Olubunmi Alice Kujore, Appellant-Petitioner v. Ademola Kujore, Appellee-Respondent (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Olubunmi Alice Kujore (“Mother”) and Ademola Kujore (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) were married in 2002 and welcomed children A.K. in 2003, Ti.K. in 2005, and T.K. in 2011.¹ Mother petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in January 2024, which the trial court granted. Mother raises multiple issues regarding the trial court's order, which we restate as:

1. Did the trial court clearly err in ordering joint legal custody of T.K.?

2. Did the trial court clearly err in calculating weekly gross income, parenting time, and the percentage share of certain expenses?

3. Did the trial court clearly err in finding Father had no child support arrearage?

4. Did the trial court clearly err in dividing the marital estate?

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Parents married in Nigeria in 2002, and the family resided with maternal grandmother there. Father moved to Indiana in 2017. Mother and the three children followed the year after. The family settled in Avon where Parents bought the marital home. Father worked in manufacturing. Mother was also employed outside the home, and she founded the real estate company Dominion Property Solutions, LLC (“Dominion Property”).

[4] Father moved out of the marital home in August 2022. At the time of separation, Parents’ oldest child, A.K., attended Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis (“IUPUI”). Father paid his tuition.

[5] In November, Mother's company purchased a property in Plainfield that she hoped to resell for a profit. A month later, Mother's company sold a previously acquired property in Clayton.

[6] Mother filed a verified petition for legal separation in March 2023. That fall, Ti.K. began her studies at Indiana University in Bloomington (“IU Bloomington”). Father paid the costs of her attendance at IU Bloomington and stopped paying for A.K.’s tuition at IUPUI. In January 2024, Mother filed a motion converting her legal separation petition to one for dissolution of marriage.

[7] The trial court held a dissolution hearing on October 3, 2025. Mother and Father stipulated to the admission of their individual child support worksheets. Mother petitioned the court for, among other things, sole legal and physical custody of their youngest child, T.K.; sole possession of the marital home; Father to receive sole possession of property in Nigeria; an order establishing Father's child support obligation; and each party to be responsible for debts in their own name. In addition, Mother provided testimony regarding Father committing alleged acts of domestic violence. Mother testified she had no communication with Father.

[8] For his part, Father asked the trial court for joint legal custody of T.K.; parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), plus time on extended weekends and school breaks; and an equitable division of property owned in Indiana and Nigeria. Father testified he had no problem communicating with Mother about T.K. through a court-approved phone application.²

[9] The trial court issued a decree dissolving the marriage on October 6, but property and child issues remained under advisement. In a subsequent order, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law at Mother's request. The trial court found, in relevant part:

1. Father and Mother were married on or about November 12, 2002.

2. Parties legally separated on or about March 30, 2023.

3. Parties have three (3) children, only one (1) of which is the subject of custody, parenting time and child support issues, this child is [T.K.]. The middle child is emancipated, but in college.

4. On March 30, 2023, Mother filed her Verified Petition for Legal Separation and later converted the action to a dissolution of marriage.

5. Father moved out of the marital residence ․ in August of 2022.

6. Since that time, Mother has solely contributed to the mortgage payment of $1,435.00 and other household expenses, as well as daily care costs for [T.K.].

7. Since separation, [T.K.] has been living primarily with Mother.

8. Between the time of separation and March 2023, Father did not exercise regular parenting time with [T.K.].

9. Father has had no ordered child support obligation since separation and has made no child support payments to Mother.

10. Parties do not communicate with one another, originally due to a Protective Order and more recently by their personal choice.

11. Mother makes decisions relating to the care of [T.K.] and Father makes decisions relating to the post-secondary education of Parties’ middle child (emancipated, but still in college).

12. Father solely pays post-secondary tuition for middle child attending IU Bloomington full time, but the amount of tuition is unknown. Father also paid for the oldest child's post-secondary education at IUPUI.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 6–7. The court concluded in part

14. It is in the best interest of [T.K.] the parties share joint legal custody[.]

15. It is in the best interest of [T.K.] Mother have primary physical custody. Child has primarily lived with Mother and his older siblings and there was no evidence ․ presented to indicate to this Court that [T.K.] is not well adjusted to this home and community.

16. Father's parenting time shall be every other weekend (Friday after school to Sunday evening at 5:00pm) and one half (1/2) of fall, winter and spring school breaks. Father shall also have parenting time with child every Wednesday after school until 7:00pm. Holidays and special days consistent with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.

