Jennifer Sharpe, Appellant-Plaintiff v. LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jennifer Sharpe appeals the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Dolgencorp, LLC d/b/a Dollar General (“Dollar General”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 28, 2021, Sharpe slipped and fell on a patch of ice while on premises leased by Dollar General for one of its stores in Columbus, Indiana. On February 6, 2023, Sharpe filed her complaint for negligence against Dollar General. She alleged that she sustained permanent physical injuries as a result of Dollar General's negligence—specifically the alleged failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. On May 2, 2023, Dollar General filed its answer denying Sharpe's allegations and raising the affirmative defense that her “claims against [Dollar General] are barred by the statute of limitations.” Appellee's Appendix Volume II at 6.

[3] On August 6, 2025, Dollar General filed its Motion for Summary Judgment alleging in relevant part that summary judgment was appropriate because Sharpe “filed her Complaint after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, thus barring her claim.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 15. On October 6, 2025, Sharpe filed her response in opposition to Dollar General's motion and, on October 15, Dollar General filed its reply in support of its motion.

[4] The trial court held a summary judgment hearing on November 6, 2025. The court later issued an order entering summary judgment in favor of Dollar General. On December 8, 2025, Sharpe filed a Motion to Correct Error. The court held a hearing on February 12, 2026. On February 14, 2026, the trial court entered an order denying Sharpe's Motion to Correct Error stating, “[p]ursuant to the Plaintiff's Request during oral argument on 2/12/26, the Court clarifies that its summary judgment decision was based on the following: 1. The complaint was barred by the two year statute of limitations.” Id. at 8.

Discussion

[5] Sharpe challenges the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Dollar General. Our standard of review is well settled. Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ind. 2001). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of making a prima facie showing there is no genuine issue of material fact. Goodwin v. Yeakle's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016). Once met, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence of a genuine issue by setting forth specifically designated facts. Id. Our review is de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the nonmovant. Ind. Dep't of Ins. v. Doe, 247 N.E.3d 1204, 1210 (Ind. 2024) (citing Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014)).

[6] Statute of limitations defenses are “particularly appropriate for summary judgment determination.” City of Marion v. London Witte Grp., LLC, 169 N.E.3d 382, 390 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Stickdorn v. Zook, 957 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied). The party asserting the defense must make a prima facie showing that the action was commenced outside the statutory period by identifying “(1) the nature of the plaintiff's action, so that the relevant statute of limitations period may be identified; (2) the date the plaintiff's cause of action accrued; and (3) the date the cause of action was brought, being beyond the relevant statutory period.” Id. (quoting McMahan v. Snap On Tool Corp., 478 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). “If the moving party demonstrates these matters properly, the burden shifts to the opponent ‘to establish facts in avoidance of the statute of limitations defense.’ ” Id.

[7] Here, the applicable statute of limitations is provided by Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 which states that an action for “injury to person or character ․ must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues.” “[W]hen a cause of action accrues is generally a question of law.” City of Marion, 169 N.E.3d at 390 (quoting Cooper Indus., LLC v. City of South Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ind. 2009)). Sharpe asserts that, in entering summary judgment in Dollar General's favor, “the trial court misapplied [her] statute of limitations bar date pursuant to Indiana's ‘Discovery Rule.’ ” Appellant's Brief at 6 (emphasis and capitalization omitted).

[8] Pursuant to the discovery rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of ordinary diligence could have discovered, that she has been injured from tortious [or negligent] conduct. City of Marion, 169 N.E.3d at 390 (citing Wehling v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind. 1992)). “The discovery rule presents a limited exception to the requirement that a party must file suit within the statutory period.” Perryman v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 683, 689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Our courts have long held that a cause of action accrues when the resultant damage of a negligent act is ascertainable or by due diligence could be ascertained. Barnes v. A.H. Robins Co., 476 N.E.2d 84, 86 (Ind. 1985) (collecting cases).

[9] Sharpe alleges that she slipped and fell on January 28, 2021. Although Sharpe wants this Court to find that her cause of action did not accrue until the date she saw her orthopedic surgeon on February 11, 2021, this position is inconsistent with Indiana law as it is not necessary that the full extent of the damage be known or even ascertainable for the cause of action to accrue; it is sufficient that some ascertainable damage has occurred. See Riddle v. Khan, 168 N.E.3d 1017, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Indeed, “[t]he discovery rule is not intended to toll the limitation period until optimal litigation conditions can be established.” Rieth-Riley Const. Co. v. Gibson, 923 N.E.2d 472, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Rather, in a “typical personal injury claim,” such as in the present case, “the injury occurs at the time the negligent act is done, and the claimant is either aware of the injury or the cause of the injury.” Id.; Gray v. Benham, 280 N.E.3d 309, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).

[10] Nothing in the designated evidence suggests that Sharpe's claim is any different from the typical personal injury claim. It is undisputed that Sharpe was aware on January 28, 2021, that she had slipped and fallen. In a typical slip and fall scenario as occurred here, as the injury occurs at the time of the fall, the injury or cause of the injury was immediately ascertainable. Accordingly, the discovery rule does not apply to extend the limitation period and Sharpe had to commence her action based on the negligent conduct alleged in her complaint on or before January 28, 2023. As Sharpe did not file her complaint until February 6, 2023, more than two years after her alleged fall, summary judgment in favor of Dollar General is appropriate.¹

[11] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Dollar General.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because we affirm the entry of summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations, we need not address Dollar General's alternative argument that it is entitled to summary judgment because, as a mere tenant of the premises upon which Sharpe fell, it owed no duty of care to Sharpe.

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.