WATSON v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Michael L. Watson (“Watson”), pro se, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Watson argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Concluding that Watson has failed to meet his burden of showing that the post-conviction court erred, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the post-conviction court erred by denying Watson's petition for post-conviction relief.

Facts 1

[3] The relevant facts of Watson's underlying offense, as set forth by this Court in Watson's direct appeal, are as follows:

The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal that on June 3, 2011, Diontae Murphy and her two young children lived with Watson on the east side of Indianapolis. Diontae and Watson had recently ended their relationship but still lived together. Although Watson was interested in continuing their relationship, Diontae was interested in another guy, Willie McDowell.

On the morning of June 3, Diontae took her children to daycare and returned home, at which point she and Watson argued. Diontae then left and walked down the street, where Willie picked her up. Diontae and Willie spent a few hours together, picked up Diontae's children from daycare, and then Willie dropped them off near their house so that they could walk the rest of the way home. During this time, Watson called and texted Diontae. Watson's daughter also called Diontae to tell her that Watson had changed the locks so that they could not get in the house. Diontae tried to use her key, and it did not work as suspected. Diontae then went to Watson's mother's nearby house. In the meantime, Watson called Diontae and told her that she and the children could come back home after all. Diontae and the children returned home. Diontae bathed her children and packed some clothes so that they could spend the weekend at her mother's house. Diontae then called Willie and asked him to pick them up two streets over.

As Diontae and the children were walking to meet Willie, Willie called her and told her that Watson was approaching them on his bicycle. Diontae then saw Watson, who asked her why Willie was picking them up. Diontae told Watson that their relationship was over, Willie was taking them to her mother's house for the weekend, and to go back home. Willie called Diontae back and told Diontae and the children to meet him at the Marathon gas station at 2964 South Keystone Avenue. Watson followed Diontae and the children on the ten-minute walk to the gas station and called three people along the way, asking them to meet him at the gas station because Diontae was “bringing this nig* * * up here.” Tr. p. 19.

When Diontae and the children arrived at the gas station, they immediately ran to Willie's car, which was backed into a parking space in front of the double doors to the gas station. Diontae put her children in the backseat, and as she was about to enter the front passenger seat, Watson pushed her out of the way and entered the car instead. While the two men were inside the car, Watson's body covered Willie's body from Diontae's line of vision, but Diontae was able to see that there was a “bunch of movement.” Id. at 26. Willie, with Diontae's help, managed to push Watson out of the car. Willie then got out of the car and said, “Aw, this nig* * * stabbed me.” Id. at 27. Diontae looked at Watson and saw that he had a six-to-eight-inch-long pocket knife in his hand, which he was in the process of closing. As Willie stumbled to the entrance of the gas station, Watson ran toward him and punched him, causing him to fall. Watson hit him a couple more times and announced, “Ain't nobody going to play me.” Id. at 30. Diontae saw that Willie's white t-shirt was soaked in blood and called 911. Watson fled the scene.

Several gas station customers also witnessed the altercation. Id. at 49-58, 66-86, 92-99, 143-59. One customer, [then seventeen-year-old] Drake Milam, saw the fight and later identified Watson as the attacker. Milam saw a knife inside the car. Milam also saw Watson throw punches at the driver and then saw the driver exit the vehicle, bleeding from his chest. Milam saw the driver walk toward the gas station and Watson following the driver. Watson then punched the driver, who fell to the ground. Milam saw Watson stab the driver with a knife as the driver was on the ground by the ice machine.

The gas station's security camera recorded the incident [(“the gas station surveillance video”)], but portions of the incident cannot be seen, either because they happened inside Willie's car or were blocked by the ice machine outside the gas station. State's Ex. 7.

As it turned out, Watson stabbed Willie in the heart, and Willie died from the seven-centimeter-deep wound to his chest that punctured his heart. Willie had some other superficial cuts as well as abrasions and bruises. The pathologist, Dr. Jolene [Clouse], M.D., opined that after being stabbed in the heart, a person can still be conscious for a couple of minutes, run a short distance, and possibly engage in a fight․

Watson v. State, No. 49A02-1206-CR-443, *1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2012) (mem.), trans. denied.

[4] The State charged Watson with murder and specifically alleged that he had knowingly killed Willie by stabbing him with a knife. The State also alleged that Watson was an habitual offender.

[5] The trial court commenced a two-day jury trial in April 2012. Watson was represented at trial by appointed counsels, James Snyder (“Trial Counsel Snyder”) and Jeffrey Neel (“Trial Counsel Neel”) (collectively referred to in the singular form as “Trial Counsel”). Watson's theory of defense was that he had stabbed Willie in self-defense while inside Willie's car.

[6] Before the presentation of the evidence, Trial Counsel objected to one sentence within the trial court's preliminary jury instruction relating to the jury's right to decide the law and the facts. The trial court overruled the objection and instructed the jury as set out in its instruction.

[7] During the trial, the pathologist testified that Willie's cause of death was from a stab wound to the chest and that his manner of death was homicide. The pathologist further testified that, in addition to the stab wound that had punctured Willie's heart, he had also sustained some cuts to his arm and hand, bruising on his face, and a scrape on his knee.

[8] The State also presented multiple witnesses, including Milam ² and three other witnesses, who testified that they had seen Watson hitting Willie while the two men were in Willie's car, had seen Watson follow Willie after Willie had exited the car, and had seen Watson punch Willie while outside the car. Milam testified that Willie had been bleeding around his chest area when he had gotten out of the car and that he had “looked like he [had] got[ten] stabbed.” (Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 1 at 148).³ Additionally, Milam testified that, after Willie had gotten out of the car, Watson punched Willie in the face and “stuck” or stabbed Willie “a couple more times.” (Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 1 at 151).

[9] During Milam's cross-examination, Trial Counsel specifically questioned Milam to establish that he had seen a knife while Watson and Willie were inside the car and had seen blood on Willie's shirt when he had gotten out of the car. Trial Counsel also questioned Milam about his testimony that he had seen Watson stab Willie “a couple more times” and then had Milam confirm that his view at that time was from behind a vehicle that had been between him and the gas station door. (Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 1 at 162).

[10] The three other witnesses to the offense had differing testimony about the timing of when Willie had blood on his T-shirt. These three witnesses testified that Willie had been on the ground and unresponsive when Watson had made hitting or punching movements against Willie and that Willie had had blood “all over” the chest area of his T-shirt only after he had been on the ground and had been struck by Watson. (Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 1 at 80, 98). One witness testified that Watson had hit Willie with “[h]eavy blows” before the witness had seen the blood on Willie's T-shirt “at his heart” area. (Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 1 at 54). Additionally, the State presented the gas station surveillance video as an exhibit.⁴

[11] When the parties discussed final instructions, Trial Counsel requested that the trial court give a self-defense instruction, an involuntary manslaughter instruction, and a reckless homicide instruction. The trial court denied the requests for the self-defense and reckless homicide instructions and granted the request for the involuntary manslaughter instruction.

[12] During closing arguments, the State replayed the gas station surveillance video and discussed what the video showed had occurred when Watson and Willie were inside the car and when they were outside the car. The State pointed out that the video showed that, while inside the car, Watson had been “swiping at Willie” and that it was at that time that Willie had gotten “defensive wounds” on his hands but had not yet been stabbed in the heart. (Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 2 at 252). Additionally, the State pointed out that the video did not show any blood on Willie's T-shirt when he had gotten out of the car and did not show any trail of blood on the ground from the car to the gas station door. Moreover, the State noted that the video showed that Watson had punched Willie's face followed by Willie falling on the ground and then Watson leaning over Willie and making a stabbing motion.

