HUNTER WARFIELD INC v. MAI (2026)

Case Summary

[1] Purdue University student Alexandra Hustedt-Mai (Tenant) signed a lease for an apartment at the conclusion of which the property management company, Granite Management, LLC (Granite), assessed Tenant around $110 in charges, which Tenant disputed that she owed. Granite eventually referred the account to Hunter Warfield, Inc. (HW), a national debt collection company. HW later reported the debt to two credit reporting agencies (CRAs), and Tenant continued to dispute it.

[2] Tenant filed a complaint against HW in Tippecanoe Circuit Court (the trial court) that, as amended, alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The case was removed to district court but remanded to the trial court for lack of federal standing. The case proceeded to a jury trial, with the jury awarding Tenant $200,000 in actual damages and $1,750,000 in punitive damages. Additionally, the trial court ordered HW to pay Tenant $306,984 in attorney's fees and $47,393 in costs.

[3] HW raises six issues, which we restate:

1. Did the trial court err by denying HW's motion for judgment on the pleadings that asserted Tenant lacked standing?

2. Did the trial court err by denying HW's motion for summary judgment on Tenant's FDCPA and FCRA claims?

3. Did the trial court err by denying HW's motion for judgment on the evidence?

4. Did the trial court apply the wrong evidentiary standard to Tenant's FCRA claim for punitive damages when it instructed the jury that Tenant needed to establish her claim by a greater weight of the evidence?

5. Did the trial court err in its costs award?

6. Did the trial court err when it denied HW's motion to correct error and refused to reduce the punitive damages award?

[4] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts & Procedural History 1

[5] While a graduate student at Purdue, Tenant leased an apartment at a complex owned by a company called MSCI for the period of August 15, 2016 through July 31, 2017. During that tenancy, Tenant executed another one-year lease, in February 2017, for a different unit, Apartment 102, beginning August 1, 2017 through July 31, 2018 (the Lease). The Lease required Tenant and her roommate to return their unit in as good a condition as when they received it, ordinary wear and tear excepted. A couple months after Tenant signed the Lease, MSCI sold the complex to Tailwind West Lafayette, LLC, who in turn contracted with Granite to manage the property, including the handling of leases, move out inspections, and assessment of charges.

[6] The prior tenant's lease of Apartment 102 did not end until July 31, 2017 – the day before Tenant's Lease was to begin. In June, Tenant electronically executed a Lease Addendum (As Is Addendum). It provided:

Granite Management, LLC, in agreement with [Tenant and roommate], tenant(s) of ․ Apartment #102 shall deliver said premises in as-is condition without having any cleaning, painting or carpet cleaning done before move in per the request of [Tenant and roommate]. The move-in date shall be August 1, 2017. No walk thru checklist will be given, and the previous walk thru checklist will serve as the reference for this lease term also.

Appendix Vol. 5 at 51. Granite did not perform a move-out inspection of Apartment 102 to assess its condition, or otherwise see it, before Tenant moved in. Tenant completed her own move-in checklist, which she electronically submitted to Granite via its portal. Tenant received a reply from Granite indicating receipt of the checklist.

[7] Tenant moved out in May 2018, a few months before the end of the Lease, as she was graduating and moving out of state; her roommate remained in the apartment for the duration of the lease term. The day after the Lease ended, Granite inspected the apartment. On September 6, 2018, Granite issued an Itemization of Security Deposit Return, charging Tenant $140.91, consisting of cleaning and painting, carpet cleaning and flooring replacement, and maintenance labor and supplies. Tenant disputed the charges. Granite revisited the assessment and, after considering Tenant's move-in checklist that she had submitted, reduced the amount owed to $110.58. Tenant continued to maintain that she did not owe the charges, telling Granite that she was being charged for things that were listed on her move-in checklist as having been already damaged. Granite ultimately referred the outstanding $110.58 to HW for collection.²

[8] In March 2019, HW sent a collection letter to Tenant, and, thereafter, Tenant and HW exchanged phone calls and letters, in which Tenant disputed the charges. Consistent with its collection practices for Granite, HW, in June 2019, began reporting the claimed obligation to two CRAs, Equifax and TransUnion. In July 2019, Tenant sent letters, by certified mail to the CRAs, disputing the reporting. To verify the debt, HW reached out to Granite, who on July 10, 2019, advised HW that Tenant owed the $110.58 balance and that the charges had been properly and timely itemized and sent to Tenant as required by Indiana law. After receiving Granite's response, and after reviewing the Lease and the itemization of charges,³ HW continued with reporting the debt to the CRAs until October 2020, when Granite withdrew the account from collections and wrote off the balance.

[9] On June 2, 2021, Tenant filed a complaint in Tippecanoe County against HW alleging violation of the FDCPA,⁴ 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., for HW's conduct in attempting to collect the claimed debt. The complaint alleged that Tenant “was harmed by [HW]’s continued attempts to collect debt that she never owed” and that she was seeking actual and statutory damages, attorney's fees, and costs for violations of the FDCPA. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 111. The complaint's numerous factual allegations detailed HW's alleged actions or failures in collecting a debt that Tenant maintained she did not owe, including sending letters and reporting a debt to CRAs that HW knew or should have known to be false to CRAs. The factual allegations alleged that, in response, Tenant had sent letters to HW, disputing the charges. Tenant also alleged damages:

58. HW's action [sic] concerning [Tenant] have caused damages, including not by way of limitation: costs of sending one or more certified letters and [Tenant]’s time.

59. HW's communications with [Tenant] caused [her] anxiety and stress.

Id. at 115.

[10] On July 26, 2021, Tenant filed an amended complaint, which added a claim for violation of the FCRA,⁵ 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. The amended complaint included additional factual allegations pertaining to HW, including that HW had failed to review all relevant information, furnished inaccurate information to CRAs, and failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of her dispute. The two paragraphs specifically alleging damages caused by HW due to mailing costs, lost time, anxiety, and stress had been removed from the first amended complaint. The amended complaint added factual allegations pertaining to actions that Tenant had taken in response to the debt collection, namely, she “notified [ ] Equifax and TransUnion that she did not owe anything to HW or Granite” and “requested a reinvestigation[.]” Id. at 123.

[11] On August 31, 2021, HW removed the action to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. On October 12, 2021, Tenant filed (in federal court) a second amended complaint, which was, in large part, the same as the first amended complaint.⁶ Tenant also moved to remand the case back to state court, arguing that she did not allege any injury in fact in her second amended complaint sufficient to support Article III standing. In opposing remand, HW argued that Tenant had alleged injury sufficient for standing and, further, had intentionally removed from her complaint the specific allegations of injury in an attempt to avoid federal standing.