17. When Father is not picking up [T.K.] from school, he shall pick up and drop off [T.K.] in Mother's driveway without exiting the vehicle. If Mother is home at the time of pick up or drop off, she is to remain in the house behind a closed door where she cannot be seen from the driveway and to not engage in conversation or communication with Father.

18. Father and Mother [are] to communicate using Our Family Wizard ․ or another app used for the purpose of communicating about [T.K.][.]

19. Father's weekly child support obligation is One Hundred and Five Dollars ($105)․

20. Mother shall continue to maintain health insurance [for T.K.]. Uninsured medical expenses shall be divided among the parties with Father paying fifty-one percent (51%) and Mother paying forty-nine percent (49%)․

21. Father and Mother shall divide [T.K.’s] extra-curricular expenses with Father paying fifty-one percent (51%) and Mother paying forty-nine percent (49%)․

***

25. With the exception of the mortgage, there was no evidence of marital debt except that it exists. The Court finds each party shall each be responsible for debt incurred in their own names. Further, each party shall be responsible for debt they incurred after the date of separation in the name of the other person.

***

28. Wife shall retain sole ownership of Dominion Property Solutions, LLC, and shall be responsible for any debt associated with the company because the company has been solely under her control since the date of separation and no evidence of the amount of any debt was offered.

29. Neither party presented any evidence of the value of the four (4) properties in Nigeria. The court having found equal distribution of the marital assets is fair, now orders all four (4) properties to be sold and the net proceeds to be distributed equally between Father and Mother.

30. Wife shall pay Father the sum of Forty-Two Thousand Six Hundred and Ninety-Seven Dollars ($42,697) as Father's one-half share of the sale of the real estate made through Mother's business. Said payment shall be made no later than January 31, 2026.

31. Having no actual evidence on expenses paid by Father or Mother, and both believing they paid the majority of expenses prior to and after the separation, the Court finds the parties paid an equal amount toward the expenses of the marital home and [T.K.]

***

48. The Court has considered all the testimony and evidence regarding the marital residence, proceeds/debts from Dominion Property Solutions, credit card debt, checking accounts, tuition expenses, and any potential ownership of property in Nigeria and includes all of these in the Court's consideration of the value of the marital pot.

49. The Court has also considered all the statutorily required factors for determining if and when an unequal division of the marital pot is warranted.

50. The Court cannot assign values to the properties in Nigeria when no evidence was offered and their state and ownership is unclear. However, the Court has heard testimony and judged the credibility of the witnesses given and has used best judgment in this area.

Id. at 7–15.

Standard of Review

[10] In reaching its decision, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A) at Mother's request. When a trial court issues special findings and conclusions under Trial Rule 52, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: we determine first whether the evidence supports the findings and, if so, whether the findings support the judgment. Town of Linden v. Birge, 204 N.E.3d 229, 233 (Ind. 2023). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility, and we will not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Findings are clearly erroneous if the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them. State v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 51 N.E.3d 150, 158 (Ind. 2016). A judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. Id.

[11] Together with the standard of review under Trial Rule 52, we give considerable latitude and deference to the determinations of our trial court judges in family law matters. Pilkington v. Pilkington, 227 N.E.3d 885, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024); see also In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 178 (Ind. 1993). An appellate court is “in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence[.]” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 210 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 1965)). “On appeal it is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by the appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016). “Appellate judges are not to reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011).

1. The trial court did not clearly err in ordering joint legal custody of T.K.

[12] Mother first argues the trial court erred when it ordered joint legal custody of T.K. Mother argues the court's best interest determination is not supported by the evidence. See Appellant's Br. at 26. According to Mother, she provided testimony regarding Father's alleged history of domestic violence and her difficulties communicating with him. Id. Mother therefore contends Father “has created an insurmountable battleground” making joint legal custody impossible. Id. at 27.

[13] “Trial courts have discretion in both initial custody and modification of custody determinations, and we review those determinations for an abuse of discretion.” In re Paternity of I.P., 148 N.E.3d 1098, 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Joint legal custody means “the persons awarded joint custody will share authority and responsibility for the major decisions concerning the child's upbringing, including the child's education, health care, and religious training.” Ind. Code § 31-9-2.1-140 (2026).