[13] During Watson's closing argument, Trial Counsel continued to argue self-defense as Watson's theory of defense. Specifically, Trial Counsel argued that Watson had stabbed Willie in self-defense while inside the car. To support that argument, Trial Counsel directed the jury's attention to Milam's testimony that he had seen a knife inside the car and had seen blood on Willie's shirt when he had exited the car. Additionally, Trial Counsel argued that the State did not want the jury to focus on Milam's testimony about what he had seen happen inside the car. Trial Counsel also argued that the jury should consider a “theory of innocence.” (Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 2 at 261, 265). Under this theory, Trial Counsel suggested that Watson had not had a weapon when he had confronted Willie inside the car. Trial Counsel argued that, instead, Willie had had a knife in the car, Watson had taken the knife from Willie, Watson had defended himself against Willie, and Watson had not realized or known that he had fatally stabbed Willie while inside the car.

[14] The jury found Watson guilty of murder and found that he was an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Watson to sixty (60) years for his murder conviction enhanced by thirty (30) years for his habitual offender adjudication.

[15] Thereafter, Watson filed a direct appeal and was represented by appointed appellate counsel (“Appellate Counsel”). Appellate Counsel argued that the trial court had abused its discretion by giving its preliminary jury instruction on the jury's right to decide the law and the facts and that his sentence was inappropriate. Our Court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in instructing the jury and that Watson had failed to show that his sentence was inappropriate, and we affirmed Watson's conviction and sentence.

[16] Watson subsequently filed multiple petitions for post-conviction relief. Specifically, Watson filed an initial petition in March 2013, a second petition in October 2019, a third petition in July 2023, and a final amended petition in July 2024. Watson's first two petitions were filed as pro se petitions, and the last two petitions were filed by retained post-conviction counsel (“Post-Conviction Counsel”).

[17] In Watson's final amended petition, which is at issue in this appeal, he raised claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Specifically, Watson argued that Trial Counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to subject Milam's testimony to “[m]eaningful [a]dversarial [t]esting” by (a) failing to object to Milam's testimony that he had seen Watson stab Willie multiple times while Willie had been on the ground and (b) failing to properly impeach Milam's credibility on that testimony with Milam's juvenile record, his charges that had been pending at the time of the April 2012 trial,⁵ or with the possibility that he could have had an incentive to testify or a possible deal with the State to provide testimony; (2) failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor elicited testimony from Milam that he had seen Watson stab Willie multiple times while Willie had been on the ground; and (3) failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. (App. Vol. 3 at 60). Additionally, Watson argued that Appellate Counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise an appellate issue to challenge the trial court's denial of Watson's request for a reckless homicide instruction.

[18] The post-conviction court held a hearing in October 2024. Watson was represented by Post-Conviction Counsel. Upon Watson's request, the post-conviction court took judicial notice of Watson's trial and direct appeal proceedings. Watson also introduced exhibits relating to Milam's juvenile delinquency history and charges that had been pending at the time of the April 2012 trial. Watson did not testify on his own behalf and presented testimony only from Trial Counsel Snyder.⁶

[19] During the post-conviction hearing, Watson asked Trial Counsel Snyder why he had not objected to Milam's testimony that “there were multiple stab wounds” when the pathologist had testified that “there was only one stab[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 6). Trial Counsel Snyder testified that he did not specifically remember his reasoning at the time of trial but that he recalled that Willie had had wounds on his fingers or hands in addition to the chest wound to his heart. Watson also questioned Trial Counsel Snyder about his ineffective assistance claim that counsel had failed to impeach Milam's credibility with his juvenile history, a pending theft charge, or possible deal that Milam may have had with the State. Trial Counsel Snyder testified that he did not recall what information he had received during discovery and further testified that he would potentially be able to impeach a witness only with a conviction. Trial Counsel Snyder also testified that he had not been aware of any deals that the State could have had with Milam in exchange for his testimony.

[20] Trial Counsel Snyder testified that Watson's case was “very, very difficult” because the “entire incident was on surveillance [video] at a gas station in broad daylight right in front of the front door.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10). Moreover, Trial Counsel Snyder testified that the defense had argued “self-defense and that this stabbing to the heart had taken place inside the car[,]” but he acknowledged there had been “a dispute because it seemed also that the surveillance [video] easily could have shown [Watson] ․ at the front door of the gas station shoving the knife into [Willie's] chest.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10).

