IN RE: K.B. and K.C. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.C. (“Mother”) and K.B. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's adjudication of their two children, K.B. and K.C. (collectively, “Children”), as children in need of services (“CHINS”). Parents raise the following restated issues:

1. Does sufficient evidence support the CHINS adjudication?

2. Did the trial court err in ordering Father's participation in father engagement services?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Parents have a history of DCS involvement. In 2021, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to then five-year-old M.C., in part because she was unable to provide M.C. with appropriate housing. Father consented to M.C.’s adoption.

[4] Parents welcomed K.B. in August 2024 and K.C. in July 2025. Shortly after K.C.’s birth, Father relocated from Indianapolis to the St. Louis metropolitan area.

[5] On November 8, 2025, Mother was arrested for battery on a public safety official following an incident with her housemate, K.J.¹ Mother called emergency services after K.J. locked her out of his house, where she claimed to be renting a room. Mother did not have a rental agreement with K.J. At some point after the responding officers and Mother were inside the house, she shoved one of the officers. Police placed Mother under arrest, and she spent the night in jail.²

[6] Police called DCS, and a caseworker arrived at the property. Once there, the caseworker observed cigarette butts and ashes near Children's food. The caseworker noted Children lacked their own place to sleep. He noticed open alcohol containers and a broken door. DCS removed Children from the home on an emergency basis because there was no one to care for them.

[7] On November 12, DCS filed verified petitions alleging Children were CHINS. Based on the above events, DCS alleged Parents failed to ensure Children's safety and well-being and that court intervention was necessary. After an initial hearing held the same day, the trial court approved Children's continued removal. DCS later placed Children under the care of a relative.

[8] The trial court held a factfinding hearing on February 5, 2026. Mother's home-based case manager testified Mother needed assistance with finding employment, stable housing, and improving her parenting skills. She testified Mother had yet to complete the assigned parenting curriculum. According to the home-based case manager, Mother intended to move to a senior citizen apartment, but her plans changed and as of the hearing she claimed to be staying at K.J.’s house.

[9] The court heard testimony from the visitation supervisor, who worked with Mother for about a month. In that time frame, Mother claimed to be living in two different places, one of which was K.J.’s house. The supervisor recounted two instances when she had to terminate Mother's visits early. She testified Mother became angry during a scheduled visit in a library room when she asked Mother not to touch the thermostat. Mother started calling the supervisor “every name in the book.” Id. at 23. Mother exited the room while yelling and swearing. She swung open the room's door after the supervisor attempted to close it.

[10] On the other occasion, K.C. was crying and the supervisor suggested Mother give the baby something to drink. Mother became upset, and she called 9-1-1 after insisting there was something wrong with K.C. She ended the call after being placed on hold. The supervisor stated Mother needed services “to learn how to control her anger around the kids.” Id. at 28.

[11] Regarding Father, the supervisor testified he interacted with Children primarily over the phone.

[12] Parents’ Family Case Manager (“FCM”) also testified at the factfinding hearing. The FCM testified about Mother's lack of employment and stable housing, and she was especially concerned with Mother returning to K.J.’s house after he previously locked her out. The FCM recommended Mother participate in home-based and anger management services as well as parenting education.

[13] As to Father, the FCM testified she reached out to him “maybe eight or more” times since Children's removal, but she did not clarify whether Father responded. Id. at 44. The FCM further testified Father had not sought to secure custody of Children. The FCM recommended Father participate in father engagement services.

[14] Mother characterized the incident precipitating DCS involvement as a “misunderstanding” between her and K.J. Id. at 50. Mother testified she was released from jail the day after the event, and she promptly returned to K.J.’s home. Mother stated she occasionally stayed elsewhere out of boredom and because Children were not with her. Mother testified she had lived in K.J.’s house for four years prior to her arrest. When asked what her plan was if he asked her to leave again, Mother testified she would move to St. Louis to live with Father.³ Mother acknowledged arguing with the visitation supervisor at the library, explaining, “You see I'm interacting with my kids and I'm hot. Be cool and let me turn on the air for a minute[ ].” Id. at 52. Mother testified she earned income as a content creator for a social media site in addition to receiving financial support from Father. Mother asserted she had no problem providing for Children's needs.