[14] In initial custody decisions, both parents are presumed equally entitled to custody, and the court shall “enter a custody order in accordance with the best interests of the child.” I.C. § 31-17-2-8 (2017). The court shall consider all relevant factors in determining the child's best interests, including:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parent or parents;

(B) the child's sibling; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.

(5) The child's adjustment to the child's:

(A) home;

(B) school; and

(C) community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

Id.

[15] Further, “the court shall consider it a matter of primary, but not determinative, importance that the persons awarded joint custody have agreed to an award of joint legal custody.” I.C. § 31-17-2-15 (2008). And the court also considers:

(1) the fitness and suitability of each of the persons awarded join custody;

(2) whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child's welfare;

(3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age;

(4) whether the child has established a close and beneficial relationship with both of the persons awarded joint custody;

(5) whether the persons awarded joint custody:

(A) live in close proximity to each other; and

(B) plan to continue to do so; and

(6) the nature of the physical and emotional environment in the home of each of the persons awarded joint custody.

Id. Joint custody is inappropriate where the parties have made child-rearing a battleground and cannot cooperate to advance the child's best interests. Holstein v. Holstein, 283 N.E.3d 233, 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026).

[16] In this case, the parties did not agree on joint custody. Mother testified she wishes to have physical and legal custody of T.K.; Father requested joint legal custody. Mother's argument against joint legal custody rests largely on her allegations of domestic violence. She testified about alleged instances when Father was physically abusive toward her in front of T.K. The trial court's order did not explicitly address Mother's allegations of domestic violence.

[17] Even so, the court ordered Father to remain in his vehicle when picking up and dropping off T.K. from Mother's home. And if Mother is home on these occasions, the court ordered her to remain “in the house” and not to “engage in conversation” with Father. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 8. The court ordered Parents to use Our Family Wizard or a similar tool “for the purpose of communicating about” T.K. Id. Father testified he has a close relationship with T.K., and he lives only ten minutes from the marital home. He testified he had “no problem” communicating with Mother concerning T.K. Tr. Vol. 2 at 95–96. The trial court found T.K. is well-adjusted to his home and community. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 8. The court's order indicates it analyzed the relevant factors to a joint custody determination and found joint legal custody was appropriate and in T.K.’s best interests. The trial court weighed the evidence and concluded child-rearing was not a battleground. In light of the substantial deference afforded to courts in custody decisions, the trial court's determination to award joint legal custody was not clearly erroneous.

2. The trial court did not clearly err in calculating weekly gross income, but we remand for clarification of summer parenting time and the percentage share of certain expenses.

[18] Mother presents several claims challenging the trial court's award of child support. See Appellant's Br. at 19–20. Mother first argues the trial court's weekly gross income calculation is unsupported by the evidence. She also argues the court miscalculated the parenting time credit awarded to Father. Third, Mother asserts the trial court erred in dividing the share of T.K.’s uninsured medical expenses between her and Father.

[19] “A trial court's calculation of child support is presumptively valid.” Morris v. White, 281 N.E.3d 567, 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting Young v. Young, 891 N.E.2d 1045, 1047 (Ind. 2008)). We will reverse a trial court's decision only if it is clearly erroneous: where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Young, 891 N.E.2d at 1047. “Child support awards are designed to provide the children as closely as possible with the same standard of living they would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved.” Bussert v. Bussert, 677 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied.

[20] There is a rebuttable presumption in proceedings for child support that the amount resulting from application of the Indiana Child Support Guidelines is the correct amount of support to be ordered. Stanke v. Schmitt, 273 N.E.3d 89, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). The Guidelines offer both structure and flexibility for trial courts “to set and modify child support obligations in ways tailored to the circumstances of the parties before them.” Johnson v. Johnson, 999 N.E.2d 56, 57 (Ind. 2013). Although courts must consider certain processes and factors, “there remains a degree of latitude within which a court may fashion an order that best meets the needs of the child and also reflects the financial realities of the parents.” Id.

A. Income calculation

[21] Each parent's weekly gross income is the starting point for determining a child support obligation under the Guidelines. Stanke, 273 N.E.3d at 95. Weekly gross income is defined as “actual weekly gross income of the parent if employed to full capacity, potential income if unemployed or underemployed, and the value of in-kind benefits received by the parent.” Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A)(1) (2024). Parental income broadly includes, but is not limited to, “income from salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, overtime, partnership distributions, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, annuities, structured settlements, capital gains, social security benefits, worker's compensation benefits, unemployment insurance benefits, disability insurance benefits, gifts, inheritance, prizes, and alimony or maintenance received.” Id. Because the Child Support Obligation Worksheet trial courts use does not include a space to calculate weekly gross income, the calculation is done separately, and the total is entered on the worksheet. Child Supp. G. 3(A) Cmt. § 2.