[21] Additionally, Watson asked Trial Counsel Snyder why he had not objected and asked for a mistrial when the State had elicited testimony from Milam that differed from the pathologist's testimony. Trial Counsel Snyder explained that his understanding was that differing or conflicting witness testimony was not grounds for a mistrial. Lastly, Watson questioned Trial Counsel Snyder about his ineffective assistance claim that counsel had failed to request a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Trial Counsel Snyder testified he had talked about and had explained it to Watson on “multiple occasions” but that Watson had said that “he didn't want” the instruction and that he “wanted to proceed on a self-defense theory.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 6, 7).

[22] In December 2024, the post-conviction court issued an order denying post-conviction relief to Watson. The post-conviction court concluded that Watson had failed to prove his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.

[23] Watson now appeals pro se.

Decision

[24] Watson argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying him post-conviction relief. At the outset, we note that Watson has chosen to proceed pro se in this appeal. It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Evans v. State, 809 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Thus, pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Id. “We will not become a party's advocate, nor will we address arguments that are inappropriate, improperly expressed, or too poorly developed to be understood.” Barrett v. State, 837 N.E.2d 1022, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[25] “[P]ost-conviction proceedings do not grant a petitioner a ‘super-appeal’ but are limited to those issues available under the Indiana Post-Conviction Rules.” Shepherd v. State, 924 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. “In post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.” Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 632 (Ind. 2021), reh'g denied. “Where, as here, the petitioner is appealing from a negative judgment denying post-conviction relief, he must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

[26] On appeal, Watson argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying post-conviction relief on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, he asserts that Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to: (1) object to Milam's testimony that he saw Watson stab Willie multiple times while he was on the ground; (2) properly impeach Milam's credibility with his juvenile record, his charges that had been pending at the time of trial, or with the possibility that he could have had an incentive or possible deal with the State to provide testimony; and (3) request a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense to murder.⁷

[27] A claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel requires a petitioner to show that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient by falling below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant such that “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), reh'g denied), reh'g denied, cert. denied. “A reasonable probability arises when there is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “Failure to satisfy either of the two prongs will cause the claim to fail.” French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002).

[28] A strong presumption arises that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Morgan v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (Ind. 2001). Counsel's performance is presumed effective, and a petitioner must offer strong and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption. Williams v. State, 771 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ind. 2002). “Isolated poor strategy or bad tactics do not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.” Whitener v. State, 696 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Ind. 1998). “Reasonable strategy is not subject to judicial second guesses.” Ingalls v. State, 187 N.E.3d 233, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (cleaned up), trans. denied. “This Court will not lightly speculate as to what may or may not have been an advantageous trial strategy as counsel should be given deference in choosing a trial strategy which, at the time and under the circumstances, seems best.” Whitener, 696 N.E.2d at 42.

[29] We first address Watson's argument that Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to Milam's testimony. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object, a petitioner must prove that an objection would have been sustained if made. Benefield v. State, 945 N.E.2d 791, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Additionally, the petitioner must show that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to make an objection. Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1138, 1150 (Ind. 2010), reh'g denied.

[30] During the post-conviction hearing, Watson asked Trial Counsel Snyder why he had not objected to Milam's testimony that “there were multiple stab wounds” when the pathologist had testified that “there was only one stab[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 6). Trial Counsel Snyder testified that he did not specifically remember his reasoning at the time of trial but that he recalled that Willie had had wounds on his fingers or hands in addition to the chest wound to his heart. On appeal, Watson neither sets forth a specific objection that Trial Counsel should have made nor does he show that any objection to Milam's testimony would have been sustained. Because Watson failed to meet his burden on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief on this claim. See Benefield, 945 N.E.2d at 799.

[31] Next, we address Watson's post-conviction claim that Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to properly impeach Milam's credibility about his testimony regarding the multiple stabs when outside of the car. Specifically, Watson contends that Trial Counsel should have impeached Milam's credibility with his juvenile history, a pending theft charge, or possible deal that Milam may have had with the State.

