CREEKMORE v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

 Statement of the Case

[1] Brian Allen Creekmore appeals the sanction imposed by the trial court when it revoked his community corrections placement. Finding no error, we affirm.

 Facts and Procedural History

[2] In August 2025, the State charged Creekmore with two counts of Level 6 felony theft, Level 5 felony corrupt business influence, and Level 5 felony contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The following month Creekmore pleaded guilty to both counts of theft and to contributing to the delinquency of a minor pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of four years on home detention.

[3] Creekmore was placed on home detention on September 24. On October 15, the State petitioned the trial court to change Creekmore's placement from community corrections to incarceration and alleged that on October 6 Creekmore had made unapproved stops at three different locations away from his residence.

[4] Following a factfinding hearing, the court determined that Creekmore had violated his community corrections placement and ordered him to serve two years of his four-year sentence at DOC. Creekmore appeals that sanction.

 Discussion and Decision

[5] Creekmore challenges the trial court's choice of sanction for his community corrections violation, which he characterizes as technical. Appellant's Br. p. 9. We review a trial court's sanction for the violation of a community corrections placement under the abuse of discretion standard. Puckett v. State, 183 N.E.3d 335, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1224, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). In performing our evaluation of a trial court's decision to revoke placement in a community corrections program, we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Puckett, 183 N.E.3d at 339.

[6] At the factfinding hearing, the State called Caitlyn Prather, Creekmore's supervising officer for home detention. She testified that Creekmore signed a home detention agreement that included a term that he was to abide by a weekly schedule, which he was required to provide to community corrections in advance for approval. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 6. Absent prior authorization, he was to remain at his residence. Id. Prather stated Creekmore was given a verbal warning because he had deviated from his weekly schedule and gone to his sister's house without permission on September 30. Id. at 6-7.

[7] Prather further testified that in a phone call with Creekmore on October 3 she “thoroughly explained that he was to remain home and what he would be risking by leaving his home without prior authorization, which would be potential escape charges.” Id. at 10. During that conversation, Prather also discussed Creekmore's September 30 deviation when he went to his sister's house, and she clarified that such acts were not acceptable while on home detention. Id. at 12.

[8] Prather testified that just three days later, on October 6, Creekmore had permission to go to court at 8:00 a.m. Id. at 16. However, he went to a gas station from approximately 8:47 to 8:49 a.m.; an unknown residence from approximately 10:53 a.m. to 12:16 p.m.; and McDonald's from approximately 12:31 to 12:40 p.m., all of which was unapproved. Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 52 (attachment to petition to change placement); Tr. Vol. 1, p. 7. Prather stated that when she questioned Creekmore about this occurrence, he told her he had spoken with the front desk assistant at her office and that the assistant had given him permission to go to these three places. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 9. Prather informed the court that she spoke with everyone in her office with whom Creekmore had contact on that date, and they all advised that they had not given Creekmore permission to deviate from his approved schedule. Id.

[9] On cross-examination, counsel asked Prather about emails Creekmore sent. Prather indicated Creekmore had emailed her on October 4 asking permission to go look at a place to live and that he sent another email at 12:26 a.m. on October 6 stating he had court and an interview in the morning and that he would then be moving. Id. at 18. Prather testified she was out of the office and unable to respond to the emails. Id. In response to defense counsel's question of why a less severe corrective action was not sought, Prather succinctly stated:

Due to [the] conversation that him and I had two days prior where I made it very clear what's expected on home detention. He had recently had another incident where he went to his sister's house and it's clear to me that he does not take home detention seriously and was not going to follow or abide by any of my directives or the Judge's directives.

Id. at 17.

[10] At the State's request, the court took judicial notice of its record, specifically a notification that Creekmore had also violated his pretrial release. Id. at 23. The State then called Creekmore as a witness. Although he heard Prather testify that no one in her office spoke with him on October 6, he maintained that he called the office and received permission to go to the residential location that day. Id. at 27.

[11] Contrary to his assertion, Creekmore's violation was not merely technical. Even by his own account, he did not have permission to go to the gas station or McDonald's. And his unapproved travel on October 6 occurred just three days after Prather's explicit explanation and warning about leaving his residence without prior authorization. Moreover, Prather's admonition was necessitated by Creekmore's unauthorized trip to his sister's house on September 30. In addition to his repeated circumvention of the terms of his home detention, he fabricated a story in an attempt to excuse his violation.

[12] Further, we disagree with Creekmore's statement that the sanction “seemed to be based more on the trial court's displeasure with the initial plea agreement than the severity of the violation.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. In support of his assertion, Creekmore cites Puckett v. State, 956 N.E.2d 1182 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) in which this Court held that a trial court's belief that the original sentence was too lenient is not a proper basis upon which to determine the sanction to be imposed following a revocation of probation. In that case, the trial judge repeatedly expressed his displeasure with Puckett's original sentence under a plea agreement that was accepted by a different judge, rehashed the details of the underlying crime, referred to the crime as “horrible” and “horrendous,” and stated that the original sentence “was unbelievably lenient in my estimation.” Id. at 1185.

[13] That is not what happened here, as the trial judge who accepted Creekmore's plea agreement is the same judge who presided over his change of placement proceedings. If, as Creekmore suggests, the judge was dissatisfied with the parties’ plea agreement, he had the authority to reject it at the plea hearing. Moreover, the judge's comments at the factfinding hearing were of an “I-told-you-so” nature rather than a scathing reiteration of the underlying facts and agreement. The judge reminded Creekmore that, despite his doubts about allowing Creekmore to serve his sentence on home detention, he nevertheless had afforded Creekmore the opportunity:

I had reservations about putting you on house arrest at all given the seriousness of the crime. I accepted the plea agreement, but I told you, you know, that in light of the fact that you've already violated home detention as a term of your pre-trial release, that you could not violate your home detention further. That I was already not liking the plea. I was going to go along with it, but I admonished you very clearly not to violate home detention. And here we find ourselves today. You know, almost immediately, there's a violation with a verbal warning, and then a violation that was filed on here today.

Tr. Vol. 1, p. 49. Creekmore's original placement outside the DOC was a demonstration of grace, and again, he has been afforded grace, as the trial court ordered him to serve only two years of his original four-year sentence at the DOC, after which he will be returned to home detention. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's chosen sanction.

 Conclusion

[14] Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot say the trial court's sanction was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.

[15] Affirmed.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.