Theresa S. Bumblis, Appellant-Petitioner v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In November 2020, Theresa Bumblis was convicted of Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent after representing herself at a jury trial. She filed a direct appeal pro se, which this Court dismissed when she failed to file her opening brief. After unsuccessfully seeking leave to pursue a belated appeal in late 2025, Bumblis filed a petition for post-conviction relief on December 1, 2025. The State filed a motion for summary disposition, which the post-conviction court granted. Bumblis appeals, arguing she presented genuine issues of material fact in opposition to the State's motion. Finding no genuine issue of material fact, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 20, 2017, the State charged Bumblis with Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent. The basis for the charge was an allegation that on August 8 of that year, a child Bumblis babysat was bitten over thirty times by another child in her care.

[3] Attorney Robert Gevers appeared for Bumblis on December 8, 2017, and represented Bumblis through most of the pre-trial proceedings. On October 4, 2019, Gevers deposed Dr. Tara L. Harris, a child abuse pediatrician he intended to call as an expert witness at trial. During Harris’ deposition, she testified that many of the photographs of the child's injuries produced by the State were too poor in quality to diagnose what caused them. She also testified that some of the child's injuries were inconsistent with bite marks and appeared to be older than the State alleged.

[4] On April 13, 2020, Gevers filed the defense's combined final witness and exhibit list. At that time, a jury was trial set to begin on June 9. Gevers listed Dr. Harris as a potential witness and indicated he intended to introduce deposition testimony of any experts or other witnesses who were unavailable for trial. At a pre-trial conference on May 18, the trial court reset the trial for November 4.

[5] On September 17, Bumblis sent an email to Gevers’ office instructing him to withdraw his appearance. On September 22, Gevers sent a letter to Bumblis acknowledging her request and indicating he would immediately file to withdraw from the case. The letter advised Bumblis that trial was set to begin on November 4 and it was in her best interest to hire new counsel. Bumblis elected to represent herself for the rest of the case, including at the jury trial. Ultimately, Bumblis was found guilty as charged and sentenced to two years in the Department of Correction, with approximately one-and-a-half years suspended to probation.

[6] Bumblis timely filed a notice of direct appeal but failed to file a brief, leading this Court to dismiss the appeal with prejudice. In October 2025, she filed a motion to bring a belated direct appeal, which this Court denied.

[7] On December 1, 2025, Bumblis filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The petition asserted two claims relevant to this appeal. First, Bumblis alleged Gevers rendered ineffective assistance before his withdrawal by failing to ensure that Dr. Harris’ testimony would be admitted at trial. Second, Bumblis claimed the State failed to serve her with a discovery notice filed less than two weeks before trial. According to Bumblis, the State's failure to serve the notice deprived her “of a fair opportunity to be heard and” prepare her defense. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 20.

[8] In its answer, the State asked the post-conviction court to summarily deny Bumblis’ petition. Bumblis opposed the motion for summary disposition and designated several exhibits, including her own affidavit, a transcript of Dr. Harris’ deposition, the final witness and exhibit list filed by Gevers, and a discovery notice filed by the State on October 23, 2020. In the affidavit, Bumblis affirmed she offered Dr. Harris’ deposition at trial, but the trial court sustained an objection made by the State. She also alleged not receiving the materials listed on the discovery notice, which deprived her of the opportunity to “review the additional photographs or text-message screenshots,” “consult Dr. Harris about those materials,” “investigate their authenticity or context,” “prepare specific objections directed to those materials,” or “request a continuance based on their late disclosure.” Id. at 55-56.

[9] On March 24, 2026, the post-conviction court held a hearing on the motion for summary disposition. At the start of the hearing, the court took judicial notice of Bumblis’ underlying criminal case. The State then argued that Gevers properly designated Dr. Harris as an expert witness, and after his withdrawal it became Bumblis’ responsibility to secure Harris’ attendance at trial. The State also claimed that if Bumblis did not receive certain materials in discovery, she had the opportunity to object or ask for a continuance when the State offered them into evidence at trial.

[10] After hearing from the State, the court questioned Bumblis about the allegations raised by her petition. When the court asked what made Gevers’ representation deficient, Bumblis said he failed to secure Dr. Harris’ attendance at trial. But she admitted Gevers withdrew from the case over a month before trial:

THE COURT: ․ I mean, you essentially ․ fired Mr. Gevers, correct?

[BUMBLIS]: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay, so once you fired him, then you became your own attorney, correct?

[BUMBLIS]: I did.

THE COURT: ․ So ․ did you subpoena the doctor?

[BUMBLIS]: ․ I did not personally send her a subpoena, no.

Transcript at 34.

[11] Regarding whether she received the October 23, 2020 notice of discovery, Bumblis clarified that the materials mentioned in that notice were admitted into evidence during the trial. The court asked Bumblis if she objected to the admission of that evidence, and when Bumblis said she could not remember, the judge reasoned as follows:

[E]ither you did object and ․ the Court overruled you in which case that would be something ․ that you should have appealed. Or you didn't object in which case ․ you waived [the issue]․ [O]ne of those two things happened [and] I don't see how it could be anything else.

Id. at 38.