[32] On the other hand, the State points out that Watson “only provided the PCR court with a listing of pending charges and juvenile adjudications” and that he asks our Court to speculate about the existence of a deal to testify where he “presented no evidence showing th[at] Milam was actually offered a deal or incentive to testify” at trial. (State's Br. 21, 22). The State further argues that Trial Counsel was not ineffective because Watson's suggested impeachment method “would have been detrimental to the defense's strategy because Milam's testimony was critical to [Watson's] theory of self-defense.” (State's Br. 21). We agree with the State.

[33] “It is well settled that the nature and extent of cross-examination is a matter of strategy delegated to trial counsel[,]” and on appeal, “we will not engage” in the “second-guessing of trial strategy[.]” Myers v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1077, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (cleaned up), reh'g denied. Additionally, our Indiana Supreme Court has held that “the method of impeaching witnesses is a tactical decision and a matter of trial strategy that does not amount to ineffective assistance.” Kubsch, 934 N.E.2d at 1151 (citing Bivins v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1116, 1134 (Ind. 2000)). In Kubsch, a petitioner argued that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to impeach a witness with evidence of a “theft conviction and a false report of a rape that never matured to a conviction[.]” Kubsch, 934 N.E.2d at 1151. Our supreme court rejected that argument, noting that trial counsel had otherwise impeached the witness’ credibility and emphasizing that trial counsel's method of impeaching the witness was a tactical decision and a matter of trial strategy. Id. Moreover, to prove that failure to impeach a witness was ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient cross-examination, he would not have been found guilty. Johnson v. State, 675 N.E.2d 678, 686 (Ind. 1996).

[34] The record on appeal reveals that Trial Counsel cross-examined Milam about his testimony that he had seen Watson stab Willie “a couple more times” and then had Milam confirm that his view at that time was from behind a vehicle that was between him and the gas station door. (Direct Appeal Tr. Vol. 1 at 162). Trial Counsel also specifically cross-examined Milam to help establish Watson's self-defense theory of defense. Specifically, Trial Counsel had Milam confirm that he had seen a knife while Watson and Willie were inside the car and had seen blood on Willie's shirt when he got out of the car. During Watson's closing argument, Trial Counsel argued that Watson had stabbed Willie in self-defense while inside the car and directed the jury's attention to Milam's testimony that he had seen a knife inside the car and had seen blood on Willie's shirt when he exited the car.

[35] Watson has failed to meet his burden of showing that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to properly impeach Milam's credibility about his testimony regarding the multiple stabs when outside of the car. The record shows that Trial Counsel otherwise challenged Milam's credibility on that testimony, and we conclude that Trial Counsel's “method of impeaching [Milam] was a tactical decision and a matter of trial strategy” that we will not second-guess. See Kubsch, 934 N.E.2d at 1151. See also Myers, 33 N.E.3d at 1101. Moreover, Watson has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged deficient cross-examination, he would not have been found guilty of murder. See Johnson, 675 N.E.2d at 686. Accordingly, the post-conviction court did not err by denying post-conviction relief on this claim. See Kubsch, 934 N.E.2d at 1151.

[36] Lastly, we turn to Watson's argument that Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a lesser-included jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Our Indiana Supreme Court has held that “a tactical decision not to tender a lesser included offense does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, even where the lesser included offense is inherently included in the greater offense.” Autrey v. State, 700 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ind. 1998). Our supreme court also explained that, on appeal, our Courts will not second-guess counsel's strategy “through the distortions of hindsight.” Id.

[37] During the post-conviction hearing, Trial Counsel Snyder explained that, in collaboration with Watson, he had made a strategic decision not to request a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, Trial Counsel Snyder testified he and Watson had talked about the possibility of a request for such an instruction and that they had made a decision to “proceed on a self-defense theory.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 7). We will not second-guess Trial Counsel's strategy on this decision. See Autrey, 700 N.E.2d at 1141.

