did not arise from a judgment rendered in favor of North Side. Ralis appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] The dispositive question is one of statutory interpretation: whether Ralis's attorney lien attached to a foreclosure judgment awarded to Nicolosi (the opponent of Ralis's former client) and the resulting surplus funds from that judgment. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Bojko v. Anonymous Physician, 232 N.E.3d 1155, 1158 (Ind. 2024).

[8] Indiana Code § 33-43-4-1 (the Attorney Lien Statute) specifies that “[a]n attorney practicing law in a court of record in Indiana may hold a lien for the attorney's fees on a judgment rendered in favor of a person employing the attorney to obtain the judgment.” “Our goal when interpreting a statute is to determine the legislature's intent.” Gierek v. Anonymous 1, 250 N.E.3d 378, 385 (Ind. 2025).

[9] “[W]e start with the text of the statute itself.” Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1139 (Ind. 2022). “When the statute is clear and unambiguous, we avoid judicial construction by interpreting its words in their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “Mindful of what the statute says and what it doesn't say,” we seek to give the statute “ ‘a practical application,’ an approach designed to ‘prevent absurdity, hardship, or injustice.’ ” Gierek, 250 N.E.3d at 385 (quoting Pabey v. Pastrick, 816 N.E.2d 1138, 1148 (Ind. 2004)).

[10] Ralis does not claim that the statute is ambiguous, nor do we find it so. The plain language of the Attorney Lien Statute authorizes an attorney lien only on “a judgment rendered in favor of a person employing the attorney to obtain the judgment.” The record does not show that North Side—the defendant in the foreclosure case that was represented by someone other than Ralis—employed Ralis to obtain the foreclosure judgment to which Ralis purportedly attached its lien. Nor was that foreclosure judgment “rendered in favor of” North Side. In fact, the foreclosure judgment was against North Side. As the trial court aptly observed, the lien Ralis asserted is “a lien on [Nicolosi's] judgment,” not a lien on any judgment in favor of North Side. App. Vol. II, p. 14.

[11] We conclude that there was no “judgment rendered in favor of” Ralis's former client to which a lien could attach under the Attorney Lien Statute. See Ind. Code § 33-43-4-1. Accordingly, Ralis was not entitled to an attorney lien on the foreclosure judgment including the resulting surplus funds. See Johnston v. First Fed. Sav. Bank, 822 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (ruling that an attorney is entitled to a lien “only upon property recovered for a client” and denying a lien on property the attorney did not recover); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ken Nunn L. Off., 977 N.E.2d 971, 975–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (strictly enforcing the Attorney Lien Statute's requirement of a judgment rendered in favor of the client).

[12] Ralis's arguments to the contrary do not change our conclusion. Ralis focuses primarily on lien priority, rather than lien creation. But lien priority is irrelevant if no lien exists in the first place.

[13] Alternatively, Ralis claims it is entitled to an equitable lien on the surplus funds. However, the record is devoid of any claim by Ralis in the trial court that it was entitled to an equitable lien. A claim raised for the first time on appeal generally is waived. Merrillville 2548, Inc. v. BMO Bank N.A., 39 N.E.3d 382, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting GKC Ind. Theatres, Inc. v. Elk Retail Investors, LLC, 764 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).

[14] As the trial court did not err in finding that Ralis did not have a valid attorney lien on the surplus funds from the foreclosure judgment, and as Ralis waived its claim of an equitable lien, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

FOOTNOTES

1.   Given our ruling that Ralis was not entitled to the surplus funds because it lacked any legally cognizable claim to them, we need not address its remaining claims because they assume Ralis had such an interest.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.