Larry Collins, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Larry Collins, Jr. sold cocaine to a buyer, who shared it with a friend. After they snorted some of the cocaine, the buyer had to be revived three times using Narcan, but his friend died. Collins was ultimately convicted of Level 1 felony dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug resulting in death and sentenced to a 40-year term in prison. Finding the evidence sufficient to support Collins's conviction, we affirm.

Facts

[2] In the fall of 2024, Andrew Kitt was regularly using cocaine and marijuana, though not heroin or fentanyl. Together with Jordan Snow, a heroin, cocaine, and marijuana user, Kitt would clean out houses and find scrap to sell for drug money. One October day, Snow encountered Collins, who offered to sell him drugs. From then on, Collins repeatedly sold Snow heroin and cocaine. Kitt would either drive Snow to meet Collins or let Snow borrow his truck to do so. On one occasion, Collins turned angry when Snow failed to follow Collins's instructions about where to drop off drug money. Collins approached the truck and yelled at Kitt and Snow.

[3] On November 4, Kitt and Snow sold some scrap metal and drove to an arranged pickup spot at a laundry, where they acquired cocaine and heroin from Collins. Kitt and Snow sold some of the cocaine to raise money. Snow then arranged to buy more drugs and drove Kitt's truck to another pickup spot at a grocery store, where Collins again delivered heroin and cocaine to him. After they parted, Collins texted Snow, warning him, “Don't do it strong” and “Lac on it.”¹ Ex. Vol. VII, p. 207. Snow interpreted this to mean the heroin was “stronger than other times” and he “could die” from it. Tr. Vol. V, pp. 229–30. When Snow reached Kitt's home, Kitt got into the truck, and the pair used some of the cocaine together. Snow snorted “a couple lines,” and Kitt snorted one line. Id. at 237.

[4] Snow set off for home on foot but began to suffer difficulties seeing where he was going. The next thing he remembered was waking up in a hospital ER, having overdosed. He survived only after receiving Narcan three times. Kitt, meanwhile, went back inside his home. Around 2 a.m., his partner saw him lying on the couch, where he appeared to be sleeping. But when she woke up around 6:30 a.m., Kitt was non-responsive with his eyes rolled back in his head. Despite the efforts of Kitt's partner, law enforcement, and paramedics, they could not revive Kitt.

[5] A pathology report later gave Kitt's cause of death as “Acute Mixed Drug Intoxication,” noting that “[t]he lethal compounds included fentanyl, acetylfentanyl, fluorofentanyl, and cocaine.” Ex. Vol. VII, pp. 66, 70. And a toxicology report showed Kitt's blood contained 9.8 nanograms of fentanyl and 191 nanograms of cocaine per milliliter of blood. It also stated that the reference range of 3–20 nanograms of fentanyl per milliliter was “associated with comatose and fatal case reports attributed to abuse of fentanyl,” though it did not provide similar information about cocaine. Id. at 73. The parties stipulated that Kitt “died as a result of using cocaine, fentanyl, acetylfentanyl, and/or fluorofentanyl,” and that fentanyl, acetylfentanyl, and fluorofentanyl are narcotic drugs. Tr. Vol. II, p. 72.

[6] The State charged Collins with a single count of Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance, specifically “a narcotic drug and/or cocaine,” resulting in Kitt's death. Id. at 220. A jury found Collins guilty, and the trial court imposed a 40-year executed sentence. Collins appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Collins challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, “we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom without reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility.” Farral v. State, 263 N.E.3d 794, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “The evidence need not ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Id. (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007)). And we will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable jury could find the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[8] Here, the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Collins knowingly or intentionally delivered “cocaine or a narcotic drug,” in violation of Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1, and that doing so “result[ed] in the death” of Kitt after he “used, injected, inhaled, absorbed, or ingested” it. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.5(a)(1). Collins argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence: (1) that he knowingly delivered fentanyl; or (2) that the cocaine Kitt ingested actually and foreseeably caused his death. We address Collins's two arguments in turn.

I. Delivery of Fentanyl

[9] Collins first argues the State failed to prove he delivered the fentanyl, acetylfentanyl, and fluorofentanyl (collectively, “fentanyl”) that Kitt ingested. And even if evidence showed Collins did deliver the fentanyl, he contends, it did not show he did so knowingly.

[10] These arguments miss the mark because the State did not have to prove Collins delivered the fentanyl Kitt ingested. To prevail at trial, the State had to prove in relevant part only that Collins delivered “cocaine or a narcotic drug” that Kitt ingested. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.5(a)(1). And the State provided sufficient evidence on this element because Snow testified that Collins delivered cocaine to him and that he shared it with Kitt.

