Zachery Ricketts, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following his placement on probation for two offenses, Zachery Ricketts committed new offenses. He pleaded guilty to the new offenses and admitted to having violated the conditions of his placement on probation. The court revoked his placement on probation and sentenced him for the new offense. Ricketts now appeals and raises the following two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentences.

2. Whether his sentence for the new offense is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 28, 2025, the State charged Ricketts with possession of methamphetamine, as a Level 6 felony; possession of a controlled substance, as a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of marijuana, as a Class B misdemeanor, in Cause Number 65C01-2504-F6-297 (“F6-297”). Then, on July 21, the State charged Ricketts with possession of a narcotic drug, as a Level 6 felony; possession of methamphetamine, as a Level 6 felony; possession of marijuana, as a Class B misdemeanor; possession of a device or substance to interfere with a drug or alcohol screening test, as a Class B misdemeanor; and possession of paraphernalia, as a Class C misdemeanor, in Cause Number 65C01-2507-F6-593 (“F6-593”).

[4] Shortly thereafter, the State and Ricketts entered into an agreement pursuant to which Ricketts agreed to plead guilty as charged in both F6-297 and F6-593. In exchange, the parties agreed to recommend that Ricketts be sentenced to an aggregate term of one year, suspended to probation, in each cause number, with the terms to run consecutively. The court accepted Ricketts’ plea and sentenced him according to the agreement.

[5] On December 12, the State charged Ricketts with two counts of resisting law enforcement, as Level 6 felonies, and one count of reckless driving, as a Class B misdemeanor, in Cause Number 65C01-2512-F6-972 (“F6-972”). The State also filed petitions to revoke Ricketts’ placement on probation in F6-297 and F6-593 based on the new charges and a failed drug screen.

[6] On March 18, 2026, the court held both an initial hearing on the new charges and a hearing on the petitions to revoke probation. At the hearing, Ricketts pleaded guilty without the benefit of an agreement to the new charges in F6-972, and he admitted to the probation violations in F6-297 and F6-593. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court revoked Ricketts’ placement on probation in F6-297 and F6-593 and ordered him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentences. The court also noted that, “for purposes of sentencing in the new cause, there are certainly aggravators with regards to prior criminal history” and “the nature of the offense[s.]” Tr. at 13. The court then identified Ricketts’ open plea as mitigating but found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigator. Accordingly, the court then sentenced Ricketts to an aggregate term of two years executed in F6-972, to run consecutive to the sentences in the other two causes. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] We initially note that Ricketts appeals both the sanction following the revocation of his probation in two cause numbers and his sentence in F6-972. Ricketts contends that the sentences, taken together, amount to an abuse of discretion and an inappropriate sentence. However, while he appeals the probation revocation and sentencing cause together, “they remain separate and distinct from one another.” Keener v. State, 267 N.E.3d 1137, 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Further, the trial court's “decision to revoke his probation” in F6-297 and F6-593 “has no bearing on our Appellate Rule 7(B) review of his sentence” in F6-972. Id. And, similarly, the disposition of F6-972 “has no bearing on our review of [Ricketts’] probation revocation sentence” in the other two cause numbers. Id. As such, we address the two claims separately.

Issue One: Probation Revocation

[8] Ricketts first asserts that the court abused its discretion when it revoked his placement on probation and ordered him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentences in F6-297 and F6-593. “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). “The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated.” Id.; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a). Indeed, violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation. Gosha v. State, 873 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[9] Upon determining that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). “Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. We review a trial court's decision to revoke probation and a trial court's sentencing decision in a probation revocation proceeding for an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.”

[10] On appeal, Ricketts contends that the court abused its discretion when it selected “the most severe sanction authorized” by statute because he “accepted responsibility for every matter pending” before the court. Appellant's Br. at 11. And, while he acknowledges that he “committed new offenses while on probation, fled from law enforcement, and admitted conduct that created a substantial risk of harm to others,” he nonetheless states, without more, that those facts do not “require the trial court to impose the harshest sanction[.]” Id. at 11-12.

[11] However, the court was well within its discretion to order Ricketts to serve his entire previously suspended sentence. Ricketts was charged with eight drug-related counts across two cause numbers over a span of only three months. But instead of incarcerating Ricketts, the court granted him leniency and suspended his entire sentence to probation. Then, a mere four months later, Ricketts fled from law enforcement and “drove at an unreasonably high rate of speed under the circumstances as to endanger the safety or property of others[.]” Tr. at 9.

[12] Stated differently, despite prior grants of leniency, Ricketts continued to violate the terms of his probation by committing new offenses. Given that Ricketts committed numerous offenses in three cause numbers over a relatively short time span, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence.

Issue Two: Appropriateness of Sentence

[13] Ricketts also contends that his sentence in F6-972 is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” This Court has held that “[t]he advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. And the Indiana Supreme Court has previously explained that:

The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers ․ but not achieve a perceived “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind.), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).

[14] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court's judgment “should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[15] The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). And a person who commits a Class B misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one hundred and eighty days. I.C. § 35-50-3-3. Because the trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently, we concern ourselves only with the most serious offense. Here, the court sentenced Ricketts to two years on the Level 6 felonies.

[16] On appeal, Ricketts concedes that the “nature of the offenses supports an executed sentence.” Appellant's Br. at 12. However, he contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character because he “was twenty-three years old at the time of sentencing and accepted responsibility for every pending allegation without requiring the State to prove a single charge or probation violation.” Id.

[17] But Ricketts has not met his burden on appeal to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate. Regarding the nature of the offenses, as Ricketts acknowledges, he fled from law enforcement and drove his car at a very high rate of speed, causing danger to himself and others. Ricketts has not presented any compelling evidence to portray his offenses in a positive light.

[18] As for his character, we acknowledge that Ricketts accepted full responsibility for his actions. But the court took that into consideration when it sentenced him. Further, at only twenty-three years old, Ricketts had already committed the eight prior offenses in F6-297 and F6-593, for which he received a sentence of two years suspended to probation. Ricketts then committed the new offenses while on probation, which reflects poorly on his character. Ricketts has not shown any substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character that would overcome our deference to the trial court. We therefore affirm his sentence.

Conclusion

[19] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Ricketts to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentences in F6-297 and F6-593. And his sentence in F6-972 is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses or his character. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[20] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.