IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: C.S. and C.W. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] C.W. and C.S. (collectively, “Children”) are the biological children of A.W. (“Mother”) and Ch.S. (“Father”). Children were removed from Parents’ care after Mother was arrested for neglecting C.S. and Father refused to retrieve Children upon her arrest. Children were each adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Parents failed to meaningfully engage in or otherwise make appreciable progress in court-ordered services, so the trial court terminated their parental rights to Children. Parents now challenge that termination and present several issues for our review, which we revise and restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence at the termination hearing; and

2. Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Parents’ parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In September 2022, Children were living with Mother in Marion County, Indiana.¹ Father often stayed with Mother, but he did not live with her. On September 11, when C.S. was less than one month old, Mother sent videos to Father, his family, and her family, of Mother “forcefully striking [C.S.] on his face” and “holding [C.S.]’s head under running water with his face facing the water,” Ex. Vol. I at 35. See also Tr. Vol. II at 8. Mother also “sent a text message with a picture of [C.S.] crying, stating that she was going [to] kill him” and “indicated in a text message that she would do the same thing to” C.W. Ex. Vol. I at 35. Mother was arrested and charged for this incident, and two no contact orders were issued that prohibited Mother from contacting Children. Father “was unwilling to go retrieve the ․ children from [Mother] while the police were at her home, due to having an active warrant.” Id.; see also Tr. Vol. II at 54. On September 14, DCS filed petitions alleging Children were CHINS. Children were placed with Mother's mother (“Maternal Grandmother”).

[4] Mother admitted Children were CHINS “because a no contact order ha[d] been issued in [her] pending criminal case alleging neglect of a dependent.” Ex. Vol. I at 44. Father did not admit Children were CHINS, so in December 2022, the trial court held a factfinding hearing, which Father did not attend. The trial court adjudicated Children as CHINS. In the adjudication order, the trial court found that Father had “refused to provide his address [to DCS] due to having active warrants for his arrest,” had “not had any contact with [DCS] since October of 2022,” had “not had any parenting time with the children since” the CHINS petition was filed, had “not demonstrated any interest or ability to parent the children since” the CHINS petition was filed, and still had an active arrest warrant. Id. at 47. In early February 2023, the trial court ordered Mother to engage in home-based therapy and case management programs, complete a parenting assessment, complete a domestic violence assessment, complete a psychological evaluation, and follow all recommendations from these services. The trial court ordered Father to complete a “Father Engagement Program,” complete a domestic violence assessment, and follow all recommendations from that assessment. Id. at 53.

[5] In July 2023, Mother pled guilty to several charges related to the September 2022 incident,² she was sentenced to 545 days of probation, and she was ordered to have no contact with Father. Less than one year later, Mother was charged with and pled guilty to violating that no contact order, and she was sentenced to 32 days in jail. Shortly thereafter, Father's girlfriend sought and obtained an order for protection against Mother.

[6] Early on in the CHINS case, Children were removed from Maternal Grandmother's care and placed with a friend of Mother's family (“Placement”). This change occurred because Maternal Grandmother had “allow[ed Mother] to see the kids when she [was not] supposed to.” Tr. Vol. III at 10. Mother “would come over [to Maternal Grandmother's home] with her little temper tantrums,” id., “throwing things, kicking the doors,” id. at 13, and Maternal Grandmother “would have to call the police on her to leave,” id. at 10.

[7] In July 2024, after a permanency hearing, the trial court found that “Father ha[d] not engaged in any services or parenting time,” and Mother, despite “continu[ing] to engage in services, ․ ha[d] failed to demonstrate the ability to keep herself or her children safe from domestic violence” and had “not fully engaged in her individual therapy to address additional underlying issues.” Mother's App. Vol. II at 36. Consequently, in August 2024, DCS filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Children.

[8] In January 2025, Mother was involved in a domestic violence incident with a former boyfriend.³ In February, Mother's former boyfriend obtained an order for protection against her.

