Julie Ann Davis Veach, Appellant-Respondent v. Larry Roger Veach, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Julie Ann Davis Veach (now Julie Ann Davis) (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's modifications of parenting time and child support. She argues that the court erred in modifying her parenting time, considered improper evidence in determining the income of Larry Roger Veach (“Father”) for purposes of calculating his child-support obligation, and erred in calculating her income. We disagree on all counts. But because the trial court appears to have made an inadvertent error in adopting Father's proposed child-support-obligation worksheet, we remand for correction of his support amount.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father have one child together: Z.V. (“Child”), who was born in 2014. Mother and Father married in 2017. In 2021, Father filed for divorce, and the marriage was dissolved by settlement agreement in January 2023. Under the agreement, Mother and Father would share joint legal and physical custody, and Father was to pay Mother $526 per week in child support. This amount was based on the child-support-obligation worksheet the parties submitted with the agreement, which included weekly gross incomes of $12,211.54 for Father and $961.54 for Mother. At the time, Mother was a self-employed artist.

[3] Several months after the divorce was finalized, Father petitioned to modify legal and physical custody. In August 2024, by agreement of the parties, the trial court ordered that Father have sole legal custody and primary physical custody and Mother have parenting time in accordance with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines. Then, in December 2025, Father petitioned to modify child support to reflect a decrease in his income and the change in physical custody. Father also alleged that Mother was refusing to take Child to his extracurricular activities during her parenting time and asked the court to either order Mother to take him or allow Father to do so if Mother refused. The court set a hearing on the petition for February 4, 2026.

[4] Father served Mother with discovery requests on January 6, and the next day, the trial court ordered Mother to respond by February 2. The same day as the court's order, Mother, pro se, moved for reciprocal financial disclosure, noting that Father had requested extensive financial information from her and seeking an order that Father produce his own financial information “prior to or concurrent with [Mother's] production.” Appellant's App. Vol. 3 p. 28. The court subsequently ordered, “Discovery shall be reciprocal and staged, with [Father's] production occurring first ․ [Mother] shall produce responsive discovery within a reasonable time following [Father's] production.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 112-13. Despite this order, Father didn't provide any documentation of his income to Mother until the afternoon before the hearing.

[5] At the hearing, Father provided his last paystub from 2025 as evidence of his income. He also brought his 2024 tax return and offered it into evidence. Mother objected on the ground that she hadn't had time to review the return, and Father withdrew it. Father submitted a child-support-obligation worksheet listing weekly gross incomes of $12,617 for him and $961.54 for Mother and a recommended support obligation of $376.86. See Ex. 3. He explained that Mother hadn't provided him with any documentation of her income, so he used the amount from the worksheet they submitted with their settlement agreement in January 2023. Father also alleged that Mother was voluntarily underemployed and that “to the extent she says she has less income” than $961.54, he “think[s] she's capable of earning” that amount. Tr. p. 12. He provided a copy of Mother's resume that he obtained online, which shows that she has a master's degree in “Interactive UI/UX Design” and a variety of certifications in graphic design. Ex. 7. Father noted that “UI designers at [his] company make anywhere between” $120,000 and $160,000 a year. Tr. p. 12.

[6] Father also testified that Child, then 11, raced go-karts, but Mother refused to take him to his races during her parenting time. Father explained that racing was Child's “dream,” but “if he's not there for every event he has no chance of winning a championship or ․ placing where ․ he wants to place,” and Mother was “holding him back from doing something he loves.” Id. at 14, 15. He proposed that either Mother take Child to the races during her parenting time or he would take Child, and Mother could have make-up parenting time. Father also said he would pay all the expenses for Child's racing.

[7] Mother testified that she was still a self-employed artist and also worked at a flower shop, where she worked around 30 hours a week at $14 an hour, but she didn't provide any documentation of her income. She refused to estimate how much she made in her self-employment because she'd “rather not have assumptive figures.” Id. at 35-36. The trial court asked Mother if her income was still $961.54 as agreed to at dissolution, and she said “it was actually never that high.” Id. at 36. Mother also disagreed that she was underemployed. She explained that she had income documentation prepared but was withholding it because she'd been waiting on Father's production. She argued that “[F]ather's income has not been fully verified under the staged disclosure order” and asked the court to “require disclosure first and reserve recalculation [of child support] until compliance.” Id. at 24. The court told Mother, “to the extent that you think that you didn't have to provide discovery or that this matter wasn't ready for a determination of child support you should have made a record and you should have requested a continuance.” Id. at 38.

[8] As for Child's racing, Mother testified that she wasn't opposed to him participating “on his father's parenting time,” but her parenting time is already “extremely limited,” and she wanted to be able to use that time for other things. Id. at 42. The court asked Mother, “[I]t is just that important to you for you to have parenting time even if it means your sons gonna [sic] miss out on things and he'll be disappointed, you're okay with that?” and she said yes. Id. at 43.

[9] After Mother's testimony, Father agreed to use $30,000 as her annual income, which amounted to a weekly gross income of $576.92 instead of $961.54. (For reference, a weekly gross income of $961.54 multiplied by 52 weeks amounts to $50,000 a year.) He explained that the $30,000 was based on $21,840 for Mother's income from the flower shop ($14 an hour x 30 hours a week x 52 weeks) plus about “eight thousand a year [for] [he]r art work.” Id. at 44. Father submitted another child-support-obligation worksheet using $576.92 as Mother's weekly gross income, which resulted in a support obligation of $405.13 instead of $376.86. See Ex. 8.

[10] Ruling from the bench, the trial court granted Father's proposed modifications. It found that Father's request regarding transportation to Child's activities during Mother's parenting time was in Child's best interests, stating, “I think it's in the best interest of the child not to have to miss out on great opportunities or things that he enjoys because of [Mother's] unreasonable demands.” Tr. p. 49. Thus, the court ordered that either Mother will transport Child to his activities during her parenting time, or Father will transport Child and Mother will receive make-up parenting time. The court also found “the request of [Father] to find that [Mother] make[s] ․ about thirty grand a year not unreasonable under the circumstances.” Id. at 48. But in the order issued after the hearing, the court ruled that “Father's child support obligation shall be $377.00 per week.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 115. The $377 support obligation was based on Father's original worksheet listing Mother's weekly gross income at $961.54 ($50,000 a year), not the revised worksheet listing her weekly gross income at $576.92 ($30,000 a year).

[11] Mother, pro se, now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The trial court properly found that modification of Mother's parenting time is in Child's best interests

[12] Mother first argues that the trial court erred in modifying her parenting time to require her to transport Child to his extracurricular activities or accept make-up time if Father transports him. Indiana Code section 31-17-4-2 provides, “The court may modify an order granting or denying parenting time rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child.” We review parenting-time decisions for an abuse of discretion. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013).

[13] Mother does not argue that the modification of her parenting time is not in Child's best interests; she merely alleges that the trial court failed to make the requisite best-interests finding. But the court did make best-interests findings. In granting Father's requests regarding transportation to Child's extracurricular activities, the court stated, “I wouldn't have to do this if I thought the two of you could work this out, but I believe it is in the best interest of your child.” Tr. p. 49. The court also said to Mother, “I think it's in the best interest of the child not to have to miss out on great opportunities or things that he enjoys because of your unreasonable demands.” Id. at 49. Mother's claim that the court failed to make a best-interests finding is not supported by the record. The trial court did not err in modifying Mother's parenting time.¹

II. While the trial court did not err in determining either parent's income, we remand for correction of an error in Father's modified child-support obligation

[14] Mother also contends that the trial court erred in determining both Father's income and her income for purposes of calculating child support. A trial court's child-support calculation is presumptively valid, and we will set aside the modification of a support obligation only if it is clearly erroneous. Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 738 (Ind. 2015). In reviewing a modification order, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment. Id.

A. Father's Income

[15] Mother claims that the trial court erred in determining Father's income due to “improper reliance” on his 2024 tax return, which was not admitted into evidence. Appellant's Br. p. 21. But nothing in the record indicates that the court relied on the 2024 tax return. The return was never provided to the court; when Mother objected to its admission, Father immediately withdrew it. Although Father testified to his total earnings in 2024, he also provided his last paystub from 2025, which was admitted without objection, as evidence of his 2025 income. And the court adopted Father's child-support-obligation worksheet, which he said was “based on what [his] income was last year” (2025), not in 2024. Tr. p. 8. The record shows that the trial court determined Father's income based on properly admitted evidence, not his 2024 tax return.²

B. Mother's Income

[16] Mother also challenges the trial court's calculation of her income. She first argues that the court erred in assigning potential income to her based on a finding that she was voluntarily underemployed. But the court didn't assign potential income to Mother. Although Father initially testified that he thought Mother was voluntarily underemployed and capable of earning $961.54 a week, he later agreed an annual income of $30,000 for Mother, or a weekly gross income of $576.92. This amount was based on an estimate of what Mother actually earns, not her potential income. Mother testified that she worked around 30 hours a week at $14 an hour at the flower shop, which amounts to $21,840 a year ($14 an hour x 30 hours a week x 52 weeks). And although Mother has a master's in Interactive UI/UX Design, and Father testified that UI designers at his company make $120,000-$160,000 a year, he attributed only about $8,000 to her in yearly earnings from her artwork. The court accepted these figures, concluding it was “not unreasonable” to find that Mother makes $30,000 a year. The court did not assign any potential income to Mother, so Mother's underemployment argument fails.

[17] Mother further contends that the trial court erred in determining her income because the amount used was “[b]ased on [s]peculation” and “was not supported by contemporaneous income documentation.” Appellant's Br. pp. 26, 28. While this is partially true, it is because Mother didn't bring any income documentation or a child-support-obligation worksheet to court. Mother also refused to estimate her income during her testimony because she'd “rather not have assumptive figures.” Given the limited evidence before it, the trial court did not err in adopting Father's proposed amount for Mother's income. See Dye v. Young, 655 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“[Father] not only did not file his own worksheet, he never provided the court with a figure he claimed to be his weekly gross income. Thus, the court [was] well within its discretion to adopt the figures supplied by [Mother] in fashioning its child support order.”).

[18] Mother refused to produce her income documentation at the hearing because Father hadn't complied with the trial court's order requiring staged discovery. She claims that “[o]nce a trial court establishes a structured disclosure process, parties are entitled to rely on that framework, and the court must either enforce it or defer adjudication until compliance occurs.” Appellant's Br. p. 26. But Mother cites no authority supporting this proposition. And regardless of what did or did not happen during discovery before the hearing, the onus was ultimately on Mother to verify her income if she wished to contest Father's requested child-support modification. Indiana Child Support Guideline 3(B) requires that “[i]n all cases,” a child-support-obligation worksheet “shall be completed and filed with the court when the court is asked to order support,” and “[i]ncome statements of the parents shall be verified with documentation of both current and past income.” Mother did not provide the court with a worksheet or income documentation. Because she failed to meet her burden, she cannot now complain that the court had insufficient evidence from which to determine her income. See In re Marriage of Duckworth, 989 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“As Mother did not submit any evidence of her income, her complaint about the amount of income assigned is misplaced. The trial court assigned an income level to Mother that was supported by the only evidence in the record of Mother's income—the figure assigned by Father on his worksheet. If Mother disagreed with that amount, the time to challenge its accuracy was at trial, not on appeal.” (citation omitted)).

[19] That said, there does appear to be an inadvertent error in the trial court's modification of Father's support obligation. Although the court found that Mother makes $30,000 a year, it modified Father's support obligation to $377 per week. The $377 figure came from Father's original worksheet, which listed Mother's weekly gross income at $961.54 ($50,000 a year). But Father's revised worksheet, which incorporated the $30,000 annual income for Mother, listed a support obligation of $405.13. See Ex. 8. We therefore reverse the modification of Father's support obligation and remand for the trial court to adopt Father's worksheet in Exhibit 8 and enter an obligation of $405.13 per week, retroactive to February 4, 2026 (the date of the court's original modification order).

[20] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother also argues that the parenting-time modification “lacks sufficient clarity for consistent enforcement.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. But she doesn't specify which parts of the modification order she believes are unclear or incapable of being consistently enforced, so she has waived this argument. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (providing that arguments must be “supported by cogent reasoning” and “citations to ․ the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on”).

2.   Regarding Father's evidence of his income, Mother also argues that the trial court violated her due-process rights by “admitting late-disclosed evidence ․ without affording [her] a meaningful opportunity to review, investigate, or respond.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. But Mother didn't raise a due-process argument in the trial court, so she has waived this claim for our review. See In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (“[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.”). And in any event, when Mother objected to the admission of certain evidence on the ground that she hadn't had time to review it, the court gave her an opportunity to look at the exhibits before ruling on their admission. See Tr. pp. 7-8, 9-11, 12-13.

Vaidik, Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.