Michael Parrish and Mary Beth Parrish, Appellants v. Mark Helm, Appellee (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Michael Parrish and Mary Beth Parrish (collectively, the “Heirs”) appeal the trial court's order approving the Second Amended Accounting, over the Heirs’ objections, and instructing Personal Representative Mark Helm to close the Unsupervised Estate of Leonard Wayne Parrish. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Leonard Wayne Parrish died on February 23, 2022. He was survived by his two adult children, the Heirs, and a minor child. Pursuant to Leonard's Last Will and Testament, Mark Helm was appointed personal representative of the Unsupervised Estate (the “Estate”). The Heirs consented to this appointment in writing, and the Estate was submitted to probate on March 8, 2022.

[3] On March 8, 2023, Helm filed a Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator. Helm asserted that administration of the bulk of the Estate, which included multiple residences, land, vehicles, and personal property, was “largely completed.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 28. However, there had been a “delaying issue.” Id. (capitalization omitted). Specifically, the Estate included Leonard's one-third interest in P.I.P.E., Inc., and Greenlight Properties, LLC, of which Helm and Gary Mitchell were also one-third owners. The governing corporate documents for both P.I.P.E. and Greenlight required that, upon a shareholder's death, the decedent's interest be redeemed by the entity and valued, absent a pre-set price, by the entity's regularly employed accounting firm. P.I.P.E.’s regular accounting firm, Compass Pointe CPAs (“Compass Pointe”), engaged Houlihan Valuation Advisors (“Houlihan”) to perform the valuation. Michael was dissatisfied with the resulting valuation and separately obtained a competing appraisal from Stonebridge Advisory, Inc., which valued the P.I.P.E. interest substantially higher than Houlihan's appraisal.

[4] In his Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, Helm stated that his one-third ownership interest in P.I.P.E. gave rise to a “question of his conflict of interest,” although he noted that Leonard “was well aware of such potential” when he “nominated” Helm, his “trusted friend and business associate.” Id. at 29. Helm indicated that he had “tendered his resignation as Personal Representative, however, as an alternative to his resignation, he requests the appointment of [a] Special Administrator over any matters in which his ownership in P.I.P.E., Inc. stock may be in conflict with his serving as Personal Representative of the Estate” but “allow him to continue as Personal Representative to all other matters.” Id. at 30. He stated that the conflict “singularly involves the disputed valuation of the P.I.P.E., Inc. stock shares, which issue is subject to a contractual buy/sell agreement between P.I.P.E., Inc. and Michael Parrish as Devisee.” Id. Helm requested a hearing.

[5] On March 21, 2023, Michael filed a Verified Petition to Disqualify and Remove Personal Representative and Objections to the Estate's accounting. He asserted that Helm's ownership interest created a disqualifying conflict and identified several concerns regarding P.I.P.E.’s internal financial records, an alleged $300,000 shareholder-loan obligation, and unresolved claims against the Estate arising from Leonard's personal guaranties of P.I.P.E. debt. Michael suggested that he replace Helm as personal representative.

[6] On April 11, 2023, the court held a remote attorney conference. After hearing extensive argument from both parties, the court declined to appoint a special administrator or to remove Helm as personal representative stating, that the court was “not comfortable with a special administrator in this matter,”¹ and proposed that the parties “proceed to arbitration” regarding the valuation dispute. Transcript Volume II at 23. The court explained that “disrupting the orderly process of the estate ․ by removing the personal representative whose [sic] been named by the decedent would be a step too far at this moment” and that “arbitration will be the route that we'll go with at this point[.]” Id. at 24.

[7] On July 5, 2023, the court ordered the parties to attend and participate in nonbinding arbitration before William Baten, an arbitrator whom Michael nominated and the court appointed. The arbitrator recommended that the valuation obtained by Compass Pointe be upheld. The Heirs raised belated objections to the arbitrator's recommendations. The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing, prior to which the objecting parties, the Heirs, had forty-one days to prepare. Before the hearing, the Heirs “filed a Memorandum on Arbitration Errors” with the court “which included as exhibits[,] the Shareholder and Operating Agreements, [the Heirs’] proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted to the Arbitrator before he issued recommendations to the Court, and an article about business law.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 48.

[8] On November 30, 2023, the court held the scheduled evidentiary hearing. During the hearing, the Estate reiterated its position that the restrictive provisions of the governing corporate documents required the Estate to accept the Compass Pointe valuations. The court reminded the parties multiple times that it was conducting an evidentiary hearing and that this was their opportunity to present evidence or argument concerning the arbitrator's recommendations to the court. Despite the opportunity, the Heirs did not offer any evidence other than their previously filed Memorandum and its attachments. The court stated that it intended to “ratify” the arbitrator's recommendation “and adopt it as the finding of the court[.]” Transcript Volume II at 86.