[22] As an initial matter, Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting “unsigned and unverified child support worksheets” in contravention of the Guidelines. Appellant's Br. at 30; see also Child Supp. G. 3(B)(1) (requiring both parties submit signed worksheets). But Mother and Father stipulated to the admission of their respective child support worksheets. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 4; see also id. at 11 (Mother's counsel on direct, inquiring, “And we've submitted to the [c]ourt a proposed child support worksheet with your paystubs. Right? These were the exhibits that we stipulated to.”); Ex. Vol. 3 at 15–16, 145–46. “A stipulation establishes a particular matter as a fact.” Stanke, 273 N.E.3d at 99. It is an “express waiver by the parties and their counsel of the intended issues.” Id. Although we do not condone admission of unsigned child support worksheets, the parties agreed to proceed accordingly. Mother cannot now appeal on this basis. Cf. Hedrick v. Gilbert, 17 N.E.3d 321, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding the father's “tacit agreement” to proceed without a verified worksheet constituted waiver of his right to appeal on that issue).

[23] At the dissolution hearing, Mother testified she earned fifteen dollars per hour from her job. Her child support worksheet indicated a weekly gross income of $1,019.65. In her appellate brief, Mother claims a weekly gross income of $1,430.40. Appellant's Br. at 30. Mother's paystubs indicate her employer uses a semi-monthly salary schedule. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 102–07. Her most recent paystub shows a year-to-date gross income of $21,456.00. Ex. Vol. 3 at 6. Father divides this figure by 13 (the number of weeks from the start of the year through the end of the pay period), which results in a weekly gross income of $1,650.46. See Appellee's Br. at 22. Mother's calculation divides the year-to-date gross income by two additional weeks, seemingly including days up to the date when the check was issued. See Appellant's Reply Br. at 11. Father's calculation of Mother's income leads to the “exact amount entered by the trial court as [her] gross weekly income on the Child Support Worksheet.” Appellee's Br. at 22; see also Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 34. The court simply did its calculations separately and entered the total on the worksheet. See Child Supp. G. 3(A) Cmt. § 2. As for Father's weekly gross income, Mother acknowledges the court's calculation of his weekly gross income is “very close to the documented evidence[.]” Appellant's Br. at 31. On these facts, the trial court did not clearly err in calculating Parents’ weekly gross income.

B. Parenting time credit calculation

[24] Mother argues the trial court incorrectly calculated Father's parenting time credit. Mother specifically argues the trial court assigned Father a range of 101–105 overnights, causing Father to “receive a higher credit which lowered his weekly support obligation.” Id. at 33. Father argues the evidence supports the credit award, particularly when accounting for summer parenting time. See Appellee's Br. at 26. However, because the trial court did not include a provision for summer parenting time, Father suggests remand is appropriate with instructions to the court to “enter language awarding [him] parenting time for half the summer break as that is clearly what the trial court intended.” Id. at 27.

[25] Indiana Child Support Guideline 6 provides, “A credit should be awarded for the number of overnights each year that the child(ren) spend with the noncustodial parent.” See also Child Supp. G. 3(G)(4) (parenting time credit). Father testified he exercised more parenting time than the Guidelines provide, including “[a]lmost half of the summer break[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 73. Mother acknowledged Father exercised additional parenting time, “[o]nce or twice” during holidays and during T.K.’s summer break. Id. at 48. The trial court determined Father shall receive parenting time of every other weekend and “one half (1/2) of fall, winter and spring school breaks.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 8. And the court awarded Father credit for 101–105 overnights—without specifying summer parenting time in its order. We remand for the trial court to clarify whether it intended to award Father summer parenting time and, if necessary, to recalculate his overnight credit accordingly.

