IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.B. and Z.B. (Minor Children) and K.K. (Mother) and R.B. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.K. (“Mother”) and R.B. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's termination of their parental rights to J.B. and Z.B. (collectively, “Children”), on petition of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Parents present several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as: Did DCS fail to present clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination decision? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents have two sons together: J.B. (born in July 2019) and Z.B. (born in February 2022). In January 2024—when Children were four and two years old—DCS responded to a report involving Parents, Children, and Mother's two older daughters from a prior relationship (Children's half-siblings).¹ The family of six was sleeping in a single room of Children's maternal grandmother's house. Mother's two adult brothers also lived on the property. The home lacked running water, and the family was using space heaters for heat. DCS put in place some services to assist with the home conditions.

[3] In February and March, DCS completed three separate assessments based on reports that Father was engaging in verbal and physical abuse of Mother and the half-siblings while using alcohol. DCS learned Father drank alcohol nightly and was frequently intoxicated. When drunk, he would make violent threats. Parents and DCS entered an informal adjustment (“IA”) and created a safety plan aimed at helping Father decrease his alcohol intake and ensuring Children had a safe, sober caregiver. Father completed an intake assessment with a treatment provider who recommended Father engage in intensive outpatient therapy (“IOP”). DCS learned Father had an extensive criminal history including operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”), reckless driving, resisting law enforcement, and public intoxication. Mother also had a substantiated DCS report from 2008 for a drug-exposed infant.

[4] The IA was unsuccessful. In April 2024, Parents and grandmother tested positive for methamphetamine on drug screens, and Mother's brothers refused to screen. DCS removed Children and their half-siblings because there was no longer a sober caregiver in the home and filed petitions alleging Children were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”).

[5] On removal, Children also tested positive for methamphetamine. J.B. showed signs of dehydration and malnutrition and had ten cavities. Z.B. needed physical therapy for a neck condition. Children were placed in foster care. In the initial order authorizing Children's continued detention, the trial court authorized parenting time contingent on Parents screening negative for methamphetamine and/or fentanyl; ordered that visitation would be immediately suspended on a positive screen for those drugs; and stated no visitation could occur in the family home due to the danger those drugs posed.

[6] During the CHINS factfinding, Parents admitted Children needed services. Mother admitted she was using methamphetamine, she and Children tested positive for that drug, and Father was struggling with alcohol use. Father admitted he was struggling with methamphetamine and alcohol use. On these admissions, the trial court adjudicated Children CHINS in July 2024. The trial court held a dispositional hearing and ordered each parent to complete or participate in: a parenting/family functioning assessment; substance use disorder assessment; home-based casework services; oral, urine, and hair drug screens; and visitation. Subsequently, the trial court ordered Parents to follow all recommendations from any assessments or evaluations and ordered Father to participate in domestic violence/batterer's services.

[7] Sometime in July, Father called law enforcement to the home while he was intoxicated. Police arrested grandmother for possession of methamphetamine and one of Mother's brothers on outstanding warrants. DCS recommended Parents move out of the home and informed Mother of the risks of methamphetamine transference.

[8] In the fall of 2024, Parents were only partially compliant with the dispositional orders. They had both completed the parenting/family functioning assessment, which resulted in additional treatment and service recommendations. In their clinical interviews and assessments, Parents indicated a history of substance use, and the evaluator emphasized the importance of Parents moving out of grandmother's home and achieving financial and housing stability, engaging in substance use treatment, maintaining sobriety, and learning new coping skills. Father started home-based case management, but otherwise, Parents were not engaged with services. Mother's visits were suspended in September due to a positive drug screen for methamphetamine. She resumed visiting with Children in November after a series of negative screens. During the same time, Father missed numerous drug screens and tested positive for alcohol. Then in December, Father's visitation was suspended after he tested positive for methamphetamine.

[9] In early 2025, Father's visitation was reinstated, so both parents were visiting Children. That February, Father was arrested for OWI, driving without a license, and battery against a public safety officer. He was incarcerated for a few weeks before being released to home detention. Mother began individual counseling. Mother also completed a substance use assessment, which recommended Mother engage in IOP, random drug screens, and individual substance use disorder counseling.