[9] On January 3, 2024, the court issued its Order on Determination of Entity Valuations. The court stated in relevant part:

23. As part of the evidentiary hearing, the Estate also requested the Court to enter into evidence the full record of the arbitration proceedings, and the Court granted the motion without objection. As of today, neither party has submitted the record of the arbitration proceedings to the Court. However, the Court does not rely on the arbitration proceedings because sufficient evidence in the record establishes that the Compass Pointe valuation is appropriate under the Shareholder and Operating Agreements. The Heirs failed to offer any evidence that persuades the Court that the Compass Pointe valuations were procedurally improper, substantially incorrect, defective, inaccurate, or unreliable.

24. Arguments of counsel are not evidence, and the Court is not persuaded by the arguments made in [the Heirs’] Memorandum on Arbitration Errors.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Estate is required to accept Compass Pointe CPAs[’] valuations for both the PIPE and Greenlight interests. No evidence was presented that persuaded the Court that Compass Pointe's valuations were inconsistent with the corporate agreements that bind the Estate and the [H]eirs.

Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 49-50.

[10] Following the redemption of Leonard's P.I.P.E. and Greenlight interests, Helm filed an accounting and closing statement. The Heirs objected to the accounting and closing statement and sought discovery from P.I.P.E., Helm, and Mitchell regarding internal corporate records and personal tax returns. The court held a lengthy attorney conference on May 15, 2025, to address, among other things, a motion to compel discovery filed by the Heirs. On May 19, 2025, the court denied the motion to compel and granted a protective order in favor of P.I.P.E., Helm, and Mitchell. Specifically, the court found:

[T]here is good cause from preventing the use of further formal discovery given the lack of live controversy before the Court, the prior exchange of information conducted in this matter, the status of this unsupervised Estate, and the availability of responsive information regarding the Estate's accounting from some other source that is more convenient and less burdensome than gathering information from P.I.P.E., Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. Helm in his personal capacity.

Id. at 55. The court ordered Helm to file a closing statement by May 30, 2025, which deadline was later extended to June 30, 2025.

[11] Helm subsequently filed a closing statement on June 5, 2025, and the Heirs filed renewed objections and discovery requests. On October 30, 2025, the court held a hearing to consider the Heirs’ renewed objections and requests. Determining that counsel for the Heirs could not identify any specific accounting issues, the court limited non-party discovery and ordered that any further discovery requests be directed to the Estate. The record does not reveal that the Heirs made any discovery requests to the Estate.

[12] The Estate filed a Second Amended Accounting on November 26, 2025.² On March 4, 2026, the court entered an order approving the Second Amended Accounting and instructing Helm to conclude administration and close the Estate. Specifically, the court instructed Helm to distribute $10,000 to each of the Heirs, assign the “Evolve Note” to the beneficiaries, direct distribution of a Robinhood brokerage account, complete outstanding tax filings, file a closing statement, and reserve not more than $25,000 of Estate funds to pay administrative and appellate costs pending expiration of the time for appeal. Id. at 27. The Heirs filed their Notice of Appeal on March 30, 2026.

Discussion and Decision

[13] The Heirs first assert that the court abused its discretion in declining to remove Helm “in March, 2023” as the personal representative of the Estate despite his tendered resignation and their subsequent petition for his removal. Appellants’ Brief at 9. The removal of a personal representative is governed by Ind. Code § 29-1-10-6(b), which provides that the court may remove the representative if he has become “incapacitated ․, disqualified, unsuitable or incapable of discharging the representative's duties, has mismanaged the estate, failed to perform any duty imposed by law or by any lawful order of the court, or has ceased to be domiciled in Indiana[.]” This Court has long observed that “[a] court with probate jurisdiction has great latitude and wide discretion in the appointment and removal of personal representatives and administrators” and its “decision in such a matter will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of that discretion is clear.” Matter of Swank's Est., 176 Ind. App. 182, 186, 375 N.E.2d 238, 240 (1978); see In re Estate of Latek, 960 N.E.2d 193, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (applying abuse of discretion standard to probate court's appointment of personal representative); Matter of Est. of Runyan, 557 N.E.2d 1353, 1356 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (applying abuse of discretion standard to probate court's decision to remove executor).

[14] Regarding Helm's tendered resignation, the Heirs suggest, without citation to authority, that a “resignation generally renders a person ‘disqualified or incapable of discharging his duties.’ ” Appellants’ Brief at 10. Our review of the record reveals that Helm's tendered resignation was far from an admission or indication that he was disqualified or otherwise incapable of discharging his duties as personal representative. Rather, it was a conditional, alternative offer filed in conjunction with the Estate's request for the appointment of a special administrator to address the highly contested P.I.P.E./Greenlight valuation dispute. The probate court heard extensive argument from the parties, considered the appointment request and offer for resignation, and exercised its discretion to allow Leonard's chosen personal representative, Helm, who by all accounts had served the Estate well, to continue serving as representative while referring resolution of the valuation dispute to nonbinding arbitration. This was a matter squarely within the trial court's discretion and we cannot say that Helm's tendered, conditional resignation required his removal as personal representative.