[9] On October 21 and 23, 2025, the trial court held the factfinding hearing on the termination petitions. Mother testified that as of October 21, she had not been able to successfully reunify with Children because of her “emotional state.” Tr. Vol. II at 9. Mother had not had unsupervised or overnight visits with Children since they were removed from her care in September 2022, and as of October 21, 2025, she was visiting Children three times per week—once in her home and twice in the community. Since September 2022, Mother had lived at seven different addresses and was evicted from two of those. Beginning in May 2025, Mother had been living with Maternal Grandmother, stepfather, and sister. The family case manager (“FCM”) testified that Children could not be returned to Mother's care while she lived with her family because Mother often argued with Maternal Grandmother and her stepfather, with some of those arguments having resulted in Mother being kicked out of Maternal Grandmother's home.

[10] From March 2023 to May 2024, Alexis Reid Cayson was Mother's home-based caseworker and visitation supervisor. Cayson testified that Mother would text “that she wanted to just stop visits, stop working with DCS, she was blocking all” the service providers, Tr. Vol. II at 125. This “would happen a few times a month,” but Mother would change her mind and “continue with the case.” Id. Mother “fired” Cayson and told Cayson “that she did not want any contact with” Cayson, id. at 130, even though Cayson became Children's home-based caseworker. According to Placement, “sometimes [Mother] wants [Children] and sometimes she don't [sic].” Id. at 165. The FCM also testified that Mother would tell her that “she just wants DCS out [of] it or you guys can just take the kids or [Placement] can just adopt the kids.” Id. at 175. The last time Mother made such a statement to the FCM was in May 2025. According to the FCM, Mother improved her mental health “slightly” since September 2022, id. at 177, but not enough to move to unsupervised parenting time.

[11] The FCM testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Children's best interests because of “the ongoing mental health concerns.” Tr. Vol. II at 187. The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Children's best interests because of “the ongoing mental health concerns and lack of stability of ․ housing throughout the life of the case.” Tr. Vol. III at 29.

[12] Father testified that he began engaging in services in December of 2024 or January of 2025 “once [he] got all [his] warrant[s] and everything out [of] the way,” Tr. Vol. II at 54. By October 21, 2025, Father had “completed Father Engagement,” and he was “at the halfway mark” for his domestic violence services. Id. Father had also not had any in-person parenting time with Children since September 2022; his only contact with them had been virtual. As of the termination hearing, Father was living in Gary, Indiana; it is unclear from the record when he left Indianapolis. Placement testified that Father had only begun virtual visits with Children “a few months” before the termination hearing, id. at 139; Father had not previously reached out to Placement to visit Children. Placement sent Father a tablet to enable the virtual visits. And according to Placement, Father only had four total virtual visits with Children.

[13] Father's Father Engagement provider testified that in January 2025, Father began the service but was unsuccessfully discharged in March for noncompliance; in June, Father reengaged in the service. Once Father reengaged, he was consistent in meeting with the provider for approximately one month, and he completed the required curriculum. Father did not complete the rest of the Father Engagement services.

[14] The FCM testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Children's best interests because of Father's “lack of participation in [the] case and his unwillingness to participate in the case since” it began. Tr. Vol. II at 187. The GAL testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Children's best interests because of “the lack of parenting time, the lack of bond being made between father and the kids for the case being up for three years and just not successfully being able to complete services.” Tr. Vol. III at 29.

[15] The trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights to Children. In its termination order, the trial court found in relevant part as follows:

85. The Court finds that Mother is unable to meet her parental responsibilities due to her mental heath and that, although she has made some progress, [she] is unable to provide for the immediate and long-term needs of [Children]. Mother has not demonstrated the ability to adequately or consistently address her own needs, including mental health, domestic violence, housing and financial stability, or manage the Children's needs. Despite services ordered and made available to her, she has not consistently demonstrated the ability to provide a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment while appropriately address[ing] her needs while caring for the children.

86. The Court finds that Father is not willing or able to meet parental responsibilities owed to the Children, and not willing or able to provide for the immediate and long-term needs of [Children]. Father, despite being aware of what needed to be done to reunify with his children, has chosen not to engage in services nor parenting time in the CHINS case due to active warrants. He only began engaging in services in January of 2025 and still has yet to be successfully discharged from either service. He has not visited with his children in-person since the filing of the CHINS petition, despite being afforded many opportunities and accommodations to do so.

Mother's App. Vol. II at 200; Father's App. Vol. II at 200. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting Certain Evidence

[16] Mother challenges the trial court's decision to admit certain evidence at the termination hearing. In particular, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Exhibits 1 through 18. Exhibits 1 and 2 were certified copies of the Chronological Case Summaries for the Children's CHINS cases. Exhibit 3 was the certified copy of the CHINS petition. Exhibits 4 through 18 were certified copies of orders entered in the CHINS case.

