IN RE: Support of: B.D.M. and K.N.M. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On February 4, 2026, Daniel D. McGuffey (Father) petitioned to modify his child support obligation. The trial court granted Father's petition and retroactively modified his support obligation to the date of his oldest child's nineteenth birthday. The State appeals, arguing that the court erred by retroactively modifying Father's child support obligation to a date earlier than the filing of his petition. We reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and Tiffany N. Goleman (Mother) (collectively, Parents) have two children together: B.D.M., born on August 15, 2005, and K.N.M., born in May 2009 (collectively, Children). In 2019, Mother opened paternity cases for Children with the Washington County Prosecutor's Office, and the State initiated support actions for Children under Title IV-D.¹ In December 2020, the trial court accepted Parents’ agreed child support order, temporarily ordering Father to pay an undivided child support obligation of thirty dollars per week.

[3] The State petitioned to modify child support in January 2023. In March, the court granted the State's petition and modified Father's child support obligation for Children to $101 per week. In July, the trial court entered another child support order gradually increasing Father's support obligation each month until it reached a final amount of $153 per week, effective October 6, 2023.

[4] B.D.M. turned nineteen on August 15, 2024. On February 4, 2026, Father petitioned to modify his child support obligation and requested K.N.M.’s personal information so he could claim her as a dependent on his 2025 taxes.

[5] On March 16, the trial court held a hearing on Father's petition. Mother testified that B.D.M. turned nineteen, graduated from high school, and is now living on his own. Father testified that he was now unable to work due to two medical conditions. Instead, he was receiving disability payments that were approximately “fifty to sixty percent of [his] normal wages.” Tr. Vol. II p. 7. The State informed the court that Father had an arrearage balance of $2,700.37 as of February 28, 2026. The State argued that the court's modification could only be retroactive to the date Father filed his petition. But Father asserted that the court could modify his child support obligation retroactively to B.D.M.’s nineteenth birthday.

[6] On April 13, 2026, the court issued an order granting Father's petition. It modified Father's support obligation as of B.D.M.’s nineteenth birthday, i.e., August 15, 2024, and found that Father's medical conditions impacted his earning potential. The court retroactively modified Father's child support obligation to $114 per week from August 15, 2024 to February 4, 2026, i.e., from B.D.M.’s nineteenth birthday to the date Father filed his petition. It also modified Father's child support obligation to $92 per week effective February 4, 2026. The court found these modifications would make Father ninety-five percent current for his obligation in 2025. The court also granted Father's request to claim K.N.M. on his 2025 taxes. The State now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] The State contends the trial court erred by retroactively modifying Father's child support obligation to B.D.M.’s nineteenth birthday where no exception applied. The State further argues that because the child support order was in gross, it should not have been modified to a date earlier than Father's filing of the petition. We agree.

[8] “[T]here is a well-established preference in Indiana for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (citation and quotations omitted). We will reverse a support order only for clear error. Bogner v. Bogner, 29 N.E.3d 733, 738 (Ind. 2015). That is, reversal of a child support order is proper only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. Id.; see also Cubel v. Cubel, 876 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ind. 2007) (“Determinations of child support obligations are within the trial court's discretion and will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.” (citation omitted)). “[T]o the extent a ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence, it is reversible, and the trial court has no discretion to reach the wrong result.” MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 941 (Ind. 2005).

[9] “ ‘The general rule in Indiana is that retroactive modification of support payments is erroneous if the modification relates back to a date earlier than the filing of the petition to modify.’ ” Sexton v. Sedlak, 946 N.E.2d 1177, 1183-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Becker v. Becker, 902 N.E.2d 818, 820 (Ind. 2009)), trans. denied. Accordingly, under the general rule, the trial court was not permitted to modify Father's child support obligation to a date before his petition to modify child support was filed.  ² See id.

[10] Father contends, however, that support for B.D.M. “ceased by operation of law on his nineteenth birthday” and that the trial court merely gave effect to that “statutory termination” as of the date it occurred. Appellee's Br. p. 8. We agree that, generally, a parent's “duty to support a child ․ ceases when the child becomes nineteen (19) years of age[.]” Ind. Code § 31-16-6-6 (2019).³ But, here, the child support order was in gross because it required Father to pay an undivided amount of support for both B.D.M. and K.N.M. See Sutton v. Sutton, 773 N.E.2d 289, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (defining an in gross child support order). And the statutory end of Father's duty to support B.D.M. did not establish what the support order should have been for the remaining minor child and did not justify a pro rata reduction in child support for the remaining child.

