Anthony Gutierrez, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2024, Anthony Gutierrez burglarized two homes in Hammond, and the State subsequently charged him with two counts of Level 4 felony burglary, Level 5 felony theft, and Level 6 felony theft under two separate cause numbers. On January 5, 2026, Gutierrez pled guilty to two counts of Level 5 felony burglary. In exchange for his plea, the State dismissed the remaining charges against him and agreed not to file a habitual-offender enhancement. The trial court accepted Gutierrez's guilty plea and imposed an aggregate twelve-year sentence. Gutierrez contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 17, 2025, the State charged Gutierrez with Level 4 felony burglary and Level 6 felony theft for a June 2024 home burglary in Hammond. Less than a week later, under a separate cause number, the State charged Gutierrez with Level 4 felony burglary and Level 5 felony theft for a November 2024 burglary in Hammond. In exchange for the State's dismissal of the remaining charges and agreement not to file a habitual-offender enhancement, Gutierrez pled guilty to two counts of Level 5 felony burglary. On April 8, 2026, the trial court accepted Gutierrez's guilty plea and sentenced him to consecutive six-year terms of imprisonment.

Discussion and Decision

[3] Gutierrez contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Sentencing decisions “rest within the sound discretion of the trial court”; therefore, we look “only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh'g by 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quotation omitted).

[4] We review for an abuse of discretion the court's finding of aggravators and mitigators to justify a sentence, but we cannot review the relative weight assigned to those factors. When reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances identified by the trial court in its sentencing statement, we will remand only if the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record, and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a matter of law.

Baumholser v. State, 62 N.E.3d 411, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citation and quotation omitted), trans. denied. “A single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to enhance a sentence.” Id. at 417.

[5] The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances: (1) the harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by the victims was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense; (2) Gutierrez's criminal history, which included at least nineteen felony and two misdemeanor convictions; and (3) the fact that he had recently violated the terms of his probation. Gutierrez challenges only the first of these aggravating circumstances, arguing that it was not supported by the record.

[6] “[W]hen a defendant challenges some, but not all, of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court, we will not remand for resentencing if we can say with confidence the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous aggravators.” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). Gutierrez's lengthy criminal record inspires that confidence. Gutierrez's criminal history dates back to 1989, spans several states, and includes at least nineteen felony and two misdemeanor convictions, all of two of which were for thefts or burglaries. Moreover, less than a year before he committed the June 2024 burglary, Gutierrez had violated the terms of his probation in Illinois. The trial court noted the extensive nature of Gutierrez's criminal history, finding that he had established a pattern of “terroriz[ing his victims] to feed” his drug habits. Tr. Vol. II p. 32.

[7] Given the trial court's statements regarding Gutierrez's criminal history, we are convinced that it would have imposed the same sentence even without the challenged aggravating circumstance. As such, any error in finding that the victims’ “harm, injury, loss, or damage” was significant and greater than the elements to prove the offense to be an aggravating circumstance was harmless in light of the other, unchallenged aggravators that the trial court identified. See, e.g., McDonald v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind. 2007) (“[E]ven if the trial court had erred in identifying the foregoing factors as aggravators, McDonald would not be entitled to remand for resentencing [․] because McDonald does not challenge the remaining aggravating factors.”).

[8] Gutierrez also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider his guilty plea as a mitigating circumstance, which he claims is evidence of an acceptance of responsibility for his actions. A trial court is not required to find mitigating circumstances or explain why it did not find a circumstance to be significantly mitigating. Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993). Further, “a guilty plea may not be significantly mitigating when [․] the defendant receives a substantial benefit in return for the plea.” Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221.

[9] Here, Gutierrez faced two Level 4 felonies, exposing him to a potential maximum sentence of twenty-four years. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. In exchange for Gutierrez's plea, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and reduce the burglary charges from Level 4 felonies to Level 5 felonies, which reduced the maximum sentence that Gutierrez could have received to twelve years, a very substantial benefit. Moreover, although Gutierrez qualified, the State also forewent its right to seek the habitual-offender enhancement in exchange for Gutierrez's guilty plea. See Smith v. State, 908 N.E.2d 1251, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that “the State's agreement not to file a habitual offender charge” was a substantial benefit to defendant). Given the substantial benefit Gutierrez received by pleading guilty, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find his guilty plea to be a mitigating factor. Anglemyer, 875 N.E.2d at 221.

[10] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.