UOPASARN v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

 Case Summary

[1] Ryan S. Uopasarn appeals his convictions for murder, a felony, and four counts of torturing or mutilating a vertebrate animal, as Level 6 felonies, as well as his corresponding sentence. Uopasarn raises the following three issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court should have found him not responsible by reason of insanity.

2. Whether the trial court erred when it declined to give his proffered jury instruction.

3. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

[2] We affirm.

 Facts and Procedural History

[3] Uopasarn lived with his father, Sulasak Uopasarn (“Mike”). At around 5:00 a.m. on March 29, 2025, Uopasarn entered Mike's room, where Mike was asleep in his bed. Uopasarn stabbed Mike multiple times, at which point Mike woke up and fled his room. Uopasarn followed Mike out of the apartment and continued to stab him. Mike ultimately fell to the sidewalk, and Uopasarn stabbed him several more times. Uopasarn then returned to the apartment and found Mike's four dogs. Uopasarn stabbed the first dog twice, the second dog six times, the third dog eight times, and the fourth dog three times. Each dog died of its wounds.

[4] A neighbor heard Mike make a “low murmuring” sound and looked outside his window. The neighbor saw what he believed to be an intoxicated person and called 9-1-1. The neighbor then went to check on the individual and saw Mike, who said: “My boy stabbed me.” Tr. Vol. 5 at 48. Officers responded to the scene and observed Mike, who was “covered in blood” and “critically injured.” Id. at 26. Medical personnel attempted to render aid, but Mike died at the scene.

[5] While the officers were outside with Mike, Uopasarn exited the apartment. The officers observed that Uopasarn had “a lot of blood on his clothes[.]” Id. at 40. Uopasarn complied with officers’ commands, and he was “quite calm.” Id. The officers apprehended Uopasarn and took him into custody.

[6] At approximately 9:30 a.m., officers interviewed Uopasarn. During the interview, Uopasarn admitted that he had “attempted to kill [his] dad.” Id. at 121. When asked why, Uopasarn said that he “[c]an't really say” and that things were “fuzzy.” Id. He then stated that he “remember[ed] specifically going after [Mike] first and then after that going after the dogs.” Id. Uopasarn said that he had used a “kitchen knife” to stab Mike and the dogs. Id. at 122. Officers asked Uopasarn how many times he had stabbed Mike, and Uopasarn responded: “Too many to count.” Id. at 141. Uopasarn also told officers that he had smoked cigarettes that contained liquid fentanyl.

[7] The State charged Uopasarn with murder, a felony, and four counts of torturing or mutilating a vertebrate animal, as Level 6 felonies.¹ Thereafter, Uopasarn filed a notice of his intent to file an insanity defense, and the court appointed Drs. Sanya Virani and Edward Connor to evaluate him.

[8] The trial court held a multi-day jury trial on the charges. During the trial, Detective Joseph May testified that Uopasarn was “calm, polite, and cooperative” during his interview with police, and that he “seemed to respond appropriately and logically.” Id. at 172, 174. Detective May also testified that Uopasarn had tested negative for any drugs or alcohol following his arrest.

[9] The forensic pathologist who performed Mike's autopsy testified that he had “conservatively” counted twenty-six stab wounds on Mike's body. Tr. Vol. 6 at 32. And the veterinary pathologist who conducted the necropsy on the dogs testified that each dog had suffered from “multiple stab wounds” that would have caused “[v]ery severe” pain and fear. Id. at 159.

[10] Luann Schaefer, the commander at the jail where Uopasarn was being held, also testified. Schaefer testified that Uopasarn had been in isolation for most of the time that he had been in custody. She then testified to incidents where Uopasarn had banged his head on the wall, thrown a cooler, thrown meals, been “nonsensical,” talked to himself, and smeared feces “on himself and on the walls.” Tr. Vol. 7 at 32, 42. Schaefer further testified that Uopasarn had attacked a guard because “it was fun.” Id. at 51. She also testified that Uopasarn said that he “just wants to cause problems because he is bored.” Id. at 53. And Schaefer testified that Uopasarn said “that he enjoys making people mad.” Id. at 72.