[11] “When a parent is ordered to pay a specified sum of undivided support for more than one child, the parent must pay that amount until the support payments are modified by court order or all of the children are emancipated or reach the age of [nineteen] years.”  ⁴ Schrock v. Gonser, 658 N.E.2d 615, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied; see also Ogle v. Ogle, 769 N.E.2d 644, 648 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“It is a long-standing rule that the non-custodial parent may not unilaterally reduce a child support obligation but must make payments in the manner, amount, and at the times required by an in gross support order until a court orders a modification or all of the children are emancipated or reach the age of [nineteen] years.” (citing Thacker v. Thacker, 710 N.E.2d 942, 944 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999))), trans. denied. “An extension of this rule is that any modification of a support obligation may relate back, at the earliest, to the date a petition to modify was filed.” Ogle, 769 N.E.2d at 648. The purpose of this rule is to allow the trial court to consider whether the in-gross support order is excessive for the remaining minor children. See, e.g., Isler v. Isler, 425 N.E.2d 667, 669-670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (where one or more children remain in the original custodian's care, “[a]ny order reducing the support must follow the court's thorough consideration of whether the support order is excessive for the remaining children.”). Thus, because a minor child covered by the in-gross order was still in Mother's care after B.D.M. turned nineteen, Father is not entitled to a retroactive modification prior to the date he filed his petition.

[12] Still, Father relies on Baker v. Grout, 116 N.E.3d 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), and Turner v. Turner, 983 N.E.2d 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), for the proposition that the trial court could not extend his obligation beyond B.D.M.’s nineteenth birthday. But these cases are inapposite because they applied to circumstances where a parent's entire child support obligation for a single child terminated when the child turned nineteen.

[13] Father's further reliance on O'Neil v. O'Neil is also unavailing. 517 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), reh'g denied, rev'd on other grounds, 535 N.E.2d 523 (Ind. 1989). In O'Neil, four children subject to a support order were emancipated in the eight years that the mother's petition to modify child support was pending. 517 N.E.2d at 434. When the court ultimately granted Mother's petition, it increased the father's original support obligation but gradually reduced that obligation for each time period following a child's emancipation. Id. at 434-35. Our court determined that these reductions were permissible because they occurred after the mother filed her petition to modify child support. Id. at 435. In reaching this conclusion, the court nevertheless reiterated that a trial court is not “empowered to retroactively reduce” child support effective to a date preceding the filing of a motion to modify child support. Id.

[14] The court's retroactive modification of Father's child support to a date preceding Father's petition to modify was clearly erroneous. We reverse and remand with instructions to modify Father's child support obligation effective February 4, 2026, the date he filed his petition. We further instruct the trial court to recalculate the arrearage balance based on Father's preexisting in-gross obligation of $153 per week and his new obligation of $92 per week effective February 4, 2026.  ⁵

[15] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The court consolidated the cases in July 2021.

2.   There are two exceptions where retroactive modification is permitted: “when: (1) the parties have agreed to and carried out an alternative method of payment which substantially complies with the spirit of the decree, or (2) the obligated parent takes the child into his or her home, assumes custody, provides necessities, and exercises parental control for such a period of time that a permanent change of custody is exercised.” Whited v. Whited, 859 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Ind. 2007). Neither exception applies here.

3.   Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6 was amended effective July 1, 2026. The relevant portions remain unchanged.

4.   The legislature “change[d] the presumptive age for termination of child support from twenty-one to nineteen” effective July 1, 2012. Sexton v. Sexton, 970 N.E.2d 707, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

5.   Father contends the State waived any challenge to the court's calculation of Father's arrearage amount and his ability to claim K.N.M. as a dependent on his 2025 taxes. The State correctly notes that both determinations depend on the effective date of the trial court's modification order. See Beckler v. Hart, 660 N.E.2d 1387, 1389-90 (“[A]ny overpayment of support should be credited only against any pre-existing child support arrearage[.]”) (emphasis removed); see also App. Vol. II pp. 61, 183 (providing Father may only claim dependent if he has paid at least ninety-five percent of his child support obligation for the calendar year by January 31 of the following year). A new effective date for the court's modification order would reduce the amount of child support Father overpaid and may result in an arrearage balance. The trial court must therefore recalculate Father's arrearage balance to accurately determine the amount of child support that remains unpaid and whether he paid ninety-five percent of his obligation in 2025.

Scheele, Judge.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.