IN RE: E.C. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.J. (“Father”) and C.C. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal both the trial court's adjudication that their child, E.C. (“Child”), is a child in need of services (“CHINS”) and the trial court's dispositional order. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Parents raise several issues on appeal, which we revise and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court's determination that Child is a CHINS is clearly erroneous.

II. Whether the dispositional order is an abuse of discretion.

Facts

[3] Parents have five children. The oldest three children—M.C., born in June 2020; A.C., born in May 2022; and L.C., born in May 2023—were removed from Parents’ care in February 2024 due to Parents’ substance abuse and deplorable home conditions. The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed petitions alleging that the three children were CHINS, and in April 2024, the trial court granted the petitions. The dispositional order required Parents to, in part, maintain suitable housing; engage in home-based counseling; complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations; complete a substance abuse assessment and complete all treatment recommendations; submit to random drug screens; and engage in individual counseling.

[4] In March 2024, Parents were each charged with three counts of neglect of a dependent resulting in physical injuries, Level 5 felonies. Parents each pleaded guilty to the lesser included offenses of three counts of neglect of a dependent, Level 6 felonies. Parents were sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction with one year served on the Continuum of Sanctions Program ¹ and two years suspended to probation. No contact orders were entered in the criminal case that prevented Parents from having contact with the three children, but those orders were modified to allow supervised visits.

[5] A fourth child, J.A.J., was born in July 2024. On the day J.A.J. was born, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, methadone, opiates, and oxycodone. J.A.J. was removed from Parents’ care, and the trial court found that J.A.J. was also a CHINS.

[6] Parents’ compliance with the dispositional orders in the four CHINS cases was minimal. Father was aggressive with service providers, and he often argued with them, yelled, stormed off, and threw tantrums. The trial court ordered Father to participate in individual counseling focused on anger management, but Father failed to do so. Both Mother and Father completed their substance abuse assessments, but neither completed the follow-up services. Parents often cancelled supervised visits or were late in arriving.

[7] Child was born in June 2025 and was significantly premature at twenty-nine weeks. Child was born exposed to Suboxone; he was placed in the neonatal intensive care unit (“NICU”); and he was being fed through a feeding tube. The hospital reported that Parents were not visiting Child and that medical providers had trouble contacting Parents. DCS visited Parents’ residence, which was clean, but a four-foot-long water monitor lizard was present in the laundry room.

[8] On August 22, 2025, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child is a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 (general neglect). DCS also alleged that there is a rebuttable presumption that Child is a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-4.6(a) (“Presumption Statute”). DCS further noted that Parents had four open CHINS cases and that Parents had failed to participate in most services in those matters. The trial court authorized the removal of Child from Parents’ care. Child was discharged from the hospital in September 2025 and placed in relative care with his siblings.

[9] The Continuum of Sanctions Program filed a notice of violation against both Mother and Father in October 2025 due to their failure to comply with the trial court's orders in the CHINS matters. The trial court issued a warrant for Mother's arrest. The probation department then filed a notice of violation of Mother's suspended sentence.

[10] In supervised visits, Mother struggled with feeding Child, who required a bottle prepared with thickener. Father failed to adequately interact with the children, failed to participate in caring for the children, and was unwilling to accept help or directions. Further, Father's anger management issues continued. On November 18, 2025, Parents were attending a supervised visit with all five children, and Father became confrontational with the service providers and began yelling. Father's behavior escalated, and the service provider ended the visit and asked Father to leave the area. Father refused, and law enforcement arrived to remove Parents. Law enforcement had to escort the service provider and the children to their vehicles.

[11] DCS then filed a motion to suspend Father's visits until he participated in and completed anger management services. The trial court granted DCS's motion and suspended Father's visits with the children. Although Mother's visits were not suspended, she refused to visit the children without Father. At the time of the first factfinding hearing, Mother did visit on one occasion. Mother, however, struggled to parent all five of the children at once. During the visit, Mother wanted to call Father so that he could visit the children despite the trial court's order suspending Father's visits.

[12] The trial court held factfinding hearings on January 20 and February 3, 2026. On February 17, 2026, the trial court granted DCS's petition and found that Child is a CHINS pursuant to both Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 and the Presumption Statute. The trial court found, in part:

5. DCS has met its burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, proving that the above-named child is a CHINS under IC 31-34-1-1.