[15] Father testified Mother and Children lived with him in Indianapolis for several months before his relocation to St. Louis. Father stated he moved to St. Louis “[t]o get apart from the family and to get a home and a better job.” Id. at 63–64. He worked full-time as a delivery driver and lived in his aunt's house. Father testified he hoped to bring Mother and Children to live with him in St. Louis where his own extended family resided. Father likewise asserted he had no problem providing for Children's needs.

[16] At the close of the evidence, Parents asked the trial court to rule from the bench, arguing the evidence was insufficient to find Children were CHINS. The trial court concluded DCS met its burden and found Children were CHINS. In a separate order issued after the factfinding, the trial court found in part:

[Children] have been removed and are currently in Relative Care.

The [c]ourt finds that it is in the best interests of the children to be removed from the home environment and remaining in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the children because: of an inability, refusal or neglect to provide shelter, care, and/or supervision at the present time and the children need[ ] protection that cannot be provided in the home.

Father's App. Vol. 2 at 100–01.

[17] The trial court held a dispositional hearing on March 5, and issued a dispositional decree shortly thereafter. In relevant part, the decree states:

3․ The [c]ourt finds pursuant to this dispositional decree that reasonable services have been offered and [are] available to the family for the purposes of preventing or eliminating the continued need for removal of [Children] and the possibility of reuniting the family.

4․ The [c]ourt finds pursuant to this dispositional decree reasonable efforts were made by DCS to prevent or eliminate the need for continued removal of the child. The statements of reasonable efforts as set forth in the pleadings, reports, and documents of DCS and/or all other service providers filed herein are incorporated by reference. The [c]ourt finds responsibility for the placement and care of [Children] is ordered or continues to be ordered to [DCS.]

Id. at 141. The decree continued Children's placement in relative care, with a plan for reunification. Additionally, the court ordered Mother to participate in services, including anger management and parenting education. The court also ordered Father to participate in father engagement services.

Standard of Review

[18] In a CHINS proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined in the juvenile code. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012); see Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 to -11 (describing instances under which a child is a CHINS); I.C. § 31-34-12-3 (1997) (stating preponderance standard). A CHINS adjudication focuses on the needs and condition of the child. In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility.” In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577–78 (Ind. 2017). We consider only the evidence supporting the trial court's decision and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. at 578.

[19] When a trial court supplements a CHINS adjudication with findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “We consider first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. “We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous.” D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578. “Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference, and a judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard.” W.H., 254 N.E.3d at 554. We accept unchallenged findings as true. Id.

[20] In this case, DCS alleged Children were CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1, which requires DCS to prove:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

“The statute contains three basic elements: (1) the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child; (2) the child's needs are unmet; and (3) those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475 (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)).

Sufficient evidence supports the CHINS adjudication.

[21] Parents both argue DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to find Children were CHINS. See Mother's Br. at 8–9; Father's Br. at 21–22. Parents essentially argue the same thing: the trial court's CHINS determination was clearly erroneous because the circumstances leading to Children's removal had been fixed, DCS failed to prove Children had unmet needs, and DCS failed to prove Children's needs were unlikely to be met without State intervention. See Mother's Br. at 13–16; Father's Br. at 25–30.

[22] A court renders a CHINS judgment as to a child, not as to a parent. In re E.K., 260 N.E.3d 901, 917 (Ind. 2025). Such an adjudication does not establish the culpability of a particular parent. K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1256. “Because a CHINS determination regards the status of the child, a separate analysis as to each parent is not required in the CHINS determination stage.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010); see also M.K. v. Ind. Dept. of Child. Servs., 964 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (declining to conduct separate analysis as to each parent when evaluating the sufficiency of the CHINS determination). The acts or omissions of one parent can cause conditions prompting the need for court intervention. In re D.P., 213 N.E.3d 552, 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105), trans. denied.

[23] The evidence demonstrates Children were seriously endangered. Mother was locked out of the property where she claimed to be a tenant. After calling the police to gain access to the house, she was arrested for shoving one of the responding officers. The DCS caseworker found conditions at the property unsafe for Children, leading to their emergency removal. Although Father expressed a willingness to drive to Indianapolis to get Children, he never acted on his offer. Parents’ actions and inactions seriously endangered Children.