[11] Granted, evidence indicated Kitt died from “Acute Mixed Drug Intoxication” by “lethal compounds” that included both fentanyl and cocaine. Ex. Vol. VII, pp. 66, 70. But the State did not have to prove the source of the fentanyl. Under the dealing-resulting-in-death statute, it is no defense that the victim died “as a result of using the controlled substance ․ in combination with ․ another controlled substance or with any other compound, mixture, diluent, or substance.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.5(d)(2). Thus, the State needed only to prove that Collins delivered cocaine and that it caused Kitt's death either on its own or in combination with another substance, such as fentanyl. See Yeary v. State, 186 N.E.3d 662, 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). We turn to that issue next.

II. Cause of Death

[12] Collins argues the State failed to prove the cocaine he delivered was either the actual or proximate cause of Kitt's death. “[W]hen an offense is predicated upon a certain result, the State must prove the defendant's action brought about the result.” Id. at 672. And this causation element contains two distinct requirements: actual causation (or cause-in-fact) and proximate causation. Id. A defendant's action is the actual cause of the result if either: but for the conduct, the result would not have occurred; or, “[i]f more than one cause precipitated the result,” the conduct was a “ ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about the result.” Id. (quoting Bowman v. State, 564 N.E.2d 309, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 577 N.E.2d 569 (Ind. 1991)). “Proximate cause centers on the concept of foreseeability, whereby a defendant is only responsible for the foreseeable results of his actions.” Id. “In Indiana, a result is deemed foreseeable if it is a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the act of the defendant.” Id. (quoting Bowman, 564 N.E.2d at 313).

[13] With respect to actual causation, Collins argues the State had to prove either that the cocaine alone would have killed Kitt or that the fentanyl alone would not have done so. But, for two reasons, we conclude the State did not need to prove either of these theories.

[14] The pathology report stated Kitt died from “Acute Mixed Drug Intoxication” by “lethal compounds” that included both fentanyl and cocaine. Ex. Vol. VII, pp. 66, 70. Because more than one cause thus precipitated Kitt's death, the State had only to prove the cocaine was a substantial factor in bringing it about. See Yeary, 186 N.E.3d at 672. And the findings of the pathology report—labeling cocaine one of the “lethal compounds” in a fatal “[m]ixed” intoxication—imply that it was a substantial factor. Alternatively, a reasonable jury could infer that the cocaine Collins delivered was laced with fentanyl and that he thus delivered all the “lethal compounds” himself. After all, Kitt died from mixed cocaine-and-fentanyl intoxication, and Snow had to be revived three times using Narcan, after they each snorted Collins's cocaine. Furthermore, Kitt was not a heroin or fentanyl user, so there was no evidence for any other source of the fentanyl in his system. Hence, the State presented sufficient evidence for actual causation whether Collins delivered either cocaine alone or cocaine laced with fentanyl.

[15] Collins's remaining challenge concerns proximate cause. He argues that Kitt's death was not foreseeable as a natural and probable consequence of using the cocaine he delivered. According to Collins, he could not have anticipated that Kitt would ingest fentanyl as well as cocaine. But we find sufficient evidence that Kitt's death was foreseeable.

[16] The State presented general testimony about fentanyl's lethality and prevalence in overdose investigations, although it did not present evidence that cocaine is commonly either laced with fentanyl or responsible for overdose deaths. Still, we agree with the Yeary court's sentiment that “[w]ith drug overdose deaths a daily occurrence in Indiana, drug dealers can reasonably foresee that the drugs they deliver may result in a death.” 186 N.E.3d at 677–78.

[17] What's more, after Collins provided cocaine and heroin to Snow for the last time, he texted Snow a warning: “Don't do it strong.” Ex. Vol. VII, p. 207. True, Snow interpreted this as a warning that the heroin—not the cocaine—might be strong enough to kill him. But a reasonable jury could infer from the evidence as a whole that Collins was warning Snow about the potency of the cocaine as well. It was snorting the cocaine, not using the heroin, that killed Kitt and nearly killed Snow, corroborating the inference that Collins warned Snow about it. The evidence thus supports the conclusion that a reasonable person in Collins's position would have foreseen the probability that someone using the cocaine would overdose and die.

Conclusion

[18] Because sufficient evidence supported Collins's conviction for dealing cocaine or a narcotic drug resulting in death, we affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “Lac” or lactose powder is commonly used “as a cutting agent” to “dilute drugs.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 112.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.