MISKULIN v. OTOLARYNGOLOGY ASSOCIATES LLC (2026)

[1] Judiann Miskulin, M.D. (“Dr. Miskulin”), was an endocrine surgeon employed by Community Health Network, Inc. (“Community Network”) between 2016 and 2023 under a physician's services employment agreement (“Employment Contract”). The Employment Contract renewed automatically after its initial term and provided that either party could terminate it “upon giving the other party one hundred eighty (180) days prior written notice.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 4 at 109.) Otolaryngology Associates, LLC (“OA”), an independent ear, nose, and throat practice group, furnished physicians to Community Network under professional services agreements, and beginning in 2018 an OA physician shared Dr. Miskulin's office suite.

[2] In September 2023, Community Network terminated Dr. Miskulin's Employment Contract on 180 days’ notice. She sued OA for tortious interference with that contract, alleging that OA had spent years eroding her relationship with Community Network and had substantially and materially impaired her ability to perform. The Indiana Commercial Court granted OA summary judgment, and Dr. Miskulin now appeals. She contends that the Commercial Court erred in granting summary judgment on her tortious interference claim, and that it improperly credited the affidavit of Community Network executive John Kunzer, M.D., in doing so. We affirm.

 Facts and Procedural History

[3] Dr. Miskulin is a fellowship-trained endocrine surgeon and was the only endocrine surgeon employed by Community Network between 2016 and 2023.¹ In November 2016, she entered into the Employment Contract, and she began working at Community South Hospital (“Community South”) in March 2017. The Employment Contract provided for an initial three-year term of employment; thereafter, it automatically renewed each year unless terminated per the Employment Contract's terms. Another term provided that either party could terminate the Employment Contract “upon giving the other party one hundred eighty (180) days prior written notice,” and authorized Community Network, “in its discretion,” to

reduce or remove [Dr. Miskulin] from scheduling patients to ensure proper transitioning of patients during this one hundred eighty (180) day period; provided, however, that in such event, [Dr. Miskulin's] compensation shall continue at the rate determined immediately prior to the date on which the termination notice was given.

(Appellant's App. Vol. 4 at 109.)

[4] The Employment Contract was renewed four times. While employed at Community Network, Dr. Miskulin increased the annual volume of thyroid and parathyroid surgeries performed at Community South from around 20 to approximately 250, met her productivity goals every year, and remained profitable for Community Network.

[5] OA is a private otolaryngology practice that began providing physician services to Community Network in approximately 2009, under a professional services agreement that was amended in 2016 to include Community North Hospital (“Community North”) and Community East Hospital. In November 2018, Community Network and OA executed a second professional services agreement to include Community South. Under the second agreement, OA agreed to “provide continuous and uninterrupted coverage of Specialty Services for patients served by Community [Network]” and to “enhance patient care.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 5 at 5.) The agreements included language that OA would “[p]rovide input and consultation on practice location, employment decisions, and other significant operational issues” at Community Network, but also indicated “the final decisions w[ould] be made by Community [Network].” (Id. at 24.)

 The Shared Office Suite

[6] In 2018, Community Network assigned OA otolaryngologist Swapna Eisinger, M.D. (“Dr. Eisinger”), to work in the same office suite as Dr. Miskulin. The suite contained a single private physician's office. Community Network assigned that office to Dr. Miskulin and gave Dr. Eisinger a desk in the nurses’ office. Dr. Miskulin claimed that Dr. Eisinger's presence in the suite had a “tremendous effect from day one on [Dr. Miskulin's] ability to work in that office” with Dr. Eisinger and had disrupted Dr. Miskulin's practice. (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 183.) Dr. Miskulin also claimed that Dr. Eisinger “interfered” with Dr. Miskulin's “medical assistant's ability to perform her job, as well as with [Dr. Miskulin's] patients.” (Id.) Dr. Eisinger came to dislike Dr. Miskulin. On one occasion, Dr. Eisinger told one of Dr. Miskulin's patients that there was “no reason” to undergo a procedure Dr. Miskulin had recommended and attempted to cancel the procedure unilaterally. (Id. at 182.)

