John Bricker, Appellant-Defendant v. LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] In June 2023, James Epstein d/b/a Lakefront Associates, LLC, leased two buildings in Michigan City, 208 Freyer Road and 210 Freyer Road, to John Bricker. Under the lease agreement, either party could terminate the lease for any reason with 60 days’ written notice. In April 2024, Lakefront brought an eviction action against Bricker alleging nonpayment of rent. Lakefront claimed it had notified Bricker multiple times to vacate the property due to nonpayment and that it was terminating the lease. Bricker argued that Lakefront's communications didn't meet the notice requirements in the lease agreement. The small-claims court found that Lakefront provided sufficient notice and that, in any event, the filing of its eviction action served as notice to Bricker that it was terminating the lease. In its July 22, 2024 order, the court concluded that the lease had ended, Bricker had no legal authority to occupy the premises, and Lakefront was entitled to possession. The court ordered Bricker “to vacate the premises and take all belongings from the subject premises of 210 Freyer Road.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 48. Bricker appealed the eviction order.

[2] While Bricker's appeal was pending, Peachtree Partners-Indiana I, LLC, purchased 208 and 210 Freyer Road. When Peachtree acquired title to the properties in January 2025, Bricker was still occupying both buildings. Aware of the eviction litigation between Bricker and Lakefront, Peachtree notified Bricker that, to the extent his lease with Lakefront still existed, it wished to terminate the lease, and it offered to help him remove his property from the premises. But Bricker refused to vacate, so Peachtree brought its own eviction action against him in March 2025. The trial court held an eviction hearing in April and took the matter under advisement.

[3] In the meantime, on June 4, 2025, a panel of this Court affirmed the small-claims court's judgment for Lakefront. See Bricker v. Epstein, No. 24A-EV-1815, 2025 WL 1577020 (Ind. Ct. App. June 4, 2025) (mem.), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Two days later, the trial court here entered an order of possession for Peachtree. The court found that Peachtree provided actual notice to Bricker of its purchase of the properties and its intention to terminate the lease (to the extent the lease still existed). Because more than 60 days had passed since this notice, Bricker's lease rights were terminated, and the court ordered Bricker to vacate 208 and 210 Freyer Road immediately. Bricker now appeals that order.

[4] Peachtree contends that this appeal is moot because Bricker's lease rights were terminated as a matter of law in the Lakefront eviction action, and our decision affirming that judgment has since been certified, leaving no effective relief we could grant Bricker here. We agree. “A case is moot when the controversy at issue has been ended, settled, or otherwise disposed of so that the court can give the parties no effective relief.” E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. 2022) (per curiam). Bricker raises a variety of claims in an attempt to avoid mootness, including that Peachtree was not a party to the Lakefront case, that he hasn't been evicted from 208 Freyer Road because the Lakefront eviction order referenced only 210 Freyer Road, and that our decision in Bricker v. Epstein didn't address a particular notice provision in the lease agreement. But Bricker misses the point. The only reason Peachtree would have had to provide him notice to terminate the lease is if the lease had still been in effect when Peachtree bought 208 and 210 Freyer Road. Although the Lakefront eviction order instructed Bricker to vacate 210 Freyer Road only, it also stated that the lease had ended, meaning Bricker no longer had rights to occupy either building. We affirmed that judgment, and our decision was certified several months after the trial court's order in this case. Our affirmance confirms that Peachtree had no obligations—notice-related or otherwise—to Bricker under the lease because the lease no longer existed when Peachtree acquired the properties. Because the issues that were before the trial court have since been decided, this case is moot. We therefore dismiss the appeal.

[5] Dismissed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.