[12] On January 24, 2022, the district court granted Tenant's motion for remand. In its order, the court observed the “topsy-turvy” nature of the situation, with Tenant “trying to convince [the court] she has no concrete injury, while [HW] insists [Tenant] has indeed been injured by its conduct.” Id. at 155. The court explained that standing in federal courts requires an “injury in fact” which is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” and that, here, Tenant had alleged only that HW reported allegedly inaccurate information to CRAs, “but nothing beyond that – not that those agencies had provided inaccurate credit reports or scores ․ to any third-parties, or that [Tenant] had otherwise been concretely and negatively impacted by HW's sharing of erroneous information.” Id. at 156, 164. The district court concluded that HW failed to demonstrate how the operative complaint alleges a concrete injury in fact so as to establish [Tenant]’s standing to bring the action ⁷ and remanded the case to the trial court.⁸

[13] On December 9, 2022, HW moved for judgment on the pleadings under Ind. Trial Rule 12(C), asserting that the second amended complaint did not allege any actual harm or injury and that Tenant lacked standing. The trial court held a hearing on January 24, 2023, taking the matter under advisement. While that was pending, our Supreme Court decided Hoosier Contrs., LLC v. Gardner, 212 N.E.3d 1234 (Ind. 2023), involving whether a homeowner, who had brought statutory claims against a contractor, had brought forth sufficient evidence of injury to establish standing to withstand the contractor's motion for summary judgment. The trial court set HW's motion for judgment on the pleadings for an additional hearing to address the impact of Hoosier Contrs.

[14] While HW's motion for judgment on the pleadings was pending, Tenant and HW each filed a motion for summary judgment. Tenant sought partial summary judgment under certain sections of the FDCPA on the basis that HW was seeking to collect money for damages that existed before she moved into the apartment and that she did not cause. HW's motion asserted it was entitled to summary judgment on both the FCRA and the FDCPA claims, in part, because the As Is Addendum was enforceable and made the debt valid and owed, precluding Tenant's statutory claims. HW also argued that, as required, it had contacted Granite to verify the debt and notified the CRAs that the account was being disputed.

[15] Following a hearing, the trial court issued an Order on Dispositive Motions on July 31, 2023, which (1) denied HW's motion for judgment on the pleadings for lack of standing and (2) granted, in part, the parties’ motions for summary judgment. As to the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court made several initial observations: Tenant had not suffered a denial of credit, a loss of credit previously extended, a lowering of credit limits or a requirement to pay a higher interest rate as a result of the reporting of the alleged debt to the CRAs; although Tenant's postage costs were pecuniary losses, “these voluntary expenses are not the types of ‘actual damages’ contemplated by the FCRA or FDCPA”; and “procedural violations and statutory damages are insufficient to confer standing” and that Tenant “does not seek injunctive relief or a declaratory judgment.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 70. The court then determined:

[T]he court finds that unless there is some binding authority holding that emotional damages alone are insufficient to confer standing in Indiana, then [Tenant] should not be denied her day in court. It is undisputed that the FCRA and FDCPA allow for actual damages, which can include emotional harm. [HW] cites no Indiana authority suggesting that emotional harm alone is insufficient to confer standing. Importantly, Hoosier Contrs. does not address emotional harm.

The court is not concerned with lack of references to emotional harm in the Second Amended Complaint, which requests “damages” and “all other relief just and proper in the premises.” Indiana's notice pleading requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and “a demand for relief to which the pleader deems entitled.” Ind. Trial Rule 8(A). A pleading need not adopt a specific legal theory of recovery or state all elements of a cause of action. A complaint's allegations are sufficient if they put a reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues. Here, [Tenant] has consistently claimed emotional harm.

Id. at 70-71 (internal citation omitted).

[16] The court granted Tenant's motion for summary judgment only to the extent that Tenant was a “consumer,” HW was a “debt collector,” and the obligation was a “consumer debt” under the relevant statutes. As to HW's motion for summary judgment, the court determined, in part, that the As Is Addendum was “enforceable to the extent it applies to routine and regular cleaning, paint touch up, or carpet vacuuming or cleaning.” Id. at 73. The court denied HW's motion in all other respects due to genuine issues of material fact.

[17] On June 4-7, 2024, the case proceeded to jury trial on Tenant's FCRA and FDCPA claims. Tenant testified that the apartment was in poor condition when she moved in, including broken locks, scuffs and holes in the walls, stained and fraying carpets, a broken stove, a stained toilet, a non-functional sink, and a front door that did not shut properly. There was also testimony that she and her then boyfriend (now husband) cleaned the apartment, he took pictures of its condition, and she left it in a better condition than she had received it. The move-in checklist from the prior tenant reflected some of the same unclean and damaged conditions that Tenant noted in her move-in checklist that she had submitted to Granite. Exhibits Vol. 2 at 82, 84 (Plaintiff's Exhibits 9 and 10). Tenant testified that, as a result of HW's reporting, she experienced increased anxiety, reputational embarrassment, intrusive thoughts, inability to focus, and emotional withdrawal and required an increase in anti-anxiety medication. She did not apply on her own for either an apartment or a car loan, anticipating denial.

[18] In her case-in-chief, Tenant also presented the testimony of: an FCRA/credit-reporting industry expert; an attorney with Purdue legal services; chief executive officer of Granite; another expert who was formerly an Experian dispute agent and, later, its corporate representative; Tenant's husband; and HW's manager of operational strategies, who was HW's corporate representative at trial. Tenant presented portions of video deposition testimony of four HW employees: two dispute agents, a manager who oversees dispute agents, and a compliance officer.

[19] HW called Granite's collection manager and HW's corporate trial representative. Generally speaking, HW's trial position was that, under the Lease and the As Is Addendum, Tenant owed the $110 in charges to Granite, that HW's agents communicated with Granite and verified that the amount was owed, such that HW's reporting of it to the CRAs was accurate as required by law, and that HW's investigation of the dispute was reasonable and proper.

[20] At the conclusion of Tenant's evidence, HW moved for Ind. Trial Rule 50 judgment on the evidence, which the trial court denied. The parties briefed and presented argument pertaining to the appropriate burden of proof applicable to punitive damages, with HW maintaining it was a clear and convincing standard and Tenant maintaining that, pursuant to federal law, it was by a preponderance/greater weight of the evidence. Ultimately, the trial court instructed the jury with a greater weight of the evidence burden of proof.

[21] The jury returned a verdict in favor of Tenant on all claims, determining that HW was liable under both the FCRA and FDCPA and that HW had willfully violated the FCRA, which allowed for recovery of punitive damages. The jury awarded Tenant $200,000 in actual damages and $1,750,000 in punitive damages.⁹ Tenant moved for statutory attorney's fees and costs, which HW opposed in part. The trial court reduced the hourly rates sought by counsel but awarded the full amount of costs sought by Tenant, $47,393.

[22] HW filed a combined renewed motion for judgment on the evidence and motion to correct error to reduce the jury award, arguing, in part, that the punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive and that the costs award exceeded statutory limits. The trial court denied the motion. HW now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

1. Denial of HW's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

[23] HW asserts that the trial court erred in denying its T.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, in which HW argued that Tenant's operative complaint did not include any allegation of injury and thus she lacked standing.