C. Share of expenses

[26] Mother argues the trial court erred when it calculated each party's obligations toward T.K.’s annual uninsured medical expenses. See Appellant's Br. at 35–36. The trial court ordered Father to be responsible for fifty-one percent of T.K.’s uninsured medical expenses and Mother for forty-nine percent. As Mother points out, the trial court's order reversed the contribution percentages calculated on its own child support worksheet. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 34. Father agrees the court intended to use the percentages in its child support worksheet. See Appellee's Br. at 27–28. Father contends remand is appropriate for the court to either modify the judgment or explain why it deviated from its child support worksheet. We agree remand is warranted for the trial court to clarify the percentage share of T.K.’s uninsured health care expenses for each parent.

3. The trial court did not clearly err in finding Father owed no child support arrearage.

[27] Mother next argues the trial court erred in finding Father owed no child support arrearage. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court's order specifically referenced Finding 20, which concerns health care insurance coverage for T.K. and division of his medical expenses. According to Mother, Finding 20 “would not be a permissible reason to reduce, annul, or vacate [Father's] accrued support obligation.” Appellant's Br. at 38. Accordingly, Mother asks this Court to vacate the court's order and remand for a determination of Father's “support obligation for the children to [Mother's] initial date of filing.” Id.

[28] “Decisions regarding child support matters are within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Campbell v. Campbell, 250 N.E.3d 459, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). An initial child support order can be retroactive to the date of the petition for dissolution. Boone v. Boone, 924 N.E.2d 649, 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Until a dissolution petition is filed, parents are free to decide between themselves financial matters involving children. Id. at 654–55. After support obligations have accumulated, a court may not retroactively reduce or eliminate a party's obligations. Dickerson v. Toney, 253 N.E.3d 1159, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied; see also Whited v. Whited, 859 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Ind. 2007). We will reverse a trial court's decision only for an abuse of its discretion or if the court's determination is contrary to law. In re Paternity of D.L., 938 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[29] Father moved out of the marital home in August 2022. At the time, A.K. was enrolled in college, attending IUPUI. Father paid for his tuition. Mother filed a petition for legal separation in March 2023, where she asked the trial court for an order requiring child support for the two minor children—T.K. and Ti.K. Father stopped paying for A.K.’s tuition in the same year because he began paying for Ti.K. to attend IU Bloomington. In January 2024, Mother filed a verified motion converting her legal separation petition to one for dissolution of marriage. She asked the court for an order requiring child support, and by then only T.K. remained a minor.

[30] There was no court order establishing Father's support obligations prior to the dissolution decree. At the dissolution hearing, Father testified he and Mother agreed after their separation to offset at least some of his child support obligations because he alone had paid tuition fees for the two older children. He asked the trial court to do the same in the future. On appeal, Father argues the court's reference to Finding 20 was a mistake. Appellee's Br. at 30. At any rate, other findings support the trial court's conclusions. In Finding 22, the court determined Father unilaterally paid for Ti.K.’s college expenses. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 9. Moving forward, the court ordered Father to continue paying her education costs. But the trial court appropriately declined to offset any of his future child support obligations. See Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ind. 2013) (explaining a custodial parent holds support payments in trust for the benefit of the child). And in Finding 31, the court determined the parties “paid an equal amount” concerning T.K.’s expenses. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 11. Based on the circumstances before it, the trial court did not clearly err in finding Father owed no child support arrearage.

4. The trial court did not clearly err in dividing the marital estate.

[31] Lastly, Mother argues the trial court erred when dividing the marital estate. First, Mother asserts the court erroneously included four properties in Nigeria as part of the marital pot. See Appellant's Br. at 39–40. Second, Mother claims the court erred “when it valued and divided the marital assets without considering the attached debt” from her real estate business. Id. at 40.

[32] We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a trial court's division of marital assets. Roetter v. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d 221, 225 (Ind. 2022); see also Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (reviewing a trial court's determination in ascertaining the value of property in a dissolution action for an abuse of discretion), trans. denied. “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision stands clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or reasonable inferences, if it misinterprets the law, or if it overlooks evidence of applicable statutory factors.” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 225. If a party fails to present evidence as to the value of assets, we will presume the court's decision is proper. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d at 539. “In reviewing a trial court's disposition of marital assets, we focus on what the court did and not on what it could have done.” Gatton v. Gatton, 249 N.E.3d 626, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[33] Trial courts “shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable.” I.C. § 31-15-7-5 (1997). A party may rebut this presumption by presenting relevant evidence that an equal division would not be just and reasonable, including evidence of the following factors:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property, regardless of whether the contribution was income producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the disposition of the property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just to the spouse having custody of any children.