[15] Moreover, the Heirs have directed us to no evidence, and there is nothing in the record to indicate, that they suffered prejudice as a result of Helm continuing to serve as personal representative. The Heirs’ primary complaint with Helm serving as personal representative revolved around his potential “conflict of interest” as a one-third owner of the stock in P.I.P.E. Appellants’ Brief at 9. However, even assuming such conflict, we cannot say that the court was constrained to find Helm disqualified or unsuitable to serve. The record indicates that the valuation of the P.I.P.E. and Greenlight interests were fixed by contract, to be obtained by the entities’ regularly retained CPA firm, not by Helm. The Estate was contractually bound to accept that valuation obtained pursuant to the entities’ governing agreements and Helm, as personal representative, had no power to substitute a different valuation method. In other words, the record does not establish an outcome-determinative conflict of interest. Indeed, when the Heirs challenged the resulting valuation, the probate court did not simply defer to that valuation; it ordered the parties to nonbinding arbitration, before an arbitrator nominated by Michael, to aid in resolution of the valuation issue. Again, this was a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the Heirs have not met their burden to establish a clear abuse of that discretion.³ We cannot say that reversal is warranted on this issue.

[16] The Heirs also challenge the trial court's denial of their Motion to Compel Discovery. They point to the October 30, 2025 hearing during which the court considered their renewed discovery request and objections to the Second Amended Accounting and argue that they had “both capacity and standing to question the administration of the [E]state, and that means they have the right to obtain what evidence there is through discovery.” Id. at 12. They maintain that the court did not have “a rational basis for denying production of that evidence.” Id.

[17] A trial court's ruling on a motion to compel discovery generally enjoys “wide discretionary latitude” on appeal. Jennings v. Smiley, 249 N.E.3d 1071, 1075 (Ind. 2025), reh'g denied (citation omitted). “Given the trial court's ability to ‘weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility,’ we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, interfering only if the ruling is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.’ ” Id. (quoting Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015)). “We will affirm if the ruling is ‘sustainable on any legal basis in the record, even though this was not the reason enunciated by the trial court.’ ” Id. (quoting Estate of Lee ex rel. McGarrah v. Lee & Urbahns Co., 876 N.E.2d 361, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).

[18] While “designed to encourage ‘liberal discovery,’ our trial rules also contain certain limiting principles—principles aimed at balancing the tension between open access to information, on the one hand, and information overreach, on the other hand.” Id. (internal citation omitted). As a general matter, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party[.]” Ind. Trial Rule 26(B)(1). However, the extent of such discovery

must be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought or; (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.

Id. The trial court may, upon motion by “any party” and for “good cause shown,” issue an order designed to “protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” that may result from a discovery request. Ind. Trial Rule 26(C).

[19] The record indicates that, during the October 30, 2025 hearing, the trial court asked the Heirs’ counsel numerous questions directed at whether the requested discovery, specifically multiple years of internal P.I.P.E. and Greenlight financial records and the personal tax returns of two non-party shareholders, was reasonably calculated to reveal something bearing on a live controversy or issue between the parties. The court explained that, given the financial information already exchanged during arbitration regarding the valuation issue, and the length of time the Estate had been open, it was seeking specificity from counsel regarding why that information was being sought. Counsel, who had only recently joined the case on behalf of the Heirs, was unable to articulate exactly what issue the information sought might clarify, other than “[p]otential distributions” to which the Estate was entitled based upon the proposed closing statement. Transcript Volume II at 108. When asked why the discovery had not been sought earlier and whether the delay in closing the Estate was likely caused by the Heirs “continuing to litigate” “the matters,” counsel responded that she “was not involved during that time and cannot speak to the litigation.” Id. at 110. The court questioned “whether we should spend tens of thousands of dollars continuing to litigate” and asked counsel for “specific objections to the [proposed] closing statement.” Id. After extensive further discussion, the court ordered the Estate to file the closing statement and, “[i]n the meantime” the Heirs “should address any discovery requests to the [E]state” and “file specific objections” to the closing statement and the court would consider those objections when made. Id. at 117. Again, this was a reasonable exercise of the court's discretion and, under the circumstances presented, we cannot say that the court's ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or that reversal is warranted.⁴

[20] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order Approving Second Amended Accounting and Instructing the Personal Representative to close the Estate.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record reveals that neither party desired the appointment of a special administrator due to the associated expense of doing so, with Appellants’ counsel lodging the greatest objection to that process.

2.   The Second Amended Accounting differed from the First Amended Accounting only in the amount of attorney fees incurred by the Estate between the first and second amendments.

3.   To the extent the Heirs rely on Estate of Jaworski v. Jaworski, 479 N.E.2d 89, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), reh'g denied, trans. denied, in support of its assertion that the court abused its discretion in declining to remove Helm as personal representative, we find that case factually distinguishable.

4.   To the extent the Heirs indicate in the Statement of Issues section of their principal brief that they challenge the court's approval of the Estate's Second Amended Accounting, we observe that the Argument section of their brief fails to cite to or develop any argument regarding the actual contents of the court's order approving the Second Amended Accounting or their specific objections to it. Accordingly, any substantive challenge to the contents of the Second Amended Accounting is waived. See Wilcox v. Gingrinch, 274 N.E.3d 1269, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (“A party waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.”).

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.