[10] In spring 2025, Parents obtained housing separate from grandmother, so Children's supervised visits moved in-home. By May, the visits progressed to semi-supervised overnight visits. But by the end of the month, Parents regressed. Father was incarcerated due to a community corrections violation and failure to pay fees, and Mother had an invalid urine drug screen. A followup oral drug screen administered to Mother in June showed “high levels” of methamphetamine, and her visits were again suspended. Exhibit Vol. 1 at 83. Mother suspected her brother spiked her drink during a recent visit with family. A second test two weeks later was also positive for methamphetamine. At a Child and Family Team Meeting, DCS learned Mother was in danger of eviction. Mother reported she began IOP treatment but expressed that she did not believe therapeutic services were beneficial or necessary. Her therapist noted she was not understanding how her decisions were directly impacting Children. At the July 2025 permanency hearing, the trial court found Parents were only partially compliant with services.

[11] On July 25, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Children. For the next several months while Father was in jail, Mother struggled to maintain employment and financial stability. Mother's landlord threatened eviction, but Mother had no back-up plan should that occur, instead relying on Father's ability to earn income on his release. Mother lacked a sober support system and seemed unmotivated to develop one. She continued to spend time with her family even though they had long-term substance use issues and providers repeatedly warned Mother of the risks those relationships posed to her and Children. Still, Mother completed IOP, participated in therapy, and engaged in virtual, therapeutic visits with Children. In September, Father was released to community corrections, re-engaged with services, and completed a substance use evaluation. Around this time, foster parents reported Children were displaying negative behavior and struggling emotionally due to the changing parental visitation format and schedule.

[12] The trial court began the factfinding hearing on October 21, 2025, and DCS presented the bulk of its evidence on January 9, 2026. At the time, J.B. was six years old and Z.B. was nearly four. Father was working full time, and Mother about ten hours per week. Parents had recently moved into a three-bedroom apartment at Father's workplace. Mother had again tested positive for methamphetamine in November 2025, so Parents and Children were participating in fully supervised, therapeutic visitation. In general, these visits went well, and Parents and Children were bonded.

[13] Numerous service providers testified about their interactions with Parents. Although at that point Parents were participating in court-ordered services, neither had been successfully discharged from them. Father had not followed through on services to address domestic violence issues. Mother denied having used methamphetamine since Children were removed, insisting her positive tests occurred only when she had contact with her family. To that end, social worker and therapeutic visit supervisor Hollie Greene testified Mother seemed to understand the risk of continuing to be around family members who actively use drugs, but “not the gravity of the risk.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 143. Greene noted Mother still lacked a sober support system. Mother's new therapist was concerned about a lack of sobriety.

[14] Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Chloe Doyle testified it was in Children's best interests to terminate the parent-child relationship due to the overall lack of progress in the case. See id. at 189 (FCM Doyle explaining termination was warranted “given the stage of the case ․ and there being a lot of back and forth. We make progress and then some sort of the same situation happens, causing us to kind of backtrack․ I would like to have seen more progress up to this point.”). Similarly, Children's court appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Audra Carroll testified termination of the parent-child relationship was in Children's best interests because the children “deserve stability and permanency.” Id. at 203. She cited Mother's recurring positive drugs screens without a plan to prevent relapse, Father's criminal history, and Parents’ housing instability throughout most of the case as barriers to providing Children with stability. Her overall assessment was that despite the provision of services including home-based case management, individual therapy, and therapeutic supervised visits, the case was not progressing, and the “back and forth ․ is continuing to hurt the children.” Id. at 208.