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the parties.

Id. Typically, the marital estate closes the day the petition for dissolution is filed. Dierckman v. Dierckman, 225 N.E.3d 185, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[34] In Indiana, the division of the marital estate requires two steps: (1) the trial court must identify the property to include in the marital estate; and (2) the court must then distribute the property in a just and reasonable manner. Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 226–27. Both assets and liabilities are included. Id. at 227; see also I.C. § 31-15-7-4 (1997) (governing division of property in dissolution proceedings). The party challenging the trial court's division of the marital estate “must overcome a strong presumption that the court considered and complied with the applicable statute.” Roetter, 182 N.E.3d at 225.

A. Nigerian properties

[35] Mother challenges the trial court's inclusion of several properties in Nigeria as part of the marital estate. Mother and Father testified they acquired a building in Lagos and land in Oyo State while married. Yet Mother and Father offered conflicting testimony regarding their stake in additions made to a building owned by maternal grandmother. Father testified the parties built a poultry house, a shop, and a cold room there. Mother testified the additional structures existed before they were married. The trial court found “[n]either party presented any evidence of the value” of the Nigerian assets. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 10. If the parties have ownership over them, the court ordered the parties to sell the properties and distribute the proceeds evenly. The trial court did not clearly err in including the Nigerian properties in the marital pot and ordering an equal distribution of proceeds from their sale.

[36] Still, Mother contends because there was no evidence the parties ever owned the poultry house, the shop, or the cold room, the court “erroneously included [this] property in the ․ marital estate[.]” Appellant's Br. at 40. But as Father counters, “Mother suffered no harm” with the inclusion of these structures in the marital pot. Appellee's Br. at 36. If the parties own the structures, “then each [party] will receive half of the proceeds” from their sale. Id. If the opposite is true, then no party will benefit. Any error in the trial court's ruling is harmless. See Balicki, 837 N.E.2d at 541 (stating errors in the division of marital assets may be considered harmless); see also Gatton, 249 N.E.3d at 638 (declining to reverse where the trial court's alleged error was at most de minimis).

B. Mother's debt

[37] Mother likewise challenges the trial court's finding there was no evidence of marital debt other than the mortgage, supposedly failing to make a finding about her company's debt. See Appellant's Br. at 40–41. She argues the court abused its discretion in ordering an equal division of proceeds from two Indiana properties her business sold “without considering the debt [she] accrued to manage the properties through the business.” Id. at 41.

[38] Mother testified she founded Dominion Property before the parties separated. The business acquired two properties in 2022—the first in February, and the second in November—which Mother sold in subsequent years. The trial court included the proceeds from these sales in the marital estate. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 11. Mother testified she accumulated debt because the properties her business acquired needed renovations before they could be sold. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 15, 28. As evidence, Mother submitted a company credit card statement from August 2023 which showed a balance of $34,779. Ex. Vol. 3 at 137. The trial court found “there was no evidence of marital debt[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 10. The court ordered Mother to be responsible for any debt associated with her business because it was “solely under her control since the date of separation[.]” Id.

[39] Mother contends the trial court erred because the debt shown on her credit card statement “should have been deducted from the property sales[.]” Appellant's Br. at 41. But as Father argues, finding Mother incurred this debt to pay for renovations amounts to “nothing more than mere speculation.” Appellee's Br. at 40. In the absence of evidence demonstrating when or how Mother incurred the debt—as reflected on a company credit card statement after the parties separated—the trial court did not clearly err in declining to include such liability in the marital pot. See Crider v. Crider, 26 N.E.3d 1045, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (construing the date husband filed for legal separation as the date the marital pot closed); see also Michaels v. Michaels, No. 25A-DN-2373, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2026) (mem.) (discerning no error in trial court's decision to exclude credit card debt from the marital pot where husband failed to present evidence whether he incurred the debt prior to the marriage, during the marriage, or since the filing for dissolution), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[40] We affirm the trial court's order of joint legal custody. We also affirm the trial court's determination of weekly gross income, finding of no child support arrearage, and its division of the marital estate. However, we remand with instructions consistent with this opinion for clarification of Father's summer parenting time and the question of each party's percentage share of T.K.’s uninsured health care expenses.

[41] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Only T.K. is subject to the custody dispute on appeal.

2.   Father also testified that Mother obtained a no contact order against him around September 2022, but the record does not state how long the order lasted.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Mathias, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.