Bill DeWayne Aaron, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Bill DeWayne Aaron, Jr. (“Aaron”) was convicted after a jury trial of intimidation ¹ as a Level 5 felony and strangulation ² as a Level 6 felony and was adjudicated a habitual offender.³ Aaron was sentenced to an aggregate term of eight years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). He appeals his conviction, raising the following restated issue for our review: whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting text messages between Aaron and the victim. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Niche Moore (“Moore”) met Aaron in approximately 2016 at the restaurant where she was employed, and the two began a relationship together. When they met, Aaron was introduced as “Don” and that was the name that Moore referred to him as throughout their relationship. Tr. Vol. II p. 104. Aaron usually called Moore by the nickname “Che.” Id. The relationship between Aaron and Moore lasted about nine years, and they had a son together. The two lived together until around the end of 2024, when the relationship ended. Around June 2025, Aaron temporarily moved back in with Moore. The two were not dating at this time but did have a sexual relationship.

[3] On June 13, 2025, Aaron sent Moore a series of text messages telling her to come back home and threatening to kill her and the dog:

Aaron: Baby please come home you making me seem like [I'm] something [I'm] not come back home baby damn

Moore: Get off my phone Don.

Aaron: Che come home please

Aaron: Don't fuckin do mr [sic] like this come home

Aaron: Me

Aaron: Come home Che

Aaron: I'm Not playin come home

Aaron: I hate you frfr [sic] fuck you bitch imma [sic] kill you and this dog fuck u

Aaron: Imm [sic] kill u next time I see u fuck u

Aaron: Bitch

Aaron: You really left me bout w fuckin dog an [sic] u told them people to keep me frfr [sic] imma [sic] kill u bitch fuck u hoe tou [sic] dead to me from here on out

Ex. Vol. I pp. 5–6.

[4] On the night of June 25, 2025, when Moore got home from work, Aaron asked Moore if she had “been involved with anyone” after their relationship ended. Tr. Vol. II p. 106. Moore admitted that she had and told Aaron, “[y]ou do know we are not in a relationship.” Id. at 107. Aaron then angrily lunged across the couch and began to strangle her with both of his hands around her throat. Aaron was on top of her, and while he was strangling her, Moore could not breathe or speak. When Aaron eventually let go of Moore's throat, she ran to the bathroom and checked her neck in the mirror. As a result of Aaron's strangulation, her neck was sore. Moore left the bathroom and confronted Aaron about the incident before returning to the bathroom.

[5] As Moore was getting ready to take a shower, Aaron came into the bathroom and pulled a knife from behind his back. He told her that he “could really kill” her and that he hated Moore more than he hated his ex-wife. Id. at 110. Based on Aaron's actions, Moore feared for her safety and the safety of their child, who was asleep in the house. Moore believed it was possible that Aaron was going to carry out his threats and harm her, and she attempted to figure out how to get out of the house without upsetting Aaron. Eventually, Aaron fell asleep, and Moore fled the house with their son.

[6] On July 23, 2025, the State charged Aaron with Level 5 felony intimidation, Level 6 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony domestic battery, and Class A misdemeanor battery. The State later added an allegation that Aaron was a habitual offender. A jury trial was held on February 4, 2026.

[7] During the trial, the State moved to admit the text messages that Aaron had sent to Moore on June 13, 2025. Moore testified that, although the phone number that the messages were sent from was not saved on her phone, she knew that the messages were from Aaron based upon “the content” of the messages. Id. at 114. She clarified that no one else was living with Moore at the time except Aaron and their son and so nobody else would say to “come home.” Id. at 121. Aaron referred to Moore as “Che” in the messages, and Moore referred to Aaron as “Don” in their exchange. Id. at 114, 120–21. Aaron objected, and the trial court admitted screenshots of the text messages over his objection. Moore also testified to the contents of the messages. The trial court stated that it found the evidence to be probative of the relationship between Moore and Aaron. It also stated that it was admitting the messages because they “show[ed] his hostility and anger toward” Moore and that the probative value outweighed the prejudice. Id. at 116. When the trial court offered to give a limiting instruction stating that the messages could not be used to show Aaron's propensity to commit crimes, Aaron declined the limiting instruction.

[8] The jury ultimately convicted Aaron of Level 5 felony intimidation, Level 6 felony strangulation, and Level 6 felony domestic battery and acquitted him of Class A misdemeanor battery. Aaron admitted he was a habitual offender, and at sentencing, the trial court merged the domestic battery conviction with the strangulation conviction. The trial court imposed an aggregate eight-year sentence, which consisted of a four-year sentence for the intimidation conviction, enhanced by four years for the habitual offender adjudication, and two years for the strangulation conviction to be served concurrently with the sentence for intimidation. Aaron now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Aaron argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the text messages at trial. The trial court is afforded wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 842 (Ind. 2017) (citing Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (Ind. 2012)). On appeal, evidentiary decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion and are reversed only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. at 842–43. We will affirm a ruling on the admissibility of evidence on any reasonable basis apparent in the record regardless of whether it was relied on by the parties or the trial court. Turner v. State, 183 N.E.3d 346, 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

[10] Aaron asserts that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit the text messages sent on June 13, 2025. He contends that the messages were irrelevant and prejudicial. Specifically, Aaron argues that there was no evidence that he sent the messages because they came from a number that Moore did not have saved in her phone, and the messages were not relevant to a matter that was at issue at the trial because motive and nature of the parties’ relationship were not in dispute at trial. Further, Aaron maintains that the messages “likely had a prejudicial impact on the average juror, such that it contributed to the verdict.” Appellant's Br. p. 14 (citing Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023), cert. denied).