* * * * *

7. The child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parents to supply the child with necessary supervision when the parents are financially able to do so. Mother and father both, at one point, have chosen not to visit this child after his birth for an extended amount of time. Father continues to have difficulty managing his anger during his supervised visits. Father needs to substantially comply with anger management services to reinstate his supervised visits, for which he has yet to complete. Mother fails to recognize the dangers of father visiting this child prior to him completing services that will address his anger issues and how her own behavior seriously endangers this child's physical or mental condition. At this time, parents also continue to have deficiencies with their parental skills that put this child in serious endangerment of physical and/or mental harm. Parents, though partially compliant with their Dispositional services, have failed to fully engage in them to the point that the Court has determined that the goals of the dispositional decree have been met. Given that this determination has been made, and parents have presented insufficient evidence to convince the Court otherwise, it stands that it is unsafe for parents to safely care for this child, who is younger and more vulnerable.

8. The Court finds the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that the child is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. Mother and father need to participate in services to address the concerns of substance use, lack of necessary supervision for the child, lack of necessary parenting skills, anger management and/or making parenting decisions that put this child in serious endangerment of physical or mental harm. Coercive intervention of the court is needed for mother and father to comply with the Department and services because they have already shown they engage in behavior inconsistent with following court orders, as demonstrated by them not fully following the CHINS court orders, mother making attempts to violate this court's order and violating terms of their Continuum of Sanctions program in their respective criminal cases. Further, regarding mother and father, the court has found that remedial services are necessary to protect and ensure safety of the child's sibling and that coercive intervention of the court is necessary.

9. DCS has also met its burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, to raise the rebuttable presumption that the above-named child is a Child in Need of Services under IC 31-34-12-4.6.

10. The court finds that the child lives in the same household as an adult who is subject to an order requiring the adult to participate in a program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation under IC 31-34-20-3, that being mother and father.

11. Parents have not rebutted said rebuttable presumption.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 67-68.

[13] DCS filed its predispositional report on March 13, 2026, and the dispositional hearing was held on March 18, 2026. Parents did not appear at the dispositional hearing due to their alleged illnesses on the day of the hearing. At the hearing, their counsel requested a continuance, which the trial court denied. The trial court asked Parents’ counsel, “Is there anything on the dispositional order that [ ] causes you any concern as their attorney?” Tr. Vol. I p. 203. Parents’ counsel responded, “No, I think it's pretty standard.” Id. The trial court, however, allowed Parents’ counsel ten days to consult with Parents regarding the dispositional order and request a hearing on any objections. The trial court then entered its dispositional order on March 18, 2026. Parents now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

I. The trial court's CHINS determination is not clearly erroneous.

[14] Parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's determination that Child is a CHINS. “CHINS proceedings are civil actions; thus, ‘the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.’ ” In re N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010)); see Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. On review, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

[15] Here, the trial court entered, sua sponte, findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting the CHINS petition. “ ‘As to the issues covered by the findings, we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.’ ” N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475 (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)). We review the remaining issues under the general judgment standard, which provides that a judgment “ ‘will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)). We will reverse a CHINS adjudication only if it is clearly erroneous.² Id.

A. The trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.

1. Findings Regarding Mother

[16] First, Mother challenges Finding No. 23, which provides:

Additionally, of grave importance, mother again asked permission to call father so that he could see this child and his siblings and so they could see him. The provider did not allow this to occur and again reminded mother that father would not be incorporated into visits until it was approved. This request by mother demonstrates to this Court that she is making active attempts to violate an order of this Court. The purpose of suspending father's visitation with this child and his siblings is to protect them from his aggressive behaviors, which puts this child and his siblings at serious risk of potential serious physical and/or mental harm. Mother is unwilling or unable to see that this violates this court's order and that allowing father around the child at this time is placing this child in serious endangerment for physical and/or mental harm.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 60-61. Mother argues that “[t]here was no evidence that the physical or mental health of [Child] or any of the other children were seriously endangered by the one incident.” Appellants’ Br. p. 23. DCS, however, presented evidence that the children were present during Father's aggressive behaviors and, although the trial court suspended Father's visits with the children, Mother persisted in trying to allow Father to see the children. Father has been repeatedly ordered to undergo anger management services in the children's CHINS proceedings and has failed to comply with the court's orders. The trial court's finding that the situation places the children in serious endangerment is not clearly erroneous.

