Trenton W. Patterson, Sr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Trenton W. Patterson, Sr., appeals his convictions and sentence for one count of attempted murder, a Level 1 felony, and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, as Level 4 felonies. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Issues

[2] Patterson raises the following restated issues:

1. Whether the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his conviction of attempted murder;

2. Whether the trial court violated double jeopardy principles by:

(a) convicting him of two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon; and/or

(b) by both convicting him of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and imposing a firearm enhancement on his attempted murder sentence;

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On February 15, 2024, Sergeant Adam Curtis of the Daleville Police Department learned that Patterson had an outstanding child support warrant for his arrest. He drove to Patterson's residence and saw a car back out of the driveway. Sergeant Curtis began to follow the vehicle and ran its license plate through dispatch. The license plate was registered to a different vehicle, so Sergeant Curtis initiated a traffic stop.

[4] Sergeant Curtis approached the car and spoke with the passenger, Patterson. When asked for his information, Patterson gave Sergeant Curtis a “false name.” Tr. v. 3 at 42. Sergeant Curtis returned to his patrol car, ran Patterson's information through dispatch, and looked at the Bureau of Motor Vehicles photograph for Patterson to confirm that it was him. Sergeant Curtis returned to the car and asked Patterson to step outside, turn around, and put his hands behind his back. As Patterson was exiting the vehicle, he told Sergeant Curtis his real name. Sergeant Curtis repeated his command that Patterson turn around and put his hands behind his back.

[5] Patterson then took a “step to the left,” made his way around the front of Sergeant Curtis's patrol car, and “took off running[.]” Tr. v. 2 at 70. Sergeant Curtis chased after Patterson as he ran across State Road 32 toward a set of railroad tracks. While they were running, Sergeant Curtis drew his taser, fired it at Patterson, and missed. He continued to chase after Patterson as Patterson made his way up an eight-foot-tall embankment, at the top of which were railroad tracks.

[6] The embankment was covered in loose gravel. When Patterson was about halfway up the embankment, Sergeant Curtis saw him fall and immediately regain his balance. As Sergeant Curtis continued the chase, he also stumbled and fell. When he looked up, he saw Patterson standing at the top of the embankment with a gun drawn and pointed down at him. Sergeant Curtis then saw a muzzle flash and heard at least one gunshot. Sergeant Curtis was not struck and attempted to return fire, but his gun jammed. He took cover and fixed the jam but, by the time he looked back up, Patterson was gone. A spent shell casing was subsequently recovered from the scene and was confirmed to have been fired from Patterson's Bersa .380 firearm.

[7] The next morning, Detective Jay Turner was dispatched to the scene to search for additional forensic evidence. When he and other officers arrived, Detective Turner saw Patterson walking down the railroad tracks toward State Road 32. Patterson was wearing the same clothes Detective Turner knew he had been wearing the night before. Detective Turner immediately ran toward Patterson and followed him into a nearby alleyway. Detective Turner saw some vehicles parked in the alley and approached one of them. He opened the driver's side door and saw Patterson alone, sitting in the passenger seat and holding a gun. Detective Turner then shut the car door and advised the other officers that Patterson was inside the vehicle and armed.

[8] Patterson remained inside the car for over an hour while Detective Turner tried to convince him to come out. Eventually, members of a SWAT team arrived and shot tear gas and pepper spray into the vehicle to force Patterson out. At that point, Patterson broke the driver's side window with his gun, and, while attempting to exit through the broken car window, accidentally shot himself in the chest. Patterson then lifted his shirt to show the officers that he had a gunshot wound in his chest.

[9] Patterson was arrested, and the State charged him with one count of Level 1 felony attempted murder, two counts of Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, one count of Level 6 felony pointing a firearm, two counts of Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and one count of Class B misdemeanor false informing. The State also filed a notice of its intent to have Patterson's sentence enhanced for his use of a firearm.

[10] Patterson's jury trial began on April 28, 2025, and concluded on April 30. The jury found him guilty of two counts of resisting law enforcement and one count of false informing and found that he had knowingly possessed a firearm. The jury found Patterson not guilty of pointing a firearm and was unable to reach a verdict on the attempted murder charge. Patterson then admitted to being a serious violent felon and pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.

[11] On January 12, 2026, the State retried Patterson on the attempted murder charge, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. Patterson waived his right to a jury trial on the firearm enhancement, and the court found that Patterson had knowingly used a firearm during the commission of the offense of attempted murder.

