Victoria J. Goring, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judges Bailey and Brown concur.

[1] Victoria Goring was convicted of criminal conversion for knowingly leaving an automobile service center without paying $50 for having her minivan started. She argues there was insufficient evidence to prove she knew she owed the money and that the trial court erroneously excluded testimony. Finding the evidence sufficient and any error in excluding the testimony harmless, we affirm.

Facts

[2] Around the end of 2024, Goring's minivan was having problems starting. Goring had the vehicle jump-started and took it to a Midas service center in Terre Haute for diagnosis and repair. Midas technicians could not fix the fault and said there was no charge. But they recommended Goring have the minivan towed instead of jump-started next time if the problem recurred.

[3] On January 13, 2025, Goring's minivan would not start again, so she and her daughter had it towed to the Midas. The tow was free under Goring's roadside coverage. This time, Midas technicians performed an electrical test and diagnosed a starter fault. The service center owner, Brian Niece, then provided Goring an estimate to repair the starter. Goring initially accepted but quickly changed her mind. Niece did not charge Goring the standard $75 diagnosis fee. [4] The witnesses’ recollections diverge as to what happened next. Niece testified that he suggested, “Hey, for fifty dollars I can try to get it started,” and that Goring responded, “Okay, I can do that.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 96. But according to Goring, a Midas employee agreed to start her minivan for free. As she could get the vehicle towed for free, Goring testified, she had no need to pay to have it started.

[5] After Midas technicians got the minivan started by turning the key and tapping the starter with a hammer, Niece stated he went into the office and informed Goring's daughter that payment was due, to which the daughter responded that Goring would pay. But according to the daughter, Niece merely told her to keep the minivan running.

[6] The daughter then walked out of the office, let Goring know the minivan was ready, and sat in the driver's seat. She did not tell Goring she had paid for anything. Goring had been talking on her cellphone around a corner from the office; she, too, walked over to the minivan, and sat in the front passenger's seat. As the daughter was waiting to pull the minivan onto the street, Niece approached, tapped on the driver's side window, and said, “Hey, you owe me fifty dollars.” Id. at 97. The daughter only looked at him and drove off. Niece then tried phoning Goring, but she did not pick up. Niece reported the incident to police.

[7] The State ultimately charged Goring with Class A misdemeanor criminal conversion. During the jury trial, Goring attempted to introduce testimony from a mechanic, Jason Windle. He had inspected the minivan with a code scanner, determined the problem lay with the neutral safety switch—not the starter—and successfully repaired the switch. But the court excluded Windle's testimony as irrelevant. At the end of the trial, the jury found Goring guilty, and the court imposed a one-year sentence suspended to informal probation.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Goring appeals both the sufficiency of the evidence and the exclusion of Windle's testimony. Because the sufficiency of the evidence analysis illuminates the evidentiary issue, we address it first.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] Goring argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude she knew either that “a payment was owed” or that her daughter “had not paid it.” Appellant's Br., p. 21.

[10] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). Rather, we consider only the evidence favorable to the verdict and affirm unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[11] Here, the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Goring “knowingly or intentionally exert[ed] unauthorized control over property of another person.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-3(a). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). And “property” means “anything of value,” including “services.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-253(a)(2). To be sure, the criminal conversion statute does not criminalize a good-faith failure to pay a debt. Harper v. S&H Leasing, LLC, 277 N.E.3d 87, 97 (Ind. 2026). But proof of the mens rea element of knowingly or intentionally exerting unauthorized control renders the conduct criminal. Id.

[12] The evidence favorable to the verdict established that Goring knowingly failed to pay $50 for starting her minivan. Niece testified that Goring accepted his offer to perform the start for $50 after she rejected the proposed starter repair. Midas technicians then started the minivan. But Goring's daughter neither paid nor told Goring she had done so. And the pair left without paying. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that Goring knowingly failed to pay the price she agreed to for starting her minivan.