[24] Contrary to Parents’ arguments, DCS presented evidence Children's needs were unmet. Mother has a history of housing instability, dating back to 2017 when the trial court found her oldest son was a CHINS partly because Mother was homeless and unable to provide him with appropriate housing. In this case, she did not have a rental agreement with K.J. She told the visitation supervisor she slept in different locations, one of which was K.J.’s house. She admitted refusing to share her address with the visitation supervisor. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 57 (Mother stating, “It's a reason for what I do. I move smart. I'm not going to tell her my address.”). If locked out of K.J.’s house again, Mother intended to relocate to St. Louis to live with Father, but she offered no additional details about the potential move.

[25] A trial court need not wait until a child is harmed before intervening; it may adjudicate a child a CHINS when the child's physical or mental condition is endangered. In re A.B., 245 N.E.3d 644, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Mother's housing instability alone raised significant concerns about her capacity to meet Children's needs. See In re A.M., 277 N.E.3d 972, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (discerning no clear error in trial court concluding mother could not meet children's needs in part because she lacked stable housing). And as DCS argues, “Father's failure to safeguard Children means that he is either unable or unwilling to provide the shelter or supervision that they need.” Appellee's Br. at 19.

[26] The record shows Children's needs would not be met without state coercion. “When determining whether coercive intervention is necessary, we determine whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child.” A.M., 277 N.E.3d at 986 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Mother has shown an inability to regulate her emotions. She became belligerent toward the visitation supervisor at the library in front of Children. She called 9-1-1 when K.C. was crying without first attempting to resolve the matter on her own. Mother also does not have a stable source of income, and she made little progress on the parenting curriculum offered. In short, Mother has shown little willingness to address Children's needs absent court intervention.

[27] Under these circumstances, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the trial court's CHINS adjudication.

The trial court did not clearly err in ordering Father's participation in father engagement services.

[28] Father separately challenges the trial court's order requiring his participation in father engagement services. See Father's Br. at 31. He argues DCS “failed to identify or prove [he] required assistance with services.” Id. at 35.

[29] “After a child is adjudicated a CHINS, a trial court may order the child's parent to complete reunification services recommended by DCS and approved by the court.” In re V.K., 279 N.E.3d 1029, 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (citing I.C. § 31-34-20-1(a)(6) (2025)). Trial courts have “broad discretion” when imposing requirements for parents to participate in programs and services, but “the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances” revealed by the evidence. K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258 (citation omitted). “In determining the appropriateness of the reunification services, the court shall consider the child's health, welfare, and safety as the paramount concern.” I.C. § 31-34-20-1(a)(6). We review a trial court's order of services and conditions in a CHINS adjudication for an abuse of discretion. In re S.V., 276 N.E.3d 652, 663 n.19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).

[30] During the factfinding hearing, the FCM testified she had reached out to Father “eight or more” times. Tr. Vol. 2 at 44. Father interacted with Children mainly over the phone. He did not seek custody of Children. In his testimony, Father faulted DCS for the few interactions he had with Children, stating, “They were just working on visitations with me. They want me to come see them. They didn't offer[ ] anything else.” Id. at 66. DCS requested Father's participation in father engagement services at the dispositional hearing “to strengthen [his] parenting skills and to increase [his] understanding of DCS’ expectation and process.” Id. at 91. Father objected. The trial court ordered Father's participation in father engagement services, finding services were “rationally related to the age of the kids and the limited amount of time [Father] has been” with Children. Id. at 101. In light of the broad deference afforded trial courts when imposing requirements for parental participation in services, we conclude the court did not clearly err in ordering Father to participate in father engagement services.

Conclusion

[31] Sufficient evidence supports the trial court's CHINS adjudication, and the trial court did not clearly err when ordering Father's participation in father engagement services.

[32] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   According to K.J., he and Mother were “[s]ort of” in a relationship. Tr. Vol. 2 at 74.

2.   Prosecutors did not file charges against Mother.

3.   K.J. testified Mother returned to live with him after her arrest and claimed he did not intend to ask Mother to leave moving forward.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.