D.T., Appellant-Respondent v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] D.T. (Mother) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her minor son, J.T. (Child).¹ She contends that the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) failed to present sufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In August 2024, DCS received two different reports alleging that Child was the victim of abuse or neglect. The first came on August 12, when Child was eight months old, and concerned alleged drug use in Mother's home and people in and out of the home. Keondra Williams, a family case manager (FCM) with DCS, investigated the report and spoke with Mother that day. Mother denied drug use, and submitted to a drug screen, which came back positive for methamphetamine a week later. Mother informed FCM Williams that she was facing eviction and that Child had not been to the doctor since he was two months old and was not current on his shots.

[4] Then on August 24, Mother left Child in the care of McKenna Rink, her friend and roommate, while Mother recovered from a swollen and bruised face. Rink took Child to a movie theater, where the police were called because she was being disorderly and exposing herself with Child in tow. Rink seemed confused and under the influence and was unable to tell the responding officers where she lived, so Child was removed from Rink's care and taken to the Mishawaka Police Department. Mother and DCS were notified, and later that day, Mother submitted to an instant drug screen, which was required by DCS given her other recent positive screen. She tested positive for methamphetamine and THC on the instant screen. Accordingly, Child was taken into DCS custody and placed in foster care. He has remained in the same foster home since that day.

[5] On August 26, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (CHINS). Mother did not appear for the detention hearing on August 27, 2024, or the initial hearing on September 12, 2024, because she had an active warrant for her arrest. Despite not attending the hearings, Mother attended a meeting with DCS on September 25 and then began supervised visits with Child in October.

[6] Mother appeared at a CHINS hearing for the first time on November 18, 2024, nearly three months after Child had been removed from her care. At the time, Mother had been evicted from her apartment, had another positive drug screen for methamphetamine on September 25, and planned to turn herself in on the warrant after the hearing. The CHINS court appointed counsel for Mother and set another hearing for December 19, 2024.

[7] After the November hearing, Mother turned herself in and spent forty-five days in the Elkhart County Jail. She appeared virtually from jail for the December 2024 CHINS hearing, and the matter was continued to allow consultation with counsel. She was released from jail by the end of December.

[8] In January 2025, Mother resumed supervised visits with Child and attended a child family team meeting (CFTM). She also submitted to a drug screen at the CFTM, which returned positive for methamphetamine.

[9] At the next hearing on February 6, 2025, Mother acknowledged her positive drug screens and her recent incarceration and admitted that Child was a CHINS. By agreement of the parties, the court moved directly to the dispositional hearing. The court then ordered Mother to, among other things, maintain a safe and stable home, secure and maintain stable income, refrain from the use of illegal substances and alcohol, submit to random drug screens, complete a substance abuse assessment and all treatment recommendations, participate in homebased case management, and attend Child's medical appointments and all scheduled visits.

[10] Mother completed an assessment through Oaklawn Psychiatric Center (Oaklawn) around January 2025, and was diagnosed with severe stimulant use disorder, amphetamine type, and moderate other substance use disorder. The assessor recommended that Mother complete an intensive outpatient program (IOP), which was an eight-week group program that meets three times per week for three-hour sessions. Following IOP completion, Mother was expected to complete twenty-six weeks of an aftercare program for relapse prevention and maintenance. The assessor also recommended that Mother complete a domestic violence program.

[11] Mother started the IOP around the beginning of March 2025. She had two positive screens the next month – one for cocaine and one for alcohol. After completing the IOP, Mother began the aftercare program in June 2025. Thereafter, Mother experienced “some months of attendance struggles” in aftercare, along with missed screens, which Oaklawn viewed as positive screens.² Transcript Vol. 2 at 38.

[12] Meanwhile, beginning in June 2025, Mother's participation in other DCS services and supervised visits began to decline. Thereafter, she did not participate in any supervised visits between July 8 and September 11, 2025. And she went “off the radar” for several weeks with her FCM at the time, Rollan Avedician, and other service providers were unable to reach her. Id. at 67. FCM Avedician was finally able to speak with Mother in August, and she assured him that she was not having a mental health crisis but noted that she had recently lost her job ³ and was struggling financially and with housing. By that point, many service referrals had been canceled for noncompliance.

[13] During this period of noncompliance, Mother became pregnant by Eric Blyly, with whom she was in a relationship marred by domestic violence. Thereafter, Blyly was incarcerated in September 2025. Mother also had a history of domestic violence with a prior partner, the father of Child's older sibling.⁴

[14] On September 3, 2025, DCS filed the instant petition for involuntary termination of parental rights. Shortly thereafter, Mother reengaged in supervised visits, which were reduced from twice per week to once per week given the lapse in visits. At the CFTM on October 17, 2025, FCM Sarah Laskowski asked Mother if she would be able to add back the second day of visits or if Mother could start attending Child's speech therapy sessions, but Mother declined, indicating that she was only available on Thursdays because she was focused on finding employment. To accommodate Mother, supervised visits remained once a week but were increased at the beginning of November to four hours. Thereafter, Mother exercised only two full-length visits, with others canceled or shortened by Mother.

