Frederick C. Ford, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In February 2026, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Frederick C. Ford pled guilty to a variety of offenses under three separate cause numbers. Ford now appeals, arguing his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 12, 2025, Ford's fiancée reported to law enforcement that Ford had hit her “several times” and, when she attempted to call police, he took her phone and threw it. Ex. 2, 1:40-1:43. The State charged Ford with Class A misdemeanor domestic battery and Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime. See Cause No. 07C01-2505-CM-109. On May 19, Ford posted bond and was released.

[3] On August 1, the State moved to revoke Ford's bond after he was arrested in Henry County on an unrelated offense. The trial court found Ford violated the conditions of his bond and pretrial release and ordered him to participate in a substance abuse evaluation and complete any recommended treatment. On October 2, Ford was arrested and charged with Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. See Cause No. 07C01-2510-CM-246. On October 7, Ford was released on bond.

[4] Later that same day, Ford was driving and was involved in a car accident in which two other people were seriously injured. Later testing revealed Ford's blood alcohol concentration at the time of the crash was .287. Ford was arrested, and the State charged him with Level 4 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury, and two counts of Level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated. See Cause No. 07C01-2510-F4-250. The State later amended the charging information to add an additional count of Level 4 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury and a count of Level 6 felony operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of .15 or more.

[5] In February 2026, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Ford pled guilty to Class A misdemeanor domestic battery in Cause No. 109, Class B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident in Cause No. 246, and two counts of Level 4 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury in Cause No. 250. Pursuant to the plea, the State dismissed the remaining charges under all three cause numbers. The plea agreement called for Ford to receive a sentence of four days for the Class B misdemeanor and stated that the executed portion of his sentences for the Class A misdemeanor and the Level 4 felonies would be capped at 180 days and three years, respectively. The plea agreement also called for the sentences in each cause number to be served consecutively.

[6] The court held a sentencing hearing on March 23, 2026. Ford stated he took “accountability” for the offenses and expressed a desire to get treatment for alcoholism. Tr. Vol. II p. 138. Ford also emphasized the “positive things” he had done throughout his life. Id. at 140. Ford served in the United States Marine Corps and was on active duty for eight years and deployed on three occasions. He was honorably discharged as a sergeant in 2016. After being discharged, Ford was diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress disorder. In 2020, Ford began “regularly drinking” alcohol and later attempted rehabilitative treatment three separate times—in 2022, 2024, and 2025. App. Vol. II p. 140. After his final arrest in October 2025, he participated in substance abuse services through the jail. The court considered all this evidence as mitigating.

[7] However, the court also found several aggravators. It first noted Ford's criminal history, consisting of misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated and misdemeanor leaving the scene of an accident. The court further noted Ford violated his pretrial conditions by committing new offenses and failed to avail himself “of the opportunity the Court gave [him] to get the help [he] needed[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 155. The court also found “the nature and circumstances of the offense” in Cause No. 250 to be an aggravator, emphasizing the accident was “horrific” and Ford's blood alcohol concentration was “astonishing[ly] high[.]” Id. at 156.

[8] Under Cause No. 109, the trial court sentenced Ford to 120 days for the Class A misdemeanor, fully executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). Under Cause No. 246, the trial court sentenced Ford to four days for the Class B misdemeanor, fully executed in the DOC. Under Cause No. 250, the court sentenced Ford to six years for each Level 4 felony, with three years executed in the DOC and three years suspended to probation, to be served consecutively. The court also ordered the sentences in each cause to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of twelve years and 124 days, with six years and 124 days executed in the DOC and six years suspended to probation. Ford now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Ford argues his sentence is inappropriate and asks us to revise it pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We give “considerable deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision and attempt only to “leaven the outliers” rather than achieve the “perceived ‘correct’ result” in every case. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Indeed, Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is a “rare” avenue for appellate relief that is reserved “for exceptional cases.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612-13 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Our deference to the trial court prevails unless we are “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). A defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).

[10] We first note Ford challenges only his sentence for the Level 4 felonies under Cause No. 250, and thus we focus our analysis on these offenses. A person convicted of a Level 4 felony shall be sentenced to a fixed term of between two and twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5 (2014). Pursuant to Ford's plea agreement, the maximum amount of executed time Ford could receive for each offense was three years. The trial court sentenced Ford to the advisory six years for each offense, with three years executed and three years suspended to probation, to be served consecutively.

[11] A defendant's “ ‘conscious choice to enter a plea agreement that limits the trial court's discretion to a sentence less than the statutory maximum should usually be understood as strong and persuasive evidence of sentence reasonableness and appropriateness’ and appellate relief should be granted ‘only in the most rare, exceptional cases.’ ” Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006) (Dickson, J., concurring)). Furthermore, “[a] defendant who receives an advisory sentence has a particularly heavy burden to prove it inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).” Kincaid v. State, 171 N.E.3d 1036, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. This is especially true where, as here, the aggregate sentence is advisory but the executed portion is below the advisory. See Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010) (“We decline to narrowly interpret the word ‘sentence’ in Appellate Rule 7 to constrict appellate courts to consider only the appropriateness of the aggregate length of the sentence without considering also whether a portion of the sentence is ordered suspended or otherwise crafted using any of the variety of sentencing tools available to the trial judge.”).

[12] As to the nature of the offense, we find little compelling evidence portraying it in a positive light. While on bond and pretrial release in Cause No. 109, Ford was arrested for a vehicle offense in Cause No. 246. He again was released a few days later and immediately committed another, much more serious, offense. As the trial court noted, the nature and circumstances of this offense are significant. Ford drove with a blood alcohol concentration of .287, over three times the legal limit, and was involved in a car crash that seriously injured two people. Nothing about this offense warrants a revised sentence.

[13] As to his character, Ford emphasizes his military service and the “very clear connection between this military service, his post-traumatic stress disorder, and the alcoholism that is the root of the offenses in this case.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. We are sympathetic to Ford's struggles with alcohol and his mental health in light of his military service. But the record indicates the trial court considered and properly valued these circumstances, as evidenced by the fact that Ford's sentence was far from the maximum he could have received. See Boner v. State, 243 N.E.3d 354, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (declining to revise defendant's sentence under Rule 7(B) where evidence of defendant's good character was already reflected in the below-advisory sentence), abrogated on other grounds by Moyers v. State, 277 N.E.3d 33, 40 (Ind. 2026). Furthermore, we note Ford's criminal history. While consisting of only two misdemeanors, even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character. Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). More troubling is that Ford's prior offenses are for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident—the exact offenses he committed here.

[14] Ford has not met the high burden to show us his advisory sentence is inappropriate.

[15] Affirmed.

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.