MALLARD v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

 Case Summary

[1] On July 18, 2025, the Fort Wayne Police Department arrested Cornelius Mallard after he, through co-defendant James Bailey, sold $20.00 worth of cocaine to an undercover police detective. A jury found Mallard guilty of Level 5 felony dealing in cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him to four years of incarceration. Mallard argues that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. We affirm.

 Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 18, 2025, Detective Jacob Sherman of the Fort Wayne Police Department was working undercover and encountered James Bailey sitting in a chair in an alley. Bailey asked Detective Sherman if he wanted crack cocaine, said that he knew where he could get it, and told Detective Sherman that the price was $40.00. Detective Sherman left, met with Detective Jeff Ripley, and obtained $40.00 of prerecorded drug-buy money.

[3] When Detective Sherman returned, Bailey directed him to drive them to Freimann Square. Detective Ripley learned through radio surveillance that the duo was headed to Friemann Square, arrived before them, and lay down on a bench. At the park, Bailey exited Detective Sherman's car and approached Mallard. In plain view, Detective Ripley watched Bailey give Mallard money and Mallard “cup something and hand it to” Bailey. Tr. Vol. II p. 138. Bailey returned to Detective Sherman's car and produced the small baggie of crack cocaine. After receiving the “takedown sign” from Detective Sherman, officers conducted a traffic stop on Detective Sherman's car and arrested Bailey, who had $20.00 of the prerecorded drug-buy money in his possession. Another detective arrested Mallard and recovered the other $20.00 of the prerecorded drug-buy money.

[4] On July 21, 2025, the State charged Mallard with Level 5 felony dealing in cocaine. On July 26, 2025, during a recorded phone call from the jail, Mallard explained to a friend that Bailey had come to buy $40.00 worth of crack cocaine, but that Mallard had only had a “dime.” Supp. Ex. 7 at 02:08–02:19. Mallard then recalled to his friend that he had told Bailey, “Man, here man, I'll give you something else a little later on.” Supp. Ex. 7 at 02:25–02:28.

[5] A jury trial was held on January 21 and 22, 2026, at which the jury heard testimony from the detectives present during the drug buy, watched their bodycam footage, and heard the recorded jail call between Mallard and his friend. The jury found Mallard guilty as charged, and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced him to four years of incarceration.

 Discussion and Decision

[6] Mallard contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for Level 5 felony dealing in cocaine. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. Suggs v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016). “All probative evidence, even where it might be conflicting, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment of conviction.” C.S. v. State, 8 N.E.3d 668, 679 (Ind. 2014). “[A]ppellate courts must affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 n.4 (Ind. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). Reversal is warranted only if the defendant can show that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him guilty on the evidence in the record. McAlpin v. State, 80 N.E.3d 157, 161 (Ind. 2017).

[7] To convict Mallard of Level 5 felony dealing in cocaine, the State was required to establish that he knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1). “ ‘Delivery’ means: (1) an actual or constructive transfer from one (1) person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship; or (2) the organizing or supervising of an activity described in subdivision (1).” Ind. Code § 35-48-1.1-10. Mallard specifically contends that, because Detective Sherman did not search Bailey prior to the alleged drug transaction, the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mallard had provided Bailey with the crack cocaine that he sold to Detective Sherman. We are not persuaded.

[8] The jury heard Mallard himself admit to the transaction in a recorded jail phone call. In this call, Mallard explained how Bailey had come to him to buy $40.00 of crack cocaine but Mallard had had only $10.00 worth. Mallard was also found with $20.00 of the prerecorded buy money in his possession, and “[t]here is no suggestion of how he otherwise acquired it.” Toney v. State, 715 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ind. 1999). Detective Ripley also stated that he had observed Mallard “cup something and hand it to” Bailey, which, from his training and experience, is indicative of a drug transaction. Tr. Vol. II p. 138. Further, because Mallard and Bailey split the $40.00 buy money between them, the jury could also infer that Bailey needed Mallard's assistance to acquire the crack cocaine. The State produced sufficient evidence to sustain Mallard's conviction for Level 5 felony dealing in cocaine.

[9] In support of his argument, Mallard cites Watson v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) and Toney, 715 N.E.2d 367. In Watson, a panel of this court reversed a conviction for dealing in cocaine because the confidential informant (“CI”) had not been searched prior to the buy and had not testified at trial, leaving the jury to speculate as to whether Watson himself had delivered the drugs to the CI. Id. at 1294. The Watson court stated that although Watson had been found with the prerecorded buy money, “no reasonable fact-finder, based on this evidence alone, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt he originally possessed the cocaine found on the CI after the buy.” Id. at 1293. As explained, however, there is much more evidence of Mallard's guilt than his mere possession of the buy money.

[10] In Toney, the CI had not been searched prior to the buy, but the CI had testified at trial, and Toney was arrested with the prerecorded buy money. 715 N.E.3d at 369. The Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the CI's “testimony coupled with Toney's possession of the ‘buy money’ was more than sufficient for the jury to convict Toney.” Id. Likewise, Mallard's incriminating phone call and possession of the buy money were “more than sufficient” to sustain Mallard's conviction. Id. Mallard's contention to the contrary is nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Suggs, 51 N.E.3d at 1193.

[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.