J.A. (Mother) and S.B. (Father), Appellants-Respondents v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] G.B. (Child) was removed from the care of J.A. (Mother) and S.B. (Father) and adjudicated a child in need of services (CHINS) due to Parents’ substance abuse. Parents were ordered to refrain from using illegal substances and alcohol and to complete substance abuse treatment. They both made some progress but ultimately relapsed. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) eventually petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights over Child. After a hearing, the trial court terminated Parents’ rights, concluding there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal would not be remedied and that termination was in Child's best interests. Parents now appeal the termination, and we affirm.

Facts

[2] DCS became involved with Child in January 2024, after receiving a report that Mother, while attempting to enroll in an inpatient detox program, had admitted using heroin daily. During the investigation, Parents both admitted ongoing substance abuse. DCS filed a CHINS petition, and the court ordered Child removed from Parents’ care. The parties ultimately stipulated in May 2024 that Child needed care, treatment, or rehabilitation that Parents could not provide and that would not likely be provided without intervention of the court. And so, after a fact-finding hearing, the court adjudicated Child a CHINS. In its dispositional order, the court ordered Parents to refrain from illegal controlled substances and alcohol, to undergo substance abuse assessments, to complete the recommended treatments, and to submit to random drug screens, among other things.

[3] At the time of the CHINS fact-finding hearing, Mother was incarcerated on a petition to revoke probation following a positive drug screening. She was placed at the Amethyst House for substance abuse treatment but was discharged after selling her medications. Mother relapsed into heroin abuse before successfully completing treatment through Volunteers of America. However, she was then reincarcerated on a probation violation stemming from her discharge from the Amethyst House.

[4] After being released, Mother initially screened positive for drugs but went on to achieve around five months of negative screens between May and October 2025. Yet she then screened positive for methamphetamine and soon after began to miss screens. Mother informed her DCS family case manager (FCM) that she was hanging out with a man who used methamphetamine and that he gave her some because she threatened to kill herself. By the time of the termination hearing, Mother was still abusing substances, including methamphetamine, cocaine, MDMA, and marijuana. She told the FCM she missed her last visit with Child because she was “tweaking” from substance abuse. Tr. Vol. II, p. 51.

[5] Father, meanwhile, struggled with heroin and fentanyl abuse. He initially failed to participate in the services ordered and was discharged from intensive outpatient treatment for that reason. He failed to screen consistently and screened positive for fentanyl and THC when he did so. Father ultimately engaged in services in May 2025, completing intensive outpatient treatment and participating in Lasting Recovery and Fatherhood Engagement programs. But he lost his job shortly before the termination hearing, stopped taking his depression medication because of the side effects, and began drinking heavily. Thereafter, the FCM witnessed Father “stumbling out” of Mother's home. Id. at 57. Father also lost his cellphone and, thus, contact with his “support team.” Id. at 35. He admitted he then “fell off” and went on a “bender.” Id. at 33, 35.

[6] In June 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights over Child, and a hearing was held six months later. Both the FCM and Child's court-appointed special advocate (CASA) testified that termination was in Child's best interests. The FCM stated that Parents could not parent effectively while intoxicated, and the CASA believed Child needed permanency, consistency, and stability that Parents could not provide.

[7] Parents admitted Child should not have to wait for a sober parent but expressed reasons why they believed they should retain their parental rights. Mother had consistently engaged in visits with Child and had been taking parenting classes. The FCM stated Mother was making progress in that area but also stated she lacked “a good, strong mother-child bond” with Child. Id. at 76. Father described making progress in dealing with depression and anxiety and in learning to handle Child's “tantrums and stuff like that.” Id. at 35. He “love[d Child] to death” and said Child was “super attached” to him. Id. at 37. Father planned to reengage in Lasting Recovery. He also claimed he had consistently engaged in visits with Child, although the FCM disagreed.

[8] After the hearing, the court issued a written order concluding: (1) neither parent had been able to remedy the circumstances that led to removal, and there was a reasonable probability those circumstances would not be remedied; (2) termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Child's best interests; and (3) there was a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment, namely adoption. The court therefore terminated Parents’ rights.

Discussion and Decision

[9] On appeal, Parents challenge only whether the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that termination of their parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[10] Before parental rights can be terminated, DCS must prove three elements by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) the existence of one ․ or more of the circumstances described in [IC 31-35-2-4(d)];

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c); In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (clear and convincing standard). In this case, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, one of the circumstances under Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d):

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(2).

[11] In determining a child's best interests, a trial court is required to look at the “totality of the evidence.” Z.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). It “must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child” and “need not wait until [the] child is harmed irreversibly before terminating the parent-child relationship.” In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “Recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” Id.

[12] Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its decision, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re G.Y., 904 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-1257 | September 28, 2026 Page 6 of 8 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009). “First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second[,] we determine whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. We do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility and consider only the evidence supporting the judgment. Id. “We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.” Id.

[13] Here, evidence supports the trial court's findings, and those findings support its conclusion on Child's best interests. Both the FCM and the CASA recommended termination. And there was evidence that Parents’ substance abuse issues, which had led to Child's removal, would not be remedied. In the FCM's words, Mother's recurrent substance abuse had put her “back where [she was] at the beginning of the case.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 52. Mother had been in and out of jail because of drugs and was facing a new arrest warrant for a marijuana offense. Additionally, Mother's substance abuse led to her missing her last visit with Child. The FCM also found no “reason to believe” Father would resolve his substance abuse issues. Id. at 58. After a one-year delay, Father eventually engaged in treatment services but “fell off” and went on a “bender” shortly before the termination hearing. Id. at 33, 35. Evidence thus supports the trial court's determination that Parents’ substance abuse would not be remedied and that termination of their parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[14] Parents argue DCS failed to prove the need for termination because they made progress during the CHINS case. Mother notes she participated in treatment services and achieved a five-month period of sobriety, even though she was not sober at the time of the termination hearing. And Father argues he, too, made progress before his relapse. Parents also contend they were consistent in participating in visits with Child, with whom they maintained a loving relationship.

[15] We recognize Parents’ struggles with and efforts to overcome addiction, as well as the tragedy that those addictions have led to the termination of their parental rights over Child. But Parents’ contentions merely invite us to reweigh and resolve for ourselves the conflicting evidence as to whether termination was in Child's best interests. This we will not do under the applicable standard of review.

Conclusion

[16] Because evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Child's best interests, we affirm the judgment.

Weissmann, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.