Like a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6), a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Trial Rule 12(C) tests the sufficiency of the complaint to state a redressable claim, not the facts to support it. A judgment on the pleadings is proper only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and when the facts shown by the pleadings clearly entitle the moving party to judgment. A trial court should grant such a motion only when it is clear from the pleadings that the non-moving party cannot in any way succeed under the facts and allegations therein. In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for judgment on the pleadings this court conducts a de novo review. We look only to the pleadings in making this assessment. We will accept as true the well-pleaded material facts alleged. The moving party is deemed to have admitted well-pleaded facts in favor of the nonmovant, and this court will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.

Lockerbie Glove Co. Town Home Owner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Indianapolis Historic Pres. Comm'n, 194 N.E.3d 1175, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal citations and quotations omitted). A trial court may grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings if the party bringing the action lacks standing to do so. Id.

[24] Standing is a threshold issue: if it is lacking, the court cannot consider the merits of the claim. Solarize Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 215 (Ind. 2022). Standing is a “significant restraint on the ability of Indiana courts to act, as it denies the courts any jurisdiction absent an actual injured party participating in the case.” Hoosier Contrs, 212 N.E.3d at 1238. Standing is a legal question reviewed de novo. City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349, 351 (Ind. 2022).

[25] To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. Red Lobster Restaurants LLC v. Fricke, 234 N.E.3d 159, 167 (Ind. 2024). “Indiana law is clear that standing requires an injury, which is met if the party shows it ‘ha[s] suffered or [is] in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct.’ ” Hoosier Contrs., 212 N.E.3d at 1238 (quoting Solarize, 182 N.E.3d at 217) (internal citation omitted); McLinden v. Tangoe U.S., Inc., 263 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). HW maintains that Tenant, who removed from her complaint the specific damage allegations of stress, anxiety, and mailing costs, “intentionally pled her way out of federal court. But in doing so, she also pled her way out of state court.” Appellant's Brief at 26. After careful consideration, we disagree.

[26] Our decision today is particularly informed by Hoosier Contrs., where our Supreme Court recognized that “[a]t the pleading stage, a claimant's general factual allegations of injury arising from the defendant's conduct may suffice to satisfy standing.” 212 N.E.3d at 1239. There, a homeowner, Gardner, contacted Hoosier Contractors (Hoosier) to inspect his roof and obtain an estimate for repairs, and Hoosier required Gardner to first sign a contract agreeing to hire Hoosier for any necessary repairs. Gardner ultimately hired another company to perform the work.

[27] Hoosier sued Gardner for breach of contract, and Gardner counterclaimed on behalf of a class, alleging that Hoosier's form contract violated the Home Improvement Contractors Act (HICA) and that the violations constituted deceptive acts under the DCSA. Hoosier moved for summary judgment on the basis that Gardner and the class lacked standing because they did not suffer actual injury, designating evidence that Garner hired another company to do the repairs for a cheaper price. Gardner and the class asserted that all those who signed the noncompliant-HICA contract had suffered statutory damages under the DCSA. The trial court denied Hoosier's motion.

[28] Our Supreme Court reversed, finding that the DCSA provides that a person who relies on a deceptive act may bring an action “for the damages actually suffered” as a result of relying on the deceptive act and that Gardner's documents submitted in response to summary judgment “showed [that] Hoosier's deceptive acts did not harm him at all” given that he hired another company for the repairs at a lower cost. Id. at 1241. Because statutory violations “are insufficient by themselves to confer standing,” and Garder and the class did not set forth designated evidence to show that they suffered actual injury, the Court concluded that Hoosier was entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 1242. Of significance here, in reaching its decision, the Court recognized that, in his counterclaim,

[Gardner] claimed that he and the other class members “relied upon [the] deceptive acts perpetrated by Hoosier” and “suffered damages as a result of the deceptive acts.” These injury allegations were sufficient to confer standing at the litigation's pleading stage. ․ But the summary-judgment phase raises the threshold for proving an injury.

Id. at 1241 (internal citation omitted) (emphases added). The Court's observation that the bar for standing at the pleading stage is lower than that necessary to survive summary judgment is a recognition of Indiana's liberal notice pleading requirements.

[29] Ind. Trial Rule 8(A) sets forth our general rules of pleading and provides that to state a claim for relief, the complaint must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for relief to which the pleader deems entitled. “In practice, [our] liberal standard merely requires that a ‘complaint ․ put the defendant on notice concerning why it is potentially liable and what it stands to lose.” NFI Interactive Logistics LLC v. Bruski, 239 N.E.3d 63, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (affirming trial court's denial of T.R. 12(B) motion for failure to state a claim, where complaint did not plead a specific theory of liability, noting that other means less drastic than dismissal can be used to clarify, such as discovery and pretrial conferences), trans. denied. A plaintiff need only plead the operative facts involved in the litigation. Id.

[30] Here, the second amended complaint opened with the allegation that Tenant “was harmed by [HW]’s continued attempts to collect debt that she never owed.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 199. The complaint then set forth several pages of factual allegations, including what HW was claimed to have done or not done, in response to which Tenant sent letters to HW to dispute the debt and challenge HW's reporting of it to CRAs, notified two CRAs that she did not owe Granite or HW, and requested a reinvestigation of the matter. Her efforts necessarily required her to expend time and effort and some mailing costs.

[31] Just as the homeowner's allegations that he relied upon deceptive acts perpetrated by the contractor and “suffered damages as a result” were sufficient to confer standing at the pleading stage in Hoosier Contrs., we find that the allegations of Tenant's second amended complaint were adequate to confer standing and survive judgment on the pleadings. We thus affirm the trial court's denial of HW's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

2. Denial of HW's Motion for Summary Judgment

[32] HW asserts that the trial court should have granted its motion for summary judgment on Tenant's FDCPA and FCRA claims. We review the denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court:

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of ․ the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is “material” if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is “genuine” if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.

The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue, at which point the burden shifts to the nonmovant to come forward with contrary evidence showing an issue for the trier of fact.

Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (cleaned up). Indiana consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims. Id. at 1004.

[33] In partially granting the motion, the trial court made several legal determinations regarding the As Is Addendum. In addition to finding that it was supported by consideration and was not ambiguous, the court determined that the As Is Addendum “is enforceable to the extent it applies to routine and regular cleaning, paint touch up, or carpet vacuuming or cleaning.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 73. The trial court clarified that the As Is Addendum did not provide a “blank check” to Granite, as “it would be unconscionable for a landlord to ask a tenant to accept all property damage from a prior tenant, sight unseen.” Id. HW's motion for summary judgment was denied in all other respects due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact.

[34] HW's position is that the trial court's ruling that the As Is Addendum was legally enforceable necessarily established that Granite could charge Tenant for the items that it did – and therefore, the debt was accurate – making HW's attempts to collect it and its reporting to the CRAs not violative of either the FDCPA or FCRA. This conclusory reasoning is flawed, however. While the trial court made the legal determination that the As Is Addendum was enforceable to a limited extent, that determination did not resolve the factual dispute as to whether the assessed charges represented damage or conditions for which Tenant was liable.