[15] Child was born with a significant hearing deficit and currently “relies pretty heavily on sign language.” Id. at 133. Though Mother was informed of his failed hearing test at birth, she did not appropriately follow-up with hearing specialists as recommended. While in foster care, Child received appropriate treatment, which included medical treatment and weekly speech therapy sessions. Mother attended these sessions early in the CHINS case but never again after June 2025. She also missed all of Child's medical appointments later in the case.

[16] DCS made a new service referral for homebased case management in October 2025, which Mother started with Carol Lipsey in November. Lipsey worked weekly with Mother on employment, housing, transportation, and budgeting. That same month, Mother obtained part-time employment at McDonald's, and she started a second part-time job at Little Caesar's at the end of December. Mother was evicted in November and could not secure new housing, so she moved in with her mother and brother on a temporary basis. For transportation, Mother relied on public transportation or rides from Lipsey, as she had not had a driver's license for several years.

[17] Mother had previously been unwilling to engage in a domestic violence program referred by DCS, indicating that she had already completed a program on her own in March 2025. DCS made a new referral for a domestic violence program through Center for Positive Change on October 7, but that referral was closed after Mother failed to engage within thirty days, cancelling two intake assessments and then was a no-show on a third. After another referral on December 3, Mother completed an intake assessment on December 10, and the assessor recommended that Mother complete a forty-week group program.⁵ Mother attended orientation on December 30 and then was scheduled to attend her first group session on January 14, 2026.

[18] The termination factfinding hearing was held on January 9, 2026. DCS called witnesses and presented evidence consistent with the facts set out above. Further, DCS established that Mother had yet to complete her twenty-six-week substance abuse aftercare program – with six weeks left to go – and had “recently missed some drug screens.” Id. at 138.

[19] Mother testified and acknowledged that she had been in a relationship with Blyly since April 2024, but she claimed that she decided to end the relationship “[a] couple of days ago.” Id. at 94. According to Mother, she never felt threatened by Blyly but was just now starting to know more about his past and realizing that “it's just not anything that I want my kids to be around or I want to be around.” Id. at 116. Mother, however, had made statements to Child's foster mother that Blyly was abusive toward Mother.

[20] Mother also testified that she was sober and no longer felt like she needed substance abuse treatment. And she explained that her two-month lapse in visits with Child occurred around the same time she was fired “based off a rumor,” lost her electricity for about two months, and had a lapse in SNAP benefits. Id. at 108. According to Mother, she was overwhelmed and unable to provide for Child during the visits, so she did not attend them. Mother also acknowledged that she had not attended Child's speech therapy or medical appointments for many months, claiming lack of knowledge, lack of transportation, and other reasons for missing them.

[21] FCM Laskowski, a supervisor and current FCM on the case, testified that reunification had never been appropriate in the case because safety concerns remained throughout. She noted ongoing concerns regarding housing and employment stability, sobriety (i.e., Mother's positive drug screens in April 2025 and subsequent missed screens), domestic violence, and participation in speech therapy ⁶ and medical appointments. FCM Laskowski further testified that visits between Mother and Child had not progressed past fully supervised visits and that Mother had not been consistent with visits. In sum, FCM Laskowski testified that Mother had not made significant progress toward reunification over the life of the CHINS case and had not demonstrated an ability to care for Child beyond short visits. FCM Laskowski opined that termination was in Child's best interests because it would provide him with permanency. The foster family wished to adopt Child, and FCM Laskowski noted that while in their care, Child had thrived having his medical and developmental needs met in a safe, stable home and had developed “significant emotional ties to the family.” Id. at 150.

[22] The CASA agreed with FCM Laskowski that termination was in Child's best interests. The CASA noted Child's “significant speech delays” and the importance of Mother's participation in speech therapy “so she could accurately communicate with him.” Id. at 180. She also expressed concern that Mother had fallen asleep during several visits with Child in June, including once in a public park, and that recently, after reengaging in visits after the lapse, Mother had been cutting the once-weekly visits short or canceling. The CASA did not believe Mother's parenting skills had improved, except for during her short period of engagement in the beginning of the CHINS case. She also noted Mother's continued lack of stable housing, frequent job changes, transportation issues, and failure to attend Child's doctor's appointments. While she recognized Mother's love for Child and her ability to engage well with him, the CASA explained:

[Child] deserves a lot more than just those short little visits with his mom. And so, I really wish this wasn't the case, but I feel like with everything that I've seen and just the lack of progress on all of the areas that I feel like are really important to [Child], I do think [termination is] in his best interest.