[12] Ultimately, the court granted the State's motion for summary disposition and denied Bumblis’ petition. In a written order, the court addressed Bumblis’ ineffective assistance claim as follows:

[Bumblis] did have counsel prior to trial, but counsel withdrew more than one month prior to trial and despite warnings from counsel and the Court, [Bumblis] chose to represent herself at trial. The Court is unable to find any genuine issue of material fact with respect to this issue, particularly given [Bumblis’] undertaking of self-representation more than one month prior to trial.

Appealed Order. As for the State's alleged failure to serve the notice of discovery, the court reasoned:

Improper service should have been objected to at trial or prior to trial and[,] depending on the Trial Court's ruling[,] may have been an issue for appeal, but the Court is not able to find a genuine issue of material fact regarding this issue that would properly be a question for resolution through the post-conviction relief process.

Id.

[13] Bumblis now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Summary dispositions of petitions for post-conviction relief are governed by Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(g), which provides:

The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the petition when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, stipulations of fact, and any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law․ If an issue of material fact is raised, then the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing as soon as reasonably possible.

We review the decision to grant a motion for summary disposition de novo using the same standard as “a motion for summary judgment.” Allen v. State, 791 N.E.2d 748, 753 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.

[15] A court may grant summary disposition “when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” State v. Daniels, 680 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ind. 1997). The moving party has the initial burden “to prove each element of its claim by admissible evidence and to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact ․” Id. If the movant meets that initial burden, “the opponent must respond by setting forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Id. Summary disposition is appropriate if the nonmovant fails to show a genuine issue for trial. Id.

[16] We are not bound by the post-conviction court's reasoning. Id. Instead, we review “the same issues that were before the [post-conviction] court and follow[ ] the same process.” Id. (quoting Ind. Dep't of State Revenue v. Caylor-Nickel Clinic, P.C., 587 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (Ind. 1992)). In that process, we resolve any factual disputes and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Id. That said, the party who lost below bears the burden of convincing us the post-conviction court erred.¹ Id.

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

[17] Bumblis first argues she presented genuine issues of fact about whether Gevers rendered deficient performance before his withdrawal by failing to ensure Dr. Harris’ testimony was admitted at trial.

[18] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution each protect a criminal defendant's right to assistance of counsel at critical stages of the proceedings. Hanks v. State, 71 N.E.3d 1178, 1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (noting “[o]ur state constitution protects the same right” as the federal constitution in this respect), trans. denied. But a defendant also has the right to represent herself, and a defendant who does so “must accept the burdens and hazards of self-representation.” Carter v. State, 512 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. 1987). Accordingly, a defendant who represented herself at trial cannot claim ineffective assistance “because [she], in effect, would be alleging [herself] ineffective.” Id.

[19] Here, the undisputed facts show that before his withdrawal, Gevers deposed Dr. Harris as an expert witness and identified her on Bumblis’ final witness and exhibit list. Bumblis then fired Gevers more than a month before trial and elected to proceed pro se. At that point, it was incumbent on Bumblis to issue a subpoena compelling Dr. Harris’ attendance at trial or otherwise find a way to admit her opinion testimony. Since the undisputed facts show it was Bumblis’ failures in that regard which led to Dr. Harris’ testimony not being presented to the jury, the State is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law on this issue. We therefore affirm the summary denial of Bumblis’ ineffective assistance claim.

2. Service of the Discovery Notice

[20] Bumblis next argues she presented questions of fact about whether the lack of service of the October 23, 2020 discovery notice hindered her ability to prepare for trial. But our Supreme Court has long instructed that “[t]he scope of the relief provided for in [the Post-Conviction Rules] is limited to ‘issues that were not known at the time of the original trial or that were not available on direct appeal.’ ” Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000), reh'g denied, cert. denied), reh'g denied, cert. denied. As such, any issue which could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal “may not be raised in a post-conviction proceeding.” Holt v. State, 656 N.E.2d 495, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.

[21] Here, the undisputed facts are that certain photographs and text messages disclosed by the State in the October 23, 2020 notice were offered and admitted at trial. While Bumblis does not remember whether she objected (and neither party presented the trial transcript to us on appeal), if her version of events is accurate, the admission of evidence not previously disclosed put her on notice of the discovery issue. Her options at that point were to raise the issue with the trial court and, depending on the trial court's ruling, seek relief on direct appeal. And because the issue was available to Bumblis at trial and on direct appeal, she cannot raise it in a post-conviction relief petition. We therefore affirm the post-conviction court's summary denial of her claim that the State failed to serve the discovery notice.

Conclusion

[22] For these reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We disagree with Bumblis’ threshold argument that the post-conviction court's judgment must be reversed because it did not enter formal findings of fact and conclusions of law under Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). This Court has long held that “when the issues are sufficiently presented for review and addressed by the parties, the failure to enter specific findings of fact and conclusions of law is not reversible error.” Toan v. State, 691 N.E.2d 477, 480 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Neville v. State, 663 N.E.2d 169, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). Here, the post-conviction court's reasoning is sufficiently clear, and in any event, we give it no deference under the applicable standard of review.

DeBoer, Judge.

Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.