[35] The Lease required Tenant to return the apartment in as good a condition as she received it, ordinary wear and tear excepted. In opposing summary judgment, Tenant maintained that she turned over the apartment without damage and in clean condition and that the As Is Addendum did not make her responsible for preexisting damage. Tenant designated evidence, including her move-in checklist that she had submitted to Granite and her supplemental affidavit, in which she averred that Granite's itemization of security deposit return “contain[ed] charges for conditions in the apartment that pre-existed my tenancy.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 5 at 248. She also designated deposition testimony of Granite's collection manager stating that Granite would not charge a tenant for damage the tenant did not cause and from an HW dispute operator who, from looking at Tenant's move-in checklist, could not verify that what Tenant was being charged for was correct. HW did not put forth evidence that Tenant had damaged the apartment or as to the condition of it at any time. The condition of the apartment upon delivery to Tenant and upon her move out was relevant to whether she owed the charges, i.e., whether the reported debt was accurate. Tenant's designated evidence created a genuine issue of material fact as to the condition of the apartment and whether the charges HW sought to collect and reported to the CRAs were owed.

[36] Further, under the FCRA, a furnisher such as HW must conduct a reasonable investigation once notified by the CRA that a consumer has disputed a reporting. Indiana courts have recognized the reasonableness of a party's investigation is a fact-sensitive question ordinarily unsuited to summary judgment. Westra v. Credit Controls of Pinellas, 409 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005) (furnisher's investigation reasonableness is a factual question normally reserved for trial, and summary judgment only proper if reasonableness is beyond question).

[37] In sum, the enforceability of the As Is Addendum did not foreclose the factual questions of whether the charged damages were owed and whether HW's investigation was reasonable; those questions were for the jury. We affirm the trial court's denial of summary judgment to HW on Tenant's FDCPA and FCRA claims.

3. Denial of HW's Motion for Judgment on the Evidence

[38] HW asserts that the trial court erred by denying its motion for judgment on the evidence. Under T.R. 50(A), a court shall withdraw an issue from the jury and enter judgment on the evidence where all or some of the issues are “not supported by sufficient evidence or a verdict thereon is clearly erroneous as contrary to the evidence because the evidence is insufficient to support it.” When ruling on a T.R. 50(A) motion, “a judge may assess both the quantity and quality of the evidence presented by the nonmovant but may not weigh the conflicting evidence or assess witness credibility; these are fact-finding functions within the jury's sole province.” Cosme v. Clark, 232 N.E.3d 1141, 1148 (Ind. 2024). A court views the evidence with all reasonable inferences for the nonmovant. Id. at 1150. We review a trial court's decision on a T.R. 50(A) motion de novo. Id. at 1152.

[39] Tenant's claims rest on the FDCPA's prohibitions against false, deceptive, or misleading representations concerning the character, amount, or legal status of a debt and the FCRA's imposition of duties on a furnisher to, among other things, report correct and complete information and conduct reasonable investigations of a disputed debt. HW asserts that the As Is Addendum allowed Granite to assess the charges against Tenant that it did, pre-existing or not, and thus “for the same reason [the court] should have granted [HW]’s motion for summary judgment,” the trial court should have granted its motion for judgment on the evidence. Reply Brief at 11. That is, HW argues that the items charged “were covered by the enforceable ‘As Is’ Addendum” and thus Tenant's trial evidence failed to establish that HW's credit reporting was not accurate or complete. Appellant's Brief at 36. HW further contends that Tenant failed to identify facts that HW should have uncovered in any additional investigation that would have changed the outcome. As a result, HW argues, Tenant did not present sufficient evidence on either the FDCPA or the FCRA claim, and the trial court should have granted its motion for judgment on the evidence.

[40] Tenant's theory at trial was that she was only responsible for conditions she caused beyond normal wear and tear and not for repair of damages that predated her tenancy. Tenant testified about the condition of the apartment at the time of her move in, including a patch on the wall, dirty doors, loose lock, front door that did not shut properly, stained toilet, problem with sink, walls with holes and chipped paint, broken blinds, and chipped mirror. She also testified about the condition of the apartment at the time of her move out, maintaining that she returned it in the same or better condition than when she received it. Tenant presented evidence of the items marked by a Granite employee in the company's move-out inspection report as needing repair, Tenant's own move-in checklist, and the prior tenant's move-in checklist. Tenant presented the testimony of a Granite collection manager who testified that Granite would not charge a tenant for pre-existing damage or for conditions the tenant did not cause. Tenant presented evidence from HW's dispute processors about how dispute investigations are handled. And she presented expert testimony that HW's reporting was not accurate/complete and fell below industry standards, HW did not conduct a reasonable investigation, and the debt was not actually verified and should have been deleted.

[41] Viewing the evidence with all reasonable inferences in favor of Tenant, we find that she presented sufficient evidence for her FDCPA and FCRA claims to go to the jury for its determinations of whether the charges were owed, in part or in full, whether the debt collected upon and reported was complete and accurate, and whether HW's investigation was reasonable. We thus affirm the trial court's denial of HW's motion for judgment on the evidence.

4. Punitive Damages Burden of Proof

[42] HW asserts that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that Tenant needed to prove her FCRA claims, including her claim for punitive damages, by a greater weight of the evidence. HW argues that, as to punitive damages, this was an incorrect statement of the law because “Indiana law requires punitive damages to be established by clear and convincing evidence.” Appellant's Brief at 33 (citing to Ind. Code § 34-51-3-2,¹⁰ the Indiana Punitive Damages Act (IPDA)). HW asks us to set aside the award and remand for a new trial on punitive damages. When an instruction is challenged as an incorrect statement of the law, appellate review is de novo. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wright, 774 N.E.2d 891, 893-94 (Ind. 2002).

[43] The FCRA provides that one who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under the act is liable for actual or statutory damages, attorney's fees, and “such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. The FCRA does not prescribe the standard of proof necessary to establish punitive damages.

[44] HW maintains that the appliable burden of proof is a procedural, not substantive, matter and that Indiana's clear and convincing standard applies. In support, HW relies on Chi. S. Shore & S. Bend R.R. v. Brown, 320 N.E.2d 809, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), where a claim arising under Illinois law was brought in Indiana, and this court determined that Illinois substantive law was to be applied but that “remedial and procedural matters,” including “questions with regard to the burden of proof at trial,” would be controlled by Indiana law. HW argues that the jury thus should have been instructed with Indiana's clear and convincing standard found in the IPDA. However, as Tenant observes, the burden of proof issue before us is not an interstate choice-of-law matter but is a Supremacy Clause ¹¹ question, as Tenant's claims are federal statutory claims brought in state court. Thus, the Chi. S. Shore case is inapposite to the matter before us.