[17] Mother objected to the admission of Exhibits 1 through 18 and “request[ed] that [they] be taken just simply as records of the proceedings and not as substantive evidence because the CHINS case rulings were mainly based upon hearsay evidence,” Tr. Vol. II at 225, “so they don't have the same weight,” id. at 226. DCS stated that it was not offering Exhibits 1 through 18 “for the truth of the matter” asserted, id. at 208; they were all certified copies of court records; and they were all “evidence of apparent DCS involvement,” which “is incredibly relevant,” id. at 210. After taking Mother's objection under advisement, the trial court admitted Exhibits 1 through 18, stating it would “give them the weight they should be given,” id. at 226.

[18] We generally review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied. “[W]e may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858 (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)).

[19] Mother contends Exhibits 1 through 18 contain inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove the truth of the matter asserted. In re K.R., 154 N.E.3d 818, 820 (Ind. 2020) (citing Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c)). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible unless it falls under a recognized exception. Evid. R. 802. Statements not admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted are not hearsay. Id.

[20] Moreover, in a termination hearing, “it is generally presumed that the trial judge disregards inadmissible evidence and renders its decision solely on the basis of [relevant] and probative evidence.” In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting In re A.J., 877 N.E.2d 805, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied. Also in such a hearing, “evidence of a parent's prior involvement with [DCS] ․ is admissible as proper character evidence and helpful in demonstrating negative habitual patterns of conduct to determine parental fitness and the best interests of the children.” A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Off. Fam. & Child., 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing In re D.G., 702 N.E.2d 777, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); In re J.L.V., 667 N.E.2d 186, 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)), trans. denied.

[21] Here, the trial court admitted Exhibits 1 through 18 for the purpose of verifying the CHINS proceedings and not for the truth of the matters contained in those documents. The statements in Exhibits 1 through 18 were therefore not hearsay, see Evid. R. 802, so we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by admitting those exhibits.

2. The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Parents’ Parental Rights to Children Was Not Clearly Erroneous

[22] Next, Parents challenge the trial court's termination of their parental rights over Children. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[23] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). In reviewing for clear error, “we determine whether the evidence supports the court's findings and whether those findings support the court's judgment.” Norris v. Norris, 275 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2026) (citing Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016)). A decision is clearly erroneous “only if the findings lack factual support in the record or if the judgment applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (citing Wysocki v. Johnson, 18 N.E.3d 600, 603–04 (Ind. 2014)). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, id. (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings that Parents do not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[24] To terminate Parents’ parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, among other things, there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside Parents’ homes will not be remedied, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d)(3) (effective Mar. 11, 2024, to June 30, 2025); and termination of their parent-child relationships is in Children's best interests, id. § -4(c)(3). Parents challenge (a) the trial court's near-verbatim adoption of DCS's proposed findings and conclusions, (b) the trial court's conclusion that Parents are not likely to remedy the reasons for Children's removal; and (c) the trial court's conclusion that termination of their parent-child relationships is in Children's best interests. We address each challenge in turn.

a. Adoption of DCS's Proposed Findings & Conclusions

[25] Parents contend that the trial court violated their due process rights by adopting DCS's proposed findings and conclusions “verbatim.” Father's Br. at 15; Mother's Reply Br. at 13. The trial court's order was a near-verbatim adoption of DCS's proposed findings and conclusions.⁴ Compare Mother's App. Vol. II at 179–211, and Father's App. Vol. II at 179–211, with Mother's App. Vol. III at 46–78, and Father's App. Vol. III at 41–73. Verbatim or near-verbatim adoption does not automatically establish clear error or warrant reversal—“the critical inquiry is whether such findings, as adopted by the court, are clearly erroneous.” State v. Hamilton, 197 N.E.3d 356, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied, 201 N.E.3d 609 (Ind. 2023). We thus review the trial court's findings for clear error.

i. Mother

[26] Mother first argues the trial court erred by entering findings that were based on inadmissible hearsay contained in Exhibits 1 through 18. Mother specifically challenges Paragraphs 7, 31, and 39. Paragraph 7 recounts the allegations in the CHINS petition; Paragraph 31 recounts why the Children were removed from their maternal grandmother's care; Paragraph 39 recounts why the Children's permanency plan was changed to adoption. By citation only, Mother also challenges Paragraphs 9, 11, 16, 26, 30, 34, 38, 41, 52, 58, and 87, all of which recount the trial court's orders in the CHINS proceedings.⁵

[27] As explained above, the statements in Exhibits 1 through 18 were not hearsay. See supra ¶¶ 16–21. We therefore cannot say Paragraphs 7, 9, 11, 16, 26, 30, 31, 34, 38, 39, 41, 52, 58, and 87 are based on inadmissible hearsay.