[12] On February 11, the court sentenced Patterson to forty years for his conviction for attempted murder, to be enhanced by fifteen years for his use of a firearm. The court sentenced him to twelve years for each of his two convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, two and one-half years for each for his two convictions for resisting law enforcement, and 180 days for his conviction for false informing. The court ordered that those sentences be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of eighty-four and one-half years. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Sufficiency of the Evidence

[13] Patterson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of attempted murder, a Level 1 felony. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction,

we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. We only consider the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence. A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the [fact-finder's] ruling.

Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066-67 (Ind. 2015) (citation modified).

[14] In conducting our review of a criminal conviction, “we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). Moreover, a conviction may be supported by circumstantial evidence and “need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. It is sufficient if an inference drawn from the circumstantial evidence reasonably tends to support the conviction.” Perry v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citation modified).

[15] To support Patterson's conviction of attempted murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Patterson (2) acting with the intent to kill (3) engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of murder. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1); I.C. § 35-41-5-1(a). “It does not matter whether the act, the substantial step taken toward the commission of murder, results in any injury whatsoever, so long as it is coupled with the intent to kill.” Lee v. State, 91 N.E.3d 978, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citation modified), trans. denied. Moreover, the requisite intent to kill “may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury[,]” such as “firing a gun in the direction of an individual[.]” Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008).

[16] The State provided evidence that, when Sergeant Curtis was chasing Patterson up an incline and was only about eight feet away from Patterson, Sergeant Curtis saw Patterson draw a gun and point it directly at him and then saw a muzzle flash and heard a gunshot. In addition, a spent shell casing was recovered from the scene and was confirmed to have been fired from Patterson's gun. That is sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Patterson intended to kill Sergeant Curtis and took a substantial step toward doing so. See, e.g., Fuentes v. State, 10 N.E.3d 68, 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (finding sufficient evidence of attempted murder where the victim did not see the defendant fire the gun but testified that he saw the defendant point the gun at him and then heard a gunshot), trans. denied. Patterson's emphasis of his testimony that the gun firing was accidental and the absence of evidence of a motive to kill ¹ Sergeant Curtis is merely a request for us to reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility, which we will not do. See, e.g., Willis, 27 N.E.3d at 1066. We affirm his conviction of attempted murder.

Double Jeopardy

[17] Patterson brings two double jeopardy claims, each of which we address in turn.

Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon Convictions

[18] First, Patterson contends that his two convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (“SVF”), a Level 4 felony, violate the prohibition against substantive double jeopardy. The State concedes on this point. However, whether convictions put the defendant in substantive double jeopardy is a question of law that we review de novo. Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 237 (Ind. 2020). Thus, “[w]hile we sometimes accept concessions from the State regarding factual matters, a question of law ․ is a matter for the courts, not the State, to decide.” In re K.W., 247 N.E.3d 1250, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citation modified).

[19] “Substantive double jeopardy claims come in two principal varieties: (1) when a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute but harms multiple victims, and (2) when a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or more victims.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247. “Whereas Wadle addresses convictions under multiple statutes, Powell [v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020),] addresses multiple convictions under a single statute.” Garrett v. State, 273 N.E.3d 122, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[20] Patterson's two firearms convictions were under the same statute, i.e., Indiana Code Section 35-47-4-5(c). Therefore, we address his double jeopardy claim under the two-step Powell framework.

Under Powell’s two-step test, we must first determine whether the statute at issue clearly indicates a “unit of prosecution.” 151 N.E.3d at 264. “[A] unit of prosecution is ‘the minimum amount of activity a defendant must undertake, what he must do, to commit each new and independent violation of a criminal statute[.]’ ” Barrozo v. State, 156 N.E.3d 718, 725 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting United States v. Rentz, 777 F.3d 1105, 1109 (10th Cir. 2015) (en banc)). If the statute clearly indicates a unit of prosecution—that is, if the statute allows multiple convictions for a single criminal act or transaction, or if it allows only one conviction for a single criminal act or transaction—the court follows the legislature's guidance and the analysis is complete. Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 264.

Garrett, 273 N.E.3d at 130.

[21] Applying the first step of the Powell analysis here, “we first look to the statute's text, reading its terms in their plain and ordinary meaning.” Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 265. Indiana Code Section 35-47-4-5(c) provides, “A serious violent felon who knowingly or intentionally possesses a firearm commits unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.” That statute does not, on the face of it, contain an “express unit of prosecution.” Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 265. Therefore, we proceed to the second step of the Powell double jeopardy analysis.

[22] Under Powell’s second step,

a court must determine whether the facts—as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial—indicate a single offense or whether they indicate distinguishable offenses. To answer this question, we ask whether the defendant's actions are so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction. If the defendant's criminal acts are sufficiently distinct, then multiple convictions may stand; but if those acts are continuous and indistinguishable, a court may impose only a single conviction. Any doubt counsels against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.