[45] Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, state courts must apply substantive federal law to federal claims. See Eggers v. CSX Transp., Inc., 198 N.E.3d 688, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (recognizing in a federal FELA action adjudicated in state court that “federal substantive law governs the merits”); Slay v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 603 N.E.2d 877, 884 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding in a § 1983 claim litigated in Indiana state court that “federal substantive law controls, and any state laws or rules which inhibit the prosecution of a § 1983 action are preempted by the Supremacy Clause”), trans. denied. Federal courts treat the burden of proof as a substantive aspect of a claim. Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20-21 (2000) (“Given its importance to the outcome of cases, we have long held the burden of proof to be a ‘substantive’ aspect of a claim.”). Preponderance of the evidence is the default standard for federal civil litigation. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983); Ramirez v. T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 778 (7th Cir. 2016) (recognizing in Title VII action that preponderance is the default standard in civil cases unless the governing statute specifies a higher burden or the Constitution demands a higher burden because of the nature of the individual interests at stake), cert. denied. The United States Supreme Court has confirmed that the Due Process Clause does not require a burden higher than preponderance for punitive damages. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n.11 (1991).

[46] Neither the Seventh Circuit nor any Indiana federal district court has squarely addressed the burden of proof standard for recovery of punitive damages under the FCRA. However, several circuits have affirmed a jury's willfulness finding and punitive damages awards under the FCRA without indicating that any heightened burden of proof was required. See Williams v. First Advantage LNS Screening Solutions Inc., 947 F.3d 735 (11th Cir. 2020); Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2010); Saunders v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. of VA, 526 F.3d 142 (4th Cir. 2008).

[47] In Jones v. Credit Bureau of Huntington, Inc., 399 S.E.2d 694 (W.Va. 1990), an FCRA action was brought in state court, and the jury was instructed that the plaintiffs needed to prove their claims for willful violation of the FCRA and punitive damages by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 703 n.8. Although the jury instruction was not at issue on appeal, the West Virginia supreme court, in rejecting the reporting agency's state-law challenges to the damages awards, pointed out that “substantive rights created by [the FCRA] are controlled by federal law and not subject to fifty different rules of interpretation.” Id. at 698. Notably, HW has provided us with no federal or state authority requiring a FCRA plaintiff to establish punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence.

[48] Moreover, federal courts have consistently applied preponderance of the evidence to punitive damages claims arising under other federal statutes. See e.g., Karnes v. SCI Col. Funeral Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d 1077, 1981 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding in Title VII action that “preponderance of the evidence” standard of federal civil rights law, rather than “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of Colorado punitive damages statute, applied to punitive damages); Florez v. Delbovo, 939 F.Supp. 1341, 1344-45 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (rejecting claim in federal civil rights case that jury should have been instructed with clear and convincing standard for punitive damages and holding that punitive damages may be imposed under preponderance standard); Bird v. Figel, 725 F.Supp. 406, 412 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (affirming preponderance of the evidence standard for damages in civil rights case and rejecting argument that Indiana's clear and convincing standard should have applied, recognizing the scope of punitive damages in federal statutory actions is governed by the federal common law of damages).

[49] HW acknowledges that “federal courts typically employ the greater weight of the evidence standard for punitive damages under the FCRA” but asserts that, because neither the United States Supreme Court nor Congress has prescribed the standard of proof, “there is no federal authority binding on the Trial Court or this Court.” Appellant's Brief at 34. Seizing on the absence of controlling federal authority, HW contends the trial court “was obligated to apply” I.C. § 34-51-3-2’s clear and convincing standard. Id. We remain unpersuaded.

[50] Indiana's courts have repeatedly interpreted I.C. § 34-51-3-2’s clear and convincing standard as applying only to common law, not statutory, punitive damages claims. In Andrews v. Mor/Ryde Int'l, Inc., 10 N.E.3d 502, 503 (Ind. 2014), the Court found the IPDA inapplicable to a state statutory claim, explaining: “Indiana significantly restricts recovery of common-law punitive damages including a heightened burden of proof, a cap on their amount, and diverting 75% of such awards to the State” but that “those restrictions do not reach statutory treble-damage awards under the [CRVA] ․ [or] ‘exemplary damage’ awards under the Indiana Sales Representative Act.” (Emphasis added). In Staggs v. Buxbaum, 60 N.E.3d 238, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied, this court rejected the argument that treble damages under the CRVA required a clear and convincing evidentiary standard pursuant to the IPDA and that the trial court's award under a preponderance standard was erroneous. In doing so, the Staggs court reaffirmed that the applicable standard “depends not upon whether damages are mandatory or discretionary, but instead upon whether they are based in common law or are a creature of statute.” We agree with Tenant that there is no legal basis under Indiana law for applying the heightened burden of proof to Tenant's federal statutory claim.

[51] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's greater weight of the evidence instruction.

5. Costs Award

[52] HW asserts that the trial court erred in its award of costs to Tenant. While courts generally review an award of attorney's fees and costs for an abuse of discretion,

the [c]ourt reviews any findings of fact for clear error and any legal conclusions de novo. Where a trial court's decision involves an issue of statutory interpretation, the standard of review is de novo.

Nardi v. King, 253 N.E.3d 1098, 1103 (Ind. 2025).

[53] As the prevailing party, Tenant was entitled to recover “the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney's fees.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(a)(3) and 1681o(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). On August 30, 2024, the trial court conducted a bench trial on Tenant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses that requested an award of $474,413.84. On October 21, 2024, the trial court issued an order reducing some hourly rates and awarding $306,984 in fees for three attorneys and an additional $47,393 in expenses and costs.¹² HW appeals only the costs portion of the award, arguing that the trial court misapplied the law and awarded Tenant costs that were in excess of those to which she was statutorily entitled. We agree.

[54] The right to recover costs is determined by federal statutes: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920. Section 1821 provides for a witness fee of “$40 per day for each day's attendance” and for travel to and from the place of attendance. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b). It also provides for the recovery of travel expenses with proof of a receipt (or mileage if a personal vehicle is used), as well as allowances for housing and subsistence, which vary based on location. Id. at (c)-(d).

[55] Section 1920 allows for “the taxation of costs” (that is, litigation expenses statutorily shifted to the losing party) of the following: (1) fees for the clerk and marshal; (2) fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) docket fees under section 1923 of this title; and (6) compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (emphasis added). Non-taxable costs are everything else a litigant spends to prosecute a case that falls outside of that enumerated list.

[56] The U.S. Supreme Court has explained:

In the general “costs” statute, codified at §§ 1821 and 1920 of Title 28, Congress has specified six categories of litigation expenses that a federal court may award as “costs,” and Congress has detailed how to calculate the amount of certain costs. Sections 1821 and 1920 in essence define what the term “costs” encompasses in the subject-specific federal statutes that provide for an award of costs.