[38] Because Trial Counsel made a reasonable strategic decision, Watson has failed to show that counsel's performance was deficient. See Autrey, 700 N.E.2d at 1141 (holding that a tactical decision not to tender a lesser included offense does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Sarwacinski v. State, 564 N.E.2d 950, 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (declining to second-guess trial counsel's strategy and explaining that “[i]f counsel had submitted an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, he would have weakened the self-defense case and diminished appellant's chances of acquittal”).

[39] Because Watson has failed to demonstrate “unmistakably and unerringly” that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of Watson's petition for post-conviction relief. See Isom, 170 N.E.3d at 632 (explaining that a post-conviction petitioner appealing from a negative judgment denying post-conviction relief must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision).

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   At the time of the trial, Milam was eighteen years old.

3.   We note that the page numbers listed at the bottom of the Direct Appeal Transcript pages do not align with the pagination on the PDF. We will cite to the page number as shown on the bottom of the Direct Appeal Transcript page.

4.   In its appellate brief, the State indicated that the gas station surveillance video exhibit is not contained in the record in this appeal because the trial court had “only retained [it] until April 26, 2022[.]” (State's Br. 8 n.1).

5.   In Watson's post-conviction petition, he asserted that Milam had been charged in two causes prior to the April 2012 trial, one in October 2011 and the other in December 2011. Additionally, he asserted that the State had dismissed the October 2011 charges in May 2012 and that Milam had pled guilty to a charge from the December 2011 charges in June 2012.

6.   At the time of the post-conviction hearing, Trial Counsel Snyder was a magistrate judge in Marion County.

7.   In Watson's appellate brief, he also includes arguments about freestanding claims and ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims that he did not include in his final amended post-conviction petition. In his freestanding claims, Watson asserts that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting testimony from Milam and by failing to disclose an alleged deal with Milam. Watson also alleges that the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction about paid informants. “On post-conviction review, aside from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner may only raise issues that were unknown and unavailable at the time of the original trial or direct appeal.” Pannell v. State, 36 N.E.3d 477, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. “Thus, if an issue was known and available but not raised on direct appeal, the issue is procedurally foreclosed.” Stephenson v. State, 864 N.E.2d 1022, 1028 (Ind. 2007), reh'g denied, cert. denied. Here, Watson's freestanding prosecutorial misconduct and jury instruction claims are based on his trial proceedings; accordingly, they were known and available at the time of the original trial and direct appeal, making the issues procedurally foreclosed and unavailable as a freestanding claim of error in this post-conviction proceeding. See Pannell, 36 N.E.3d at 494; Perryman v. State, 13 N.E.3d 923, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a petitioner for post-conviction relief waives issues known at the time of the original trial or available on direct appeal), trans. denied.Turning to Watson's arguments not included in his final amended post-conviction petition, we note that he attempts to raise new claims relating to ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, he asserts that Trial Counsel was ineffective by failing to secure Milam's deposition before trial and by failing to ensure that a proper self-defense instruction was presented. Because Watson failed to raise these claims in his final amended post-conviction petition, he has waived appellate review of such claims. See Isom, 170 N.E.3d at 640 (holding that a petitioner is prohibited from raising an issue in his post-conviction appeal where he failed to raise the issue below); Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind. 2002) (explaining that issues not raised in a post-conviction petition may not be raised for the first time in a post-conviction appeal), reh'g denied, cert. denied; Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(8) (“All grounds for relief available to a petitioner under this rule must be raised in his original petition.”).Lastly, we note that Watson included a general assertion that Appellate Counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise an appellate challenge to the trial court's denial of his request for a reckless homicide instruction. Watson, however, makes no cogent argument or provides any relevant caselaw regarding such assertion. Therefore, we conclude that he has waived any such argument. See Ind. App. Rule 46(A)(8)(a). See also Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 n.5 (Ind. 2016) (noting that the defendant had waived his arguments by failing to provide cogent argument). Accordingly, we will address only the three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel set forth above.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.