[15] On February 27, 2026, the trial court issued an order terminating Parents’ parental rights to Children. The court entered numerous findings of fact and determined DCS had proven the allegations in the petition by clear and convincing evidence, specifically concluding: (1) DCS had a satisfactory plan for Children's care (adoption); (2) despite DCS's reasonable efforts to reunify the family, Parents were unable to remedy the circumstances resulting in Children's placement outside the home; (3) there was a reasonable probability Parents would not remedy the conditions resulting in Children's removal or reasons for placement outside the home; and (4) termination was in Children's best interests.² Mother and Father each appealed, and this Court consolidated the appeals on the State's motion.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[16] Parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). But “this right is not absolute.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[17] A decision to terminate parental rights is among the most difficult a trial court is called upon to make. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). These decisions are “among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts, recognizing their superior vantage point for weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility.” Id. We apply a two-tiered standard of review to a termination decision: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the trial court's judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We do not reweigh the evidence but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). And we do not judge witness credibility for ourselves, instead giving due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses firsthand. Id. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts supporting them either directly or by inference. In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Trial court findings not challenged on appeal are accepted as true. See In re A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

Statutory Requirements

[18] To terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCS must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2025) (“termination statute”). In this case, DCS alleged the following subsection (d) circumstances existed:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office [for the requisite time]; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)–(3).

[19] The State bears the burden of proving the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997). If the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition have been proven, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship and shall enter findings of fact supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c)(1) (2012).

Challenged Findings

[20] We begin with an argument raised by Mother alone: that two of the trial court's findings are unsupported by the record. In Finding 33, the trial court found “Mother tested positive for methamphetamine in November and December of 2025.” Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 86 (citing Exhibit 5a). Mother argues this is inaccurate because she only tested positive for methamphetamine once in that time frame. Mother is correct: the exhibit volume shows only one positive test result based on a sample collected on November 24 and reported on December 9, 2025. See Exhibit Vol. 5 at 119. It appears the trial court counted the same result twice. But this minor mistake does not undermine our confidence in the court's findings. The record shows Mother had many negative drug screens and months-long stretches of apparent sobriety. Yet Mother also missed screens and periodically tested positive for methamphetamine throughout the life of the case, specifically in April 2024, August 2024, June 2025 (twice), and November 2025. As the trial court found, these drug screens indicate Mother “struggled with maintaining sobriety.” Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 85. The trial court's mistake about one test result does not fundamentally undermine the unchallenged finding about Mother's sobriety, and thus the error is harmless. See A.J. v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 881 N.E.2d 706, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (erroneous factual findings are harmless if the court's unchallenged or otherwise valid findings still support its judgment), trans. denied.

[21] Mother also challenges Finding 42, wherein the court found: “Father and Mother failed to complete services offered by DCS, continue to have therapeutic supervised visitations only, show a lack of progress from the beginning of the CHINS case, to-wit: Domestic violence, alcohol abuse, and illegal substance abuse.” Mother's App. Vol. 2 at 86. Mother argues the evidence does not support this finding because when the trial court entered its order, there had been no reported domestic violence in the last year, Mother had not recently tested positive for alcohol use, and DCS had no knowledge of methamphetamine use in Parents’ new home. Mother also points to the possibility her positive tests were the result of transference from her family members, a position she maintained throughout the case.

[22] As to domestic violence, evidence shows the trial court ordered Father to participate in services to prevent domestic violence, but Father did not do so. Parents cannot refuse to complete a court ordered service and then claim DCS failed to prove the need for the service still exists. See In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“A parent whose drug use led to a child's removal cannot be permitted to refuse to submit to drug testing, then later claim the DCS has failed to prove that the drug use has continued.”).

[23] As to alcohol and drug use, Father has a history of alcohol use spanning his entire adult life and resulting in numerous alcohol-related criminal convictions, including an OWI during the CHINS matter. Although he had not tested positive for alcohol use since his release from jail in September 2025, at the time of the factfinding he was not engaged in substance use treatment or other interventions to maintain sobriety. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 56, 59. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine in November 2025, three months after DCS petitioned to terminate her parental rights and one month after the factfinding hearing began. As DCS points out, the trial court was not required to credit Mother's testimony denying active drug use and attributing positive test results to her family members’ actions. See Appellee's Br. at 39 (citing Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004), for its statement that “factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted”). Mother's argument regarding Finding 42 is largely a request to reweigh the evidence in her favor, which we cannot do. Based on our review, evidence supports the trial court's finding there was a lack of progress in the case, specifically in the areas of domestic violence and Parents’ substance use.