Sections 1821 and 1920 create a default rule and establish a clear baseline against which Congress may legislate. Consistent with the default rule, some federal statutes simply refer to “costs.” In those cases, federal courts are limited to awarding the costs specified in §§ 1821 and 1920. If, for particular kinds of cases, Congress wants to authorize awards of expenses beyond the six categories specified in the general costs statute, Congress may do so. For example, some federal statutes go beyond §§ 1821 and 1920 to expressly provide for the award of expert witness fees or attorney's fees.

Rimini St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2019) (emphasis added). Because the FCRA and FDCPA do not expressly provide for awards beyond the six categories specified in the costs statute, the trial court was limited to awarding costs as outlined in §§ 1821 and 1920.

[57] HW challenges the trial court's costs award in three respects: (1) expert fees; (2) deposition-related expenses; and (3) attorney out-of-pocket expenses. We address each in turn, finding that the trial court erred in part.

5.1 Expert Fees

[58] The trial court ordered that HW pay the full costs of Tenant's two expert witnesses (who were not court-ordered), including expert witness fees, totaling around $27,531. However, such expert fees are not recoverable absent explicit statutory authority, not present here. See Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank FSB, 706 F.Supp.2d 916, 925 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (under the Truth in Lending Act's fee-shifting provision – which uses the “costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee” language found in the FCRA and FDCPA – expert witness fees not recoverable as fees or as § 1920 costs); Bankston v. State of Ill., 60 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fair Labor Standing Act's fee-shifting provision did not support recovery of expert witness fees, which were limited to § 1920’s $40 per day). Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to calculate the costs recoverable under §§ 1821 and 1920 associated with Tenant's two expert witnesses, including witness/attendance fees, lodging, and food on dates of court appearance and travel. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b), (c)(2), (d)(1)-(2).

5.2 Deposition Expenses

[59] The trial court awarded $13,765.36 in deposition-related expenses, related to the depositions of: HW dispute operators Fabiola Mansilla and Wendy Santos; HW compliance officer Richard Stoltenborg; HW quality control manager Ana Ventura; and Tenant's expert Evan Hendricks. The costs included transcript and video conversion/sync expenses, transcription expenses, video court reporting expenses, editing service expenses, and certified mailing cost. HW argues that because § 1920 provides for recovery of “fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case,” that statute “makes clear” that Tenant is entitled to either the cost for transcribing the deposition or videotaping it but not both. Appellant's Brief at 41. We disagree that the statute precludes both.

[60] In Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N. Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit held that a district court was authorized under § 1920 to award a prevailing party the costs of both video-recording and stenographically transcribing the same deposition. The Little court reiterated, however, that § 1920 authorizes such costs only if “necessarily for use in the case” and, even if the cost is authorized by statute, it “must be both reasonable and necessary for a prevailing party to recover it.” Id.

[61] We observe, as persuasive authority, that district courts in our circuit have allowed both video recording and stenographic transcription of the same deposition, as well as video encoding/synchronization fees, where reasonable and necessary. See Magnuson v. Trulite Glass & Aluminum Sols., LLC, No. 19 C 6158, 2024 WL 5485913 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 12, 2024); Olivarius v. Tharaldson Prop. Mgmt. Inc., No. 08 C 463, 2012 WL 1117468 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2012); Treat v. Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-0173-WCLRBC, 2010 WL 3672230 at *2 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 13, 2010). We find that, here, remand is warranted for a determination of reasonableness and necessity of both the transcription/videotaping and the editing/syncing of the depositions at issue.¹³

5.3 Attorney Expenses

[62] The trial court's award of attorney's fees to attorney Ian Lyngklip included $2,416.90 for a Certificate of Good Standing and hotel fees for a trial that was continued and the trial that went forward. While HW asserts there was no basis for this award, we disagree and find that these costs fall within the scope of recoverable attorney's fees and affirm that portion of the cost award. See Henry v. Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 192 (7th Cir. 1984) (out-of-pocket expenses “normally bill[ed]” to clients separately from the hourly rate, such as travel, lodging, postage, long-distance calls, photocopying, held recoverable as a component of the attorney's fee); Dickinson v. Indiana State Election Bd., 817 F.Supp. 737, 752 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (awarding hotel, mileage, and facsimile costs).

6. Denial of Motion to Correct Error - Punitive Damages Award

[63] HW asserts that the trial court erred when it denied its motion to correct error that sought, as relevant here, to reduce the $1,750,000 punitive damages award, which HW claims is unconstitutionally excessive. The parties agree that our review of a constitutional challenge to punitive damages is de novo. Stroud v. Lints, 790 N.E.2d 440, 442 (Ind. 2003); Gracia v. SigmaTron, Int'l, Inc., 842 F.3d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 2016).

[64] In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003), the United States Supreme Court directed that, in reviewing such claims, “all courts, state and federal,” are required to consider: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” Reprehensibility is the “most important indicum of [a] punitive damages award's reasonableness.” Id.; see also BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).

[65] Reprehensibility is assessed through consideration of five subfactors:

[1] the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; [2] the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; [3] the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; [4] the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and [5] the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.

State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419. HW maintains that Tenant did not establish any of the five subfactors. We agree with HW that the harm caused was not physical nor did HW's conduct evince a disregard of the health or safety of others – the first two considerations. See Saccameno v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 943 F.3d 1071, 1086-87 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied; Bach v. First Union Nat. Bank, 486 F.3d 150, 155 (6th Cir. 2007). However, we disagree with HW's assessment as to the remaining subfactors.

[66] At the time of the events, Tenant was a graduate student living in a shared apartment, working as lab assistant and making “barely enough to cover living expenses,” and, upon graduation, she worked an unpaid externship. Transcript Vol. 5 at 194. In seeking assistance with challenging Granite's charges that she believed she did not owe, Tenant initially sought the assistance of free student legal aid services. Upon graduation, Tenant's externship was out of state and, due to the stain on her credit report, Tenant believed she would not be able to obtain an apartment in a safe area, or perhaps at all, and relied on her boyfriend to apply. She also was in need of a replacement vehicle but was afraid of likely credit denial. While her financial circumstances may not rise to the equivalent of the plaintiffs in Bach, a retired plaintiff on a fixed income, or Saccameno, where the individual had just come out of bankruptcy, we find that Tenant's situation nonetheless exhibited a degree of financial vulnerability worthy of consideration.

[67] As to the fourth subfactor, repeated conduct, a court may consider whether the defendant engaged in repetition of the misconduct as to the plaintiff (repetition) as well as whether the defendant has visited the same conduct on other occasions (recidivism). Stewardson v. Titus, 126 F.4th 1264, 1273 (7th Cir. 2025). We find both present in this case. Despite being notified by phone calls and letters that the account was disputed, HW continued to report Tenant's account twice per month for about a year. Tenant presented evidence that HW received and processed roughly 8,000 disputes per month in a system that Tenant argued lacked substantive means of investigation and was essentially a rubber stamping of the creditor's report of the debt.

