IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.A.G. (Minor Child) and M.W. (Mother) and C.G. (Father) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.W. (“Mother”) appeals the Knox Superior Court's order terminating her parental rights to her child, C.G. Specifically, Mother argues that the juvenile court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in C.G.’s best interests is not supported by its factual findings.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother gave birth to C.G. in July 2023 while under the influence of methamphetamine and marijuana.¹ Tr. p. 25. The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed C.G. from Mother's care at birth.² Thereafter, DCS filed a petition alleging that C.G. was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”).

[4] The juvenile court found that C.G. was a CHINS and ordered Mother to participate in numerous services including services aimed at addressing her substance abuse issues and inability to care for C.G. However, Mother continued to test positive for methamphetamine and THC. Mother also failed to maintain consistent contact with service providers and failed to complete substance abuse treatment and other programs aimed at improving her ability to parent her child.

[5] Mother had one sustained period of sobriety during the CHINS proceedings while she was pregnant with her third child, and C.G. was returned to her care for a trial home visit. But Mother relapsed in May 2025, and DCS ended the trial home visit. C.G. was in Mother's care for approximately eight weeks before the trial home visit ended. Also, while in Mother's care, C.G. missed First Steps appointments that were scheduled to take place in Mother's home, which also delayed C.G.’s evaluation for placement of tubes in her ears. Id. at 62.

[6] On July 1, the State charged Mother with Level 6 felony intimidation, which charge is still pending in Knox Circuit Court. That same day, the State filed a misdemeanor charge alleging that Mother operated a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance or its metabolite in her blood. Mother pleaded guilty to that offense and was ordered to serve 180 days on supervised probation.

[7] On August 28, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to C.G. because she continued to use illegal substances and was incapable of caring for C.G. Appellant's App. p. 16. During the termination fact-finding hearing held on October 27, Mother testified that she was on probation, that she has a pending criminal charge for intimidation, and that she had no income or employment. Tr. pp. 27-28. She also admitted that she was unable to support C.G. or provide a “safe and secure home” for her. Id. at 29, 34.

[8] Mother participated in substance abuse treatment programs but only completed one out of four programs. Mother failed to complete her last treatment program because she “needed something more ․” Id. at 31. Mother relapsed after participating in various treatment programs and continued to use methamphetamine and marijuana throughout these proceedings. A few days before the fact-finding hearing concluded on November 5, Mother entered a new drug treatment program with a minimum treatment period of nine months.

[9] Mother testified that she suffers from anxiety and depression, and she was participating in therapy. She also completed parenting classes, attended narcotics anonymous meetings, and worked with a peer recovery specialist. The family case manager testified that Mother was appropriately engaged with C.G. during visitations. Id. at 89.

[10] The Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) testified that C.G., who was twenty-eight months old at the time of the hearing, deserved a “safe, stable, permanent environment with a sober caregiver.” Id. at 122. She believed that terminating Mother's parental rights was in C.G.’s best interests. Id.

[11] The juvenile court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to C.G. on February 3, 2026. The court found that Mother had not remedied the reasons that C.G. was removed from her care. The court's findings described Mother's continued drug use and inability to support C.G. if the child was placed in her care. The court also found that termination of Mother's parental rights was in C.G.’s best interests because of Mother's continued struggles with substance abuse.

[12] Mother now appeals.³

Standard of Review

[13] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[14] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[15] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required, in relevant part, to prove that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2) to (c)(3) (2025).

[16] Moreover, DCS must prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances relevant here:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) to (d)(4). In this case, the juvenile court found that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in C.G.’s removal or the reasons for her placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied. Mother does not challenge that finding in this appeal.

[17] Finally, clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

The juvenile court's findings support its conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights was in C.G.’s best interests.

[18] In determining what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id.

[19] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed special advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[20] Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's factual findings. She argues only that those findings do not support the court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in C.G.’s best interests. Mother acknowledges her inability to maintain sobriety throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings, but notes that she had extended periods of sobriety during the CHINS proceedings and she has never given “up on trying to be the parent that [C.G.] needed her to be.” Appellant's Br. at 15.

[21] Although cited in her brief, Mother ignores the well-settled principle that when considering the totality of the evidence, the juvenile court is required to “ ‘subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.’ ” Id. at 14 (quoting Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d [41,] 49 [(Ind. 2019)]). C.G. was removed from Mother's care at birth because Mother was under the influence of methamphetamine and Mother admitted that she was unable to care for her child. Approximately twenty-eight months later, on the date of the termination fact-finding hearing, Mother continued to struggle with substance abuse, specifically methamphetamine and THC, and admitted that she did not have the current ability to care for her child. Mother's period of sobriety in 2025 allowed her to have C.G. in her care for eight weeks before she relapsed. While C.G. was in Mother's care, C.G. missed her First Steps appointments, which delayed C.G.’s evaluation to have tubes placed in her ears. In addition, the State charged Mother with two criminal offenses shortly after she relapsed in May 2025. Mother is also unemployed and has no income.

[22] Mother loves C.G. and is bonded with the child, but she does not have the ability or resources to be a parent to her. C.G., like every child, needs a stable home with a sober caregiver. The DCS service providers and CASA agreed that termination of Mother's parental rights was in C.G.’s best interests because Mother was unable to remedy the reasons C.G. was removed from her care. Mother was unable to make any significant progress towards remedying those issues in over two years during which DCS offered her numerous services and the ability to participate in several substance abuse treatment programs.

[23] The juvenile court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights was in C.G.’s best interests is supported by its factual findings, and, therefore, we affirm the order terminating Mother's parental rights to C.G.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   C.G.’s father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother has two other children who are also no longer in her care.

3.   The motions panel of our court granted Mother permission to file a belated notice of appeal after she failed to file her notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals by March 11, the last date to file the notice as allowed by Indiana Appellate Rule 9. Mother's trial counsel filed a notice of appeal and request for appointment of appellate counsel with the trial court clerk on February 27 but failed to file the notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals as required by Appellate Rule 9. On March 3, the trial court advised the State Public Defender that it would be appointing their office to represent Mother on appeal and that a notice of appeal had already been filed. Thereafter, an unidentified person advised the State Public Defender's Office that Mother had retained private appellate counsel. Before closing its case file in April, that Office checked the Appellate Docket and noted that Mother's appeal had not been filed. Subsequently, the trial court informed the State Public Defender that Mother had not retained private counsel, and the Public Defender filed an appearance on Mother's behalf.Presented with these facts, our motions panel granted Mother's request to file a belated notice of appeal. The State asks our court to revisit that ruling and dismiss Mother's fully briefed appeal. Although our court has inherent authority to revisit a decision of our motions panel, we decline to do so in this case. See Pryor v. State, 189 N.E.3d 167, 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (noting that this court has the inherent authority to reconsider a ruling by the motions panel).

Mathias, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.