Id. at 264-65 (citation modified).

[23] Here, the facts indicate only a single offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF. Patterson possessed the same Bersa .380 firearm on both February 15, 2024, and February 16, 2024. His possession was unlawful because he had a prior conviction for domestic battery with a deadly weapon, making him a SVF. And while his possession of the gun spanned the night, the record supports only one continuous possession of the same gun—not separate possessions. Patterson ran from Sergeant Curtis at around 8:45 p.m. on February 15 and hid from the police until the next morning, when he was spotted by officers who had returned to the scene. At that time, Patterson was wearing the same clothes he had been wearing the night before. There is no indication that Patterson ever went home or that he ever divested himself of his actual or constructive possession of the gun. Based on this continuity of action, we agree with the parties that Patterson's conduct constitutes one single offense under the facts of this case; therefore, only one conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF is permitted. We remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate one of the convictions and its corresponding sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF.

Firearm Enhancement

[24] Patterson also maintains that his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF and the enhancement to his sentence for attempted murder due to his use of the same firearm violate double jeopardy principles. However, as our Supreme Court has recently noted, “an enhanced punishment, whether based on attendant circumstances or on a prior conviction, presents no double jeopardy issue at all.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 254 (citation modified). This is because the enhancement is “neither a new jeopardy nor an additional penalty for an earlier offense, but rather a stiffened penalty for the latest crime[.]” Id. (citation modified). Therefore, the elevation “is not a separate offense or conviction [so] double-jeopardy analysis is simply inapposite.” Id. (citation modified). See also, e.g., White v. State, 282 N.E.3d 574, 584 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (holding the enhancement of a murder sentence based on the use of the same firearm that formed the charge for possession of a firearm by a SVF did not violate double jeopardy principles, as possession of firearm and use of firearm were legally separate acts even when performed with the same weapon, and the enhancement was a cumulative punishment rather than a separate offense), trans. pending; Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (recognizing that a firearm enhancement is “a cumulative punishment rather than a separate offense[,]” and sentencing enhancements do not implicate double jeopardy concerns), trans. denied.

[25] Patterson's conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF and the firearm enhancement ² to his attempted murder conviction do not violate the prohibition on double jeopardy.

Consecutive Sentences

[26] Patterson challenges the trial court's imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences. Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2 allows a court to order either concurrent or consecutive sentences and provides that the court may consider aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances in doing so. The statute also provides for maximum consecutive terms of imprisonment for crimes that are not “crimes of violence.” I.C. § 35-50-1-2(a), (c), (d). As Patterson acknowledges, his felony convictions were all “crimes of violence.”³ Appellant's Br. at 21. Therefore, the trial court had discretion to sentence him to either concurrent or consecutive sentences. See, e.g., Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1143 (Ind. 2022). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Yost v. State, 150 N.E.3d 610, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citation modified).

[27] Although Patterson contends the court abused its discretion when it ordered consecutive sentences, he does not provide any cogent argument or reasoning in support of that bare claim and therefore waives it. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because its imposition of consecutive sentences was based permissibly on aggravating circumstances such as Patterson's significant criminal history and institutional write-ups while incarcerated. See, e.g., Gleason v. State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding the defendant's unchallenged significant criminal history, alone, was sufficient to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences.

Conclusion

[28] Patterson's attempted murder conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. And the firearm enhancement to that conviction did not present any double jeopardy issue at all. However, under our double jeopardy jurisprudence, only one of Patterson's convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF may stand because his possession of the firearm was so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction. And, waiver notwithstanding, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate one of Patterson's convictions and corresponding sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF.

[29] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Motive is not an element of attempted murder, although its absence may be an exculpatory factor to be weighed by the fact-finder. See Kiefer v. State, 761 N.E.2d 802, 806 (Ind. 2002).

2.   We note that Sweatt v. State, cited by Patterson, is inapposite; unlike Patterson's case, Sweatt involved a challenge to two enhancements of two different crimes based on the same prior felony conviction. 887 N.E.2d 81 (Ind. 2008). The Court found that, while the imposition of those two enhancements did not, itself, constitute improper “double enhancement[,]” it had the same impermissible effect as “double enhancement” on the aggregate sentence unless the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Id. at 84. Here, of course, the trial court applied only one enhancement.

3.   “Crime[s] of violence” are listed in Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-79 and include the felony crimes of which Patterson was convicted—i.e., attempted murder, felony resisting law enforcement, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF.

Bailey, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.