[17] Next, Mother challenges Finding No. 29, which provides: “Additionally, parents have violated the terms of their Continuum of Sanctions program[.] In fact, mother was recently arrested for violating her Continuum of Sanctions. Father was not arrested for his violation. The bases for their violations are, in part, for not following the CHINS court orders.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 62. Mother contends that she completed her Continuum of Sanctions program in March 2026 and that the arrest did not represent a current condition. At the time of the February 2026 order, however, this finding was correct, and Mother's later completion of the program does not make the February 2026 findings clearly erroneous.

2. Findings Regarding Father

[18] Father first argues that Finding No. 12 is clearly erroneous. This finding provides: “While this child was in the hospital for approximately one to two months, father did not visit the child. Father did not start visiting with this child until this child was out of the hospital and joined the supervised visits with his siblings.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 58. Father claims that his failure to visit Child in the NICU did not endanger Child's physical or mental health. The finding, however, does not address whether Child was seriously endangered by Father's conduct at issue. This finding merely states facts regarding Father's failure to visit Child, and Father does not dispute these facts. The finding is not clearly erroneous.

[19] Next, Father challenges Finding No. 14, which provides: “Father is aggressive and/or demonstrates angry behaviors in front of this child and his siblings while he is visiting with them. Father's aggressive and angry behavior in this manner directly puts this child's, along with his siblings for that matter, physical and/or mental health in serious endangerment.” Id. Father claims that his behavior has not seriously endangered Child. Again, Father has been repeatedly ordered to undergo anger management services and has failed to do so. The children have been present during Father's outbursts, and the finding that Father's behavior seriously endangers the children is not clearly erroneous.

[20] Finally, Father challenges Finding No. 13, which provides:

During visits, father refuses to interact appropriately with [Child], as evidenced by facts such as him refusing to hold [Child] and to provide other childcare tasks during the visits. Father claims this is, in part, because [Child] is small and he is afraid to hurt [Child]. This Court finds his reasoning is illogical and unpersuasive as an excuse for not performing needed childcare tasks for [Child].

Appellants’ App. Vol. II p. 58. Father argues that the finding is erroneous and that Father testified he will only hold Child when he is sitting down. The trial court, however, specifically found that Father was not credible. Further, DCS presented evidence that, during visits, Father would not engage with the children or interact with them unless directed to do so. The trial court's finding is not clearly erroneous.

B. The CHINS determination under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 is not clearly erroneous.

[21] Next, Parents challenge the trial court's finding that Child is a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-4.6(a), the Presumption Statute.³ Specifically, Parents argue that Child did not live in their household because he had been in the NICU since his birth. The trial court found that Child is a CHINS under both: (1) Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1; and (2) Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-4.6(a). We need not address Parents’ argument regarding the Presumption Statute because the evidence is sufficient under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 to find that Child is a CHINS.

[22] Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financia able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[23] Other than challenging the findings discussed above, Parents make no cogent argument regarding the serious endangerment or coercive intervention elements. Accordingly, Parents have waived any argument regarding the CHINS finding under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1. See In re A.B., 277 N.E.3d 98, 105 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (holding that the mother waived an issue by failing to provide cogent argument); see also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

[24] Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court's finding that Child is a CHINS under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 is not clearly erroneous. Regarding the serious endangerment element, DCS presented evidence that Parents were subject to dispositional orders in four other CHINS cases for their older children. The CHINS cases were opened due to Parents’ drug usage and deplorable home conditions. Parents have failed to fully comply with the dispositional orders in those cases, and Child was born prematurely and exposed to suboxone. Child was in NICU, and Parents were not visiting him. Father's anger management issues have continued, and Father's supervised visits with the children were suspended due to his anger issues. Mother has struggled to manage five children and address Child's needs. The trial court's finding regarding the serious endangerment of Child is not clearly erroneous.

[25] Regarding the coercive intervention element, DCS presented evidence that Parents have failed to comply with the prior four dispositional orders, including failing to complete substance abuse services and anger management services. When Father's supervised visits with the children were suspended, Mother initially refused to visit the children without him. When she started visiting the children, she wanted to call Father so he could visit the children. Given these circumstances, the trial court's coercive intervention finding is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, waiver notwithstanding, the trial court's finding that Child is a CHINS is not clearly erroneous.

