IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of Ala.W. and Aly.W. (Minor Children) and J.F. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.F. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's termination of his parental rights to his twin daughters, Ala.W. and Aly.W. (collectively, “Children”), on petition of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Father presents several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as: Did DCS fail to present clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination decision? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Children were born in October 2016 to A.W. (“Mother”)¹ and Father. Children were first adjudicated Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) when they were approximately six months old. Those cases closed in December 2019 with reunification.

[3] The underlying CHINS cases began in January 2024, when Children were seven years old and living with Mother. Based on a report to DCS and subsequent investigation, DCS became concerned for Children's safety due to Mother's extensive illegal drug use. Father's whereabouts were unknown. DCS removed Children from Mother's care. Mother admitted she needed assistance providing Children with a safe, stable living environment free from substance use, and Children were adjudicated CHINS. They were eventually placed in kinship care with their half-siblings’ biological father.

[4] About a month after Children's removal, Father was arrested and charged with several offenses—including domestic battery, battery, residential entry, confinement, and interference with the reporting of a crime—in which Mother was the alleged victim. Father was incarcerated for a few months, and in April, pleaded guilty in that case to felony residential entry and confinement. The trial court sentenced him to 910 days as a direct commitment to community corrections on home detention.

[5] Father appeared at a CHINS hearing in May 2024, waived his right to a factfinding hearing, and did not contest Children were CHINS. On May 15, the trial court held a dispositional hearing and ordered Father to participate in: home-based case management; a substance use assessment and all resulting treatment recommendations; random drug screens; father engagement services, including a parenting education component; and a domestic violence assessment and all recommendations.

[6] The record shows that over the next year, Father engaged in some services and made some progress. Yet Father's participation was inconsistent and incomplete. For example, when a new Family Case Manager (“FCM”), Isiaka Costa, was assigned to the case in March 2025, Father had not completed a substance use evaluation, was not participating in any services, and was not visiting Children. Although FCM Costa referred him to a supervised visitation and father engagement service provider, Father declined to engage with those services that spring, telling the visit supervisor he would reach out to her “when he's ready.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 20.

[7] In April 2025, Father violated the terms of his community corrections placement. He was arrested on a drug-related charge and remained incarcerated through June. Also around this time, Father pleaded guilty in Johnson County to Level 6 felony operating while intoxicated, and the trial court sentenced him to two years as a direct commitment to work release.²

[8] On May 28, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights to Children. Once released from jail, Father began serving his work release commitment on July 1. In August, with the petition to terminate pending, Father reached out to the visit supervisor and began to regularly visit Children.

[9] The trial court held a factfinding hearing on October 16 and 24, at which DCS presented evidence of the above-stated facts. Children were then nine years old and had never lived with Father. Father was residing in the Johnson County work release program. If able to successfully complete the work release requirements, Father's housing plan was to “probably end up staying with” an ex-employer and then “progress from there.” Id. at 16. He had been offered a job at a restaurant but had not yet begun work. By his own account, Father was inconsistent with his services because his “first [service] provider was not good,” he “had a lot going on,” and he was “overwhelmed because of the courts and the cases.” Id. at 49.

[10] Father's visit supervisor and father engagement provider, Vera Azubuike, confirmed she first received a referral for Father in March 2025, but Father canceled their appointment. He later reached out and began services in August 2025. In her opinion, the twice-weekly visits were going well. Father demonstrated appropriate parenting skills and had not cancelled any visits. She was working with him on obtaining a job and eventually housing.

[11] According to FCM Costa, Father had been consistent with visitation and father engagement services during the two to three months since his most recent release from incarceration. But Father had not expressed a desire to have Children placed with him; rather, he wanted Children to be placed with his former employer. FCM Costa believed Children were doing well in their placement with their half-siblings. He testified it was in Children's best interest to terminate parental rights.

[12] Children's guardian ad litem (“GAL”) also testified it was in Children's best interest to terminate parental rights. In the GAL's view, Father had not made the necessary efforts to achieve sobriety and obtain stable housing and employment adequate to meet Children's needs. According to the GAL, Children were bonded to their half-siblings and comfortable in the placement.

[13] On January 21, 2026, the trial court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights to Children. The court entered numerous findings of fact and concluded DCS had proven the allegations in the petition by clear and convincing evidence, specifically concluding: (1) DCS had a satisfactory plan for Children's care (adoption); (2) despite DCS's reasonable efforts to reunify the family, Father was unable to remedy the conditions resulting in Children's removal; (3) there was a reasonable probability Father would not remedy the conditions resulting in Children's removal; (4) there was a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Children's wellbeing; and (5) termination was in Children's best interests.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[14] Father argues the trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous. Parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). But “this right is not absolute.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[15] A decision to terminate parental rights is among the most difficult a trial court is called upon to make. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). These decisions are “among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts, recognizing their superior vantage point for weighing the evidence and assessing witness credibility.” Id. We apply a two-tiered standard of review to a termination decision: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the trial court's judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We do not reweigh the evidence but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). And we do not judge witness credibility for ourselves, instead giving due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses firsthand. Id. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when the record contains no facts supporting them either directly or by inference. In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Trial court findings not challenged on appeal are accepted as true. See In re A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

Statutory Requirements

[16] To terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCS must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024) (“termination statute”). In this case, DCS alleged the following subsection (d) circumstances existed:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office [for the requisite time]; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)–(4).