[11] Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence[,]” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. “This ‘liberal standard for relevancy’ sets a low bar, and the trial court enjoys ‘wide discretion’ in deciding whether that bar is cleared.” Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177 (Ind. 2017) (internal citations omitted). However, Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) prohibits a trial court from admitting evidence of another crime, wrong, or act “to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Evid. R. 404(b)(1). “The purpose of the rule is to protect against the ‘forbidden inference -- that the defendant acted badly in the past, and that the defendant's present, charged actions conform with those past bad acts ․’ ” Erickson v. State, 72 N.E.3d 965, 973–74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Nicholson, 963 N.E.2d at 1099–100 (citation omitted)), trans. denied.

[12] Nevertheless, evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other acts are admissible if offered for another purpose, such as to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2). The law governing the admissibility of specific-acts evidence for “other purposes” requires a trial court to make three findings. D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 2009). First, the court must determine that the proponent has sufficiently proven that the person who allegedly committed the act did, in fact, commit the act. Id. Second, the court must determine that the evidence of the crime, wrong, or other act is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act. Id. Third, the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Evidence Rule 403. Id.

[13] Under Indiana Rule of Evidence 403, relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of ․ unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Evid. R. 403. “When determining any unfair prejudicial impact, courts should look for the dangers that the jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.” Bell v. State, 29 N.E.3d 137, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied), trans. denied. Whether the probative value of an evidentiary matter is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is a discretionary task best performed by the trial court. Id.

[14] We must first determine if the State presented sufficient proof that Aaron sent the text messages to Moore. To lay a proper foundation for admission under Evidence Rule 404(b), “[t]here must be sufficient proof from which a reasonable jury could find the uncharged conduct proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” Caldwell v. State, 43 N.E.3d 258, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing D.R.C., 908 N.E.2d at 224), trans. denied. Here, the State presented evidence that, although the messages came from a number that Moore did not have saved in her phone, she knew they came from Aaron based on “the content” of the messages, which discussed things that “only [Aaron] would know.” Tr. Vol. II p. 114. Moore stated that no one else would say to “come home” except for Aaron as he was the only other person living with Moore at the time except for their son. Id. at 121. Further, Aaron referred to Moore as “Che” in the messages, and Moore referred to Aaron as “Don” in their exchange, which were the nicknames that they used for each other. Id. at 114, 120–21. This was sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Aaron was the one who sent the messages to Moore.

[15] Next, the messages were relevant to Aaron's motive and the hostile nature of the relationship between Aaron and Moore. “Evidence of motive is always relevant in the proof of a crime, and a defendant's prior actions with respect to the victim are also usually admissible to show the relationship between the two.” Fry v. State, 748 N.E.2d 369, 372 (Ind. 2001). Additionally, evidence of prior crimes and misconduct that tends to show a hostile relationship between the defendant and the victim is admissible. See Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1080 (Ind. 2000) (finding that evidence of prior bad acts was relevant and probative in that it showed the defendant's relationship with the victim); Iqbal v. State, 805 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a prior incident where defendant argued with victim and threatened her was admissible because it was indicative of defendant's relationship with victim and highly relevant for his motive to shoot her), trans. denied.

[16] The text messages between Aaron and Moore were probative to establish the nature of the relationship between the two and Aaron's motive for attacking Moore on June 25. The messages were sent less than two weeks prior and revealed Aaron's hostility toward Moore and the tumultuous nature of their relationship. In the messages, he stated that he hated her, called her derogatory names, and threatened to kill her three times. See Ex. Vol. I pp. 5–6. The text messages were properly admitted to establish Aaron's motive to commit the charged offenses and the hostile nature of the relationship between him and Moore. See Carr v. State, 255 N.E.3d 519, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (text messages found to be admissible because they demonstrated a relationship between the parties that was filled with threats and conflict and the defendant's motive in murdering the victim), trans. denied.

[17] Aaron argues that motive and the nature of the relationship were not at dispute at trial, and thus, evidence of such was not relevant. Although motive and the nature of the parties’ relationship were not specifically challenged by Aaron at trial, he did challenge Moore's credibility. At trial, Moore testified to Aaron's actions on June 25 and how he attacked her, strangled her, and threatened her. Aaron disputed her credibility as to these actions, and the text messages helped bolster her credibility as they established that the parties had a hostile relationship and Aaron's motive in committing the charged offenses. Thus, establishing a motive and the nature of their relationship was linked to finding Moore credible. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly found that the text messages were relevant to a matter at issue other than Aaron's propensity to commit the crimes charged.

[18] Although the messages were relevant to show motive and the nature of the relationship, we must still determine if their probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See D.R.C., 908 N.E.2d at 223. Here, the text messages were sent less than two weeks prior to the date of the alleged crimes and revealed a recent history of threats of violence by Aaron toward Moore. The messages revealed a history of conflict between the two and demonstrated Aaron's hostility toward Moore. Such evidence was highly probative to show Aaron's potential motive for attacking Moore on June 25. We conclude these messages had substantial probative value that outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.

[19] Based on the above, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the text messages.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(2)(A) (2022).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-2-9(c).

3.   I.C. § 35-50-2-8(c).

Foley, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur.