T.G., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case 1

[1] T.G. (“T.G.”) appeals his juvenile delinquency adjudication for Level 4 felony child molesting if committed by an adult.² T.G. argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his juvenile delinquency adjudication. Concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support T.G.’s adjudication, we affirm the juvenile court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether there is sufficient evidence to support T.G.’s juvenile delinquency adjudication for Level 4 felony child molesting if committed by an adult.

Facts

[3] T.G. was born in 2006, and his stepsister, F.C. (“F.C.”) was born in 2012. F.C.’s father (“F.C.’s father”) and T.G.’s mother (“T.G.’s mother”) were married. Throughout 2016 to 2022, T.G. lived in a house with his mother, F.C., F.C.’s father, and other siblings and stepsiblings. The family lived in one house from 2016 to 2019 and then another house from 2019 to 2022.

[4] On one occasion, when F.C. was five years old, she was home alone with T.G. when he asked her to come into his bedroom. Once in the bedroom, T.G. touched F.C.’s vagina with his penis.

[5] T.G. inappropriately touched F.C. a second time when she was around seven years old. T.G. was watching F.C. and two siblings at their house. T.G. told F.C. that he needed to talk to her and told her to go into his bedroom. T.G. locked his door and then touched F.C.’s vagina with his hands.

[6] On another occasion, when T.G.’s mother, T.G., F.C., and another sibling (“the sibling”) were at T.G.’s grandparents’ house (“the grandparents’ house”), T.G. asked F.C. to go to a “little shed garage” to help him work on his bike. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 21). The sibling asked T.G. if he could also help T.G. with the bike, and T.G. told him no. Once inside the shed, T.G. “grabbed [F.C.’s] hands and made [her] touch” his penis. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 23).

[7] Additionally, when F.C. was around nine years old, T.G. went into F.C.’s bedroom around 2:00 a.m., when everyone else in the family was asleep. Upon entering F.C.’s bedroom, he said, “hi sissy[,] it's me[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). F.C. told T.G. to “go away[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). T.G. went to F.C.’s bed, removed her hoodie, sweatpants, and underwear, and then touched her vagina with his hands. T.G. stayed in F.C.’s bedroom and touched her for over two hours before he went back to his own bedroom.

[8] In the Fall of 2024, when F.C. was twelve years old, F.C.’s mother (“F.C.’s mother”) was talking to F.C. about F.C.’s “self-harming behaviors[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 45). F.C. then told her mother about what T.G. had done to her “because [she] couldn't hold it back anymore.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 45).

[9] Thereafter, the State alleged that T.G. was a juvenile delinquent for committing Level 4 felony child molesting if committed by an adult.³ In February 2026, the juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing, and F.C. testified to the facts as set forth above.⁴

[10] After the State rested its case, T.G. called his mother as a witness. T.G.’s mother testified that she had never left T.G. and F.C. alone at their home and that T.G. had never watched F.C. or the other siblings. Additionally, T.G.’s mother testified that the grandparents’ house had had a garage and not a shed. She further testified that the garage “stayed locked” and that T.G. had not had a key to the garage. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 57). T.G.’s mother further testified that she did not recall a time when T.G. and F.C. would have been in the garage. T.G.’s mother also testified that T.G.’s bedroom did not have a lock on it and that, at one point in time, they had removed the door because T.G. “had hurt himself accidently[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 59). In addition, T.G.’s mother testified that T.G. and F.C. “acted just like [a] normal brother and sister” and that “they would hang out and play.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 60).

[11] T.G. testified on his own behalf and denied that he had inappropriately touched F.C. T.G. also testified that he had never been left home alone with F.C. During cross-examination, the State asked T.G. if he had told a detective (“the detective”) that he had been left alone with F.C. on a few occasions when F.C.’s father had been at work and T.G.’s mother had gone to the store. T.G. testified that he had not said that to the detective.

[12] Thereafter, the State called the detective as a rebuttal witness. The detective testified that, during the investigation of the case, he had interviewed T.G. The detective then testified that T.G. had told the detective that he would occasionally be home alone with his siblings and watch them when F.C.’s father was at work and T.G.’s mother went to run errands.

[13] At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court specifically noted that F.C. and the detective were “very credible[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 72). Additionally, the juvenile court found that T.G.’s mother had a “motive to bolster the testimony of ․ her son” but that the detective had rebutted T.G.’s mother's testimony. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 73). The juvenile court determined that T.G. had committed the act of Level 4 felony child molesting and entered a true finding for this offense. Following an immediate dispositional hearing, the juvenile court placed T.G. on probation and ordered him to complete a sexual behavior evaluation.

[14] T.G. now appeals.

Decision

[15] T.G. argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his juvenile delinquency adjudication for Level 4 felony child molesting if committed by an adult. We disagree.