[17] The State bears the burden of proving the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997). If the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition have been proven, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship and shall enter findings of fact supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c)(1) (2012).

Subsection (d) Circumstances

[18] Father first appeals the trial court's determination that DCS proved all the alleged subsection (d) circumstances. But because subsection (d) of the termination statute is written in the disjunctive, “the trial court need only find that one requirement of subsection (d) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” A.L., 273 N.E.3d at 489; see also In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Ind. 2010) (applying prior version of the statute). Accordingly, we focus on the trial court's determination under subsection (d)(3): that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal or reasons for Children's placement outside the home will not be remedied.

[19] To make this determination, trial courts engage in a two-step analysis: first, the trial court ascertains what conditions led to Children's removal and placement outside the home, and then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1134. When making these decisions, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. But the trial court must balance any recent improvements against a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. The evidence presented by DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[20] DCS removed Children from Mother's care due to her drug use and lack of a safe, stable home. Father's whereabouts were then unknown, and Children had never resided with him. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 16 (Father stating, “They never lived with me.”). Soon after Children's removal, Father committed two felonies against Mother. He spent several months in jail, necessitating Children's continued placement outside the home. On his release, he engaged in services with some success. As of an August 2024 periodic review hearing, Father was doing well but lacked employment. Father had not made sufficient progress such that Children could be placed with him. Then, by his own admission, he voluntarily stopped participating in services because he disliked his provider and felt overwhelmed. Although FCM Costa attempted to connect him with a new visitation and family engagement services provider in March 2025, Father told the provider he was not yet ready to participate. Soon after, he was arrested and again incarcerated. At the time of the factfinding, Father had acquired a job which he expected to start “[p]robably Sunday morning.” Id. at 15. He was living in a work release facility and thought he could stay with his former employer if he paid his work release fees and requested a placement change.

[21] Father argues he “effectively remedied the reasons for Children's removal” by obtaining employment and demonstrating he could live with his ex-employer. Appellant's Br. at 20. Therefore, he argues, the trial court erred when it found the conditions leading to Children's removal and placement outside the home were unlikely to be remedied.

[22] Contrary to Father's appellate arguments, Father's newly acquired job, which he had not yet started, does not constitute stable employment. Similarly, Father's speculative plan to live temporarily with an ex-employer, provided he could successfully be discharged from work release, does not equate to stable housing. Even if it did, the trial court was entitled to give greater weight to Father's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. “Habitual conduct may include criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.” In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 647 (Ind. 2015). To that end, the record shows Children never lived with Father. After DCS removed them from Mother's care, Father was in and out of jail; sometimes chose not to engage with services when not incarcerated; and even failed to consistently visit Children until shortly before the termination hearing. He did not complete the court-ordered services during the life of the case. At the time of the factfinding, his visitation was still supervised. The trial court did not err when it found the conditions leading to removal and reasons for Children's placement outside the home were unlikely to be remedied.

Best Interests

[23] Father also challenges the trial court's finding that termination was in Children's best interests. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3). When deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests, trial courts “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. A child's need for permanency is a central concern. Id. “Indeed, ‘children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Id. (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). And trial courts “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[24] FCM Costa and the GAL stated it was in Children's best interests to terminate the parent-child relationship. Recommendations of the case manager and child advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal or reasons for placement outside the home will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. See In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[25] In addition, a parent's historical and current inability to provide adequate housing, stability, and supervision will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. At the factfinding hearing, FCM Costa testified Father had “not been involved with” Children and needed father engagement services to help develop his relationship with them. Tr. Vol. 2 at 31. Yet Father voluntarily stopped participating in services, including visitation. Father also downplayed his responsibility for Children's situation and deflected it to Mother. Id. at 48 (Father explaining, “The mother is a good mother. She just cannot get it straight. I've always been there to help her, ․ but she couldn't do it.”). And as the trial court found, Father never discussed with FCM Costa the prospect of reunification and “instead focused more on the Children being placed with his former employer rather than the goals of stable housing and a legal source of income to provide for the Children's needs.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 202. Based on Father's historical and current inability or unwillingness to provide Children with a safe, stable home, and in light of the FCM's and GAL's recommendations, the trial court's conclusion that termination was in Children's best interests was not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[26] Clear and convincing evidence supports the court's termination decision.

[27] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother consented to Children's adoption. She is not a party to this appeal.

2.   These charges were brought in October 2024 and stemmed from acts Father committed in 2023 (before the CHINS petitions were filed).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.