[7] The tension in the office suite came to a head on July 8, 2021. While Dr. Eisinger was at her desk in the nurses’ office, dictating her notes, Dr. Miskulin's medical assistant, Barbara Walker, answered a patient's telephone call in that office, which angered Dr. Eisinger. When Walker stated that “[i]t's a small office and we all have to try to share” (id. at 234), Dr. Eisinger began screaming at Walker and, using profanity, Dr. Eisinger pointed toward Dr. Miskulin's office and stated, “[w]ell, if someone else would [f***ing] share, we wouldn't have this problem.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 108.) Community Network investigated the incident and issued Walker a verbal warning.

[8] On July 20, 2021, OA's president, Dr. John Goldenberg, exchanged emails with Dr. Eisinger about the incident. Dr. Goldenberg advised Dr. Eisinger to apologize for using profanity and to take a behavior-management course. Dr. Goldenberg added that Community Network and OA were “working closely to separate the offices” and that “[i]f they move [Dr.] Miskulin/[Walker] out, then you will have the last laugh!” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 239.) Dr. Eisinger replied, “[F]rom what I understand, they are going to move [Walker/Dr. Miskulin] out so I guess I will have the last laugh when I'm sitting in that office she has continued to deny me use of.” (Id. at 241.) In January 2022, Dr. Goldenberg attended a meeting with Community Network administrators that included a discussion about moving Dr. Miskulin to a new office location, and the following month Community Network began that process.

[9] In the spring of 2023, Community Network moved Dr. Miskulin to an office located in a strip mall (“the strip-mall office”) that was a few minutes’ drive from her previous office suite. Dr. Eisinger remained in the suite the two physicians had previously shared. Dr. Miskulin's office telephone number remained with her previous office; her fax number was eventually transferred to the strip-mall office. As a result, patients and referring providers who called what they believed to be Dr. Miskulin's office instead reached the previous office suite that, after Dr. Miskulin's move, was staffed by OA, and OA did not always transfer those calls to Dr. Miskulin or provide Dr. Miskulin's new telephone number. Dr. Miskulin's patients also had difficulty locating the strip-mall office.

 The Community North Thyroid Cancer Clinic

[10] Before 2020, Dr. Miskulin and Community Network discussed plans to develop a thyroid cancer clinic to “streamline patient care[.]” (Id. at 188.) The plan advanced to a “very detailed” meeting with Community Network personnel. (Id. at 203.) No decision regarding the clinic was made at that time.

[11] In August 2020, Dr. Goldenberg began discussions with Community Network to develop a thyroid cancer center clinic at Community North. Although Dr. Goldenberg expressed in an email that he wanted to “enlist support from other high volume thyroid surgeons ․ such as [Dr. Miskulin],” he never contacted or included her. (Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 26.) When another Community Network physician told Dr. Goldenberg that the physician had already “discussed running a clinic with [Dr. Miskulin,]” Dr. Goldenberg responded that he was “leery of having too many chiefs in this process at one site” and that he envisioned a clinic located at Community North and a separate clinic on the south side that would pair Dr. Miskulin with a south-side endocrinologist. (Appellant's App. Vol. 5 at 37, 38.)

[12] Around January of 2022, Community Network informed Dr. Miskulin that Dr. Goldenberg would staff the Community North clinic. The Community South clinic never came to fruition. Community Network selected Dr. Goldenberg to staff the Community North clinic because Community Network had entered into an agreement with the MD Anderson Cancer Center and the Cancer Center required an MD Anderson-certified physician to staff the clinic. Dr. Miskulin was not then MD Anderson-certified, but she acquired her MD Anderson certification sometime in 2022.²

 The Termination

[13] In 2022, Community Network lost approximately $161 million on operations and investments, and in May 2023, the hospital announced a workforce restructuring. Community Network directed its product-line leaders to identify redundancies in the organization, and the leaders recommended terminating employment contracts with physicians in several practice areas. Dr. Shekar Narayanan, Community Network's physician executive for the surgery product line, determined that endocrine surgery, Dr. Miskulin's practice area, was not a “mandatory” service line. (Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 77.)

[14] Because Community Network was required to ensure continuity of patient care, any recommendation to terminate a physician was to be accompanied by a coverage plan. In May and June 2023, Dr. Narayanan spoke with three physicians, including Dr. Goldenberg, about their ability to absorb Dr. Miskulin's patients if Community Network terminated her. Each confirmed that they could absorb Dr. Miskulin's patients.