[28] Mother next challenges Paragraphs 7, 9, 11, 15 through 17, 26, 30, 31, 34, 38, 39, 52, 68 through 72, 75, and 87 as surplusage. A finding is generally deemed “mere surplusage” if it recounts or reports who testified and what they testified to; a hallmark of such findings are terms like “testified that,” “stated that,” “reported that,” “described,” “expressed,” or “believed.” In re G.V., 274 N.E.3d 996, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. not sought. Mother correctly notes that Paragraph 68 and the first sentence of Paragraph 69 describe what DCS and the GAL “observed,” Mother's App. Vol. II at 195, and the trial court did not adopt those observations as its own. We therefore disregard Paragraph 68 and the first sentence of Paragraph 69 as surplusage. See In re G.V., 274 N.E.3d 996, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting Parks v. Delaware Cnty. Dept. Child Servs., 862 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), superseded by statute on other grounds), trans. not sought. The second sentence of Paragraph 69 and the entirety of Paragraphs 70 through 72 describe what DCS and the GAL “reasonably believe.” Mother's App. Vol. II at 196. The trial court's use of “reasonably” in these paragraphs indicates that it evaluated DCS's and the GAL's beliefs and determined they were reasonable. Accordingly, we cannot say that the second sentence of Paragraph 69 as well as Paragraphs 70 through 72 are simply reports of what those witnesses testified to, so they are not surplusage.

[29] As for the rest of the challenged paragraphs, they all recount the procedural history of Children's CHINS cases, which is helpful context given that CHINS proceedings are the backbone of termination proceedings. We will not deem such recitations surplusage.

[30] Mother challenges several other findings; for the reasons set forth below, those challenges are unavailing. See infra ¶¶ 34, 38–40. Based on the foregoing, the trial court's near-verbatim adoption of DCS's proposed findings and conclusions was not clearly erroneous and does not warrant reversal as to Mother.

ii. Father

[31] Father also challenges Paragraphs 7 and 39 as relying on inadmissible hearsay. For the same reasons set forth above, we cannot agree. See supra ¶¶ 26–27. Father challenges several other findings; for the reasons set forth below, those challenges are unavailing. See infra ¶¶ 36, 38, 41. Based on the foregoing, the trial court's near-verbatim adoption of DCS's proposed findings and conclusions was not clearly erroneous and does not warrant reversal as to Father.

b. Remediation of Reasons for Removal

[32] Parents challenge the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside Parents’ homes will not be remedied. To determine whether those conditions are not likely to be remedied, the trial court first “identif[ies] the conditions that led to removal” and then “determine[s] whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647 (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643); see also In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ind. 2010). “The second step of the analysis requires judgment of the parent's fitness at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. Changed conditions are balanced against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect.” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234).

i. Mother

[33] Concerning Mother's likelihood of remediating the reasons for Children's removal from her care, the trial court made the following relevant findings and conclusions:

d. The conditions that led to the Children's removal or placement and retention outside the home of Mother is that she cannot provide a safe, stable, and appropriate home for the Children, and she has yet to demonstrate stability in her mental health or housing. Mother has also not demonstrated that she can sustain any progress that she may have made in services. Mother has found housing of her own, then has been evicted; she has moved in with friends, then has moved out; she has moved in with [Maternal Grandmother] and then has moved out. Mother has demonstrated a pattern of unstable housing. Mother completed domestic violence services yet remained in contact with Father and entered another relationship with domestic violence present. Mother has two active protective orders against her, both of which were sought out while the CHINS case was open; the most recent one being issued in January 2025․ Mother completed her parenting education yet continues to display a pattern of engaging and then not engaging in the CHINS case.