[11] After both parties had presented their evidence, the court called the two doctors who had evaluated Uopasarn. Dr. Connor testified that Uopasarn was “coherent” during his interview with officers and that he had answered questions “appropriately[.]” Id. at 118. Dr. Connor also testified that Uopasarn's confession was “very detailed” and “void of statements that would reflect a mental illness.” Id. at 119. He then testified that Uopasarn had “some degree of mental illness” but that he “may be embellishing his symptoms[.]” Id. at 142. Dr. Connor further testified that Uopasarn acknowledged that his behavior in stabbing Mike and the dogs was not justified “in any way” and that stabbing people “is not good in any way,” which indicated to Dr. Connor that “there is an understanding of the wrongfulness of the behavior.” Id. at 146. Dr. Connor then testified that, while he believed Uopasarn had some mental illness, it was “not so severe that he could not appreciate what is right and what is wrong.” Id. at 187. And Dr. Connor testified that it was “unlikely that [Uopasarn] was severely mentally ill at the time of the crime and then cognitively coherent during the police interview shortly thereafter.” Id. at 180.

[12] Similarly, Dr. Virani testified that, during her evaluation of Uopasarn, he “brought up the fact that the murder was premeditated[.]” Tr. Vol. 8 at 26. She then testified that Uopasarn had a mental disease or defect but that “he was in that moment able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.” Id. at 33.

[13] At the conclusion of the trial, Uopasarn requested the following jury instruction:

When you hear testimony from a medical professional using the phrase “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” you are instructed that this phrase does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or absolute medical precision. Instead, it refers to the level of certainty ordinarily relied upon by medical professionals in forming opinions in their field.

For purposes of your deliberations, an expert opinion offered to a “reasonable degree of medical certainty” must be based upon facts and data sufficient to support a conclusion that it is more likely true than not. This is known as the preponderance of the evidence standard.

A fact is proven by a preponderance of the evidence when you find that it is more likely than not to be true after considering all the evidence. If the expert's opinion meets this standard, you may accept it and give it whatever weight you believe it deserves.

You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of all witnesses, including medical experts, and of the weight to be given to their testimony. You should consider the expert's training, the basis of the opinion, the reliability of the methods used, and any other evidence in the case when deciding how much weight to give the opinion.

Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 184. The trial court declined to give the proffered instruction.

[14] The jury was presented with four options regarding Uopasarn's culpability. It could find him guilty, not guilty, not responsible by reason of insanity, or guilty but mentally ill. The jury found him guilty of murder and the four counts of torturing or mutilating a vertebrate animal, and the court entered judgment of conviction accordingly. Following a sentencing hearing, the court identified the following aggravators: the harm, injury, or loss suffered by the victim; Uopasarn's prior contact with the juvenile justice system for having molested his sister and her friends; that two neighbors had children “who could either have heard the victim screaming for help or may have actually s[een] the victim laying on the sidewalk in a pool of his own blood”; that Uopasarn has shown no remorse; that he is not likely to respond to probation; that he attacked jailers while incarcerated; that he had been charged with four more crimes while incarcerated; that he admitted he likes to cause trouble; that he was not employed; and that he has no family support. Appellant's App. Vol. 4 at 76-77.

[15] In mitigation, the court found that Uopasarn was molested by a babysitter when he was a child, that his stepfather had physically abused him, that he suffers from “unspecified psychoses,” that he had an individualized education plan (“IEP”) in school, that he cooperated with the officers and doctors, and that he admitted to the crimes. Id. at 77. The court found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Uopasarn to sixty-five years on the murder charge and two and one-half years on each of the Level 6 felonies. The court ordered the sentences for the Level 6 felonies to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the sentence for murder, for an aggregate sentence of sixty-seven and one-half years in the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued.

