Michael Blanchard, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Michael Blanchard molested a five-year-old Child (“Child”) on multiple occasions over a period of two or three months. Child later disclosed the abuse, and Blanchard was charged with and convicted of several child molesting counts. Blanchard now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to support Blanchard's child molesting convictions.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] When Child was approximately five years old, she visited Blanchard “every other week” after school at his home in Indianapolis, Indiana. Tr. Vol. II at 27. Child and Blanchard had a close relationship, and she called Blanchard, “Pops.” Id. at 46. In August 2024, when Child was 15 years old, she disclosed that Blanchard had sexually abused her when she was 5 years old. In an interview with law enforcement officers, Blanchard claimed he touched Child's “vagina,” Ex. Vol. I at 30, “many times,” id. at 35, because “she wanted [him] to touch her,” id. at 29. Blanchard could not remember whether his fingers went inside Child's vagina. The State charged Blanchard with six counts of child molesting—two as Class A felonies,¹ two as Level 1 felonies,² one as a Class C felony,³ and one as a Level 4 felony ⁴ .

[4] At Blanchard's bench trial, Child testified that when she was five years old, she was sitting “crisscross applesauce” on Blanchard's lap when he “asked [her] to pull [her] pants down until [she] did.” Tr. Vol. II at 51. Blanchard then touched her “bare vagina” with “[h]is fingers,” which he used to “rub[ ] in a circular motion” while the “top lips of [her] vagina opened.” Id. at 52. Child confirmed that Blanchard's fingers “went into [her] vagina[ ] but not into the hole,” id., and it felt “weird,” id. at 60. Child said that on another occasion and in a different room, Blanchard “touched [her in]appropriately in [her] vagina” in the same way as the previously described incident; that is, inside her vagina, but not inside her vaginal canal. Id. at 53. Child also described a time when Blanchard “had his pants pulled down and ․ made [her] touch his penis.” Id.

[5] Blanchard testified in his own defense, claimed his memory improved since his initial interview, and denied “touch[ing] inside of the lips of [Child's] vagina.” Tr. Vol. II at 104. According to Blanchard, he “could have” molested Child “more than five” times, id. at 108, but he only “move[d his] fingers back and forth” on the “outer ․ lip” of Child's vagina, id. at 110.

[6] The trial court found Blanchard guilty of one count each of child molesting as a Class A felony, child molesting as a Level 1 felony, child molesting as a Class C felony, and child molesting as a Level 4 felony. The trial court dismissed the remaining charges. In reaching its verdict, the trial court found Child's testimony was “clear,” Tr. Vol. II at 118, and did “not believe [Blanchard's] version of events,” id. at 117. The trial court sentenced Blanchard to a total of 30 years of incarceration. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Blanchard's Child Molesting Convictions

[7] Blanchard argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his convictions for child molesting as a Class A felony and child molesting as a Level 1 felony.⁵ Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[8] To convict Blanchard of child molesting as a Class A felony, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Blanchard was at least 21 years old when he performed or submitted to “deviate sexual conduct” with Child, who was less than 14 years old. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a) (effective July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2014). To convict Blanchard of child molesting as a Level 1 felony, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Blanchard was at least 21 years old when he knowingly or intentionally performed or submitted to “other sexual conduct” with Child, who was less than 14 years old. Id. § 35-42-4-3(a) (effective July 1, 2014, to June 30, 2015). Blanchard argues only that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show that he penetrated Child.

[9] “Deviate sexual conduct” and “other sexual conduct” both include “penetration of the sex organ ․ by an object.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-221.5; id. § -94 (effective July 1, 2012, to June 30, 2014). A finger is an object for purposes of the child molesting statute. Seal v. State, 105 N.E.3d 201, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Simmons v. State, 746 N.E.2d 81, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied), trans. denied. “[P]roof of the slightest penetration of the sex organ, including penetration of the external genitalia, is sufficient to demonstrate a person performed other sexual misconduct with a child.” Boggs v. State, 104 N.E.3d 1287, 1289 (Ind. 2018); see also Spurlock v. State, 675 N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ind. 1996) (concluding the same with respect to deviate sexual conduct).

[10] This is not a case where the testimony was limited to acts of “rub[bing] ‘up and down’ on the ‘outside’ of [a child's] ‘private part.’ ” Austin v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1184, 1185 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (reversing convictions for insufficient evidence of penetration). See Appellant's Br. at 14. Here, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that Blanchard rubbed Child's “bare vagina” with “[h]is fingers ․ in a circular motion” through the open “top lips of [her] vagina.” Tr. Vol. II at 52. Blanchard's fingers went “into [Child's] vagina[ ] but not into the hole” on at least two occasions. Id.

[11] Blanchard nevertheless argues that the evidence only supports fondling ⁶ because the State failed to elicit testimony from Child about her knowledge of female anatomy and Child's testimony was vague. These are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). Moreover, “a detailed anatomical description of penetration is unnecessary.” Spurlock, 675 N.E.2d at 315. The trial court specifically credited Child's testimony and disbelieved Blanchard's. From the evidence presented, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that Blanchard penetrated Child's external genitalia on at least two occasions. We therefore cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Blanchard's child molesting convictions, and we affirm those convictions.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a) (effective July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2014).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a) (effective July 1, 2014, to June 30, 2015).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b) (effective July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2014).

4.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b) (effective July 1, 2014, to June 30, 2015).

5.   Blanchard does not challenge his convictions for child molesting as a Level 4 felony and child molesting as a Class C felony.

6.   Child molesting by fondling is a lesser offense and does not require evidence of penetration. See Adcock v. State, 22 N.E.3d 720, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Downey v. State, 726 N.E.2d 794, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied).

Felix, Judge.

Foley, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.