Bradley Allen Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] A court ordered Bradley Smith to have no contact with his parents. He nevertheless entered his parents’ property, smashed up their vehicles, and threatened his father. After a jury found Smith guilty of three misdemeanors—two for invasion of privacy and one for criminal mischief—he admitted he had a prior conviction that enhanced his invasion of privacy convictions to felonies. The trial court then imposed an aggregate three-and-one-half-year sentence. Smith appeals both his felony enhancements and his sentence. We affirm.

Facts

[2] In 2024, a court issued a two-year protective order prohibiting Smith from contacting his parents, J.S. and K.S. The order specifically required Smith to stay away from his parents’ home. In June 2025, J.S. was at home when she heard “a very loud, repetitive, thumping, hitting noise” outside. Tr. Vol. II, p. 71. She ran to a window and saw Smith striking K.S.’s work van with what appeared to be a long pipe or cable. J.S. woke up K.S., and they went into the garage, where they saw that Smith had smashed several windows of J.S.’s car. Smith continued striking the vehicles for some time before leaving. As he walked away, he pointed at K.S. and said something to the effect of “[Y]ou're next.” Id. at 89. The total estimate for repairing the vehicles exceeded $5,000.

[3] The State ultimately charged Smith with two counts of Level 6 felony invasion of privacy with a prior conviction and one count of Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief.¹ In the first phase of the bifurcated trial, a jury found Smith guilty on two counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy and on the criminal mischief count. But instead of proceeding with the second phase of trial on Smith's alleged prior conviction for invasion of privacy, Smith's counsel informed the trial court that Smith would stipulate to it.

[4] When the court asked Smith whether he intended to admit to the prior conviction, Smith responded, “What was all that?” Id. at 124. He then began making disruptive remarks such as, “That is not even my father,” “He killed my family,” and “[T]his is bullshit.” Id. at 125, 127. He also stated he had “African American heritage” and that the jury was “racist.” Id. at 127. Once Smith refocused on the court's questioning, he insisted he would “admit to nothing.” Id. at 129. The court eventually removed Smith from the courtroom and allowed him time to compose himself.

[5] After consulting with counsel, Smith returned. The court again asked whether he wished to admit the alleged prior conviction, and Smith answered, “Sure, sure. Yeah.” Id. at 134. The court then explained that the trial had been bifurcated to keep Smith's prior conviction out of the first phase. And it informed him: “If you agree that you have this prior conviction, then we can move forward.” Id. at 135–36. Smith replied, “I just want to get it done.” Id. at 136. The court asked counsel whether any additional foundation was needed for Smith's convictions, and both parties’ attorneys said no. Smith also confirmed that it “ma[d]e sense” for him to cooperate with a probation officer in preparing his presentence investigation (PSI) report. Id. at 138. The court then entered judgments of conviction.

[6] The PSI report revealed Smith's extensive history of criminal convictions and probation violations, as well as reported mental health diagnoses for bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and depression. At the sentencing hearing, J.S. testified that Smith was “a severe addict and alcoholic” and that meth had “taken over his life.” Id. at 144. She hoped for Smith to get “evaluated” and receive “long-term treatment.” Id. at 145. K.S. agreed with J.S.’s statements and hoped the court would help Smith get treatment before somebody got “hurt.” Id. at 151.

[7] The court proceeded to sentencing, citing as aggravating circumstances Smith's violation of protective orders, the failure of less restrictive measures to improve his mental health and substance abuse issues, and the age of his victims. It also concluded that Smith had shown “no desire to ․ get well.” Id. at 155. The court then imposed concurrent two-and-one-half-year terms for each of the invasion of privacy counts and a consecutive one-year term for criminal mischief, for an aggregate three and one-half years executed to the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC).

Discussion and Decision

[8] Smith challenges the enhancement of his invasion of privacy convictions to felonies, argues the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him, and seeks revision of his sentence.

I. Felony Enhancements

[9] Smith first argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he had a prior conviction, as necessary to enhance his invasion of privacy convictions to felonies. But because Smith admitted to that prior conviction, he cannot challenge it through this appeal.

[10] A person who “knowingly or intentionally violates ․ a protective order to prevent domestic or family violence or harassment” commits invasion of privacy as a Class A misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(1). But “the offense is a Level 6 felony if the person has a prior unrelated conviction for” invasion of privacy or stalking. Id. § -15.1(a).

[11] Smith contends he did not make “a clear, unequivocal, knowing, and intentional concession that he had a prior conviction [for] invasion of privacy” and that no other evidence demonstrated he had such a conviction. Appellant's Br., p. 11.