 Discussion and Decision

 Issue One: Insanity Defense

[16] Uopasarn does not deny that he murdered his father and killed the four dogs. Rather, he contends that he should have been found not responsible by reason of insanity. “To convict a criminal defendant, the State must prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Barcroft v. State, 111 N.E.3d 997, 1002 (Ind. 2018) (citing Ind. Code § 35-41-4-1(a)). “But a defendant may avoid criminal responsibility by invoking the insanity defense.” Id. “This plea requires the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that [he] suffers from a ‘mental disease or defect’ and (2) that the ‘mental disease or defect’ rendered [him] unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of [his] conduct at the time of the offense.” Id. (quoting I.C. §§ 35-41-4-1(b), 35-41-3-6(a)). “Proof of mental illness alone is not enough.” Id. “A successful insanity defense results in the defendant being found not responsible by reason of insanity[.]” Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 708 (Ind. 2010).

[17] “Whether a defendant appreciated the wrongfulness of his or her conduct at the time of the offense is a question for the trier of fact.” Id. at 709. “A factfinder's determination that ‘a defendant was not insane at the time of the offense warrants substantial deference from’ an appellate court.” Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 1002 (quoting Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709). “A defendant claiming the insanity defense should have prevailed at trial faces a heavy burden because he or she ‘is in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment.’ ” Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709 (quoting Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004)). “A court on review will not reweigh evidence, reassess witness credibility, or disturb reasonable inferences made by the trier of fact (even though ‘more reasonable’ inferences could have been made).” Id. (quoting Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149-50). Further, our Supreme Court “has long held that where the defendant claims the insanity defense should have prevailed, the conviction will be set aside ‘when the evidence is without conflict and leads only to the conclusion that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.’ ” Id. at 710 (emphasis in Galloway) (quoting Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149).

[18] On appeal, Uopasarn argues that he should have been found not responsible by reason of insanity because “the record leads unequivocally to the conclusion that [he] suffered from a severe, unmanaged mental illness that rendered him incapable of understanding or appreciating the wrongfulness of his acts at the time of the offense.” Appellant's Br. at 20. In particular, he argues that both Dr. Connor and Dr. Virani diagnosed him with a mental disease or defect, that he “demonstrated severe cognitive disorientation and delusional thinking” immediately following the incidents, that he “could not recall what he had done the day prior,” and that his “behavior while incarcerated directly mirrors and substantiates his profound, unmanaged psychosis at the time of the offense.” Id. at 21.

[19] However, contrary to Uopasarn's argument, the evidence does not lead only to the conclusion that he was insane at the time of the offense. First, while both Dr. Connor and Dr. Virani acknowledged that Uopasarn suffered from a mental disease or defect, proof of mental illness alone is not enough. See Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at 1002. Further, and importantly, both experts testified that Uopasarn's mental illness did not impact his ability to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time he committed the offenses.

[20] Indeed, Dr. Connor testified that Uopasarn's mental illness would not “disturb his thinking to the point whereby he would not understand the difference between right and wrong.” Tr. Vol. 7 at 148. And he again testified that “the mental illness was not so severe that he could not appreciate what is right and what is wrong.” Id. at 187. Similarly, Dr. Virani testified that Uopasarn's mental illness “would not have interfered with his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of his offense[.]” Tr. Vol. 8 at 34.

[21] Given the unanimous expert testimony that Uopasarn was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time he committed the offenses, the evidence does not lead only to the conclusion that he was insane at the time of the offenses. While we acknowledge that there may be evidence that conflicts with the doctors’ testimonies, Uopasarn's argument on appeal is simply a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

 Issue Two: Jury Instruction

[22] Uopasarn next argues that the court erred when it declined to give his proffered jury instruction. Our standard of review is well settled:

“In reviewing challenges to jury instructions, we afford great deference to the trial court.” R.T. v. State, 848 N.E.2d 326, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In reviewing a trial court's decision to give or refuse a tendered instruction, this Court considers “whether the instruction (1) correctly states the law, (2) is supported by the evidence in the record, and (3) is covered in substance by other instructions.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wright, 774 N.E.2d 891, 893 (Ind. 2002).