[16] “In juvenile delinquency adjudication proceedings, the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” C.D.H. v. State, 860 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. “We will affirm the adjudication if we conclude that evidence of probative value exists so that a reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the underlying crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Additionally, a conviction of child molesting may rest on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim. Young v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1225, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[17] To support a true finding for child molesting as alleged, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that T.G. performed or submitted to fondling or touching with F.C., who was under the age of fourteen, and that he did so with the intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires. See I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b).

[18] T.G. does not challenge any specific element of his child molesting adjudication and does not dispute that F.C.’s testimony provided evidence of the elements of his adjudication. Instead, T.G. invokes the incredible dubiosity rule to challenge F.C.’s testimony. Specifically, T.G. contends that F.C.’s testimony was incredibly dubious because F.C. delayed in informing her mother about the allegations against T.G., there was no physical evidence to corroborate F.C.’s testimony, no family members had ever observed the offense occur, and F.C.’s testimony about non-substantive details surrounding the offense conflicted with the testimony of T.G.’s mother.⁵

[19] Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is “rare” and requires a reviewing court to determine “whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002). The rule is applied in limited circumstances and requires that there be: (1) a sole testifying witness; (2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and (3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015). “[W]hile [the] incredible dubiosity [rule] provides a standard that is ‘not impossible’ to meet, it is a ‘difficult standard to meet, [and] one that requires great ambiguity and inconsistency in the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001)). Application of this rule “is limited to cases with very specific circumstances because we are extremely hesitant to invade the province of the [trier of fact].” Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211, 1221 (Ind. 2015).

[20] Here, the incredible dubiosity rule is not applicable. F.C.’s testimony was not inherently contradictory or equivocal. Indeed, F.C. did not waiver in her testimony that T.G. had touched her vagina with his penis, had twice touched her vagina with his hands, and had forced her to touch his penis with her hands. Additionally, the fact that F.C. did not immediately divulge T.G.’s offenses against her did not render her testimony inherently improbable. See Feyka v. State, 972 N.E.2d 387, 393 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that the fact that the victim did not immediately report the defendant's offenses was “insignificant” and did not support the defendant's incredible dubiosity argument), trans. denied.

[21] Furthermore, the fact that there was no physical evidence to corroborate F.C.’s testimony regarding T.G.’s actions against her and that no one in the home observed the offense does not render F.C.’s testimony incredibly dubious. See Cardwell v. State, 516 N.E.2d 1083, 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that the “lack of corroborating medical or physical evidence and the improbability of the events occurring as described because of the presence of other children or adults in the immediate vicinity does not, of itself, render the uncorroborated testimony of the victims insufficient to sustain a child molesting conviction”), reh'g denied, trans. denied; Smith v. State, 163 N.E.3d 925, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (explaining that a child molesting offense “seldom leaves outward physical scars that can be corroborated by medical testimony and is seldom committed in the presence of eye-witnesses” and holding that a conviction for such an offense can be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim); Carter v. State, 31 N.E.3d 17, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (rejecting the defendant's incredible dubiosity argument and explaining that the fact “[t]hat no other person testified to witnessing or hearing [the victim] being molested does not establish that the abuse did not happen”), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[22] Lastly, we reject T.G.’s argument that F.C.’s testimony was incredibly dubious because it conflicted with the testimony of T.G.’s mother. “Inconsistencies in the testimonies of two or more witnesses go to the weight of the evidence and do not make the evidence ‘incredible’ as a matter of law.” Manuel v. State, 971 N.E.2d 1262, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). See also Morell v. State, 933 N.E.2d 484, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that “the standard for dubious testimony is inherent contradiction, not contradiction between the testimony of witnesses”).

[23] T.G.’s challenge to F.C.’s testimony as being incredibly dubious is simply a request to reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility. The juvenile court heard F.C.’s testimony and found it to be “very credible[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 72). F.C.’s testimony was sufficient to support T.G.’s juvenile delinquency adjudication for Level 4 felony child molesting if committed by an adult, and we decline to impinge on the juvenile court's credibility determination. See C.D.H., 860 N.E.2d at 610. See also Ferrell v. State, 746 N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ind. 2001) (“If the testimony believed by the trier of fact is enough to support the verdict, then the reviewing court will not disturb it.”). Because there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's entry of a true finding for child molesting, we affirm T.G.’s adjudication.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3.

3.   The State also alleged that T.G. was a juvenile delinquent for committing four acts of Level 3 felony child molesting. However, the juvenile court did not enter true findings for these allegations.

4.   At the time of the fact-finding hearing, T.G. was nineteen years old.

5.   T.G. contends that F.C. and T.G.’s mother gave differing testimony about whether F.C. had been left at home alone with T.G. and whether there had been a lock on T.G.’s door.

Pyle, Judge.

[25] Mathias, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.