IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.M. (Minor Child) and L.M. (Mother) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] L.M. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights over her minor child, K.M. (“Child”).¹ Mother raises two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the court clearly erred when it terminated her parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother gave birth to Child on September 13, 2023. In March 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with the family when it learned that Child had been the “victim of physical abuse” by Mother's boyfriend (“Boyfriend”). Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 61.² DCS then received a subsequent report that Child had been the “victim of neglect due to physical abuse by” Boyfriend “and substance use by Mother.” Id. On March 15, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”), and DCS removed Child from Mother's care.

[3] On July 26, Mother stipulated that Child was a CHINS. In that stipulation, Mother agreed that she had “used methamphetamine in the family home while [Child was] present in another room,” that she “continues to struggle with substance use, including alcohol[,]” and that she and Boyfriend “have engaged in domestic violence.” Id. at 62. The court then entered a dispositional order, which required Mother to participate in various services.

[4] The trial court held a review hearing on November 4. At that time, Mother had “partially complied” with the case plan, she had “recently [become] engaged with providers and had nearly completed her” intensive outpatient program (“IOP”), and she had been working with her homebased case worker. Id. at 63. However, she had been “inconsistent” with participation in case planning. Id.

[5] On April 3, 2025, following a hearing at which Mother did not appear, the court issued an order approving a permanency plan of reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption. In that order, the court found that Mother “had not complied with the child's case plan[,]” Mother “was dismissed from her IOP program for her failure to participate[,]” Mother “had not been screening regularly” with DCS, Mother had not “consistently engaged in visitation[,]” Mother's providers “had to intervene in her visitation regularly due to her inappropriate behavior[,]” and Mother “had not engaged in services recommended through her psychological evaluation.” Id. at 64.

[6] On June 25, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's rights as to Child. Following a hearing, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. In particular, the court recited the foregoing facts related to the CHINS adjudication and “adopted” them “as facts found for the purposes of this termination proceeding.” Id. at 61. The court also “found as facts for the purpose of this termination hearing” the facts related to the November review hearing. Id. at 63. And the court “found as facts” the facts as outlined in the April 3 order adopting the permanency plan. Id. at 64.

[7] The court then found that “[e]ach paragraph, independently and cumulatively, demonstrates this Court's finding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child's removal from the home of the biological Mother will not be remedied” and that the “termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interests of the Child[.]” Id. at 65. The court also found that DCS had presented a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, that being adoption. Accordingly, the court terminated Mother's parental rights. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Mother contends that the court clearly erred when it terminated her parental rights. We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.) 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[9] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS must file a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. As the Indiana General Assembly has provided:

(c) A petition ․ must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition ․ must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4. If the court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, “the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). DCS's “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[10] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[11] Here, in terminating Mother's parental rights, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court's judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[12] On appeal, Mother does not challenge any of the court's findings of fact. Thus, we accept them as true. L.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re S.S.), 120 N.E.3d 605, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). However, Mother contends that the findings, even if true, are improper because they are a recitation of DCS's proposed findings and because they fail to address certain pieces of evidence. Mother also contends that, if proper, the findings do not support the court's conclusions that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or continued placement outside of her home will not be remedied and that the termination of her parental rights is in Child's best interests. We address each argument in turn.

Findings

[13] Mother first challenges the propriety of the trial court's findings. In particular, Mother alleges that the court's findings are improper because they are a verbatim adoption of the proposed findings submitted by DCS. However, as our Supreme Court has stated:

“It is not uncommon for a trial court to enter findings that are verbatim reproductions of submissions by the prevailing party. The trial courts of this state are faced with an enormous volume of cases and few have the law clerks and other resources that would be available in a more perfect world to help craft more elegant trial court findings and legal reasoning. We recognize that the need to keep the docket moving is properly a high priority of our trial bench. For this reason, we do not prohibit the practice of adopting a party's proposed findings.”

Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1188 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 708-09 (Ind. 2001)). As such, as Mother concedes, it is not “uncommon or per se improper for a trial court to enter findings that are verbatim submissions by the prevailing party[.]” M.V. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re G.V.), 274 N.E.3d 996, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). The fact that the court adopted DCS's proposed findings, alone, does not warrant reversal.³

[14] Still, Mother contends that the court's findings are incomplete because they “did not mention Mother's completion of an outpatient treatment program, her maintained sobriety, her completion of a parenting curriculum, her enrollment and participation in a batterer's intervention program, her consistent visits with Child, [or] her stable housing and employment[.]” Appellant's Br. at 13. However, it is well settled that we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265. Thus, even if there was evidence in the record that was contrary to the judgment, we do not consider it. Having determined that the findings are not improper, we turn to Mother's argument that the findings do not support the court's conclusion to terminate her parental rights.

Remedy

[15] Mother next challenges the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from her care or the reasons for the continued placement outside her home will not be remedied. To make this determination, the trial court should judge Mother's fitness to care for the Child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. See E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). However, the court must also “evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Moore v. Jasper Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id. Moreover, DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. Id. The trial court has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. See R.C. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re K.T.K.), 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013). “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” J.C. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 133 N.E.3d 707, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citation omitted).

[16] Here, Mother contends the court erred when it determined that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for Child's continued placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied because she “had completed her intensive outpatient treatment program, was actively involved in an aftercare program, had completed a parenting class, had maintained sobriety for almost a year, and was actively participating in batterer's intervention services.” Appellant's Br. at 15.

[17] However, contrary to Mother's contention, the court's findings do not demonstrate that Mother has remedied her drug use or completed programs. Rather, the court found, and Mother does not challenge, that Mother “has used methamphetamine in the family home while [Child was] present in another room” and that she “continues to struggle with substance use, including alcohol.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 62. In addition, the court found that, as of April 2025, Mother “had not complied with the child's case plan[,]” Mother “was dismissed from her IOP program for her failure to participate[,]” Mother “had not been screening regularly” with DCS, Mother had not “consistently engaged in visitation[,]” Mother's providers “have had to intervene in her visitation regularly due to her inappropriate behavior[,]” and Mother “had not engaged in services recommended through her psychological evaluation.” Id. at 64.

[18] Those unchallenged findings ⁴ support the court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or continued placement outside Mother's home will not likely be remedied. And, while Mother argues that the evidence shows that she made improvements between April 2025 and the fact-finding hearing, the court was not required to discount Mother's history in light of recent efforts to make change. Mother's arguments on appeal are simply requests for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

Best Interests

[19] Finally, Mother challenges the court's conclusion that the termination of her parental rights is in Child's best interests. In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id. at 221. When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Further, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed special advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[20] On appeal, Mother asserts that the court erred when it determined that the termination of her rights is in Child's best interests because she “had completed substance abuse treatment, had maintained sobriety for almost a year, had completed a parenting course, had stayed in contact with DCS and attended the child and family team meetings, worked two jobs and had suitable housing for Child, and had consistently visited with Child.” Appellant's Br. at 16.

[21] But as the court's unchallenged findings demonstrate, Child was removed from Mother's care because of Mother's drug use in the family home and involvement with domestic battery. As outlined above, while Mother initially partially complied with services, she was ultimately dismissed from her IOP for failing to participate, she did not regularly submit to drug screens with DCS or consistently engage in visitation, her providers had to intervene during visits because of Mother's inappropriate behaviors, and Mother did not engage in recommended services. Stated differently, the trial court's findings show that Mother is not capable of providing Child with a stable home free from drug use.

[22] Child needs permanency. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Child had been removed from Mother's care for nearly two years. And both Child's guardian ad litem and court-appointed special advocate testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. That testimony and the court's findings that Mother did not comply with services support the trial court's determination that the termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests.

Conclusion

[23] The trial court did not clearly err when it terminated Mother's parental rights. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child had two alleged fathers. One was dismissed as a party after DNA testing excluded him as Child's father. The other alleged father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   As Mother points out, DCS relies on evidence that was presented to the trial court but was not identified as a finding of fact in the court's order. We limit our recitation of the facts to those specifically found by the court.

3.   And, unlike in In re G.V., on which Mother relies, the trial court in this case did not “simply recount who testified and what they testified to[.]” 274 N.E.3d at 1001.

4.   We note that all of the court's findings outlining the history of the case and Mother's compliance are found in the court's recitation of the CHINS hearing, a review hearing, and a permanency hearing. However, the court specifically adopted each of those findings for purposes of the termination proceeding. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 61, 63, and 64.

Bailey, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.