Ramey v. Ping, 190 N.E.3d 392, 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

[23] On appeal, Uopasarn contends that the court should have given his proffered instruction regarding the reasonable degree of medical certainty because “the instruction correctly defined the standard of proof applied to expert opinions” and “there was ample evidence in the record to support giving the instruction, as Dr. Virani specifically cited to and relied upon” the reasonable degree of medical certainty standard during her trial testimony. Appellant's Br. at 23-24.

[24] However, other than Uopasarn's bald statements, he cites no authority, and we find none, to show that “reasonable degree of medical certainty” is equivalent to the preponderance of the evidence standard as contended in the proffered instruction. Thus, he has not demonstrated that his proffered instruction is a correct statement of the law.

[25] Further, Uopasarn has not demonstrated that the record supported giving the instruction. The phrase “reasonable degree of medical certainty” was used only once during the multi-day, multi-witness trial. Dr. Virani was asked whether Uopasarn's actions demonstrated “rage under volitional control” as opposed to a delusion, and she responded: “Seemed to me more to the degree of reasonable medical certainty, yes.” Tr. Vol. 8 at 73. Neither party asked Dr. Virani what she meant by that phrase, and she did not elaborate on its meaning. Given that the term was used only one time during the lengthy trial with no explanation as to what it means, Uopasarn has not shown there was evidence to support giving the instruction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to give Uopasarn's proffered instruction.

 Issue Three: Appropriateness of Sentence

[26] Finally, Uopasarn asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” This Court has held that “[t]he advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. And the Indiana Supreme Court has previously explained that:

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers ․ but not achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind.), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).

[27] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court's judgment “should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[28] The sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). And the sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). Here, the court sentenced Uopasarn to the maximum terms for murder and each of the Level 6 felonies. And the court ordered the Level 6 felony sentences to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the sentence for murder, for an aggregate term of sixty-seven and one-half years.

[29] On appeal, Uopasarn contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses because none “of the twenty-six stab wounds inflicted upon Mike Uopasarn were immediately fatal”; the offense “was not prolonged, calculated, or accompanied by torture, torture-like cruelty, or ransom”; and Uopasarn “did not attempt to conceal the offense or resist law enforcement[.]” Appellant's Br. at 26. And Uopasarn asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character because he has a “history of severe, unaddressed mental illness, childhood trauma, and developmental deficits.” Id. at 27.

[30] However, Uopasarn has not met his burden on appeal to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. Regarding the nature of the offenses, Uopasarn, unprovoked, entered his father's bedroom while his father was asleep and stabbed him several times. Then, as Mike fled from the house, Uopasarn followed and continued to stab him. Uopasarn even continued to stab Mike once he was down on the sidewalk. In total, Uopasarn stabbed his father twenty-six times. Then, after he left his father, Uopasarn reentered the house and proceeded to kill all four of Mike's dogs. Each dog suffered multiple stab wounds, which caused them severe pain and fear. Uopasarn has not presented any evidence showing restraint, regard, or a lack of brutality.

[31] As for his character, we acknowledge that Uopasarn has a history of mental illness. But, as both experts testified, his mental illness did not prohibit him from understanding or appreciating that murdering his father and killing four dogs was wrong. Further, Uopasarn showed no remorse for his actions. And after his arrest, Uopasarn attacked a jail officer and caused trouble because he was bored. Uopasarn has not presented compelling evidence of substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character. Uopasarn's sentence is not inappropriate. Conclusion

[32] The evidence did not lead solely to the conclusion that Uopasarn was insane at the time of the offense. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused Uopasarn's proffered jury instruction. And Uopasarn's sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. We therefore affirm his convictions and sentence.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also charged Uopasarn with cruelty to an animal, as a Class A misdemeanor, but that charge was ultimately dismissed. The State also charged Uopasarn with four counts of possession of child pornography based on information officers had learned during the murder investigation. The trial court severed those counts on Uopasarn's motion.

Bailey, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.