[15] In the summer of 2023, Dr. Narayanan advised Dr. Goldenberg that Community Network was planning to terminate Dr. Miskulin's employment. The two exchanged additional messages through June and July of 2023. On June 23, 2023, Dr. Narayanan wrote that “a decision [would] be made for sure by July 15” and that he “would be very surprised if the decision isn't what we both expect.” (Id. at 89.) Dr. Goldenberg followed up with Dr. Narayanan about the termination on at least four occasions.

[16] On July 25, 2023, Dr. John Kunzer, President of Community Physician Network and Executive Vice President of Community Network, sent an email to Community Network's employment termination panel recommending that Dr. Miskulin's employment be terminated without cause. Dr. Kunzer described the “reasoning” for the recommendation as “strategic[.] This physician is in a highly specialized area ․ that we are not looking to strategically grow.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 4 at 221-22.)

[17] On August 29, 2023, a Community Network employee informed Dr. Goldenberg that Dr. Miskulin would be terminated on September 5, 2023, and that OA could not communicate with her patients until then. Dr. Goldenberg heeded the directive. He responded to the Community Network employee with detailed instructions for redirecting Dr. Miskulin's patients.

[18] On September 5, 2023, Dr. Kunzer, Dr. Narayanan, and another Community Network employee met with Dr. Miskulin. Dr. Kunzer told her that Community Network was “going to let [her] go” and that Community Network did “not have to give [her] a reason, so [he was] not giving [her] one.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 177.) When she asked whether it concerned patient care, Dr. Narayanan replied, “the only thing I can tell you is that it had nothing to do with patient care.” (Id.) Dr. Kunzer provided Dr. Miskulin with a letter memorializing the termination, which was effective March 3, 2024, or 180 days from September 5, 2023. The letter informed Dr. Miskulin that her patients would be removed from her care immediately.³

[19] Once the meeting concluded, Dr. Narayanan sent a text message to Dr. Goldenberg, who replied that he would “rapidly distribute” Dr. Miskulin's patients to OA physicians. (Appellant's App. Vol. 4 at 209.) Approximately ninety-five percent of Dr. Miskulin's patients were transferred to OA physicians. Within hours, many of Dr. Miskulin's scheduled surgeries were cancelled and rescheduled with OA physicians.

 Proceedings Below

Dr. Miskulin filed her amended complaint against OA on May 10, 2024, alleging a single claim for tortious interference with contract.⁴ She alleged that OA intentionally interfered with her Employment Contract by:

a. Insisting that [OA's] personnel be co-located in Dr. Miskulin's office [suite];

b. Insisting that Dr. Miskulin's office be moved to a new location;

c. Insisting that surgical cases be referred to Dr. Goldenberg and Dr. Eisinger instead of Dr. Miskulin;

d. Blocking Dr. Miskulin from staffing the [thyroid cancer] clinic at Community North; and

e. Insisting that [Community Network] terminate Dr. Miskulin's employment contract.

(Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 29.) Dr. Miskulin further alleged that OA “undertook to induce [Community Network] to terminate [her] as an employee because of Dr. Eisinger's negative personal feelings toward Dr. Miskulin[,]” and because “OA could not meaningfully compete with Dr. Miskulin, who was trained and qualified to perform a broader array of surgical procedures than OA's physicians were.” (Id. at 28.) OA answered the amended complaint on May 30, 2024.

[20] On April 22, 2025, OA filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that Dr. Miskulin had failed to “produce evidence” that OA “had actual knowledge” of Dr. Miskulin's Employment Contract and its terms or that OA had “intentionally and unjustifiably induced a breach of the contract.” (Id. at 55.) OA supported its motion with deposition testimony from, among others, Dr. Miskulin, Dr. Goldenberg, Dr. Eisinger, and Dr. Narayanan, and with an affidavit provided by Dr. Kunzer. On June 5, 2025, Dr. Miskulin filed a response in opposition to OA's motion for summary judgment, and on July 7, 2025, OA filed a reply.

