Kailynd D. Baker, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Kailynd D. Baker appeals his convictions for three counts of Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug. Baker raises three issues for our review, which we restate as the following two issues:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of certain evidence.

2. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it closed the courtroom during the testimony of a confidential informant.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Around August 2023, a criminal defendant in another cause informed Elkhart County law enforcement officers that Baker was a dealer in fentanyl pills disguised as oxycodone pills. The defendant agreed to work with undercover officers as a confidential informant and to engage Baker in a series of five controlled drug buys.

[4] The first controlled drug buy occurred on August 30 at the informant's residence. Baker sold the informant 100 pills for $300. The second controlled buy occurred on September 5, and the informant again purchased 100 pills from Baker at the informant's residence.

[5] The third controlled drug buy occurred on September 13. The informant met Baker in a Walmart parking lot and purchased 500 pills from him there. But Baker had not yet sorted out the 500 pills from his stash, so the informant entered Baker's red Buick to help Baker count out the right number of pills.

[6] The fourth controlled drug buy occurred on September 21 in the same Walmart parking lot. Undercover officers near Baker's residence observed Baker leave his home and meet with the informant at the Walmart, where the informant purchased 100 pills from Baker.

[7] The fifth controlled drug buy occurred on October 9. This buy was again for 500 pills, and officers again watched Baker leave his residence and drive to the same Walmart as the third and fourth buys. There, Baker sold the informant the 500 pills.

[8] For all five controlled drug buys, the informant was at all times observed by an undercover officer referred to in the record as “U.C. 12.” Officer U.C. 12 also observed and recognized Baker as the dealer of the informant's narcotics immediately following the first transaction. Another undercover officer, referred to in the record as “U.C. 14,” observed Baker drive from his residence to the Walmart in the course of the fourth transaction.

[9] Following the fifth controlled drug buy, the State charged Baker with three counts of Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, charging him for the second, third, and fifth transactions. Baker's defense at trial was that the only evidence identifying him as the dealer was the confidential informant's testimony, and the informant was a person of dubious credibility. But, over Baker's objections, the State had admitted into evidence the various officers’ testimonies regarding all five transactions, including U.C. 12's and U.C. 14's recognition of Baker as the dealer in the uncharged first and fourth transactions. The State also had the pills from the three charged transactions admitted into evidence over Baker's chain-of-custody objection.

[10] In anticipation of the informant's testimony against Baker, the State presented evidence to the court that the informant had recently received “multiple threats” to “not show up to court.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 60. Based on that evidence, the court closed the courtroom during the informant's testimony. Baker informed the court that closing the courtroom during the informant's testimony was “fine” with him and that he had “no problem with it.” Id. at 57-58.

[11] Thereafter, the jury found Baker guilty as charged. The trial court entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Baker accordingly. This appeal ensued.

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence.

[12] On appeal, Baker first asserts that the trial court erred in the admission of evidence. The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of that discretion and ordinarily reversed only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances that were before the court. Id.

[13] Baker first contends that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of the first and fourth controlled drug buys into the record. According to Baker, because the State did not charge him for those two transactions, evidence relating to them was inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rules 403 and 404(b).

[14] As our Supreme Court has explained:

Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) serves to safeguard the presumption of innocence in favor of criminal defendants. See Swain v. State, 647 N.E.2d 23, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Hardin v. State, 611 N.E.2d 123, 128 (Ind. 1993)), trans. denied. The Rule's mandate is clear: a court may not admit evidence of another crime, wrong, or act “to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(1). This restriction prevents the jury from indulging in the “forbidden inference” that a criminal defendant's “prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.” Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Ind. 1999).

But Rule 404(b) does not totally proscribe other-bad-acts evidence—only its use as character evidence. Indeed, the Rule plainly states that other-bad-acts evidence may be admissible for other purposes, and it provides an illustrative list—to show “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2). So when the State claims that other-bad-acts evidence is admissible for a proper purpose, the trial court is tasked with deciding whether that evidence “is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act.” Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 219 (Ind. 1997).

If the evidence passes that relevance test, it has to clear a second hurdle: Indiana Evidence Rule 403’s balancing test. In applying Rule 403, the trial court must conclude that the evidence's probative value is not “substantially outweighed” by the danger of unfair prejudice, Evid. R. 403—otherwise, the evidence is not admissible. See Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 223.

Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019).

