IN RE: the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: I.M. (Minor Child) (2026)

[1] S.A. (“Father”) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his daughter, I.M. (“Child”). He contends the trial court committed multiple errors and asks us to decide: (1) whether Father received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) whether findings regarding Father's ability to care for Child are supported by the evidence; (3) whether the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from Father's care would not be remedied or that the continuation of the Father-Child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being; and (4) whether the trial court's findings support its conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights to Child was in Child's best interests. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father has been incarcerated since January 2022, and his earliest release date is November 2026. Child was born in June 2022.¹ Father has never met Child in person.

[3] In October 2023, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging Child to be a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) based on Mother's drug use and Father's incarceration. The trial court authorized DCS to remove Child from Mother's care at the time it filed the petition. On February 29, 2024, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS and removed Child from Mother's care. In its dispositional order, the trial court ordered Father to participate in a Father's Engagement program and other similar programs; to contact DCS within seventy-two hours of his release from incarceration; and to participate in phone visits with Child. While incarcerated, Father completed the Father's Engagement program via DCS referral, along with substance-abuse, parenting, stress-management, and anger-management programming offered through the Department of Correction.

[4] Father was released from incarceration in April 2025. He did not contact DCS to arrange visitation, failed to attend two hearings held during his release, and did not see Child. Within forty-seven days of his release, he twice tested positive for controlled substances in violation of the conditions of his probation and was incarcerated again by June 2025. On May 7, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights.

[5] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on January 7, 2026. Father appeared remotely and was represented by counsel. Father told the trial court that he had completed the programs described above and that he intended to enter a recovery house, obtain independent housing through a grant, and ultimately seek custody of Child upon release. He indicated that his earliest possible release date was November 10, 2026, but that a sentence modification could result in release as early as March 10, 2026, if approved. He also stated that he had written letters to Child but had kept them rather than sending them, so that he could later show Child he had not given up on reunification.

[6] Family Case Manager Courtney Whitfield (“FCM Whitfield”) told the trial court that Father's progress with services had been minimal, that Father had not maintained contact with DCS, and that termination and adoption were in Child's best interests. FCM Whitfield noted that DCS placed Child with a half-sibling in a pre-adoptive kinship placement, that Child had bonded to her caregivers, and that she was doing very well. Guardian ad Litem Stefanie Minnett (“GAL Minnett”) also stated that permanency through adoption was in Child's best interests and that she could not recommend placement with Father given his incarceration and lack of housing. On January 29, 2026, the trial court entered its order terminating Father's parental rights.

Discussion and Decision

[7] To terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must allege and prove there is a satisfactory plan for the child's care and treatment, that termination is in the child's best interests, and one or more of the circumstances in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) (2024). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024). DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of these allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009). Those Section 4(d) circumstances include a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the child's removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) (2024), and a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the child's well-being, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(4) (2024).

[8] When reviewing the trial court's decision, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Where, as here, the trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment, and we will set the judgment aside only if it is clearly erroneous. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We accept unchallenged findings as true. Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

[9] As an initial matter, Father asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel and asks us to remand this matter for an additional evidentiary hearing. In his argument, Father asks us to adopt the holdings of two out-of-state cases – New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. B.R., 929 A.2d 1034 (N.J. 2007), and In re R.E.S., 978 A.2d 182 (D.C. 2009) – each of which applied the standard from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in the termination of parental rights context.

[10] In Baker v. Marion County Office of Family and Children, 810 N.E.2d 1035 (Ind. 2004), our Indiana Supreme Court rejected the use of the Strickland standard as untenable in termination cases. The Court reasoned that “transporting the structure of the criminal law, featuring as it does the opportunity for repeated re-examination of the original court judgment through ineffectiveness claims and post-conviction processes, has the potential for doing serious harm to children whose lives have by definition already been very difficult.” Baker, 810 N.E.2d at 1039. Instead, our Supreme Court set forth a less stringent test for determining whether counsel provided ineffective assistance in termination proceedings: “whether it appears that the parents received a fundamentally fair trial whose facts demonstrate an accurate determination.” Id. at 1041. We decline Father's invitation to change this well-established standard.²

[11] Moreover, Father has not demonstrated his counsel was inadequate under that test. Father's counsel was present, cross-examined witnesses, presented evidence, and made arguments. Father has not identified additional evidence that counsel should have introduced. Father received a fundamentally fair hearing, and, as discussed more fully below, the record supports the trial court's determination that termination was proper. Accordingly, Father cannot overturn the trial court's determination based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., id. at 1042 (holding parents did not receive ineffective assistance from when jointly represented because their interests were not adverse).

