WATTLEY v. STATE (2026)

 Case Summary

[1] Marquel Jamar Wattley admitted violating his probation by failing to report for supervision and complete treatment, and the trial court ordered him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended sentence of four years. Wattley now appeals, arguing that because his violations occurred during a well-documented mental-health decompensation for which he received treatment, the trial court should have imposed a sanction commensurate with his violations rather than the entire suspended term. We agree with Wattley and, accordingly, reverse and remand with instructions.

 Facts and Procedural History

[2] In June 2017, Wattley was found guilty of Level 4 felony arson, Level 4 felony attempted arson, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement in Allen Superior Court. These were Wattley's first criminal convictions. The trial court reset Wattley's sentencing hearing several times to determine his eligibility for community corrections home detention; each time Wattley refused to participate in the screening process. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 108, 112, 114-15. In November 2017, the trial court ordered the Bowen Center to complete a psychiatric evaluation of Wattley “for the purpose of making sentencing recommendations to the court.” Id. at 117. But Wattley either did not appear or refused to be evaluated. See id. at 121-22.

[3] A sentencing hearing was held in March 2018. Wattley's mother testified that Wattley had “mental health challenges and that medical providers have previously recommended that Wattley be assessed for a host of mental conditions.” Wattley v. State, No. 18A-CR-651, 2018 WL 4939347, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2018) (mem.). The trial court sentenced Wattley to an aggregate term of 12 years, with 8 years to serve and 4 years suspended to probation. Wattley appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to issue a sentencing statement. We found that the court erred in not issuing a statement but that the error was harmless because his sentence was not inappropriate. We noted that although Wattley alluded to “a history of bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, panic attacks,” and an “impulsivity control issue,” he “presented no evidence of a mental health diagnosis.” Id. at *5.

[4] While in prison, Wattley was charged with and pled guilty to Level 6 felony battery by bodily waste and Level 6 felony battery on a public safety official. See Cause No. 67D01-2201-F6-25.

[5] Wattley was released from prison and started probation in June 2024. Later that month, Wattley's probation was transferred from Allen County to Marion County, where his mother lived, as a “courtesy.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 193.

[6] On March 6, 2025, the Allen County probation department petitioned to revoke Wattley's probation, alleging that Wattley (1) did not “report for supervision as instructed”—his last phone contact was on February 13, 2025, and his last face-to-face contact was on September 5, 2024—and (2) did not complete treatment as ordered (either Thinking for a Change or Moral Reconation Therapy). Id. at 193, 198. The probation department had “no objection to alternative sentencing.” See id. at 198, 201. The trial court issued a warrant for Wattley's arrest.

[7] As it turned out, Wattley was going through a mental-health crisis during his period of non-compliance. On February 26, 2025, Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health filed an application in Marion County for Wattley's emergency detention based on his mental illness. See Cause No. 49D08-2502-MH-9457. On March 6—the same day the revocation petition was filed in Allen County—a Marion County court found that Wattley suffered from schizophrenia, concluded that he was “gravely disabled” as defined in Indiana Code section 12-7-2-96, and ordered him civilly committed at Fairbanks for a period not to exceed 90 days. Wattley was later transferred to Aspire. On April 17, he was arrested on the warrant in this case in Marion County and transported to the Allen County jail the next day.

[8] In May, Wattley's defense counsel in this case filed a motion to determine competency, alleging that Wattley was currently under a civil-commitment order in Marion County, that Wattley had refused to meet with him, and that he could not adequately prepare and represent Wattley due to his mental illness. The trial court found that Wattley was incompetent to assist in his defense and placed him in the custody of the Indiana Division of Mental Health and Addiction for competency-restoration services.

[9] Wattley was sent to Logansport State Hospital, which notified the trial court on January 30, 2026, that his competency had been restored. He was returned to the Allen County jail on February 9. The trial court held a status hearing on February 20, and Wattley admitted violating his probation. The court proceeded to address sanctions. Defense counsel argued that Wattley's violations were technical and that he had not committed any new offenses, that Wattley did not report for supervision or complete treatment due to his mental-health issues, and that Wattley was now medication-compliant and would live with his mother—a former Marion County probation officer—in Indianapolis. Defense counsel asked that Wattley be continued on probation. See Tr. pp. 13-14. The State had no recommendation and deferred to the trial court's discretion.