[21] The Commercial Court heard argument on the summary judgment motion on July 21, 2025. On August 18, 2025, the Commercial Court entered a ten-page order granting OA's motion, in which it found, in relevant part:

The parties dispute the requirements for a court to find an inducement to breach a contract. [OA] argues that [Dr. Miskulin] must show that [OA] took intentional steps to induce a breach of the agreement. [Dr. Miskulin] claims that the standard set out in [Levee v. Beeching, 729 N.E.2d 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000),] should be applied – that “frustrating an employee's expectations under her contract and making performance of her contractual duties more burdensome” is sufficient to find inducement to breach the agreement.

(Id. at 19) (internal citation omitted).

[22] The Commercial Court further found that “[o]n its face, there was no breach of the [Employment Contract]” because Community Network was “fully entitled to terminate Dr. Miskulin without cause so long as they provided her with 180 days’ notice and compensated her[,]” and that “[t]his situation is distinct from Levee[,] and the idea of frustrated expectations does not apply here.” (Id. at 19-20.) The court also found that there was “no evidence to support the conclusion that OA intentionally took actions with the goal of frustrating [Dr. Miskulin's] performance of her contractual duties[;]” “[a]ll actions taken with respect to Dr. Miskulin were taken by Community[ Network;]” “[t]here is no actual evidence that demonstrates OA had any involvement in those choices[;]” and “[t]he evidence presented is entirely speculative and does not rise to the level of creating a genuine issue of material fact.” (Id. at 21-22) (emphasis in original).

[23] The Commercial Court concluded that

[b]ased on the evidence on the record, there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding inducement of a breach of the contract – since there is no breach – or any lack of justification for any of OA's actions. The element requiring [OA's] knowledge of the contract is likely met, but that alone is insufficient to show tortious interference.

(Id. at 22.)

 Discussion and Decision

1. Summary Judgment

[24] We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009). “[T]he trial court's judgment arrives on appeal clothed with a presumption of validity, and the challenging party bears the burden of proving that the trial court erred[.]” Id. at 762 (internal quotations omitted). “[W]e will affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any theory supported by evidence in the record.” Woodruff v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin., 964 N.E.2d 784, 790 (Ind. 2012).

[25] Summary judgment should be entered only when the designated evidence demonstrates “there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Poiry v. City of New Haven, 113 N.E.3d 1236, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” City of Marion v. London Witte Grp., LLC, 169 N.E.3d 382, 390 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Williams, 914 N.E.2d at 761).

[26] The party that moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating “the absence of any genuine issue of fact” on a determinative issue, and then “the burden shifts to the non-movant to come forward with contrary evidence showing an issue for the trier of fact.” Poiry, 113 N.E.3d at 1239. When assessing the motion, we “view the pleadings and designated materials in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. We also construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. In so doing, “we give careful scrutiny to make sure the non-movant's day in court is not improperly denied.” Zaragoza v. Wexford of Ind., LLC, 225 N.E.3d 146, 151 (Ind. 2024) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1187 (Ind. 2016)). “Summary judgment is available when the nonmovant cannot prove its claim based on the undisputed evidence[.]” Cave Quarries, Inc. v. Warex LLC, 240 N.E.3d 681, 685 (Ind. 2024) (internal quotations omitted).

[27] Dr. Miskulin contends the Commercial Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of OA on her claim that OA tortiously interfered with her Employment Contract with Community Network. “Indiana has long recognized that intentional interference with a contract is an actionable tort, and includes any intentional, unjustified interference by third parties with an employment contract.” Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 (Ind. 1994). “The tort reflects the public policy that contract rights are property, and under proper circumstances, are entitled to enforcement and protection from those who tortiously interfere with those rights.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

[28] The elements of tortious interference with a contract are: “(1) a valid and enforceable contract existed; (2) defendant knew the contract existed; (3) defendant intentionally induced a breach of the contract; (4) defendant lacked justification for inducing the breach; and (5) defendant's unjustified inducement of the breach caused the plaintiff to suffer damages.” Diamond Quality, Inc. v. Dana Light Axle Prods., LLC, 256 N.E.3d 529, 533 (Ind. 2025) (citing Am. Consulting, Inc. v. Hannum Wagle & Cline Eng'g, Inc., 136 N.E.3d 208, 214 (Ind. 2019)). All of the elements must be shown to establish this tort. Id.