[68] As to the fifth consideration, HW's conduct may not have risen to the level of trickery or deceit but it clearly was not the result of accident. And courts have recognized that reckless indifference, not just intentional malice, satisfies this subfactor. See E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 839 (7th Cir. 2013). Tenant presented evidence that HW's practices and policies for dispute investigation included pre-populated forms and processes that emphasized speed, with dispute operators having arguably unattainable quotas that gave them approximately two to three minutes to handle a dispute. They lacked resources, such as phones or access to internet, to conduct a legitimate investigation, with their task primarily being limited to comparing the debt with paperwork the creditor had initially reported. HW's corporate representative and manager of operational strategies acknowledged that HW refused to provide information about its dispute process or identify the employees who handed Tenant's dispute until compelled by court order. While HW ultimately provided its net worth of $5,525,462, it refused to disclose its revenue or profit figures. Reprehensibility determinations are fact intensive, and, on balance of the subfactors, we are satisfied that the reprehensible nature of HW's conduct was established.

[69] We next turn to the other two State Farm considerations: the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.¹⁴ Here, the actual damages were $200,000, making the ratio of punitive to actual damages 8.75:1. HW argues that this ratio is far outside of constitutional bounds and should be reduced.

[70] In State Farm the Supreme Court reviewed a $145 million punitive damages award against a $1 million compensatory damages award – a 145:1 ratio – and found it unconstitutional. The Court declined to impose a bright-line rule delineating the constitutional limit of damages but found that “single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than award with ratios in range of 500 to 1,” noting its previous approval of a 4:1 ratio. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425; see also Curry v. Revolution Labs., LLC, 124 F.4th 441, 457 (7th Cir. 2024) (“few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio ‘to a significant degree’ will satisfy due process”). The present 8.75:1 ratio falls within State Farm’s presumptive single-digit range, albeit at the upper end.

[71] Not long after State Farm, the Seventh Circuit decided Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003), where the court upheld a 37:1 ratio – $186,000 punitive and $5,000 compensatory – in a case involving a hotel's deliberate concealment of a bed bug infestation, reasoning that the compensatory damages were small and difficult to quantify, the defendant may have profited from the misconduct, and the conduct was highly reprehensible. Mathias stated that State Farm “did not lay down a 4-to-1 or single-digit-ratio rule,” but rather said there is a presumption against a 145:1 ratio. Id. at 676.

[72] In Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sports Inc., 698 N.E.2d 834, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied, this court rejected any mathematical formula and upheld a 14:1 ratio, $1,000,000 punitive and $78,000 compensatory, as not unconstitutionally excessive, noting that “the harm that might be inflicted on other victims if similar future behavior were not deterred” is a consideration. See also Rainey v. Taylor, 941 F.3d 243, 255 (7th Cir. 2019) (upholding as constitutional a 6:1 ratio, $6 million in punitives and $1.13 million in compensatory, where the defendant's conduct was considered “truly egregious”); but see Saccameno, 943 F.3d at 1090 (FCRA case reducing $3 million punitive award to 1:1 as $582,000 “was a considerable compensatory award” consisting mostly of emotional damages); Bach, 486 F.3d at 157 (reducing a $2.2 million punitive award to $400,000 in a FCRA case where court found that only financial vulnerability was present).

[73] We, like the trial court, recognize that the punitive award is “substantial.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 61. However, the jury heard the evidence and evaluated the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses. And it decided that Tenant did not owe the $110 charges, HW did not conduct a reasonable investigation, and HW's actions were willful. The jury clearly was persuaded that HW's manner of doing business was systematically geared toward profit-maximizing over fairness, accuracy, and completeness, and we are reluctant to override the jury's assessment of what amount would result in adequate punishment or deterrence. Concluding that the jury's determination of punitive damages falls within constitutional boundaries, we affirm the trial court's denial of HW's request to reduce the punitive damages award.

[74] Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for calculation of recoverable costs associated with the expert witnesses and a reasonableness and necessity determination as to deposition expenses.

[75] I concur with the majority's conclusion to reduce costs. I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the trial court's denial of HW's motion for judgment on the evidence and its conclusion that the determination of punitive damages in the amount of $1,750,000 fell within constitutional boundaries.

[76] With respect to HW's motion for judgment on the evidence, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that mere speculation is insufficient to overcome a motion for judgment on the evidence. Cave Quarries, Inc. v. Warex LLC, 240 N.E.3d 681, 685 (Ind. 2024). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that “[n]onpecuniary harms, including reputational damage and emotional distress, may also follow an FCRA violation, though these harms must be described in ‘reasonable detail’—conclusory statements are insufficient.” Persinger v. Sw. Credit Sys., L.P., 20 F.4th 1184, 1194 (7th Cir. 2021). With respect to the FDCPA, “[i]t's not enough for the plaintiff to just spout off some buzzwords in order to get her case to a jury. She can't just say in a conclusory way that ‘I'm a wreck’ or ‘my grief is overwhelming’ and then expect to get her case to a jury.” Rosen v. MLO Acquisitions LLC, 505 F. Supp. 3d 823, 827 (N.D. Ind. 2020). Although not dispositive, I note that, while Hustedt-Mai testified that she has had “an anxiety diagnosis since [she] was a child,” and that she took more of her medication due to “the stress and anxiety about that situation” with HW, Transcript Volume V at 198-199, she introduced no testimony from a mental health professional. Further, Evan Hendricks, Hustedt-Mai's expert witness, testified that he did not see any evidence of a lower credit score for Hustedt-Mai or any evidence of a credit denial. Under these circumstances, I would conclude that the trial court erred in denying HW's motion for judgment on the evidence and would vacate the award of $200,000. See Davenport v. Sallie Mae, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 574, 581-583 (D. Md. 2015) (discussing the FCRA; noting that the Fourth Circuit has held that the statutory requirement of “actual damages” acts as a “gatekeeping function [to avoid] tremendous overcompensation of plaintiffs whose damages evidence fails to establish any meaningful injury at all” (quoting Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 181 n.6 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 539 U.S. 957, 123 S. Ct. 2640 (2003), aff'd, 540 U.S. 614, 124 S. Ct. 1204 (2004)); holding that the plaintiff's claims were too speculative to survive a motion for summary judgment where he claimed he lost employment opportunities but did not provide a single example where the reported delinquency had any bearing on a hiring decision and, “[t]he same holds true with respect to [the plaintiff's] claim that he was chilled from even applying for a home loan refinance” where “[t]here can be no compensable injury when he never even applied for such refinancing”; and holding that, with respect to the plaintiff's claims regarding emotional distress, “a showing of ‘very minor emotional distress,’ which, one supposes, would have to include any amount of momentary annoyance, angst, or irritation that might support a nominal damages award, cannot possibly suffice to establish ‘actual damages’ ” (quoting Doe, 306 F.3d at 181 n.6), and plaintiff's claims for emotional distress did not rise above conclusory assertions that he suffered embarrassment and stress related to his credit issues), aff'd, 623 F. App'x 94 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Johnson v. Waypoint Res. Grp., 596 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1196-1197 (S.D. Ind. 2022) (addressing actual damages under the FDCPA, observing that plaintiff had no evidence of being denied credit, having credit terms change, or other financial harms, and holding that plaintiff's claims for emotional distress fit squarely into the category of conclusory and unreasonably detailed allegations which could not alone support an award of actual damages for emotional distress).