[15] The Indiana Supreme Court has long recognized that our trial courts may admit evidence of a series of controlled drug buys against the same defendant, even though the State has selectively charged the defendant for only some and not all of those transactions, under the “plan” exception to Evidence Rule 404(b). Goodner v. State, 685 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (Ind. 1997). Baker's assertion on appeal to the contrary is therefore not persuasive. Further, given that Goodner expressly allows such evidence under Rule 404(b)’s plan exception, we need not consider the State's argument that the evidence may also have been admissible under the identity exception.

[16] Regarding whether the admissible evidence should have nonetheless been excluded under Rule 403, our Supreme Court has been clear that the trial court has broad discretion under that Rule, and we will not step into the trial court's shoes unless the unfair prejudice was “so high that it overrode the trial court's wide discretion.” Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 179 (Ind. 2017). That is not the case here, and so Baker's argument under Rule 403 also fails.

[17] Baker also argues that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody to permit the admission of the pills into evidence. As our Supreme Court has explained:

The State bears a higher burden to establish the chain of custody of “fungible” evidence, such as blood and hair samples, whose appearance is indistinguishable to the naked eye. To establish a proper chain of custody, the State must give reasonable assurances that the evidence remained in an undisturbed condition. However, the State need not establish a perfect chain of custody, and once the State “strongly suggests” the exact whereabouts of the evidence, any gaps go to the weight of the evidence and not to admissibility. Moreover, there is a presumption of regularity in the handling of evidence by officers, and there is a presumption that officers exercise due care in handling their duties. To mount a successful challenge to the chain of custody, one must present evidence that does more than raise a mere possibility that the evidence may have been tampered with.

Troxell v. State, 778 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ind. 2002) (citations omitted).

[18] The State's chain-of-custody foundation established the necessary reasonable assurances that the pills remained undisturbed from seizure to testing to trial. U.C. 12 testified that he continuously observed the informant throughout the controlled buys. He testified that he received the pills in baggies directly from the informant following each controlled buy. He testified that he sealed and initialed each baggie to secure its contents. Another officer testified that that evidence, once collected, then went into a guarded evidence-collection room. That officer further testified that he had removed the sealed baggies with the pills from the evidence-collection room and submitted them to the Indiana State Police Lab. The State Lab, in turn, submitted the pills to a contractor called NMS for testing. Once tested, NMS returned the pills to the State Lab, and the State Lab returned the pills to local officers, who retained custody over them from that point to the trial.

[19] Baker argues on appeal that the State Lab's internal process of submitting the evidence to its own contractors and receiving the evidence back from them was not explained, and, thus, the State failed to provide reasonable assurance that the pills here remained undisturbed during those exchanges. But we disagree. The State's foundation established that the pills were continuously in the custody of local or state officers, or their agents, from the controlled buys to the trial. Baker's argument thus goes to the weight of the evidence and not to admissibility.

2. No fundamental error occurred when the trial court closed the courtroom.

[20] Baker also argues on appeal that the trial court committed fundamental error when it closed the courtroom during the informant's testimony. Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution protect a criminal defendant's right to a public trial. Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 166-67 (Ind. 1997). While that right is “fundamental,” it is not “absolute.” Id. at 167. Complete or partial exclusion of the public may be justified if a court finds that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. Such an interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. Id.

[21] But Baker did not object to the trial court's closing of the courtroom during the informant's testimony. Thus, to demonstrate reversible error on appeal, he must show that the trial court's decision was “fundamental error.” Bolcerek v. State, 255 N.E.3d 1206, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. To demonstrate fundamental error, an appellant must show that the alleged error “made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018) (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted). Fundamental error is “extremely narrow” and “encompasses only errors so blatant that the trial judge should have acted independently to correct the situation.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Further, if the trial judge “could recognize a viable reason why an effective attorney might not object, the error is not blatant enough to constitute fundamental error.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[22] Baker argues that the trial court's closure of the courtroom was erroneous because the trial court relied only on a “generalized concern for witness safety.” Appellant's Br. at 17. But Baker's argument is not a due process argument, which is what the fundamental-error doctrine protects. Baker's argument is a routine public-trial argument; it is not an argument that a blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process occurred that made the outcome of his trial untenable. We therefore reject his argument.

Conclusion

[23] For all of these reasons, we affirm Baker's convictions.

[24] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Kenworthy, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.