2. Challenged Findings

[12] Father challenges five findings, all relating to his ability to care for Child, either through the completion of services or changed circumstances at the time of the fact-finding hearing. Father takes issue with two findings that indicate he made “minimal progress” to achieve reunification with Child and he “demonstrated a lack of commitment” in doing so. (App. Vol. II at 90.) Father completed Father's Engagement and other related services while incarcerated, but Father never met Child in person and remained incarcerated at the time of the fact-finding hearing. In addition, when Father was released from incarceration, he did not contact DCS to establish visitation with Child or to engage in further services. Within two months of his release, Father used drugs in violation of his probation and was returned to incarceration. Father's earliest release date was November 2026, and the only changed condition at the time of the fact-finding hearing was the possibility that Father would be released from incarceration in March 2026. Sufficient evidence supports Father's challenged findings. Any argument to the contrary is an invitation for us to reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1043 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).

3. Conditions Would Not Be Remedied

[13] Father contends the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from his care would not be remedied because the trial court “improperly relied exclusively on Father's incarceration and past relapse.” (Father's Br. at 12.) The trial court found that Child was removed from Mother's care due to her drug use and Father's incarceration. In its order, the trial court made several findings regarding Father's continued incarceration as well as his probation violation that resulted in full execution of his sentence. The trial court found that Father completed some services while incarcerated but did not try to engage in services or see Child when he was released from incarceration prior to his probation violation. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from his care would not be remedied.³ See, e.g., In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 644 (Ind. 2014) (the trial court's findings about father's failure to engage in services, including visitation, that would reunify him with his children supported its conclusion that the conditions under which children were removed from his care would not be remedied).

4. Best Interests

[14] Father contends the termination of his parental rights is not in Child's best interests because he is committed to reunification with her. He asserts that Child is in kinship care and can remain there until he is able to complete the steps required to reunify with Child. In determining a child's best interests, the trial court looks to the totality of the evidence, subordinates the parent's interests to those of the child, and need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed. Z.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. Additionally, the recommendations of service providers may support finding that termination is in a child's best interests. Id.

[15] Here, FCM Whitfield and GAL Minnett each recommended termination and adoption, and the evidence established that Child was thriving in a pre-adoptive kinship placement with her half-sibling while Father remained unable to provide care. Father's request that Child remain in foster care until he is ready to take care of her requires Child to “ ‘languish, forgotten, in custodial limbo for long periods of time without permanency[.]’ ” Matter of E.S., 253 N.E.3d 1153, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Baker, 810 N.E.2d at 1041 n.4). Father has had over two years to complete services to achieve reunification with Child and has never met Child in person. Child needs permanency. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. See, e.g., J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1047 (“A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the [child]”) (quoting Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied).

Conclusion

[16] Father has not demonstrated he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, we conclude the evidence supports the findings Father challenges; the trial court's findings support its conclusions that the conditions under which Child was removed from Father's care would not be remedied; and termination of Father's parental rights to Child was in Child's best interests. Accordingly, we affirm.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's mother, S.M. (“Mother”), consented to Child's adoption and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Therefore, we also decline Father's request to remand for an evidentiary hearing regarding counsel's alleged ineffective assistance.

3.   Father also argues that the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the continuation of the Father-Child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c), DCS is required to prove only one of the factors alleged in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) (2024), and we therefore need not address Father's argument. See, e.g., In re J.S., 183 N.E.3d 362, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (statute regarding factors required to terminate parental rights is written in the disjunctive and, thus, DCS need prove only one of the enumerated elements therein), trans. denied.

May, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur.