Dalton E. Griffith, Appellant-Respondent v. Dawn M. Griffith, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Dalton E. Griffith (Husband) and Dawn M. Griffith (Wife) divorced in August 2023. Husband appealed from the court's dissolution decree, alleging the court erred in denying his request to repudiate the parties’ settlement agreement regarding the division of his military pension. We affirmed.

[2] Since then, pursuant to the dissolution decree, the court entered its Military Retired Pay Division Order. Husband now appeals that order, alleging it includes obligations not contained in the parties’ settlement or the dissolution decree. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] This is the second time this case has come before our court. As we explained in Husband's appeal from the trial court's dissolution decree:

Husband and [Wife] were married in 1998. In 2019, Wife filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. The parties participated in mediation in April 2022 which resulted in an agreement resolving all matters except for the division of Husband's military pension. On August 21, 2023, the court held a hearing on the division of Husband's military pension. Wife testified that Husband was in the United States Army, he left the military in 2009, she believed that he was in the military for twenty-three and one-half years, and he received retirement and disability payments. The court admitted a valuation of Husband's military pension. Husband's counsel requested a break.

Following a recess, Husband's counsel stated, “Your Honor, we have reached an agreement to resolve all pending matters before the Court” and asked to read the agreement into the record. Transcript Volume II at 64. The court replied affirmatively and stated it would then ask Wife's counsel if there were any additions or corrections and “ask both parties who have already been sworn in if this is, in fact, your agreement.” Id. at 64. The court asked, “what about the entry of the final decree,” and after conferring with Wife's counsel, Husband's counsel stated, “[t]he entry of the final decree is today, Your Honor,” and the court replied, “Okay. All right. Yes.” Id. at 64-65. Husband's counsel stated:

[T]he parties have agreed that [Husband] owes back pay of $36,500, which will come out of Husband's proceeds for the sale of the marital residence. Then the parties agreed that from April of 2023 to the present, [Husband] owes [Wife] $5,600 in pension back pay. He's going to repay that all to her in 12 months, and moving forward from today, which is the date of the decree, the pension will be divided 50/50, evenly, between the two of them. And [Wife's counsel] will prepare the QDRO for DFAS and submit it, and we would just like a minute entry – or [Wife's counsel] and I will submit an agreed to entry for today that will not require clients’ signatures – it will just be an agreed to entry.

Id. at 65. Wife's counsel stated:

I think that covers everything. I think that [Husband] has also determined that he'll just make even payments over a year on the $5,600. I'm going to assume that we'll also want to add a provision that if it's not paid within a year, it would then at that point become a judgment and statutory interest would accrue on any balance that's not owed (sic).

Id. at 65-66. Husband's counsel said, “we do not have any dates. These are just numbers we've agreed to because that is the best way to resolve this case,” and the court stated, “[w]ell, whatever the parties can come up with is better [than] what I can come up with.” Id. at 66. The court asked the parties if they heard and agreed to the terms of the agreement, Wife stated “Yes, I do,” and Husband stated, “Good to go, sir. Agreed.” Id. The court stated: “The Court, having found it has jurisdiction over the parties and of the marriage, does now hereby find that the marriage of the parties has suffered an irretrievable breakdown, it shall be dissolved and the parties shall be restored to the status of unmarried persons.” Id. at 67. The court requested Wife's counsel to submit “the proposed decree and whatever additional decree or orders are necessary to divide the military pension” and stated, “[u]pon receipt of those documents, I will sign those and counsel will receive those through our e-filing system.” Id. at 67-68. Husband's counsel stated, “September 1 is the first date that the pension's divided 50/50 because we agreed to back pay [for] the four months since April.” Id. at 68. On September 7, 2023, Husband's counsel filed a motion to withdraw appearance.

On October 6, 2023, counsel for Wife submitted a proposed order. An entry dated October 9, 2023, in the chronological case summary (“CCS”) states:

The Court is in receipt of a proposed Decree of Dissolution filed by counsel for [Wife]. [Husband] is given to and including October 23, 2023, to file a written objection. Absent written objection, the Court will sign the proposed Decree of Dissolution as tendered.

Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 17.

Griffith v. Griffith, 241 N.E.3d 1137, 1138-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied (Griffith I).

[4] Husband filed a verified notice attempting to repudiate the settlement agreement, which the trial court denied. The court then issued a decree of dissolution providing in relevant part:

The parties appeared on August 21, 2023, for final hearing on the issue of the division of [Husband's] military pension․ After the presentation of some evidence, by way of testimony elicited from [Wife], and after a brief recess, the parties reported that an agreement had been reached as to the division of [Husband's] military pension.

The COURT DOES NOW APPROVE as the Court's findings the parties’ stipulations and agreement as to the division of [Husband's] military pension.

* * *

The COURT FURTHER FINDS that [Husband's] entire military pension (and the terms attendant thereto, such as COLA) shall be divided equally between the parties and that a separate order entitled Military Retired Pay Division Order shall be entered which provides for the equal division of [Husband's] military retirement pension.

The COURT FURTHER FINDS that [Husband] shall pay the sum of $36,500 which represented [his] share of net proceeds from the sale of the former marital residence to [Wife] in order to compensate [her] for her share of the pension benefits paid to [Husband] during the pendency of this action as well as the sum of $5,600 which shall be paid by [Husband] to [Wife] in equal installments over a one year period commencing with the entry of the decree of dissolution.

* * *

SIGNED: February 8, 2024; EFFECTIVE August 21, 2023.

App. Vol. II pp. 39-40; see Griffith, 241 N.E.3d at 1140.

[5] Husband appealed, arguing that the court erred in incorporating the settlement agreement regarding the division of his military pension into the dissolution decree because he timely repudiated the agreement. Finding that Husband did not repudiate the agreement before the trial court accepted it, we concluded the court did not err in denying Husband's request to repudiate or in entering the dissolution decree. We thus affirmed the dissolution decree. Our Supreme Court denied transfer.

[6] In 2025, Wife's counsel filed a proposed Military Retired Pay Division Order (MRPDO). Husband filed an objection to the proposed MRPDO, alleging that some of the proposed terms exceeded the scope of the parties’ settlement agreement and the court's dissolution decree. In December, the court adopted the proposed MRPDO, which provides in relevant part:

3. Benefit Assignment: This Order assigns to the Former Spouse the following portion of the Member's “Disposable Retired Pay,” as defined in 10 USC Section 1408(a)(4):

A. Amount: This Order assigns to the Former Spouse 50% of the Member's Disposable Retired Pay.

B. Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA): The Former Spouse's share of the Member's Disposable Retired Pay shall include a pro rata share of any COLA applied to such pay.

4. Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) / Reserve Component SBP (RCSBP): If the Former Spouse was covered by the SBP or RCSBP under the “spouse” or “spouse and child” category immediately prior to the parties’ divorce, then promptly after the court signs this Order (and in no event later than 1 year after the parties’ divorce) the Member shall change such SBP or RCSBP coverage to the corresponding category to cover the Former Spouse (i.e., “former spouse” or “former spouse and child”). Otherwise, the Member cannot now elect SBP or RCSBP coverage for the Former Spouse.

* * *

7. Member's Death: Since the Member's Disposable Retired Pay ceases upon the Member's death, payment of the portion of such pay assigned to the Former Spouse (if still alive) shall also cease at that time. In this event, however, the Former Spouse may be entitled to survivor annuity benefits under the SBP or RCSBP if provided in this Order.

* * *

9. Notice of Certain Actions: The Member shall notify the Former Spouse of any action the Member intends to take that will impact the amount of retired pay that DFAS pays to the Former Spouse (e.g., transfers or merges retired pay into another retirement system; waives retired pay to receive VA disability compensation; etc.). The Member shall send such notice in writing via regular first class mail at least 30 days, but not more than 90 days, prior to such action. For this purpose, the Former Spouse shall notify the Member of any change in the Former Spouse's mailing address.

10. Overpayments: If the Member receives Disposable Retired Pay that is assigned to the Former Spouse, or if the Former Spouse receives Disposable Retired Pay that is not assigned to the Former Spouse, then the relevant party shall return such overpayment to DFAS within 10 days of receipt.

11. Member Payments to the Former Spouse: If DFAS does not pay to the Former Spouse any portion of the Member's benefit that is covered by the MRPDO (e.g., if there are multiple court orders and, combined, they exceed the direct payment limits in 10 U.S.C. Section l408(e)), the Member shall pay that portion directly to the Former Spouse within 7 days after the date the Former Spouse otherwise would have received it. Such payment(s) to the Former Spouse shall be net of any income and similar taxes the Member incurs with respect to that portion of Plan benefits.

* * *

13. Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA) Jurisdiction: The court has jurisdictional authority, pursuant to 10 USC Section l408(c)(4), to treat the Member's Disposable Retired Pay as divisible marital property because the Member consented to the court's jurisdiction.

App. Vol. II pp. 36-38. Husband now appeals pro se. Additional facts are provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Husband argues the provisions of the MRPDO regarding “[Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP)] obligations, indemnification provisions, anti-diminishment protections, fallback payment obligations, [and] continuing obligations to future federal benefit elections” exceed the scope of the parties’ settlement agreement and the court's dissolution order.¹ Appellant's Br. p. 12. He contends the “challenged provisions” should be vacated and remanded for entry of a MRPDO “limited to the terms expressly agreed upon by the parties on August 21, 2023.” Id. at 10. Wife initially asserts that Husband's argument is waived for failure to raise it when he appealed the dissolution decree. Alternatively, she argues Husband consented to the provisions he now contests and that his claim is now barred by law of the case.

[8] In Griffith I, we found that the parties’ counsels’ verbal recitation of the parties’ agreement into the record in open court, while the parties were under oath, met the statutory requirements to be considered a binding settlement agreement. Thus, we observed that the terms of the settlement agreement regarding Husband's pension are as follows:

[T]he parties have agreed that [Husband] owes back pay of $36,500, which will come out of Husband's proceeds for the sale of the marital residence. Then the parties agreed that from April of 2023 to the present, [Husband] owes [Wife] $5,600 in pension back pay. He's going to repay that all to her in 12 months, and moving forward from today, which is the date of the decree, the pension will be divided 50/50, evenly, between the two of them.

Griffith, 241 N.E.3d at 1138. The trial court incorporated those terms into the divorce decree, finding that Husband's “entire military pension (and the terms attendant thereto, such as COLA) shall be divided equally between the parties” and that a MRPDO shall later be entered “provid[ing] for the equal division of [Husband's] military retirement pension.” App. Vol. II pp. 39-40. The court also found that Husband would pay a sum of money to Wife to “compensate [her] for her share of the pension benefits paid to [Husband] during the pendency of this action[.]” Id. at 40.

[9] Griffith I settled that these verbal statements are the settlement agreement and that the agreement is binding and cannot be repudiated. We further note Husband's concession that the settlement agreement provided that “the pension would be divided ‘50/50, evenly,’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 6, and the court's explicit statement that COLA adjustments would be accounted for in the final MRPDO. Paragraph 3 of the MRPDO refers directly to the explicit statements from the settlement agreement and the court's underlying decree. Because paragraph 3 of the MRPDO does no more than implement terms we have already held binding, it is affirmed. See supra ¶6.

[10] However, a contract can be binding even when one word needs interpreting: in other words, a potential ambiguity in one word does not disrupt whether a deal was struck. Thus, to determine whether the remainder of the MRPDO stayed within the scope of the settlement agreement, we must now interpret the meaning of the term “pension” within that agreement; this issue was not before us in Griffith I.