[10] The trial court revoked Wattley's probation and ordered him to serve his full suspended sentence of four years in prison. It explained that, once court supervision ends and Wattley “is out on his own, he chooses to not comply with any of the mental health recommendations that are made” and “chooses not to comply with taking his medication.” Id. at 14. The court observed that it could compel compliance “while they're at the jail” but “cannot make them do it while they're out on community supervision.” Id. It concluded that it was “out of tools” and had “nothing else” it could order to secure Wattley's treatment compliance. Id. at 18, 20. The court denied defense counsel's request for a two-week status setting to arrange community-corrections supervision.

[11] Wattley filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the trial court erred in “not considering the timing of [his] absences from probation meetings, which led to the filing of the revocation of his probation,” and that “[t]he missed meetings aligned with the deterioration of [his] mental health and the eventual Order for his Temporary Commitment.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 231. The court denied the motion without hearing, relying upon events that occurred before Wattley received mental-health services, such as his failures to meet with the Bowen Center and his criminal convictions for the batteries he committed in prison. See id. at 234. The court concluded:

The courts have committed a large amount of time and effort into helping the defendant maintain his mental health to no avail and with seemingly little help from the defendant himself. The Court's position is that no amount of additional community supervision will result in the defendant's compliance with mental health recommendations and compliance with the rules of probation.

Id.

[12] Wattley now appeals.

 Discussion and Decision

[13] Wattley contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve the entirety of his previously suspended four-year sentence for violating his probation. Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in determining the appropriate sanction for a probation violation, and we review only for an abuse of that discretion. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). That deference, however, is not without limit. Even a probationer who admits the allegations against him “must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation does not warrant revocation,” and automatic revocation “no matter the reason is constitutionally suspect.” Perez v. State, 279 N.E.3d 1066, 1069, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quotations omitted).

[14] Upon finding a violation, a trial court may (1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions; (2) extend the probationary period by not more than one year; or (3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). Incarceration for the full suspended term is thus the most severe sanction available, not the only sanction available.

[15] Wattley argues that because his probation violations were for failing to report for supervision and complete treatment during a well-documented mental-health decompensation for which he later received treatment, the trial court should have imposed a sanction commensurate with his violations rather than the entire suspended term. We agree.

[16] In Brown v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), we affirmed the revocation of probation based on missed appointments with a probation officer but reversed the trial court's order that the defendant serve the entire remaining suspended term. We held that “the selection of an appropriate sanction will depend upon the severity of the defendant's probation violation” and that, where the violations are “technical in nature, the trial court, in its discretion, may decide to continue the probationer on probation without modification.” Id. at 1184 (quotation omitted). We remanded with instructions to impose a sanction “commensurate with the severity” of the missed appointments. Id.

[17] We reached the same result in Perez, where the defendant admitted missing two appointments with his probation officer and the trial court ordered him to serve the entirety of his suspended sentence. We emphasized “the importance of individualized assessments in determining appropriate sanctions” and held that “even in the case of ‘technical’ violations,” the sanction must fit the seriousness of the conduct. Perez, 279 N.E.3d at 1070-71. Given “the less serious nature of the violations, the lack of additional misconduct, [and the defendant's] acceptance of responsibility,” we concluded that ordering the entire suspended sentence executed was an abuse of discretion because “[l]esser sanctions were available.” Id. at 1071. We remanded for the trial court to determine an appropriate sanction, “including consideration of alternatives.” Id.

[18] Wattley's case is similar to Brown and Perez. Wattley violated his probation by failing to report for supervision and complete treatment. These violations occurred during a well-documented mental-health decompensation for which Wattley was involuntarily committed, found incompetent to assist in his defense, and sent to the state hospital. As soon as he was returned to Allen County, Wattley admitted the violations. Notably, neither the prosecutor nor the probation department requested full execution of the suspended sentence. To be sure, Wattley's violations were not confined to missed appointments—he also failed to complete court-ordered treatment—and the record reflects a history of noncompliance that includes criminal convictions for conduct against prison staff. But the dispositive point is the undisputed connection between those violations and Wattley's mental illness: his failures to report for supervision and engage in treatment coincided with the very decompensation that led to his involuntary civil commitment and a finding that he was incompetent to assist in his defense. In other words, this is not a case in which a probationer invokes mental illness untethered to the conduct at issue. Although the trial court's observations about the large amount of time and effort the courts have spent on Wattley's mental illness are true, as Wattley points out, he has not been given an opportunity to comply with probation after receiving these mental-health services. Ordering Wattley to serve the entirety of his four-year suspended sentence, rather than a sanction commensurate with the nature of his violations, was an abuse of discretion. We therefore remand this case for the trial court to consider alternatives that are conditioned upon Wattley's compliance with mental-health treatment.

[19] Reversed and remanded.

Vaidik, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and May, J., concur.