Matthew Joseph Morris and Danny Lee Morris, Appellants-Plaintiffs v. Tesla, Inc., Appellee-Defendant (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Matthew and Danny Morris, proceeding pro se, appeal the trial court's order dismissing their complaint against Tesla, Inc. with prejudice and compelling them to participate in arbitration on their complaint. The Morrises raise four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court's judgment for Tesla is erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In February 2025, Matthew attempted to purchase a new vehicle from Tesla. But Matthew was dissatisfied with the annual percentage rate Tesla quoted him on the amount he would have to finance. And so Matthew asked his father, Danny, to be a co-signer. Danny agreed, and the two executed a final retail installment sale contract (“RISC”) with Tesla on March 31, 2025.

[4] The RISC informed the Morrises that their APR would be 7.79%. It informed them that their federal electric-vehicle tax incentive of $7,500 would be added to a cash payment by the Morrises for a total downpayment. The RISC stated the total financed amount and what the Morrises’ monthly payments against the financed amount would be. The RISC further stated that “[t]his contract contains the entire agreement between you and us relating to this contract” and that “[n]o oral changes are binding.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 94.

[5] And the RISC contained the following arbitration clause:

Arbitration Provision

Please Review—Important—Affects Your Legal Rights

1. Either you or we may choose to have any dispute between you and us decided by arbitration and not in court or by jury trial.

* * *

Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, any allegation of waiver of rights under this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us ․ which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or condition of this Vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship ․ shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action․

Id. (reformatted).

[6] In April 2026, the Morrises filed their complaint against Tesla in the Marion Superior Court. In their complaint, they represented that Tesla had promoted a 0.00% APR to qualified purchasers who took delivery of their vehicle by March 31, 2025. Because they did not receive the 0.00% APR and they alleged they otherwise qualified, the Morrises asserted that Tesla had committed a breach of contract; fraud and intentional misrepresentation; and violations of Indiana's Deceptive Consumer Sales Act. The Morrises also alleged in their complaint that Tesla should be subjected to promissory estoppel and punitive and treble damages.

[7] The Morrises further alleged that the arbitration clause in the RISC was unenforceable. Their theories against the arbitration clause included fraudulent inducement, unconscionability, and a claim that they had signed the contract under an oral assertion of protest. The Morrises attached numerous exhibits to their complaint, including the RISC.

[8] Tesla moved to dismiss the Morrises’ complaint under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) and to compel the Morrises to bring their claims to an arbitrator. In support of its motion, Tesla relied on the exhibits attached to the Morrises’ complaint.

[9] The trial court summarily granted Tesla's motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration. In accordance with that decision, the court dismissed the Morrises’ complaint with prejudice.

[10] This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[11] The Morrises appeal the trial court's order dismissing their complaint with prejudice and compelling them to file their claims with an arbitrator. But we initially note that, while Tesla's motion was styled under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), because that motion was based on evidentiary exhibits attached to the Morrises’ complaint, the proper analysis of the request was as a request for summary judgment. Ind. Trial Rule 12(B).

[12] Under Indiana's summary-judgment standards, the burden is on the moving party to show that the designated evidence affirmatively negates the nonmoving party's claims. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003-04 (Ind. 2014). If the moving party makes such a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that the designated evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact that precludes the entry of summary judgment. Id.

[13] Here, Tesla, the moving party, relied on the RISC, which was attached to the Morrises’ complaint. The RISC's arbitration provision is unambiguous and broad. It expressly compels the parties to arbitrate, at either party's election, “[a]ny claim or dispute” between them, including the question of arbitrability itself. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p. 94. The RISC's integration clause is further clear and provides that the RISC represents the entirety of the parties’ agreement and that no “oral changes” by the parties to the RISC's written terms “are binding.” Id. Accordingly, Tesla made a prima facie showing that it was entitled to have the Morrises’ claims against it dismissed from the trial court and compelled to arbitration.

[14] The burden thus shifted to the Morrises to show that a genuine issue of material fact precluded judgment for Tesla. But the Morrises cannot do so. They rely on their claims against Tesla that the arbitration clause is unenforceable, but that question goes to the arbitrability of their claims, which the arbitration clause expressly captures as a basis for arbitration. Thus, the Morrises are unable to show that the trial court erred in granting Tesla's motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.

[15] Still, the Morrises also assert that the trial court was required to hold a hearing on Tesla's motion. In support of this position, the Morrises rely on Indiana Code section 34-57-2-3(a), which states that, where a party “denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue ․” But that statute does not say that an in-person hearing is required for the trial court to summarily determine the issue, and we decline to accept the Morrises’ reading of the statutory language accordingly.

[16] The Morrises also assert that the trial court erred when it dismissed their complaint with prejudice rather than issuing a stay. Here, the Morrises rely on Indiana Code section 34-57-2-3(d), which states that “[a]ny action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an application for an order for arbitration has been made ․”

[17] But we have long made clear that whether a trial court stays or dismisses a complaint following an order to compel arbitration is within the trial court's discretion. Ind. CPA Soc'y, Inc. v. GoMembers, Inc., 777 N.E.2d 747, 752 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). As we have made clear:

By utilizing this discretion, courts may examine the facts and circumstances of each case to determine the most prudent course of action. Factors which the trial court may wish to consider include whether court intervention will be necessary to compel discovery, whether the arbitration award will be enforced through the court, whether the entire controversy is arbitrable, which state's substantive law will be applicable to the controversy, and the location of the parties and the evidence.

Id. Given the breadth of the RISC's arbitration clause, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it dismissed the Morrises’ complaint with prejudice.

[18] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing the Morrises’ complaint with prejudice and ordering them to take their claims to arbitration.

[19] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.