I. Standard of Review

[11] A dissolution court that enters a property settlement agreement retains jurisdiction to interpret the terms of settlement agreements and to enforce them. Shorter v. Shorter, 851 N.E.2d 378, 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Fackler v. Powell, 839 N.E.2d 165 (Ind. 2005)). However, our review “remains an exercise in the construction of the terms of a written contract, which is a pure question of law, so our standard of review is de novo.” Id. When interpreting settlement agreements, “we apply the general rules applicable to the construction of contracts.” Id. Unambiguous contract terms are given their plain and ordinary meaning and deemed conclusive. Id. However, a “word or phrase is ambiguous if reasonable people could differ as to its meaning.” Story v. Story, 148 N.E.3d 1155, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citation omitted).

[12] “If the language is deemed ambiguous, the contract terms must be construed to determine and give effect to the intent of the parties when they entered into the contract.” Id. at 1160 (citation omitted). “Where an instrument is ambiguous, we will consider all relevant evidence, including extrinsic evidence, to discern the meaning of the instrument's provisions.” Shorter, 851 N.E.2d at 383 (citing Univ. of S. Ind. Found. v. Baker, 843 N.E.2d 528 (Ind. 2006)). “Extrinsic evidence is evidence relating to a contract but not appearing on the face of the contract because it comes from other sources, such as statements between the parties or the circumstances surrounding the agreement.” Story, 148 N.E.3d at 1160 (citation omitted).

II. Survivor Benefit Plan

[13] In this case, the parties generally used the term “pension” in their settlement agreement to describe the division of marital property stemming from Husband's military retirement benefits. Thus, the crux of the dispute is whether an SBP is inherently included in Husband's “pension.” Thus, we must first decide whether this term is ambiguous. See Shorter, 851 N.E.2d at 383. “Terms are not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree as to the proper interpretation of those terms.” Id. But if a term might reasonably be construed as having multiple interpretations, it is ambiguous. Id.

[14] To determine whether the meaning of “pension” is ambiguous here, we first look at our historical treatment of SBPs in Indiana. In general, we treat SBPs as divisible marital property. See, e.g., Bock v. Bock, 116 N.E.3d 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (although each spouse's interest in an SBP is remote and speculative, SBPs are properly included as divisible property in the marital estate); Leonard v. Leonard, 877 N.E.2d 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (a court properly included each spouse's reciprocal SBP as a marital asset subject to division). However, in these cases, the parties’ disclosures of the SBPs as property and the SBP values at the time a dissolution petition was filed were clearly before the respective courts. See Bock, 116 N.E.3d at 1126 (parties sought valuation of husband's pension and the SBP, and the court explicitly included the SBP's value in its dissolution decree and awarded the SBP to wife); Leonard, 877 N.E.2d at 901 (trial court considered the premium cost for maintaining reciprocal SBPs and did not err when it equally divided the burden of the premiums between each spouse). Although SBPs are treated as marital assets, they are valued independently of pensions and are divided as separate assets in these cases.

[15] Turning to federal definitions regarding military retirement benefits for further guidance, we note that none of the relevant U.S. Code uses the term “pension.” Instead, U.S. Code provides for the computation of “retired military pay” in one section and for an SBP benefit option in another. Title 10, Chapter 71 of the U.S. Code provides for the computation of retired military pay and provides that a state dissolution court “may treat disposable retired pay” as marital property in the court's final dissolution decree. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1). “Disposable retired pay” is defined as

the total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled less amounts which ․ are deducted because of an election under chapter 73 of this title to provide an annuity to a ․ former spouse to whom payment of a portion of such member's retired pay is being made pursuant to a court order under this section.

Id. at (4)(A)(iv). One such annuity that a service member may elect under Chapter 73 is an SBP that may benefit a former spouse. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-1455. Chapter 73 provides for regulations of SBPs that are independent from the regulations regarding division of disposable retired pay under Chapter 71. As such, it is clear on the face of these statutes that SBPs are not automatically included in the term disposable retired pay. However, a service member's total monthly retired pay includes an SBP premium if an election is made.

[16] Given all this, we can surmise multiple reasonable interpretations of “pension” as used by the parties in this case. In other words, it would be reasonable to interpret the term to mean either total monthly retired pay or disposable retired pay; and, if one reasonably interpreted “pension” to mean total monthly retired pay, one may reasonably believe that the SBP is included in the term “pension” because the premium had not yet been deducted. Because either interpretation would be reasonable on the facts of this case, we conclude the parties’ use of “pension” in the settlement agreement is ambiguous. Shorter, 851 N.E.2d at 383.