[13] Goring argues she did not know Midas was charging her because the service center had previously examined her minivan for free and because, as she and her daughter were leaving the service center, Niece only tapped the window on her daughter's side and tried to speak with her daughter. But it is the jury's function to resolve conflicts in the evidence and decide where the truth lies. Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022). Goring merely asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.

II. Exclusion of Testimony

[14] Goring also argues the trial court erroneously excluded testimony from the mechanic, Windle, who diagnosed and repaired the neutral safety switch. Goring contends his testimony was: (1) relevant to establish her “genuine, good-faith belief that she owe[d] nothing”; and (2) admissible to impeach Niece's credibility concerning his testimony that Midas technicians diagnosed a faulty starter. Appellant's Br., p. 14. Goring additionally maintains the exclusion of Windle's testimony deprived her of her constitutional right to present a defense.

[15] Assuming Windle's testimony was admissible to establish Goring's good-faith defense or to impeach Niece, we nevertheless find its erroneous exclusion harmless. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A), no error is reversible on appeal “where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” And in applying this standard, “we consider the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all the evidence in the case.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023). The appellant “bears the burden of demonstrating how ․ the error's probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below.” Id.

[16] Goring contends the alleged error was harmful because, “[h]ad the jury been permitted to hear Windle's testimony, it would have had reasonable doubt about whether Goring knowingly walked away from a legitimate debt.” Appellant's Br., p. 19. But we conclude the alleged error was harmless for several reasons.

[17] First, Windle's testimony would have been cumulative of admitted testimony. The substance of Windle's evidence was that he used a code scanner on Goring's minivan and obtained a code for the neutral safety switch, not the starter. After he took the switch out, cleaned it, and put it back, the minivan then started successfully. Windle also opined that his approach was standard diagnostic procedure. Although the trial court excluded Windle's testimony, Goring testified without objection that she took the minivan to another mechanic who “put in a diagnostic” with “one of those scannery things that read the codes” and got the minivan starting “perfectly” without replacing the starter. Tr. Vol. II, p. 172. Goring also stated that “it turned out it was this neutral switch.” Id. at 178. Where, as here, “excluded testimony is merely cumulative of other evidence presented, its exclusion is harmless error.” Sylvester v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (Ind. 1998).

[18] Windle's testimony also had little bearing on whether Goring knowingly obtained Midas's services without paying for them. As Goring's attorney stated in closing argument, the State's version of events was that Goring accepted Niece's offer to start her minivan “for fifty bucks.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 181. Windle's proffered testimony, by contrast, concerned whether Midas accurately diagnosed a starter fault—a diagnosis for which Midas charged nothing. Windle candidly admitted he had “no idea” what happened before he looked at the minivan, and he could not speak to whether Goring agreed to pay $50 for starting the vehicle. Id. at 157.

[19] Windle's testimony would not have significantly impeached Niece's credibility as a witness either. While Windle detected a neutral safety switch fault using a code scanner, Niece stated his technicians reached a different diagnosis after performing an electrical test. That difference in approach explained why Midas did not detect the code for a faulty switch.

[20] Finally, Goring argues for the first time on appeal that the exclusion of Windle's testimony infringed her constitutional right to present a defense because Windle was the “only witness capable of establishing that [she] had a good-faith basis to believe she owed Midas nothing.” Appellant's Br., p. 18; see Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731, 164 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2006). Waiver aside, Goring was permitted to present the substance of Windle's evidence through her own testimony and to argue her good-faith defense in closing argument. Furthermore, as we have explained, Goring's good-faith defense was tangential to the issue of her guilt or innocence. Thus, any violation of Goring's constitutional rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Crossland v. State, 256 N.E.3d 517, 528 (Ind. 2025).

[21] For these reasons, Goring fails to demonstrate that the alleged evidentiary error should undermine our confidence in the verdict.

Conclusion

[22] Because the State presented sufficient evidence to prove criminal conversion, and any error in excluding testimony was harmless, we affirm the judgment.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.