Subsection (d) Circumstances

[24] Turning to the trial court's judgment terminating the parent-child relationship, both parents appeal the trial court's determination that DCS proved the alleged subsection (d) circumstances. But because subsection (d) of the termination statute is written in the disjunctive, “the trial court need only find that one requirement of subsection (d) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” A.L., 273 N.E.3d at 489; see also In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind. 2010) (applying prior version of the statute). Accordingly, we focus on the trial court's determination under subsection (d)(3): that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal or reasons for Children's placement outside the home will not be remedied.

[25] To make this determination, trial courts engage in a two-step analysis: first, the trial court ascertains what conditions led to Children's removal and placement outside the home, and then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1134. When making these decisions, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. But the trial court must balance any recent improvements against a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. The evidence presented by DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[26] Here, DCS became involved with the family due to poor home conditions and allegations Father engaged in domestic violence while using alcohol. DCS removed Children after Parents and grandmother tested positive for methamphetamine. Children, too, tested positive for the drug.

[27] At the time of the factfinding, Parents had recently moved into a suitable home and obtained employment. Both were re-engaged with services and participating in supervised, therapeutic visitation. But Mother had also recently tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother denied intentionally using methamphetamine throughout the life of the case, claiming she tested positive due to the actions of others. The trial court's finding that Mother struggled to maintain sobriety implicitly rejects Mother's explanation for her positive drug screens. Moreover, the court found that even if it were to credit Mother's testimony in this regard, such testimony was evidence of Mother's inability to protect herself and ensure Children's safety around family members known to use drugs. Mother's service providers also believed Mother lacked insight into the negative effects of her drug use and association with known illicit drug users on Children. And there was testimony Mother had not developed a network of sober supports, increasing the likelihood she would continue to endanger Children through exposure to illegal drugs.

[28] As for Father, he had not engaged with court-ordered services to address the allegations of domestic violence, despite evidence he sometimes engaged in threats and violence when intoxicated. He completed a substance use disorder assessment only after DCS filed the petition to terminate. True, he had tested negative for alcohol use for several months since his release from jail. But at the time of the factfinding, he was not participating in recommended services to maintain sobriety, despite a very long pattern of negative consequences stemming from his alcohol use, including criminal convictions and jail time.

[29] In sum, the record shows Parents engaged in a pattern of instability and poor decision making due to drug and alcohol use. Throughout the case, Parents downplayed the negative effects of substance use on their lives and were skeptical of the necessity and efficacy of treatment. Parents also demonstrated a general lack of insight into how their drug and alcohol use negatively affected Children or how to protect Children from these negative consequences. We have repeatedly noted that a trial court is entitled to weigh more heavily Parents’ prior history than efforts made only shortly before termination. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. In this case, Parents’ long history of substance use, failure to make meaningful progress to change their behavior during the CHINS case, and current lack of insight into the negative impact of parental substance use on a child, support the trial court's determination that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal or reasons for Children's placement outside the home will not be remedied.

Best Interests

[30] Parents also challenge the trial court's determination that termination was in Children's best interests. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3). When deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests, trial courts “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. A child's need for permanency is a central concern. Id. “Indeed, ‘children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Id. (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). And trial courts “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[31] Here, both FCM Doyle and CASA Carroll testified about Children's need for permanency. They were concerned the general lack of progress and “back and forth” nature of the case was causing Children harm. Both testified that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Children's best interests. Recommendations of the case manager and child advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal or reasons for placement outside the home will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. See In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Based on the FCM's and CASA's recommendations, and Parents’ inability or unwillingness to provide Children with an environment free from domestic violence, abuse, neglect, and alcohol and drug use, the trial court's conclusion that termination was in Children's best interests was not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[32] Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[33] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The half-siblings were eventually placed with their father and are not involved in this case.

2.   The trial court also found there was a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Children's wellbeing, safety, physical health, or life, and Parents failed to substantially comply with the dispositional decree for at least twelve months after the CHINS adjudication. But DCS did not allege these circumstances in the petition, so we do not address these findings.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.