[29] A claim for tortious interference with an employment relationship can be maintained upon a contract terminable at will. Bradley v. Hall, 720 N.E.2d 747, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). “One who induces a party to a contract to break it, intending to injure another person or to get a benefit for himself, commits an actionable wrong unless there is sufficient justification for the interference.” Bragg v. City of Muncie, 930 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Whether the defendant harbored actual ill will towards the plaintiff is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether a defendant committed tortious interference. Allison v. Union Hosp., Inc., 883 N.E.2d 113, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[30] Here, the parties do not dispute that a valid and enforceable contract existed between Dr. Miskulin and Community Network. The parties maintain that resolution of this appeal turns on elements (2) through (4) – that is, whether OA knew the Employment Contract existed; whether OA intentionally induced a breach of the Employment Contract; and, if so, whether OA lacked justification for inducing the breach. To affirm the grant of summary judgment to OA, we need only address the element of justification.

[31] To determine whether a defendant's conduct is justified, we consider and balance seven factors: (1) the nature of the defendant's conduct; (2) the defendant's motive; (3) the plaintiff's interests with which the defendant's conduct interfered; (4) the interests the defendant sought to advance; (5) the social interests in protecting the defendant's freedom of action and the plaintiff's contractual interests; (6) the proximity or remoteness of the defendant's conduct to the interference; and (7) the relations between the parties. Diamond Quality, 256 N.E.3d at 533.

[32] The weight to be given each consideration may differ from case to case, but the overriding question is whether the defendant's conduct has been fair and reasonable under the circumstances. Bilimoria Comput. Sys., LLC v. Am. Online, Inc., 829 N.E.2d 150, 156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). This element is established only if the interferer acted intentionally, without a legitimate business purpose, and the breach is malicious and exclusively directed to the injury and damage of another. Id. (citations omitted). The existence of a legitimate reason for the defendant's actions provides the necessary justification to avoid liability. Id. (citation omitted).

[33] Here, the Commercial Court found OA's actions justified because the designated evidence “does not demonstrate any malicious act on behalf of” OA that would “indicate an unjustified interference.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 21.) The court further found that “[a]ll actions taken with respect to Dr. Miskulin were taken by Community [Network], from the decision regarding where her office was placed to the decision to terminate her employment.” (Id. at 21-22.) The court found that “[t]here is no actual evidence that demonstrates OA had any involvement in those choices, nor did any input from OA guide [Community Network's] decision-making process.” (Id. at 22.) The court added that, “[w]hile it is possible that doctors at OA disliked [Dr. Miskulin], that does not demonstrate malicious behavior on its own.” (Id.) We agree.

[34] The designated evidence shows that following the workspace incident, Community Network and OA worked to resolve it, and Dr. Goldenberg and Dr. Eisinger celebrated the possibility that Community Network would remove Dr. Miskulin from the office suite. However, under OA's professional services agreements with Community Network, OA agreed to “[p]rovide input and consultation on practice location, employment decisions, and other significant operational issues,” while Community Network retained final decision-making authority. (Appellant's App. Vol. 5 at 24.) Accordingly, OA's request that Community Network address the workplace issue was well within its contractual obligation to Community Network. Furthermore, Community Network – not OA – ultimately decided to move Dr. Miskulin to the strip-mall office. While the record, indeed, reflects interpersonal conflict – and that Dr. Eisinger disliked Dr. Miskulin – Dr. Eisinger's request for adequate workspace and OA's request to separate physicians who could not work together were ordinary workplace requests, not conduct that was “malicious and exclusively directed” at injuring Dr. Miskulin. Am. Consulting, 136 N.E.3d at 215.

[35] The designated evidence also shows that early in her tenure at Community Network, Dr. Miskulin discussed staffing a thyroid cancer clinic – first at Community North and later at Community South – however, the plans never materialized. Community Network later included Dr. Goldenberg in the discussions and ultimately decided he would staff the Community North clinic. Community Network selected Dr. Goldenberg in part because he was certified by MD Anderson, while Dr. Miskulin was not. Although Dr. Goldenberg had extensive discussions with Community Network about developing the clinics, including his concern about having “too many chiefs in this process at one site” (Appellant's App. Vol. 5 at 37), those discussions reflect legitimate efforts to advance his and OA's professional interests in staffing the northside clinic, not malice toward Dr. Miskulin. Simply put, Community Network made the staffing decisions, and Dr. Goldenberg and OA's actions regarding the clinic were for legitimate business purposes and did not rise to the level of malicious conduct exclusively directed at injuring Dr. Miskulin.