[17] We therefore continue on to consider all relevant evidence, including extrinsic evidence, to discern whether the parties intended to include an SBP when they agreed to divide Husband's pension equally. See id. (when a term is ambiguous we look to extrinsic evidence to discern the parties’ intent in crafting the provisions). In its dissolution decree, the court found “the parties owned tangible and intangible personal property and owed debts which have been equitably divided as set forth in the mediated agreement entered into on April 25, 2022, and per the stipulations and agreements of the parties attested to, under oath, on August 21, 2023.” App. Vol. II p. 39. The mediated agreement never mentioned an SBP or division thereof. Instead, it provided:

The parties agree that each shall retain title to the assets in their possession and shall transfer any necessary titles or releases as to the same. The parties shall split the funds held trust in [sic] from house sale as follows: Husband shall receive $36,500, wife to receive $56,308.23. House funds to be disbursed within 5 business days of the Courts [sic] final decision with respect to pension. The parties reserve all issues related to division of husband's military pension for hearing and decision of the Court.

Griffith I App. Vol. II p. 33.² Nothing in the record defines the “assets” that were already in each party's possession. The record also lacks a marital estate worksheet listing the parties’ complete assets and debts and their respective values. From this, there is no indication that the parties had an SBP or that they intended to divide one as part of the mediated agreement.

[18] Prior to the August 2023 hearing, Husband filed his “Contentions as to Bifurcation & Evidence Material and Relevant Hereto,” id. at 62, requesting the court award to Wife “27.5% of the entire value of Husband's military pension.” Id. at 66. Husband never mentioned an SBP in this filing. Wife responded by filing a report prepared by accountant Dan Andrews that provided a valuation of Husband's military pension. In filing the report, Wife asserted that Andrews’ report was “a complete copy of the pension valuation report reflecting the full value of [Husband's] military pension as well as the coverture value alluded to by [Husband]” and that “[n]o other financial documentation related to the division of all other assets and debts is relevant or material.” Id. at 67. Andrews’ report provided an estimated market value of Husband's pension based on Husband's age, years of service, anticipated COLA adjustments, and several other factors. See id. at 73.

[19] The valuation did not include any adjustment in total value based on contributions to an SBP, and Wife's filing did not include a separate valuation of an SBP from Andrews. Coupled with Wife's assertion that Andrews’ report reflected the “full value” of Husband's military pension, id. at 67, this evidence indicates the parties did not intend the term “pension” to include the value of an SBP. Moreover, the court memorialized this intention when it divided Husband's “entire military pension (and the terms attendant thereto, such as COLA)” but made no reference to an SBP or other military benefits. App. Vol. II p. 39.

[20] Finally, in their settlement agreement, the parties discussed back pay that Husband owed Wife. The court memorialized the back pay provision by ordering Husband to pay a sum of money to Wife to “compensate [her] for her share of the pension benefits paid to [Husband] during the pendency of this action[.]” Id. at 40. This plainly references money Husband collected from his pension while the case was pending and does not reference any accounting for contributions to an SBP.

[21] Indeed, the record lacks any indication that Husband ever elected to fund an SBP, let alone any indication that the parties ever valued and intended to divide one. The MRPDO itself only contemplates the possible existence of an SBP and unilaterally orders Husband to name Wife as the beneficiary if she was covered by an SBP before the divorce. See App. Vol. II p. 36. And there is no evidence that the parties ever agreed to division of the post-dissolution premium cost for an SBP, if one existed. All the evidence in this case indicates that the parties did not intend for the term “pension” to include the value of an SBP. Accordingly, paragraph 4 of the MRPDO, awarding Wife an SBP if the parties had one, exceeds the scope of the parties’ settlement agreement and the court's dissolution decree.

III. Other Challenged Provisions

[22] Throughout his brief, Husband also alleges the MRPDO's “indemnification provisions, anti-diminishment protections, fallback payment obligations, [and] continuing obligations to future federal benefit elections” exceeded the scope of the parties’ agreement. Appellant's Br. p. 12. However, Husband never enumerates which specific provisions in the MRPDO he is challenging relevant to these assertions, and we will not develop his argument for him. As such, Husband's imprecise, general arguments are waived. See Burnell v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1167, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (appellate court will not review undeveloped arguments or make up an argument for a party).

[23] Notwithstanding Husband's waiver, we find no error in the remainder of the court's MRPDO. None of the other provisions burden Husband with additional, non-negotiated financial obligations. For example, paragraph 9 of the MRPDO requires Husband to notify Wife if he intends to take actions that will impact the amount of retired pay he receives, including if he “transfers or merges retired pay into another retirement system; waives retired pay to receive VA disability compensation; etc.” App. Vol. II p. 37. Although we agree that Wife would not be entitled to compensation for retired pay that is waived for one of these reasons—i.e., for disability compensation ³ —this paragraph does not require Husband to provide Wife with any additional pay under any condition. This is merely a notice provision, and it does not prematurely specify a resolution for pay reduction, should one occur. Husband does not provide any authority that prohibits a notice requirement, and we find none.

[24] Likewise, paragraph 10 describes how either party should behave if one of them receives an overpayment from the federal government in disbursing Husband's pension. That is, if either party receives an overpayment, then the relevant party is simply required to return the overpayment to the federal government for distribution to the correct party. This provision simply ensures that the parties comply with the court's order that they each receive fifty percent of Husband's disposable retired pay.

[25] And paragraph 11 has the same effect, requiring Husband to pay Wife her portion of his monthly pay directly “[i]f [the federal government] does not pay to [Wife] any portion of [Husband's] benefit that is covered by the MRPDO[.]” Id. As construed, this provision simply requires the parties to ensure that Wife receive the equivalent of fifty percent of Husband's monthly disposable retired pay. There are no implicit conditions requiring indemnification for future pay reductions that are excluded by federal law. Nothing in the MRPDO prohibits the parties from litigating the impact of potential future pay reductions.

Conclusion

[26] Because the parties’ settlement agreement and the divorce decree did not contemplate an SBP as a marital asset, we reverse the court's conditional award of an SBP to Wife contained in the MRPDO. We remand with instructions to exclude current paragraph 4 from the MRPDO and to remove any other reference to an SBP benefit for Wife. We affirm the remainder of the MRPDO.⁴

[27] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note Wife's frustration in deciphering the issues Husband raises for review; as Wife notes, Husband states his issues several different ways in his brief. However, the substance of Husband's argument consistently challenges the same topics as beyond the parties’ agreement. Thus, we address the portions of that argument which are sufficiently developed for review.

2.   Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 27, the documents before the trial court that were memorialized in the appendix for Griffith I are part of the record on appeal, and we have taken judicial notice of this filing. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2016) (taking judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 of documents that were part of the record on appeal as defined in Appellate Rule 27).

3.   See Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214, 221-22 (2017) (States are prohibited from increasing, pro rata, the amount of disposable retired pay that a former spouse receives each month to indemnify former spouse to restore the portion of retired pay lost due to service member's waiver of retired pay for disability benefits).We also note that Husband relies on Howell and its predecessor, Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989), for the proposition that “state-courts may not impose indemnification or reimbursement mechanisms designed to compensate a former spouse for future reductions in disposable retired pay resulting from federal law.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. Husband misconstrues the federal holdings and applies them too broadly. These cases only prohibit indemnification of a former spouse for portions of retired pay waived so the service member can receive disability benefits; they do not broadly apply to all potential reductions in retired pay.

4.   Husband also notes that he “objected to inclusion of ‘consent to jurisdiction’ language within an expanded proposed MRPDO[,]” and states “[t]he challenged provisions include ․ the selected ‘member consented to the court's jurisdiction’ language contained in Paragraph 13.” Appellant's Br. pp. 15, 16. Because Husband does not develop this argument, it is waived. See Burnell v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1167, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.