[77] To the extent HW asserts that the trial court erred when it denied its motion to correct error seeking to reduce the $1,750,000 punitive damages award, as acknowledged by the majority, the first two subfactors for reprehensibility weigh in favor of reversal as the harm caused was not physical and HW's conduct did not evince a disregard of the health or safety of others. As for financial vulnerability, the majority acknowledged that Hustedt-Mai's circumstances may not rise to the equivalent of the plaintiff in Bach v. First Union Nat. Bank, 486 F.3d 150 (6th Cir. 2007), a retired plaintiff on a fixed income, or the plaintiff in Saccameno v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 943 F.3d 1071 (7th Cir. 2019), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, cert. denied, 590 U.S. 906, 140 S. Ct. 2674 (2020), where the individual had just come out of bankruptcy. The majority also acknowledged that HW's conduct may not have risen to the level of trickery or deceit. With respect to the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by Hustedt-Mai and the punitive damages award of $1,750,000, which both the trial court and the majority recognize as substantial, given that I would vacate the verdict of $200,000, I easily conclude that the disparity is excessive and would reduce the punitive damages award to $8,750.¹⁵

[78] For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the $200,000 verdict, reduce the $1,750,000 punitive damages award to $8,750, affirm the $1,000 in statutory damages under the FDCPA to which the parties stipulated, and affirm the award of attorney fees.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Under HW's contract with Granite, HW would be paid forty percent of any charges successfully collected.

3.   HW either did not have or did not consider the As Is Addendum at that time.

4.   The FDCPA's purpose is “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors [and] to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged․” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The act regulates communications in connection with debt collection, including when and under what circumstances a debt collector can communicate with a consumer, and with whom, besides the consumer, a debt collector may communicate. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c. A debt collector “may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Violative conduct includes “[t]he false representation of [ ] the character, amount, or legal status of any debt[,]” “[t]he threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken[,]” “[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false[,]” and “[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt[.]” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A), (5), (8) and (10). A debt collector “may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Violative conduct includes “[t]he collection of any amount ․ unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” Id.

5.   The FCRA's purpose is “to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit ․ in a manner that is fair and equitable to the consumer․” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). Furnishers – entities that provide consumer credit information to CRAs – are prohibited from providing any information to a CRA if the furnisher knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a). If a furnisher determines that previously reported information is not complete or accurate, it must promptly notify the CRA of that determination, provide any necessary corrections, and refrain from thereafter furnishing the information that remains incomplete or inaccurate. Id.When a furnisher is notified by a CRA that a consumer has disputed the accuracy or completeness of information that the furnisher provided, the furnisher has a duty to conduct an investigation (sometimes referred to as a “reinvestigation”). 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). Courts have held that the investigation must be “reasonable.” See Woods v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 27 F.4th 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2022) (holding the investigation must be reasonable and “pro forma inquiries will not do”); Walton v. EOS CCA, 885 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Whether the furnisher's investigation is reasonable is a factual inquiry.”). If a furnisher cannot verify the disputed information, it must delete it. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E).A consumer who demonstrates that a furnisher was negligent in breaching Section -2(b) is entitled to actual damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. If the consumer can establish that a furnisher willfully violated one of its duties, the consumer may recover actual or statutory damages, as well as punitive damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. Costs and reasonable attorney's fees are authorized under both §§ 1681n and 1681o.

6.   Several factual allegations pertaining to “[t]he CRA Defendants” that had been in the first amended complaint were not included in the second amended complaint, with HW explaining at a hearing that CRAs had never been named as defendants and the allegations had been inadvertently included in the first amended complaint that was filed. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 124; Appellant's Appendix Vol. 8 at 224-232.

7.   The court recognized that, unlike some circuits, “the Seventh Circuit has taken a very restrictive view on the standing requirement in FCRA and FDCPA cases, dismissing many cases over the past couple years on standing grounds.” Id. at 158.

8.   Tenant's action against HW was consolidated with a case that Tenant had filed against Granite and Tailwind in August 2019. On January 19, 2023, summary judgment was granted in favor of Granite and Tailwind on Tenant's then-remaining claims, which were under Indiana's Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (DCSA) and Indiana's Crime Victim's Relief Act (CVRA). See Appellant's Appendix Vol. 3 at 148.

9.   Following trial, the parties stipulated that Tenant was entitled to $1,000 in statutory damages under FDCPA with HW retaining the right to appeal the jury's verdict. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 8 at 245.

10.   The IPDA provides: “Before a person may recover punitive damages in any civil action, that person must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, all of the facts that are relied upon by that person to support the recovery of punitive damages.”

11.   U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

12.   The relevant portion of the trial court's order, awarding the full amount of costs/expenses sought, stated:ExpensesThe overriding concern in determining whether a fee-shifting provision should be upheld is whether enforcement makes the prevailing party whole, and requiring a prevailing party to absorb fees or costs would not fully compensate a plaintiff for enforcing her rights. See generally White v. Szalasny, 191 N.E.3d 260, 264-265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The Court cannot say that Plaintiff's expenses are unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court awards reasonable expenses in the amount of $47,393.Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 58

13.   We note that factors to consider include but are not limited to whether the video was played at trial or used in a motion, whether the witness was outside the court's subpoena power or unavailable for trial, whether the opposing party was given advance notice that the deposition would be recorded by both methods and raised no objection, or whether a court order or protocol required both formats. See Little, 514 F.3d at 702; Magnuson, 2024 WL 5485913 at *5; Treat, 2010 WL 3672230 at *2-3; Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 503, 511 (E.D.N.C. 2012).

14.   Some courts have observed that the factor calling for comparison of the punitive damages award and civil penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct is “not particularly useful” to the constitutional excessiveness analysis in a FCRA case. See Drew v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. C 07-00726 SI, 2010 WL 5022466, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2010) (citing to Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuit cases that found the factor not useful and observed that Congress chose not to limit punitive damages in the FCRA and that there is no truly comparable civil penalty to a FCRA punitive damages award).

15.   Even if the $200,000 award remained, I would find the award of $1,750,000 in punitive damages excessive. See generally Saccameno, 943 F.3d at 1091 (“Considering all the factors together, we are convinced that the maximum permissible punitive damages award is $582,000. An award of this size punishes [defendant's] atrocious recordkeeping and service of [plaintiff's] loan without equating its indifference to intentional malice. It reflects a 1:1 ratio relative to the large total compensatory award ․”).

Altice, Judge.

DeBoer, J. concurs. Brown, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.