II. Parents waived their arguments regarding the predispositional report and the dispositional order.

[26] Next, Parents challenge the trial court's dispositional order. Parents first argue that the dispositional order was based upon an improper predispositional report. Parents contend that: (1) the predispositional report was not timely; (2) the predispositional report did not identify any experts that DCS consulted with regarding Child's needs; and (3) the predispositional report failed to mention evidence of Mother's visits with Child at the hospital. Parents also argue that the dispositional order included unnecessary requirements for Parents, such as maintaining suitable housing; maintaining a legal and stable source of income; ensuring that Child is properly clothed, fed, and supervised; and assisting in a protection plan.

[27] We conclude that Parents waived these arguments. Parents were provided with the predispositional report on March 13, 2026, and the dispositional hearing was held five days later. See Ind. Code § 31-34-18-6(a) (requiring the predispositional report to be made available at least forty-eight hours before the dispositional hearing). Parents did not appear for the dispositional hearing and failed to raise any of the alleged problems with the predispositional report that they now raise. It is well established that an appellant may not raise an argument for the first time on appeal. In re V.K., 279 N.E.3d 1029, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).

[28] As for Parents’ arguments regarding the dispositional order, when questioned by the trial court, Parents’ counsel made no objection to the proposed requirements and specifically said that the proposed requirements were “pretty standard.” Tr. Vol. I p. 203. Moreover, because the Parents did not appear at the dispositional hearing, the trial court specifically gave Parents ten days to present their objections, and Parents did not object to any of the dispositional order requirements. Parents had the opportunity to dispute the requirements of the dispositional order and failed to do so.

[29] Our Court recently noted:

A parent who objects to DCS's recommendations gives the trial court an opportunity to correct any errors—before a parent is ordered to comply with the recommended conditions and services. And a timely objection gives the parties opportunity to develop the record for appeal as to why the evidence does—or does not—warrant imposition of the disputed recommendation or service. Requiring a parent to object in the trial court to DCS's predispositional report recommendations to preserve the issue for appeal therefore best advances these important policy considerations.

V.K., 279 N.E.3d at 1039. Having failed to raise any objection with the trial court, we conclude that Parents have waived these issues on appeal.  ⁴ See, e.g., id. (“Mother had a responsibility to challenge before the trial court any of DCS's recommendations she believed were unsupported by the evidence, inappropriate, or otherwise unnecessary. Mother did not do so, and accordingly her challenge to the dispositional requirements is waived.”).

Conclusion

[30] The trial court's finding that Child is a CHINS is not clearly erroneous, and Parents’ arguments regarding the predispositional report and dispositional order are waived. Accordingly, we affirm.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Continuum of Sanctions program is “a flexible supervision concept designed to provide a structured sliding scale of services through various program component placement opportunities and services.” https://www.madisoncounty.in.gov/departments/community-corrections [https://perma.cc/D2FG-EY5Q] (last visited September 24, 2026).

2.   Parents also argue that the trial court erred by adopting DCS's proposed order verbatim. We “by no means encourage” this type of practice out of concern that it may cause an “inevitable erosion of the confidence of an appellate court that the findings reflect the considered judgment of the trial court.” State v. Hamilton, 197 N.E.3d 356, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. This adoption, however, does not automatically establish clear error or warrant reversal. The trial court's adoption of DCS's proposed order does not, standing alone, constitute clear error.

3.   The Presumption Statute, Indiana Code Section 31-34-12-4.6(a), provides: “There is a rebuttable presumption that a child is a child in need of services if the court finds that the child lives in the same household as an adult who is subject to an order requiring the adult to participate in a program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation under IC 31-34-20-3.”

4.   Parents contend that their arguments are not waived because Indiana Trial Rule 52(B) provides: “Failure of a party to move to modify the findings or judgment under this subdivision and failure to object to proposed findings or judgment or such findings or judgment which has been entered of record shall not constitute a waiver of the right to raise the question in or with a motion to correct errors, or on appeal.” Our Courts, however, have consistently applied the waiver doctrine where parents fail to raise objections to predispositional reports or dispositional reports. V.K., 279 N.E.3d at 1038. The statutory provisions regarding such reports specifically give parents notice of the predispositional reports, the opportunity to make recommendations to the trial court, and the opportunity to controvert the predispositional report. See id. at 1036. Further, here, the trial court gave Parents an additional ten days to make objections to the dispositional order, yet they still failed to do so. Accordingly, we do not find Parents’ argument persuasive.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.