[36] As for Dr. Goldenberg's and OA's actions leading up to Community Network's decision to terminate Dr. Miskulin's Employment Contract, the designated evidence shows that Community Network's financial losses and subsequent restructuring prompted product-line leaders to identify redundancies, and Dr. Miskulin's product line was flagged. The evidence also shows that Community Network – not OA – decided to terminate Dr. Miskulin, and Community Network initiated communications with OA about coverage for Dr. Miskulin's patients after the termination. Dr. Narayanan – a Community Network physician – continued discussions with Dr. Goldenberg about Dr. Goldenberg's ability to absorb Dr. Miskulin's patient load, as well as OA's ability to provide oncology surgeon staffing for Community South.

[37] The designated evidence shows that Dr. Goldenberg's involvement was limited to coverage planning and transition logistics – actions that served the continuity of patient care. That Dr. Goldenberg and OA were willing and able to step in and care for Dr. Miskulin's patients after her termination did not show that their actions were unjustified and motivated by anything other than legitimate business concerns.

[38] OA successfully negated the absence-of-justification element of Dr. Miskulin's claim that OA tortiously interfered with her Employment Contract. Therefore, the Commercial Court did not err by granting summary judgment in OA's favor on her tortious interference claim.

2. Consideration of Affidavit

[39] Dr. Miskulin challenges the Commercial Court's reliance upon Dr. Kunzer's affidavit, which OA had designated to support its summary judgment motion. Dr. Miskulin contends that the affidavit is “disputed, inconsistent, and unreliable” (Appellant's Br. at 47) and “makes several broad statements” that are contradicted by evidence Dr. Miskulin designated in opposition to OA's summary judgment motion. (Id. at 43.) OA, on the other hand, argues that Dr. Miskulin has waived this issue for our review by failing to raise the issue in the Commercial Court. We agree with OA.

[40] To avoid waiver, “a party in summary judgment proceedings who believes that the opposing party has filed a problematic affidavit has a duty to direct the trial court's attention to the allegedly defective affidavit.” A House Mechanics, Inc. v. Massey, 124 N.E.3d 1257, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “An affidavit which does not satisfy the requirements of [Indiana Trial Rule] 56(E) is subject to a motion to strike, and formal defects are waived in the absence of a motion to strike or other objection.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).

[41] Dr. Miskulin did not move to strike or otherwise object to the affidavit and did not contend that the affidavit failed to satisfy the requirements of Trial Rule 56(E).⁵ She maintains, however, that she preserved this issue for our review when she argued in her response to OA's summary judgment motion that parts of Dr. Kunzer's affidavit were “suspect[,]” inconsistent, and contradicted by other designated evidence. (Appellant's Reply Br. at 23.) However, arguing that the affidavit contains “inconsistencies and contradictions” that the Commercial Court should not have accepted “at face value” is not the same thing as moving to strike the affidavit or otherwise raising a specific objection about a defective affidavit. (Id. at 24). Dr. Miskulin did not move to strike Dr. Kunzer's affidavit. Accordingly, she has waived this argument for our review.

 Conclusion

[42] The Commercial Court did not err by granting summary judgment to OA on Dr. Miskulin's claim of tortious interference with her Employment Contract, and Dr. Miskulin's challenge to Dr. Kunzer's affidavit – as being improperly credited by the Commercial Court – is waived. Accordingly, we affirm the Commercial Court's judgment.

[43] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Endocrine surgeons focus their practice on diseases of the thyroid, parathyroid, and adrenal glands.

2.   It is unclear from the record when the Community North thyroid cancer clinic opened or when Community Network entered the partnership with MD Anderson Cancer Center.

3.   Community Network paid Dr. Miskulin's salary through the 180-day period.

4.   Dr. Miskulin's original complaint had also included a claim for tortious interference with an employment relationship.

5.   Indiana Trial Rule 56(E) requires that an affidavit “shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.