[12] The difficulty with this argument is that Smith informed the trial court he was admitting he had a prior conviction for invasion of privacy and agreed to move on to sentencing. His admission was akin to a guilty plea to the felony enhancements and relieved the State of its burden of proof because nothing more remained to be proven. See Young v. State, 143 N.E.3d 965, 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020); cf. Garrett v. State, 737 N.E.2d 388, 392 (Ind. 2000) (holding that a defendant's admission to alleged prior convictions was not akin to a guilty plea to habitual offender status where the State still had to prove the convictions were unrelated). And it has long been settled that “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty, they cannot challenge their conviction through a direct appeal; they must instead pursue post-conviction relief.” Monroe v. State, 281 N.E.3d 546, 548 (Ind. 2026) (citing Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394, 395–96 (Ind. 1996)). We therefore decline to review in this appeal whether Smith's admission to his prior conviction was knowing and voluntary. See Stringer v. State, 899 N.E.2d 748, 749–50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (requiring a defendant to challenge his admission to a prior conviction through post-conviction relief).

II. Sentencing

[13] Smith presents two distinct sentencing issues. First, he maintains the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing him by: (1) relying on his violation of the protective order as an aggravating circumstance even though that violation was an element of his invasion of privacy convictions; and (2) failing to consider his mental illness as a mitigating circumstance. Second, Smith asks us to deem his aggregate sentence inappropriate and revise it to “advisory and concurrent sentences” under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Appellant's Br., p. 33.

[14] We address only the appropriateness of Smith's sentence. Where a trial court has abused its discretion in sentencing a defendant, a reviewing court may exercise its authority to review and revise the sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B) instead of remanding for resentencing. Chappell v. State, 966 N.E.2d 124, 134 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). But if the sentence is not inappropriate, any sentencing error is harmless. Id.; see also Windhorst v. State, 868 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ind. 2007). Accordingly, we elect to review Smith's sentence for inappropriateness without separately addressing his claim that the court abused its discretion in including an improper aggravating factor and failing to consider a mitigating factor. See Govan v. State, 116 N.E.3d 1165, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[15] Under Appellate Rule 7(B), we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In applying this standard, we afford “considerable deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision unless “compelling evidence” portrays the defendant's offenses and character “in a positive light.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). Our principal role is to “leaven the outliers” rather than “to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225.

[16] Here, Smith was sentenced for two Level 6 felonies and a Class A misdemeanor. The respective sentencing ranges were: six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year on each felony; and up to one year on the misdemeanor. Ind. Code §§ 35-50-2-7(b), -3-2. Thus, Smith's maximum sentencing exposure was six years. But he was sentenced to an aggregate three and one-half years executed, considerably below the maximum.

[17] We turn first to the nature of Smith's offenses and find significant aggravating circumstances. Besides violating the protective order simply by contacting his parents and entering their property, Smith smashed up their vehicles and threatened his father by saying something to the effect of “[Y]ou're next.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 89. And by causing over $5,000 in property damage, Smith's criminal mischief offense went far beyond the $750 threshold for a Class A misdemeanor. See Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a)(1) (2024). Thus, the nature of Smith's offenses does not support relief.

[18] We next address Smith's character. His lengthy criminal history contains felony convictions for drug possession, driving offenses, and intimidation, as well as his April 2025 conviction for invasion of privacy. He also has numerous misdemeanor convictions for battery and public intoxication, among other offenses. The PSI report additionally discloses seven probation violations, several of which were for committing new offenses, including battery and intimidation. This history indicates Smith has repeatedly failed to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and to court orders. What's more, Smith became “increasingly aggressive” during his time in jail awaiting trial and sentencing in this case. Tr. Vol. II, p. 155. And his father, K.S., expressed fear that Smith's behavior would keep escalating until somebody got seriously hurt. Smith's history of criminal conduct, unsuccessful past experiences on probation, and continuing risk of future offenses weigh against relief. See Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1272 (Ind. 2023) (noting that a history of criminal conduct weighs against a defendant).

[19] Smith argues that his character nevertheless warrants a sentence revision because he is “a person battling mental illness.” Appellant's Br., p. 31. We sympathize with Smith's struggles but decline to revise his sentence on this ground. It is not clear that mental illness motivated Smith's offenses, and he has demonstrated neither remorse nor empathy. See Tillett v. State, 278 N.E.3d 359, 367 (Ind. 2026). The trial court specifically stated that Smith had shown “no desire to ․ get well.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 155. And, as the trial court noted, Smith's record does not suggest he can successfully manage his mental illness or methamphetamine addiction in conditions less restrictive than DOC. In these circumstances, Smith's mental illness does not warrant relief.

[20] Because Smith has not presented compelling evidence portraying his offenses or his character in a positive light, we do not find his sentence inappropriate.

Conclusion

[21] Smith may not challenge his admission to his prior conviction in this appeal, and his sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This offense was recently renamed “criminal vandalism.” See Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2 (2026).

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.