* * *

f. It is highly probable that these conditions will not be remedied, even if parents were given additional time to remedy the conditions. [Children's] cases have been open for three years and Mother [has] made little to no progress toward reunifying with the children.

Mother's App. Vol. II at 206–07.

[34] On appeal, Mother argues that she “demonstrated a pattern of participation in services and improvement in the stability in all areas of her life in 2025.” Mother's Br. at 53. Mother specifically points to her obtaining a full-time job in January 2025 as well as alleged improvements, beginning in May 2025, in her housing stability and engagement in services. Mother's arguments are merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). Even if the trial court credited Mother's testimony about her recent improvements, the trial court had the discretion to not give that testimony much weight in light of Mother's years-long pattern of behavior. See K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647. Mother herself testified to her housing instability and the fact that her visits with Children were still supervised after three years. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the termination decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Mother has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for Children's removal or placement outside of Mother's care.

ii. Father

[35] Concerning Father's likelihood of remediating the reasons for Children's removal from his care, the trial court made the following relevant findings and conclusions:

e. The conditions that led to the Children's removal or placement and retention outside the home of Father is that he cannot provide a safe, stable, and appropriate home for the Children, and he has yet to demonstrate a willingness to parent [Children]. Father only began engaging in services in early 2025 and still has not completed any of his services. Father refuses to visit with his children in a meaningful way that would allow a relationship to develop. DCS has talked with Father about reunification multiple times and DCS and services providers have explained the importance of visiting with his children, yet he continues not to do so.

f. It is highly probable that these conditions will not be remedied, even if parents were given additional time to remedy the conditions. [Children's] cases have been open for three years and ․ Father [has] made little to no progress toward reunifying with the children.

Father's App. Vol. II at 207.

[36] Father claims the sole condition leading to Children's removal from his care was his warrants, and he “remedied this condition by resolving his warrants in January 2025.” Father's Br. at 35. Father's argument is a request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). The evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the termination decision show that Father was more concerned with his warrants than caring for his Children—he chose not to participate in services for approximately two years, deciding instead to focus on his legal matters, and once he did engage in the CHINS case, he did not do so fully and had very few virtual visits with Children.⁶ Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Father has not and likely will not remedy the reasons for Children's removal or placement outside of Father's care.⁷

c. Best Interests

[37] Parents also challenge the trial court's conclusion that termination of their parental rights over Children is in Children's best interests. To determine the best interests of a child, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[38] Importantly, “the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing L.S. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). Both the FCM and the GAL in this case testified that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Children's best interests, and we have already concluded that the trial court did not clearly err by concluding the conditions leading to Children's removal will not be remedied. This alone is sufficient to show that termination is in Children's best interests.

i. Mother

[39] Mother argues that termination of her parent-child relationship with Children is not in Children's best interests because Placement “is committed to maintaining the children's relationship with their family,” so “delaying the adoption [of Children by Placement] will have no significant effect on the children.” Mother's Br. at 57. In support of this argument, Mother relies on our Supreme Court's decision in In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625 (Ind. 2016). There, in terminating the father's rights to his child, the trial court concluded that the father had consistent contact with his child, id. at 629; the two shared a bond, id.; the father “exercised parenting time with [the child] two to three times a week, including overnights,” id. at 630; and “[i]t would be best for [the child] to be able to keep visiting his father” after the termination and adoption, id. at 629. The R.S. court concluded that the father's failure to attend some scheduled visits and CHINS hearings was “not clear and convincing evidence that [he was] uninterested or unwilling to parent” the child. Id. at 630. Additionally, the child was in relative placement and the permanency plan was for the child to be adopted by that relative, so “prolonging the adoption [was] unlikely to have an effect upon the child.” Id. (citing Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 619, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). Also of import to the R.S. court was that the father had “repeatedly expressed his desire and willingness to continue to develop as a person and a parent for” the child. Id. The R.S. court reversed the trial court's termination decision in light of “the loving bond that [the child and the father] share[d], [the father's] successful completion of multiple self-improvement and parenting courses, [the father's] successful completion of probation, his repeatedly expressed desire to parent [the child], and his exercise of regular visitation with [the child].” Id. at 631.