Id. at 191.

[23] In contrast, the CASA observed that Child had “made a lot of progress” developmentally with his foster family and that they adhere to a “stringent schedule” that Child thrives in. Id. The CASA testified that Child needs stability and consistency, a safe, stable home, “a caregiver who can care for him every single day and meet his needs,” and continued medical care and speech therapy. Id. at 187. The foster parents have met these needs well and a strong bond exists between them and Child.

[24] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that DCS had proven its case and made several observations. The court opined that Mother's illicit drug use “was a symptom of a bigger problem” – Mother's lack of judgment. Id. at 210. The court noted, among other things, Mother's recent involvement in another domestic violence relationship, her limited stability with employment, the missed visits with Child, her lack of attendance at speech therapy sessions, and her being “off the radar for months” and not engaging with homebased casework until about two months before the hearing. Id. at 211. The court did not see follow-through with Mother “at least as far as demonstrating an ability to make those important decisions on a daily basis to be able to meet her and [Child's] needs.” Id.

[25] Thereafter, on February 25, 2026, the trial court issued its termination order, which included findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mother now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Standard of Review

[26] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, and thus we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019). In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[27] Our review for clear error is confined to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). Reviewing whether the evidence “clearly and convincingly” supports the findings, or the findings “clearly and convincingly” support the judgment, is not a license to reweigh the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (observing that weighing the evidence under the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to termination cases is the trial court's prerogative, not ours). Further, we must accept any unchallenged findings as true. See Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

Discussion & Decision

[28] Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In re J.W., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[29] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS must allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the existence of one or more of the circumstances described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (Subsection (d)); (2) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and (3) termination is in the child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c); Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

[30] On appeal, Mother challenges only the trial court's determinations regarding Subsection (d) and Child's best interests. That is, she does not challenge the determination that that DCS has a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment. Mother also challenges some of the trial court's findings of fact as clearly erroneous.

A. Challenged Factual Findings

[31] The trial court made thirty-six specific factual findings, of which Mother challenges the following seven:

10. Mother has completed 20 out of 26 weeks of her aftercare program but will only recently begin her Batterers Intervention Program on January 14, 2026, which is a 40 week program.

13. Mother does not have reliable transportation. She does not own a car and relies on Public Transportation and rides from friends and family. Mother also uses a taxi service provided by Medicaid, but that service has stipulations regarding mileage and how far a destination can be. Mother has missed or been late for several appointments due to this.

19. The child had medical issues involving speech and hearing. The child recently got a tube placed in his ear to help and regularly attends speech therapy appointments where he learns sign language to communicate. Mother started attending these appointments but stopped recently. DCS and Case Managers believe it is essential for mother to attend all appointments regarding the child's medical needs, to ensure that Mother is equipped with the tools and knowledge to care for the child.

20. Mother states that she is not informed of these appointments until after they happen and that she attempted to attend the child's hospital stay at Riley Children's Hospital but was unable to get a ride.

29. The Court finds that Mother's judgment is not trustworthy and has concerns over Mother's romantic relationships and friendship choices.

32. The Court finds that due to Mother missing the child's medical appointments, Mother does not know how to properly communicate with the child in the way the child needs, by using sign language.

36. The specific instances of Mother's lack of stable housing, lack of stable employment, lack of stable transportation, and lack of involvement raises concerns for the child's safety and well-being.

Appendix Vol. 2 at 10-11.

[32] Mother attempts to explain or add context to the challenged findings, often relying on her own testimony, but she does not show that any of them were clearly erroneous. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The challenged findings are supported by the evidence, which we cannot reweigh.

B. Subsection (d) Conclusion

[33] Subsection (d) contains several circumstances supporting termination, of which the following two were alleged by DCS:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d). The trial court found both circumstances to have been proven by clear and convincing evidence. If we affirm one of these, we need not address the other. See J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1047 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[34] Thus, we turn to Mother's contention that the evidence was insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that that the conditions that resulted in Child's placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied. In making such a determination, a trial court engages in a two-step analysis: (1) ascertaining what conditions led to the child's placement and retention outside the home and (2) determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. The latter step requires the trial court to “judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1045 (quoting In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied).

In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through DCS. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.

Id. (brackets omitted). Further, it is within the trial court's discretion to disregard efforts made shortly before the termination hearing and to weigh more heavily the parent's history of conduct prior to those efforts. P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799.

[35] In determining that there is a reasonable probability that conditions keeping Child out of Mother's care would not be remedied, the trial court observed: Mother had been inconsistent with supervised visitation, which was only one day per week; Mother had done “little to avail herself of services or opportunities offered to her”; she had a pattern of noncompliance with services; and she could not provide adequate housing for Child. Further, while Mother was bonded with Child, the court determined that she was not stable enough to address his special needs. Appendix Vol. 2 at 12.

[36] Mother's argument on appeal with respect to the court's Subsection (d) conclusion is short. She makes excuses for the missed and shortened visits in the months leading up to the termination hearing. She then asserts the following with respect to her participation in services: “The record reflects Mother had negative drug tests, had participated in home-based care, visited her child, had completed the drug abuse program and was nearly finished with the aftercare program.” Appellant's Brief at 16. Finally, she argues that there is no evidence that her mother's home, where she had been living for a month or two, was inadequate or that Mother was unable to address Child's hearing loss or delayed speech.

[37] We reject Mother's invitation to reweigh the evidence. There is ample evidence of Mother's continued instability with respect to housing, transportation, and employment and her lack of full engagement in services. At the time of the termination hearing, she had recently been evicted again and was temporarily living with her mother, had been employed part-time for only about two months after a period of unemployment, had just completed orientation for the forty-week domestic violence program, had not completed the substance abuse aftercare program despite plenty of time, and had been engaged in homebased casework for only about two months. Further, Mother's visits with Child were never able to move past being fully supervised and, at the time of the hearing, were only once a week, by Mother's own choice. Despite being once weekly, Mother remained inconsistent with the scheduled visits, shortening or canceling them on several occasions leading up to the termination hearing. And Mother had not attended Child's speech therapy sessions or medical appointments for more than six months. She had also been in another abusive relationship, which she claimed she ended days before the hearing based on information she had learned about Blyly, the incarcerated father of her unborn child. Finally, we observe that while Mother had negative drug screens after April 2025, she also had several missed screens and one invalid screen after that time, which are considered positive screens.

[38] Mother has failed to establish clear error regarding the trial court's conclusion that the conditions keeping Child out of Mother's home were unlikely to be remedied.

C. Best Interests Conclusion

[39] When making a best-interest determination, a trial court must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parent's interests to those of the child, with the child's need for permanency being a central consideration. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Further, “we have previously held that recommendations of the case manager and [CASA], in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests[.]” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[40] In this regard, the trial court concluded that Child needed permanency, as well as regular structure and therapy, and that Mother had shown both an historical and a current inability to provide for his needs. Further, the court observed that both the CASA and the current FCM believed that termination of parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[41] Again, Mother asks that we reweigh the evidence. She contends that she has “participated in services and is very close to completing the drug aftercare” and that although she has not completed the required domestic violence program, “she completed another domestic violence program and is scheduled to begin the Oaklawn-required program.” Appellant's Brief at 18. Mother notes that she has a “good relationship” with Child and that he is young and in a good foster home, and she thus argues that giving her more time to complete services would not negatively impact Child. Id. at 19. She also asserts that despite a high turnover of FCMs throughout the case, “she has continued to reach out, communicate, and do what is expected of her.” Id. at 20. Finally, she claims, with no citation to the record, that “there has been a lack of communication from DCS and a lack of reasonable efforts on the part of DCS to provide Mother what she needs to be able to have [Child] returned to her.” Id.

[42] Contrary to Mother's assertions, the record establishes that she has not consistently complied with services or remained in contact with providers. She went off the radar during the summer of 2025, after completing the IOP, and then, after the termination petition was filed, she only partly and slowly reengaged in services. By the time of the termination hearing, she was not even consistently visiting with Child, and she had turned down the opportunity to increase visits to twice per week or to attend his speech therapy sessions.

[43] The evidence established that Child needed permanency, stability, structure, and ongoing support for his special needs. He was receiving this and more from his foster family and was thriving in their care. At the time of the hearing, Mother was still unable to adequately provide for Child's needs, and it was unlikely that the conditions keeping Child out of Mother's home would be remedied. Additionally, the CASA and FCM testified regarding the unremedied conditions and their belief that termination of parental rights was in Child best interests. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court's determination regarding Child's best interests was not clearly erroneous.

[44] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's father is unknown and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother also had a screen in July that did not pass the validity testing, which was considered a positive result.

3.   Mother held this job at the Elkhart Aquatic Center for about three months. According to Mother, she was fired in July 2025 “[b]ased off a rumor.” Id. at 88.

4.   Child's older sibling had been in the care and custody of a paternal relative since sometime in 2024.

5.   Mother expressed dismay to FCM Laskowski after learning of the recommendation, indicating that she did not understand why she was being asked to complete the domestic violence program because she had “answered no to every question.” Id. at 146.

6.   FCM Laskowski described speech therapy as a “huge need” for Child. Id. at 148. Child was nonverbal at the beginning of the CHINS case and was now saying about fifteen words and using sign language.

Altice, Judge.

Vaidik, J. and Foley, J., concur.