[40] Here, in contrast to the father in R.S., Mother never progressed beyond supervised visits with Children, Mother repeatedly expressed her desire to no longer parent Children, and the trial court did not find that it would be in Children's best interests to continue to visit Mother after her parental rights are terminated. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the termination decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination is in Children's best interests. Likewise, based on the foregoing, the trial court did not clearly err by terminating Mother's parental rights to Children.

ii. Father

[41] Father argues that termination of his parent-child relationship with Children is not in Children's best interests because he had been involved in Children's lives before September 2022, he was engaging in services by the time of the termination hearing, and he did not present a safety risk to Children. Father's arguments are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Norris, 275 N.E.3d at 509 (citing Steele-Giri, 51 N.E.3d at 123). The trial court was well within its discretion when it gave more weight to Father's two years of nonengagement in services and visitation than to his less than one year of partial engagement in services and virtual visits. Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the termination decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination is in Children's best interests. And based on the foregoing, the trial court did not clearly err by terminating Father's parental rights to Children.

Conclusion

[42] In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Exhibits 1 through 18, and it did not clearly err by terminating Parents’ parental rights to Children. We affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[43] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   C.W. was born on October 15, 2021. C.S. was born on August 23, 2022.

2.   Specifically, Mother pled guilty to battery as a Level 6 felony, neglect of a dependent as a Level 6 felony, and intimidation as a Level 6 felony.

3.   Mother's former boyfriend was charged for the incident, but those charges were later dismissed.

4.   This practice “is not prohibited,” State v. Hamilton, 197 N.E.3d 356, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied, 201 N.E.3d 609 (Ind. 2023), but it is also not “encourage[d],” id. (quoting Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 762 (Ind. 2002)). See also Cook v. Whitsell-Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 274 n.1 (Ind. 2003); In re G.V., 274 N.E.3d 996, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (same), trans. not sought; In re G.V., 280 N.E.3d 825, 832 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App.) (same), trans. denied, 283 N.E.3d 742 (Ind. 2026). When a trial court uses a proposed order as a guide that it modifies, we have more confidence that the decision is the judicial officer's “considered judgment.” Hamilton, 197 N.E.3d at 362 (quoting Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 762).

5.   For example, Paragraph 16 provided:At the [CHINS] fact-finding hearing, based on the above-stated findings, and having considered Mother's admission agreement, the Court adjudicated the Children to be children in need of services. The CHINS court further found that it is in the best interest of the children to be removed from the home environment, and remaining in the home environment would be contrary to the health and welfare of the children, and reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal. Petitioner's Exhibit 8.Mother's App. Vol. II at 182. And Paragraph 41 provided:On December 9, 2024, the CHINS court held a Periodic Case Review Hearing. Parents appeared. The court found that DCS had made reasonable efforts to make it possible for the children to return safely to their home, but the services offered and available were not effective or completed sufficiently to allow the return of the children without Court intervention. The Court ordered the children's continued removal from their parents’ care. The Court denied Mother's request for unsupervised parenting time. Petitioner's Exhibit 16.Id. at 189.

6.   In a related argument aimed at the trial court's conclusion that Father's parental rights to Children should be terminated pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(2) (effective Mar. 11, 2024, to June 30, 2025), Father faults DCS for not transporting Children to and from his residence in Gary. According to Father, “DCS is a 1.1 billion dollar taxpayer funded government agency” that “[s]urely ․ could afford the relatively nominal transportation costs between [Placement's residence in] Greenwood and Gary.” Father's Br. at 33. Father chose to leave Indianapolis for Gary, chose to not ask for in-person visits until spring 2025, acknowledged at the termination hearing that the distance between the two cities was too far for Children to travel, rejected an offer to meet the Children halfway in Lafayette, and chose not to set up a day and time for his Father Engagement provider to transport him to and from Indianapolis for visitation. Father cannot now be heard to complain that DCS should have transported Children to him for visits.

7.   Additionally, DCS alleged and the trial court concluded that Parents’ parental rights to Children should be terminated pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(2) and (d)(4) (effective Mar. 11, 2024, to June 30, 2025). Parents challenge these conclusions, as well, but DCS only needed to prove either that the circumstances described in Subsection (d)(3) or Subsection (d)(2) or Subsection (d)(4) existed. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d) (effective Mar. 11, 2024, to June 30, 2025). Because we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in concluding the circumstances described in Subsection (d)(3) existed, we need not address Parents’ arguments concerning Subsections (d)(2) and (d)(4). However, we note that Parents arguments thereon are requests for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)).

Felix, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.